The fourth in a series of articles examining the dwindling US operations in Syria and Iraq aimed against ISIS and the al-Qaida aligned Hurras al-Din remnants, we herein analyze the fascinating bombardments in reaction to an unexpected militant attack on US personnel in the region. The Pentagon reiterated the intention to withdrawal further forces from Iraq on October 1, citing “success” in defeating ISIS, and the established security alliance between Iraq and the US, and the desire for Iraq to grow into a regional force and partner¹. This was framed as the most beneficial option for Iraq, and demonstrated the American commitment to cease perpetual operations in the nation. By October 27, American forces confirmed and “validated” the military capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in maintaining and conducting their own airstrikes, raids, and counterterror operations². Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve personnel observed and approved complex ISF live-fire exercises in order to assure future Iraqi suppression strikes against ISIS. Simultaneously, CJTF-OIR described ISIS operations as “degraded,” and operatives as “dispersed³.” This sentiment persisted in underestimating the extremist dedication and resilience, and even the interoperability among various factions. This proved perilous to the US mission and troops.

Evolving Partners

Ambitions to equip, instruct, and increase knowledge within the ISF is commendable and must be completed as efficiently as possible. Yet as we have assessed and described through this brief series, the continued presence of American forces may be an inevitability, in order to ensure that ISIS or another radical faction does not take root in what has proven to be potentially fertile extremist grounds. There is nothing inherently wrong with the desire to eventually depart, handing over security to local forces, but the departure cannot be arbitrary, rushed, or an abandonment of responsible duty. In neighboring Syria, the situation was reliant on Ahmed al-Sharaa, the erstwhile militant-turned-President, once known as Abu Mohamed al-Jolani. In fact, in November, Sharaa officially entered Syria into the Global Coalition against ISIS, transforming the embattled and broken nation into a proper partner in the conflict⁴. It remains remarkable that a former al-Qaeda lieutenant would be the commander of such a venture, but does display the intriguing evolution of hostilities across more than two decades. On November 10, Sharaa conducted a state visit to the White House and met with President Trump, thus solidifying the security relationship and counterterror partnership between the nations⁵. This also signaled a conspicuous American shift away from dedicated cooperation with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and focus on supporting Sharaa’s fledgling and composite forces. He departed Washington DC with a promise of any and all assistance from President Trump⁶.

As for CJTF-OIR in Syria, the Pentagon and CENTCOM increasingly emphasized and praised the successes against the extremists, in order to silence detractors and critics. From October 1 to November 6, CJTF-OIR oversaw, supported, and joined Syrian government forces in 22 targeted operations, killing five ISIS operatives and apprehended an additional 19 personnel⁷. Another daunting proposition was the repatriation of over 30,000 ISIS associated individuals and their families in the SDF managed al-Hawl and al-Roj encampments of northeast Syria to their native nations. US officials implored other countries to take custody of their respective citizens, due to their susceptibility to ISIS influence⁸. Even more concerning were the dedicated ISIS militants held still in Syria and then need to transfer them to detention in their homelands. This dilemma was indicative of the unstable nature of the relationship between Sharaa, his government, and the SDF.

Murder in Palmyra

Meanwhile, an array of ISIS arsenals existed still, and as such were targeted from November 24 through 27. A total of 15 such locations were destroyed throughout Rif Damashq province via airstrikes and contained explosions. Assault weapons, mines, IEDs, 130 mortars and other projectiles were among the materials known to be obliterated⁹. Intriguingly, some of the sites were also said to have contained illegal substances, providing further evidence for ISIS involvement in drug trades in order to sustain finances¹⁰.

For American authorities, the occasional supported operations were likely necessary, but seemingly only conducted to demonstrate dedication to counterterror operations to the public. Essentially, the Pentagon needed positive stories, operations, and events in Iraq and Syria during the withdrawal, as well as the persistent reporting on the perfunctory strikes. This changed on December 13, with a succinct press release from the Pentagon acknowledging the deaths of three Americans, two military and one civilian, in an ambush in Syria, perpetrated by a single alleged ISIS assailant¹¹.

Rebel forces were overwhelmed by responsibilities and the need for personnel after conquering Syria in unanticipated minimal time. For example, in the Badiyah region, where ISIS vestiges were viable, security forces hastily assembled a nascent 5,000 man unit, which was instantly infiltrated by the jihadists¹². Security force commanders noticed information being divulged to ISIS and suspicions fell onto the Badiyah unit, resulting in an investigation. This in turn revealed the eventual assailant as a suspect in early December. However, security forces did not take custody of the man, but rather chose to surveil him instead, with the desire to uncover his contacts and immediate ISIS affiliates¹³. In order to prevent his interaction with American forces, the suspect was transferred to guarding equipment on a base; a reaction that failed to deter his determination. While American and Syrian forces dined together on December 13 in the facility near Palmyra, the infiltrator forced his way into the gathering and opened fire, killing the three Americans, wounding three more, and injuring three Syrians as well¹⁴. He was felled by Syrian guards before he could inflict even more harm¹⁵.

The two US military fatalities were members of the Iowa National Guard, assigned to the 113th Cavalry Regiment, participating in and supporting counterterror operations in Syria. They were identified as Sgt. William Nathaniel Howard, age 29, and Sgt. Edgar Brian Torres Tovar, age 25¹⁶. The deceased civilian was Ayad Mansoor Sakat, age 54, also known as Eddie, who labored as an interpreter for US forces in Syria, and had previously done so in Iraq from 2003-2007¹⁷. The three wounded Iowa Guardsman were transported for medical care and recovery.

Hawkeye Strike

Quietly, American forces immediately engaged in ten targeted assaults in both Syria and Iraq, yielding 23 ISIS operatives slain or captured¹⁸. However, a larger response was due. In an apparent nod to Iowa, the Pentagon labeled its series of lethal responses as Operation Hawkeye Strike¹⁹. Initially, the first announcement described the response as merely “massive,” with a noticeable dearth in details, as the events were happening concurrently²⁰. A subsequent documentation of Hawkeye Strike noted that at 1600 on December 19, a barrage of strikes was commenced by American and Jordanian forces across 70 Syrian targets, utilizing fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, as well as artillery from ground forces launching over 100 projectiles²¹. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights clarified that a five-man ISIS unit was neutralized during the response, including their overseer²². Eleven smaller raids followed from December 20 through 29, killing seven ISIS personnel and apprehending another 18, while dismantling four weapons depots²³. Noticeably, the CENTCOM press releases during this phase referenced past successes over the course of the previous year, as if to remind the American public that there were in fact, counterterror operations occurring.

A second sizeable round of Hawkeye Strike commenced at 1230 on January 10, 2026, ushering in the new year with a barrage of strikes against vaguely described targets across Syria²⁴. Additionally, the language in the USCENTCOM release describing the action, intending to be bold and resilient, merely evoked desperation in light of the impending withdrawals and perpetual cycles of violence. As stated in the release:

“Our message remains strong: if you harm our warfighters, we will find you and kill you anywhere in the world, no matter how hard you try to evade justice²⁵.”

The concern and sentiment remained valid, as a response had to be leveled against ISIS for the brazen murders of an American civilian and service members. Yet one must question how such a large militant infrastructure, which was targeted by Hawkeye Strike, was in existence by this point in the conflict. Americans were led to believe that the fight was essentially winding down, and that Syrian and Iraqi forces would maintain operations against limited ISIS agents and capabilities. The sheer volume of December and January strikes indicated that the persistence of the terrorists was intact, and their infrastructure remained potentially robust. A subsequent release declared over 100 valid targets were impacted by over 200 precision munitions over the course of the two waves and surrounding events²⁶.

An Ambiguous Suspect

Further complicating matters was an airstrike conducted on January 16 in northwest Syria. An al-Qaida official, declared to have “direct ties” with the perpetrator of the December 13 murders, was himself targeted and eliminated. Bilal Hassan al-Jasim was said to have experience in terrorist and militant matters as a veteran of the relentless conflict²⁷. The release detailing his death twice emphasized his linkage to the ISIS assailant.

The language of the USCENTCOM release also seemed to implicate the involvement in Jasim in either plotting or initiating the assault. From USCENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper: “The death of a terrorist operative linked the death of three Americans demonstrates our resolve in pursuing terrorists who attack our forces. There is no safe place for those who conduct, plot, or inspire attacks on American citizens and our warfighters. We will find you²⁸.”

It is reasonable to assume that various jihadists would have working relationships spanning the vast timeline of the Syrian civil war. However, we must question the connection between an al-Qaida official and a supposed ISIS gunman. Was this a relationship of convenience, centered on a common nemesis in the form of the American presence? Was the presence of the new Syrian government under Ahmed al-Sharaa forcing interoperability between factions of al-Qaida and ISIS, who before were definite enemies? Regardless, without any explanation the sudden attribution to al-Qaida of at least inspiring the crime, was surprising and confusing. Terrorism analysts agreed, and noted that even by the time of Jasim’s assassination in mid-January, ISIS had yet to actually claim the shootings from December²⁹.

Bilal Hassan al-Jasim as an al-Qaida official, would have been active within the al-Qaida affiliate Hurras al-Din, an entity that when functional, existed entirely as a negative response to Sharaa, his leadership, and his split from al-Qaida ideology. Essentially, Jasim belonged to the philosophical lineage that regarded Sharaa’s abandonment of al-Qaida, dedicated focus and emphasis only upon Syria, absorption of broad Syrian rebel organizations into his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and subsequent alignment with Western governments and forces, as a sincere betrayal of jihadist principles. He was effectively de-radicalizing his own rebellion and shielding his eventual government from accusations of extremism. As we have previously discussed in the series, the al-Qaida loyalists of Hurras al-Din were therefore hindrances to this progress. The US already began to systematically target these individuals, and remove obstacles for Sharaa in consolidating power. Yet Hurras al-Din and al-Qaida established a large Syrian presence and was pervasive in its influence. It is possible that the Palmyra attack was orchestrated by former Hurras al-Din elements such as Jasim, instead of ISIS, revealing a problematic reality in that Sharaa’s current enemies were responding in kind to American and Syrian attacks with simple but effective plots of their own.

The likeliest explanation is that the attacker was involved with multiple networks and individuals to include Hurras al-Din and Jasim, and may have carried out an attack for ISIS but not necessarily sanctioned by the organization’s Syrian command. Yet it remains intriguing that American press releases were committed to ISIS responsibility while simultaneously attributing some blame to a Hurras al-Din official. Further the military response was tailored to eliminate any infrastructure associated with the culprits, begging the question of whether only ISIS targets were destroyed or whether infrastructure associated with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s foes was finally and decisively targeted. Perhaps the politically convenient response was to focus blame on the familiar enemy of ISIS and not complicate the matter by truthfully acknowledging that Sharaa’s former comrades (now nemeses) may have been responsible for destabilizing the US military withdraw and public narrative.

Prisoners

Meanwhile, Sharaa was embroiled in disappointing hostilities with the Kurdish SDF from December into January. Syrian government forces engaged the SDF briefly and pushed eastward, taking and occupying Deir al-Zour and Raqqa provinces along with their critical infrastructure from the Kurds³⁰. Subsequently, the SDF commander Mazloum Abdi capitulated to prevent further conflict, agreeing to a cessation of combat with Sharaa. Among the terms of the ceasefire were the disassembling of SDF and their absorption into the Syrian governmental forces³¹. Officers and senior civilians were to be allowed to obtain ranking positions in the government and military³². US authorities were approved of the ceasefire and the ending of the independent SDF. Further, the SDF withdrew from al-Hawl prison camp, initiating a hastily conducted handover to Syrian government forces (and accusations of abandonment) of the 24,000 prisoners (of 42 nationalities). However, the Syrian government confirmed by January 21 that it was capable and ready to ensure the camp’s security³³. American authorities began their own prisoner transfer commencing the movement of 7,000 ISIS captives at a camp in al-Hasakah, Syria, by delivering 150 inmates to an Iraqi facility under a security agreement with that nation³⁴. This particular mission endured for 23 days until February 12, during which CJTF-OIR transferred 5,700 adult male ISIS prisoners from Syrian camps to Iraqi prisons via delicate and coordinated flights³⁵. The sudden rush to move these inmates and the less than efficient handover of al-Hawl between the dissolving SDF and the Syrian government indicated a poor planning process regarding the burden of the ISIS prisoners. As seen above, in the American rush to convey strength and withdraw, there were numerous complicating factors, mostly along political lines that were destined to challenge intentions and objectives.

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