SERIES: Predators Of Khorasan – A Perilous Inheritance

Written by Nolan R Beasley

The newly elected Obama Administration faced an immediate choice in continuing or ceasing the drone strikes. A mere day after signing the executive orders that ended the Bush administration’s policy on enhanced interrogation, and closed the CIA detention sites, the new president was being briefed on his first drone strike. Departing CIA Director Michael V Hayden provided the details to President Obama, but the assault was a disaster and in the aftermath the Administration desired more control and checks over the strikes1. President Obama allowed for the continuation of signature strikes against large gatherings of suspected combatants, and permitted the CIA Director to maintain authority in conducting the attacks, but remained both hesitant of the weapon and intent on utilizing it to dismantle al-Qaida2. It seemed that a drastic expansion of the drone operations was unlikely, and the militants could capitalize by restructuring and recovering. Al-Qaida was still capable of adjusting, and was forced to absorb their losses and promote from within their ranks. Certain committees had defined succession plans, while others required screening and appointments. In 2009 the incoming administration still faced a structured adversary.

Status of Enemy Forces

Internal management of al-Qaida was consistently the purview of Sheikh Said al-Masri, with Atiyah Abdulrahman (often under the alias Sheikh Mahmud al-Libi) providing valuable reinforcement. Ayman al-Zawahiri maintained a presence, but was shielded due to heightened security. Abu Yahya al-Libi was their primary ideologue, and often the face of the organization. Behind this curtain, others labored on legal and religious matters, to include Abu Mansur al-Shami and the rising Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti. For media and public issuances, as-Sahab was overseen by Abu Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi (Mohamed Abbatay), the son-in-law of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Fellow Egyptian Abu Muhsin al-Masri (Hussam Abdulrauf) edited the Arabic Vanguards of Khorasan publication. American Adam Gadahn (Azzam al-Amriki) was often the preferred representative utilized to speak to Western audiences. Other figures were not precluded from appearing in propaganda releases. Sheikh Said himself appeared in a February 2009 video, confirming for authorities that he was not slain in Bajaur the previous August. He used his time to again call for the dismantling of the Pakistani government, and to warn India against assaulting Pakistan, lest it face the wrath of the mujahidin3. Previously, Zawahiri issued an audio message in November 2008, in response to Barack Obama’s election victory, wherein he disparaged the president-elect for his foreign policy, support of Israel, and commitment to the war in Afghanistan, while mocking him for his intention to withdraw from Iraq4. He invoked racial imagery and history by referencing differences between Obama and Malcolm X, naming the new President as a “house slave.” Further, Zawahiri declared that Obama was inheriting a criminal lineage, and promised more American deaths in Afghanistan, predicting that the “dogs of Afghanistan” would feast upon their flesh5. Zawahiri’s welcome to Obama appeared to indicate that al-Qaida expected weakness from the incoming administration. This was a remarkable miscalculation.

Equivalent in importance to the Media and Shariah Committees were those operatives charged with security and counterintelligence. However, perhaps due to the underestimation of the new administration, al-Qaida initially neglected this capacity. Abu Wafa al-Madani (al-Saudi) succeeded Abu Jihad al-Masri as the commander of the Security Committee, and was hailed by Sheikh Said al-Masri as competent for the position due to his five years of Saudi military service, and extensive labor in group settings6. From Abu Wafa’s perspective, though, he was much less enthused, complaining within internal communication that upon assuming this duty, he received nothing of value in terms of resources for the security mission7. Abu Wafa observed a culture within the organization’s upper echelon indifferent to necessary security precautions and careful operation8. Following the assassination of Abu Jihad, the now burdened Abu Wafa was the recipient of a minimal and insufficient budget, totaling only 40,000 rupees (just over $900 in 2008). No vehicles or major equipment were transferred to the Committee, but only five personnel and negligible electronics9. The organization, despite surviving for so long, was in no way poised to stem the impending barrage from the drone campaign. Rising from overseeing the communications and courier apparatus of the organization to security, by 2009 Abu Wafa also provided logistics and administrative efforts across North and South Waziristan, thus earning a chair on the al-Qaida Majlis ash-Shura10. His hold on security, therefore, could almost be viewed as a collateral duty, as the courier network was itself a burdensome task. It is remarkable that al-Qaida seemingly disregarded the threat, even with the warnings of Abu Wafa. An internal accounting proved that Abu Wafa continued to receive funding11, but the network’s expenses were vast.

Al-Qaida was financially burdened by the perpetual cost of their “martyrs,” and by basic personnel funding. The internal ledger revealed that families of fallen jihadists continually received care and payments. For example, Sheikh Ihsanullah al-Masri, of the Majlis ash-Shura, received funds for the travel expenses of deceased paramilitary operative Abu Hassan al-Masri’s family12. It was bin Laden son-in-law Abu Abdullah al-Halabi (Mohamed Abdullah Hassan Abu al-Khayr) who was eventually appointed in 2009 to manage the organization’s finances13, given that Sheikh Said was preoccupied with the entire command apparatus. Pakistani Hassan Ghul also labored with couriers and finances, facilitating travel and conferences across the organization, and even funding transfers from the Middle East to Pakistan at this time14.

Command of their paramilitary infrastructure was now ensconced with Abdullah Said al-Libi, the fourth individual to hold this position after Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, Abu Laith al-Libi, and Khalid Habib. In fact, Abdullah Said had been slated to do so even before Khalid Habib was slain15. Abdullah Said retained several of his and Abu Laith’s subordinates as senior officers in this network, now colloquially known as the Lashkar al-Zil. This entity comprised several battalions drawn not just from Arab and foreign elements, but local forces including Brigade 313, the combatant unit of Pakistani militant Ilyas Kashmiri 16. As for the vestiges of Abu Laith’s command, Abu Luqman al-Makki presided over the Abu Bakr al-Siddiq battalion. Another was a Libyan, Abdulhamid Mohamed Abdulhamid al-Masli, known as Hamza al-Darnawi17. By 2009, Masli was responsible for IED component manufacturing at the primary al-Qaida electronics shop in Pakistan, while also informing his apprentices on the construction of detonators18. The Egyptian contingent maintained some sway over paramilitary affairs, with Sheikh Ihsanullah al-Masri complimenting Abdullah Said as one of his primary recognized lieutenants19. As a relative unknown, Qari Sufyan al-Maghrebi held an upward and impressive trajectory through the ranks during this time20. Sheikh Said al-Masri’s 19 year old son Abdulrahman, known better as Yaqub, joined them and was reportedly given command of some operations along the border despite his age21. This is assessed to be due to his father’s status, and to his access to extensive advanced training based on his pedigree. Along with Shariah education, Yaqub previously labored with deceased militants’ families22. In the aftermath of the assassination of Khalid Habib, the elder son of Sheikh Said, Abdullah (known as Mohamed Khan) was transferred to the care of Shura member Abu Khalil al-Madani, focusing on command of special operations (consisting of suicide operations)23. While it may seem odd that the young Egyptian was placed in such a command, it is assessed again that his name ensured his position, but that proper oversight was provided by Abu Khalil.

With Abu Hassan al-Rimi assassinated in 2008, the Omar al-Faruq battalion eventually came to be overseen by the Qatari national Naif Salam Mohamed Ujaim al-Hababi, known as Faruq al-Qahtani24. American authorities acknowledged his activities in Afghanistan as of 200925. Detained by Qatari intelligence during 2005 and held sans charges, he was liberated on June 22, 2006 after outcry from human rights organization Alkarama26. An additional militant officer, responsible for operations in Kunar province, was Saleh Naif Eid al-Makhlafi, a Saudi known as Abu Hafs al-Najdi27. Under the moniker Abdulghani, the Americans had been pursuing Abu Hafs since at least 200728. He joined Abu Ikhlas al-Masri as two of the known Arab insurgents in the restive province. Paramilitary training centers were abundant, but it is unknown who oversaw the program at this time. Abu Abdulkarim al-Najdi (in theatre since 2006) managed one location, while revamping the overall curriculum with advanced courses29. Meanwhile, Atiyah and Sheikh Said appointed the Saudi Abu Othman al-Shehri to assume command of operations in Pakistan after the assassination of Osama al-Kini30 – [A]. He would do so initially with a compromised network of Pakistani subordinates.

The local affiliates of the Kenyan’s network were also targeted. In January, the Pakistanis arrested nine compatriots of Osama al-Kini in the Dhok Lakhan area of the garrison city Rawalpindi. Hailed as the largest raid resulting in arrests in Rawalpindi during the war, the incarcerated included Qari Mohamed Ilyas, the former Guantanamo detainee31. The nine – [B] were suspected of involvement in all of the al-Kini Group bombings as previously discussed, and transferred to the Adiala prison32. However, due to technicalities and supposed issues with evidence, the primary three of the group were acquitted in September 201033. Qari Mohamed Ilyas was yet again released. In 2009 though, the primary Pakistani remnant of the al-Kini network still operating was Qari Yasin.

While Pakistani operations were pertinent, al-Qaida labored for and desired successful assaults abroad. External operations command was still maintained by Abu Saleh al-Somali. While his recognized deputy was Adnan al-Shukrijumah, it was Abu Yunis al-Mauritani who encroached from his position on the Shariah Committee to interject himself into the plots and planning of these potential missions34.

The Outliers and Independents

As previously discussed, not all foreign and Arab militants operated under an al-Qaida umbrella, yet they all maintained a common cause. For the incoming Obama Administration these men were legitimate wartime targets, as they continued to wage jihad in Afghanistan against American forces, regardless of the overall command structure. Also, for those operating outside of the FATA, they provided a logistical problem for the Americans. The drone strikes thus far were rarely utilized outside of the tribal agencies. Often there had to be a reliance on a potentially unreliable Pakistani security apparatus. As such, at least 70 American special forces members were engaged in training and preparing an effective component of the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps in counterterrorism35. These men would be trustworthy and efficient in their battle against and potential capture of militants, leading to the disruption of terrorist operations within Pakistan. One such operation was carried out on January 22, 2009, the first authorized counterterrorism operation of the incoming Obama Administration. The Pakistani Frontier Corps commando contingent though, was birthed the year before in the summer of 2008. On that January day, they were unleashed, after a local tip explaining that a dwelling in the village of Bara Qadeem in the suburbs of Peshawar along the border between the city and Khyber Agency contained individuals driving out of place vehicles36. The automobiles were too ostentatious for the region and drew suspicion37. The commandos descended on the dual room domicile, which belonged to an Afghan refugee, while American agents watched from a nearby vehicle, with drones and helicopters in the sky38. Surprise was to the advantage of the Pakistanis and they took Abu Dhabbah al-Taifi and six of his men, mostly Afghans, into custody sans a battle39. The militants were believed to be involved in ambuscades against NATO logistics convoys traveling through Khyber into Afghanistan40. Abu Dhabbah was said to have recently been operating in Bajaur41. Although taken to Islamabad for questioning, it is unknown exactly what intelligence he provided. Initially, the Pakistani authorities claimed that Abu Dhabbah played a direct role in the London 7/7 bombings of three and a half years prior42. This was met with incredulity on the part of British officials and silence from the Americans43. It is possible that Abu Dhabbah had contact with the bombers, or more likely Rashid Rauf and Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, but the analysis of the bombings in an earlier chapter proved no such obvious link to the Saudi. Abu Dhabbah, a Bedouin from the Najd whose name appears to have been Mahmud, was a frequent target of criticism from al-Qaida leadership due to his disregard of their command44. However, al-Qaida expressed regret at the capture of Abu Dhabbah. Within an internal discussion between Atiyah and AQAP commander Nasir al-Wuhaishi, Atiyah wished for Abu Dhabbah’s safe recovery while simultaneously complaining about his insubordination45. Atiyah also referenced that Abu Dhabbah was subsequently extradited to Saudi Arabian custody46.

Shortly thereafter on February 24, a similar group of commandos, this time titled the Special Services Group, raided a suspected al-Qaida locale in Quetta, the base of the Afghan Taliban, and apprehended Abu Sufyan al-Yemeni47. He was described as a primary logistician and facilitator of the Lashkar al-Zil. While Pakistani authorities hailed the capture as a major victory, their American counterparts tempered their excitement and the inflated assessment of the insurgent’s importance, while still acknowledging the value and significance of the arrest48. In this capacity Abu Sufyan was reportedly responsible for communications between senior al-Qaida officials in various franchises across the world, to include AQAP, al-Shabaab, etc. In addition, he facilitated the travel of jihadists from other regions to the Khorasan49. This movement of personnel may explain his basing in a major city nexus as opposed to the tribal agencies. Yet it must also be noted that his aide Abu Issa al-Yemeni had declared that he was no longer with al-Qaida, but specifically the Taliban, giving some reason why Abu Sufyan would be located in the city50. Conversely, Atiyah directly stated that Abu Sufyan and his companion were captured in Quetta because they were traveling to Iran, apparently to exit the theatre51.

These al-Qaida internal communications corroborate the assessment of the Yemeni as a facilitator, even as they deconstruct the character of Abu Sufyan. In a communique from Atiyah to Abu Basir al-Yemeni (Nasir al-Wuhaishi), the commander of AQAP, the author mentioned that Abu Sufyan had acted as an intermediary between the franchise and the primary organization, and had provided senior leadership with a video from AQAP52. Abu Sufyan previously confirmed this role to American militant Bryant Neal Vinas53. Furthermore, Abu Sufyan was revealed in the letter to have been captured along with his Yemeni aide named Issa bin Miriam54. This individual is assessed to be Abu Issa al-Yemeni55. The communication, however, provides an assessment of Abu Sufyan as similar to Abu Dhabbah, in that he acted often on his own, outside of orders, and in the furtherance of divisions among the jihadists56. While there is no doubt that he played a significant paramilitary role for al-Qaida, his overall influence was inhibited by the knowledge that he was often at odds with his superiors. As for his close personal relationships, he was reported to be associated with Abu Dhahak al-Yemeni and Mustafa Hamid, the previously mentioned al-Qaida operatives in Iran57.

It also must be noted that information gleaned from the detained fighter Bryant Neal Vinas was instrumental in assisting in the location and capture of both Abu Dhabbah al-Taifi and Abu Sufyan al-Yemeni58. As was discussed, Vinas during his time awaiting his session at the training camp had become well acquainted with Abu Sufyan and his companion Abu Issa at a guesthouse in the FATA59. Abu Sufyan took to Vinas and shared with him details of his time fighting in Iraq, screened a jihadist video from Iraq in which he featured, and proudly displayed items taken from that particular theatre of war60. Their close relationship, or even friendship, became detrimental to the Yemenis.

These two demonstrated a necessary quandary for the terrorist outfit.  Al-Qaida simply could not afford to completely disregard officers like Abu Dhabbah and Abu Sufyan.  Yes, they were both insubordinate at times, but as is exemplified in the case of Abu Sufyan, they could also be vital to the basic functions of the organization.  Divisions were potentially growing in the network, and the fissures were magnified by the power vacuums established by senior officials falling to drone strikes.  The Obama Administration intended on pushing forward with the program to deepen the discontent. 

Which brings up an important question.  If the Obama Administration was keen to both close Guantanamo and increase extrajudicial executions via drone strikes, why then take the time and risk for ground operations to apprehend Abu Dhabbah and Abu Sufyan?  The obvious answer is that both were located in areas where drone strikes were either infeasible or unacceptable. A second likelihood is that since both were dissenters from al-Qaida, then their intelligence value could have been increased, if they were willing to speak against officials in the FATA with whom they had disagreements. Thirdly, there must have been deals in place to render the men to Saudi Arabia in order to avoid having to immediately place them into American custody. This is apparent with Abu Dhabbah having been transferred to the Saudis. Abu Sufyan and Abu Issa were also confirmed to have faced Saudi charges and eventually served five years of a prison sentence therein61. A surprising and controversial final option for the duo was revealed when Abu Sufyan and Abu Issa were released from Saudi custody and extradited to the US so that in January 2015 they could face charges in civilian court for their paramilitary activities62. Abu Sufyan was named as Saddiq al-Abbadi and Abu Issa was the alias of Ali Alvi al-Hamidi, both of Yemen63. Both pleaded guilty to membership in al-Qaida, providing material support to terrorists, and conspiracy to kill US nationals64.

Evolving Drone Operations

As mentioned, President Obama authorized strikes beginning on January 23, 2009. One each occurred in South and North Waziristan, and were aimed at supposed ranking al-Qaida and Taliban militants, yet failed to neutralize any such targets, instead inadvertently targeting civilians. In Zerakai, North Waziristan, several men convened in a compound, a gathering precipitated by the return of a laborer having spent time in the UAE. Unfortunately, the congregation was misidentified as a militant conference, and on the Friday evening, subjected to a missile impact65. Faheem Qurashi, a 14 yr old survived but was maimed, losing his left eye, peppered by shrapnel, and suffering burns. Two of his uncles and a cousin were among nine civilians the Pakistanis acknowledged from the 15 fatalities66. In Gangi Khel, South Waziristan, the Pakistanis revealed five were slain in the concurrent strike, with later reporting clarifying that a pro-government elder and four of his family members were the mistakenly assailed victims67. Obama was perturbed by the outcome, potential ramifications to his policies, and the notion of signature strikes. Nonetheless, the strikes were to continue, crafted and expanded by his administration. President Obama and his officials were cognizant that the drone campaign alone could not strategically defeat al-Qaida or prevent the influence of its ideologies. Yet they accepted that the tactic was immediately efficient as the best-assured method in disruption of al-Qaida68. While Pakistani intelligence diverted attention away from civilian casualties and falsely claimed insurgents were eliminated, the American press declared that Obama’s intent with the drone campaign, and his hardline stance with the Pakistani government, was now clear and obvious69. Going forward, his Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, became intensely invested in the campaign, and new CIA Director Leon Panetta eventually requested and received all logistics, finances, and permissions that the agency coveted70. Also important was the Obama Administration’s willingness to inflict damage upon the allied movements of al-Qaida, who themselves were not just providing shelter to the organization, but actively participating in cross-border raids into Afghanistan and destabilizing the Pakistani government in the region. Targets and locations began to vary.

For example, the following drone strike occurred on February 14, against an expansive fortified structure and adjacent encampment in South Waziristan, utilized by Uzbek militants for training purposes. Upwards of 60 Uzbeks of Tahir Yuldashev’s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan occupied the camp71. When the missile barrage impacted, 25 militants were reported slain72. The Pakistanis acknowledged 20 foreigners and five locals killed in the compound in Nasri Khel, in the vicinity of Makin73. Furthering the linkages between the TTP and IMU, the structure was described as associated with and occasionally visited by Baitullah Mahsud and his men74. This provides evidence that Baitullah continued to harbor the Uzbek militants in his portion of South Waziristan. As each was a bane to the Pakistani government, and Baitullah condoned and facilitated assaults in Afghanistan, it is notable that the new administration endorsed the targeting of these entities as well. In a nearby residence, shrapnel from the massive blasts killed two children, including one aged only eight years75. The incident was immortalized by a local photographer whose picture of the child was featured in a later exhibit profiling civilian collateral casualties of the campaign76.

The following strike, on February 16, represented the first operation against a target in Kurram agency of the FATA. A compound within an abandoned refugee encampment in Sarpul, utilized by an Afghan Taliban commander, was destroyed by a four-missile barrage77. Despite an initial fatality count of at least 30, the Pakistanis determined that 18 locals were slain78. The expansion of strikes to this agency revealed the strength and influence of Taliban and TTP forces within the FATA, and sought to take the militants unawares, as they were used to abundant strikes in North and South Waziristan, and few elsewhere.

An American Dilemma

Retaliation and sustained operations across the border were integral for al-Qaida. As two trucks approached the outer perimeter and gate of FOB Chapman in Khost province on January 19, the Afghan and American security presence took notice. Inside the first vehicle, a pickup truck, a suicide bomber initiated his controls and detonated79. At least one American soldier and several Afghans suffered wounds. There was still another vehicle, this one encumbered with 7500 pounds of explosives80. Unfortunately for the second intended bomber, the first explosion created a massive crater in which the second vehicle was soon stranded. Unsure of what to do next, the intended bomber attempted to escape from his vehicle and the crater, but was shot down81. Not only was a catastrophe averted, but the unexploded truck provided for a forensic treasure. From the packing tape used to adhere together the various explosives and components in the device, 18 sets of fingerprints were retrieved. Disturbingly, they belonged to the American citizen Muhannad Mahmud al-Farekh82. This discovery verified that Farekh remained in the war theatre, and was gradually assuming more responsibilities, technical acumen, and potential leadership capacity. His very existence would be a dilemma to the new Administration, and the debate over his fate was intense, exhausting, and full of consternation for all sides83.

An Iranian Dilemma

Zawahiri explained to bin Laden that the matter was addressed initially with patience, as per the latter’s request84. However, the February 2008 conference in which Zawahiri met with Sheikh Said, Atiyah, and Khalid Habib to discuss Iraqi issues, also veered into a decision on how to approach the Iranians. The combined al-Qaida commanders settled on an aggressive position, one that would insinuate potential adversarial relations and conflict between the two entities85. Atiyah later described this as a multi-front effort, involving direct threats, political pressure, and the issuance of statements against and/or condemning the Iranians86. A response was delivered via an envoy from Iran. However, this precipitated another meeting between Zawahiri and his lieutenants, this time in August, where they conferred and chose to take drastic measures for the sake of Abu Mohamed al-Masri (whom they referred to as al-Zayyat) and the other captives87.

Zawahiri declared that the meeting and subsequent actions bore “fruit,” and that al-Qaida was preparing to “pick” even more substantial “fruit88.” This is undoubtedly a reference to al-Qaida shifting tactics towards abducting Iranian officials, with the ambition of trading hostages for the incarcerated jihadists and their families.

On November 14, 2008, an Iranian diplomat, the commercial counselor in Peshawar, was abducted from his vehicle as he was being transported to his nation’s consulate in the city. Two men intercepted the car on a bridge, preventing its escape, and spraying gunfire89. Heshmatollah Attarzadeh Nyaki was spirited away by the seizing militants, while his driver was murdered90. Atiyah admitted to al-Qaida culpability in a missive to bin Laden, taking credit for the abduction of the commercial agent from the consulate in Peshawar, leaving no doubt as to whom he referenced91.

The militants produced a video message to the Iranians, but held off on sending until they could obtain a more important hostage. Nonetheless, the Iranians dispatched a message with the desire to deploy another envoy in light of the incident in order to negotiate terms of a potential swap92. Zawahiri called another meeting, this time with just Sheikh Said and Atiyah due to Khalid Habib’s assassination, and specifically focused on the Iranian ordeal93. They made preparations for a more significant Iranian official to be targeted and abducted, assuming that a higher-ranking captive would yield more favorable exchanges. They also had to dissuade bin Laden from his preferred “mediator,” stating that the individual may place the proceedings to free captive al-Qaida officials at risk. In fact, the mediator, who was supposed to meet with Sheikh Said in December 2008, refused to come due to fear, instead offering to deploy his own son94. The better option was to patiently await the representative from Tehran.

However, with the Iranian envoy delayed, Zawahiri suggested that Sheikh Issa al-Masri be deployed to Iran to hold direct talks95. Sheikh Issa was conspicuously missing from matters in 2008, having been wounded by a drone strike in Bannu during December 200796, but apparently his injuries were not debilitating. According to Zawahiri, Sheikh Issa attempted to relocate elsewhere in 2008 and was en route to Turkiye when he was apprehended by the Iranians97. He chose not to obfuscate his identity or travel intentions. Despite this, his captors did not incarcerate him, but rather held and questioned him for some time, ascertaining that the primary point of contention with al-Qaida centered on the imprisoned jihadists98. Afterwards he was released, with the Iranians returning him to Pakistan, as opposed to allowing his continued journey. In fact, later reports indicated that Sheikh Issa was apprehended next by Pakistani authorities in January 2009, which was likely connected to the incident in Iran. However, Sheikh Issa did not remain detained, and despite the method of his liberation being unknown, the Egyptian was allowed to rejoin his militant comrades in hiding99. Due to this now established relationship with the Iranians, and their tolerance of him, Zawahiri deemed Sheikh Issa an appropriate envoy100.

After absconding from Pakistani detainment, Sheikh Issa journeyed, successfully this time, to Syria via Iran101. Once in Damascus, Sheikh Issa was said to be involved with the establishment of al-Qaida in Iraq capabilities and infrastructure within Syria as well as assisting in coordination of operations in Iraq. The truth of this is unknown, and it is probable that Sheikh Issa was involved purely in a theological and ideological capacity with this franchise of al-Qaida and their expansion into neighboring Syria. Regardless, he was out of Pakistan and apparently recovered from his stroke and wounds endured and obtained in 2007. Once established in Damascus, he was said to be coordinating with an AQI primary lieutenant named Abu Khalaf (Saad Owaid Obaid Mujil al-Shammari), responsible for smuggling fighters, funds, and suicide bombers into Iraq from Syria102. Press reports also claimed that Syrian security services offered Sheikh Issa protection103. While Abu Khalaf was later killed in an American military raid in Mosul on January 28, 2010, Sheikh Issa remained free to proselytize and potentially coordinate operations104.

Since the surreptitious journey of Sheikh Issa was revealed through intelligence and media means, it stood to reason that other movements within Iran and relationships with Iranian officials would be observed by authorities. On January 16, for example, the US Department of the Treasury designated four individuals as terrorists due to their purported interactions with Iran. The list was headed by Abu Walid al-Masri (Mustafa Hamid), the father-in-law of Saif al-Adel, and known central liaison between al-Qaida and the Iranians105. Next was Abu Dujanah al-Basha (Mohamed Mahmud Rabi al-Zaid al-Bahtiti), the son-in-law of Zawahiri, known to have transferred and housed al-Qaida family members within Iran. Third was Abu Dhahak al-Yemeni (Ali Saleh Hussain), the militant primarily focused on Chechnya, but who after 2001 facilitated al-Qaida and jihadist movements via Zahedan, Iran. All three were apprehended in Iran’s 2003 sweeps for al-Qaida106, and all were detained at a center in Tehran107. After four years of captivity, Basha was transferred to a new fortified home in Tehran with less restrictive conditions, indicating a positive and established connection with his captors108. Abu Dhahak was also removed from his comrades after four years, supposedly for cursing the Ayatollah109. This may have been a ruse due to increased cooperation, as US authorities were obviously declaring an existing relationship. Most intriguing though was the inclusion of Saad bin Laden on the list, and the continued assertion that he assisted in overseeing operations from Iran110. The reality we know, and have previously discussed, was that Saad was autistic, struggled with unfamiliarity, and was placed in charge of the fleeing bin Laden family in 2001 solely due to his name, and not with any accompanying operational prowess111. His willingness to escape from detention in approximately May 2008 was a surprise to his family. Yet by August he was established in the FATA, enlisted as a militant112. The Treasury designation correctly noted that by September 2008, Saad was no longer detained in Iran113. American press at the time, though, postulated instead that Saad was an intermediary between al-Qaida leadership such as Zawahiri, and the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps114. His sudden appearance in Pakistan, revealed by careless online jihadist activity, indicated to authorities that there must have been cooperation between al-Qaida and Iran, as these officials did not consider that Saad had simply escaped115.

Insurgent Advantages

Al-Qaida could now labor to liberate their detained comrades in Iran via their hostage, opening the possibility of an influx of militants to reinforce the organization’s infrastructure. For the targeted network, this was one of their finest accomplishments. Al-Qaida received another unexpected asset and infamous operative in the Jordanian doctor Humam Khalil al-Balawi. As Abu Dujanah al-Khorasani, Balawi was a formidable online presence and jihadist propagandist, resulting in his detainment by Jordanian authorities in January 2009116. He was subsequently deployed to Pakistan in March as an intended double agent, but was readily welcomed by al-Qaida as an asset of their own117. Parallel to the Obama Administration’s expanding campaign against the allied movements, al-Qaida’s most significant achievement during this time was the formation of a Shura council designed to unite the various local Pashtun militants: Shura Ittehad al-Mujahidin. All of these factors made the American advantage in the conflict precarious, and helped to explain how such a perilous inheritance for the new administration precipitated a brutal expansion of the drone campaign.

SUBSTANTIVE NOTES and CITATIONS:

  • [A] Abu Othman al-Shehri was the wanted Saudi, Saad Mohamed Mubarak al-Jubeiri al-Shehri, and previously used the alias Abdulrahman al-Najdi118.
  • [B] The nine of the al-Kini Group were named as: Mohamed Ilyas alias Qari Jamil; Mohamed Rizwan alias Shams al-Haq; Dr Abdul Razzaq; Zeeshan Jalil alias Khizar; Faisal Ahmed Khan; Mohamed Naim Shakir alias Zubair; Mohamed Sarfaraz alias Mohamed Khan; Mohamed Nadeem alias Babu Salahuddin; and Osama bin Waheed alias Hidayatullah119.
  1. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Daniel Klaidman, Mariner Books, 2013 ↩︎
  2. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Daniel Klaidman, Mariner Books, 2013 ↩︎
  3. Al-Qaeda video belies death claim, by Syed Shoaib Hasan, BBC News, February 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7879511.stm ↩︎
  4. Al Qaeda leader mocks Obama in Web posting, CNN, November 19, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/19/obama.alqaeda/ ↩︎
  5. Al Qaeda leader mocks Obama in Web posting, CNN, November 19, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/19/obama.alqaeda/ ↩︎
  6. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated February 17, 2010 ↩︎
  7. Al-Qaida Security Committee Report, dated May 17, 2010 ↩︎
  8. Al-Qaida Security Committee Report, dated May 17, 2010 ↩︎
  9. Al-Qaida Security Committee Report, dated May 17, 2010 ↩︎
  10. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders In Syria, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, May 14, 2014, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl2396 ↩︎
  11. Al-Qaida Accounting Ledger, unknown date ↩︎
  12. Al-Qaida Accounting Ledger, unknown date ↩︎
  13. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, dated August 24, 2009 ↩︎
  14. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289?utm_source=chatgpt.com ↩︎
  15. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, ‘From Haji Othman to Azmarai,’ dated April 16, 2008 ↩︎
  16. Lashkar-e-Zil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force, by Farhan Zahid, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 23, December 5, 2014, https://jamestown.org/lashkar-e-zil-al-qaedas-shock-and-awe-force/ ↩︎
  17. Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds One Individual to Its Sanctions List, Abdulhamid Mohamed Abdulhamid al-Masli, November 26, 2013, https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc11193.doc.htm ↩︎
  18. Treasury Designates Senior Al-Qa’ida Bomb Maker, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, June 6, 2013, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl1973 ↩︎
  19. Martyrs of Khorasan, Part 6, Abdulrahman Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Yaqub) ↩︎
  20. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  21. Martyrs of Khorasan, Part 6, Abdulrahman Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Yaqub) ↩︎
  22. Martyrs of Khorasan, Part 6, Abdulrahman Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Yaqub) ↩︎
  23. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 1, The Knight and Emir Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Mohamed Khan) ↩︎
  24. Treasury Designates Senior al-Qaida Leader in Afghanistan, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, February 10, 2016, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0346 // Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Abdullah,” dated July 17, 2010 ↩︎
  25. Treasury Designates Senior al-Qaida Leader in Afghanistan, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, February 10, 2016, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0346 ↩︎
  26. Catch and Release: Did Qatar Free a Future al-Qaeda Emir?, by David Andrew Weinberg, The Huffington Post, May 18, 2017, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/catch-and-release-did-qatar-free-a-future-al-qaeda_b_591e3b27e4b07617ae4cbabe ↩︎
  27. Most wanted Saudi killed in Afghanistan, UPI News, April 27, 2011, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/04/27/Most-wanted-Saudi-killed-in-Afghanistan/UPI-94881303915642/ ↩︎
  28. ISAF Confirms Number 2 Insurgent Killed in Coalition Airstrike, ISAF Public Affairs Office Press Release, April 26, 2011, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/884283/isaf-confirms-number-2-insurgent-killed-in-coalition-airstrike/ ↩︎
  29. Martyrs of Khorasan, Part 3, Muqad al-Otaibi (Abdulkarim al-Najdi) – A Knight of the Arabian Peninsula ↩︎
  30. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, dated June 19, 2009 ↩︎
  31. High-Profile Terror Network Busted, by Shahid Rao, The Nation, January 30, 2009, https://www.nation.com.pk/30-Jan-2009/highprofile-terror-network-busted // ATC Sends Nine High Profile Terror Suspects to Adiala Jail, Business Recorder, January 31, 2009, https://www.brecorder.com/news/amp/3598656 ↩︎
  32. High-Profile Terror Network Busted, by Shahid Rao, The Nation, January 30, 2009, https://www.nation.com.pk/30-Jan-2009/highprofile-terror-network-busted // ATC Sends Nine High Profile Terror Suspects to Adiala Jail, Business Recorder, January 31, 2009, https://www.brecorder.com/news/amp/3598656 ↩︎
  33. Men acquitted over Pakistan bombing, Al-Jazeera, September 25, 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/9/25/men-acquitted-over-pakistan-bombing ↩︎
  34. Al-Qaida Security Committee Report, dated May 17, 2010 ↩︎
  35. U.S. Unit Secretly in Pakistan Lends Ally Support, by Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, The New York Times, February 22, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/world/asia/23terror.html ↩︎
  36. ‘Al-Qaida members’ arrested in Pakistan raid, by Saeed Shah, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, January 22, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/al-qaida-pakistan-raid // Suspect in 7/7 attacks held in Pakistan, by Saad Khan, Reuters, January 21, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-qaeda-idUKTRE50K5F220090121/ // Pakistan arrests suspect in London bombings, The New York Times, January 22, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22iht-pakistan.1.19587664.html ↩︎
  37. ‘Al-Qaida members’ arrested in Pakistan raid, by Saeed Shah, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, January 22, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/al-qaida-pakistan-raid ↩︎
  38. ‘Al-Qaida members’ arrested in Pakistan raid, by Saeed Shah, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, January 22, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/al-qaida-pakistan-raid // Suspect in 7/7 attacks held in Pakistan, by Saad Khan, Reuters, January 21, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-qaeda-idUKTRE50K5F220090121/ ↩︎
  39. Suspect in 7/7 attacks held in Pakistan, by Saad Khan, Reuters, January 21, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-qaeda-idUKTRE50K5F220090121/ ↩︎
  40. Pakistan arrests suspect in London bombings, The New York Times, January 22, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22iht-pakistan.1.19587664.html // Suspect in 7/7 attacks held in Pakistan, by Saad Khan, Reuters, January 21, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-qaeda-idUKTRE50K5F220090121/ ↩︎
  41. Pakistan arrests suspect in London bombings, The New York Times, January 22, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22iht-pakistan.1.19587664.html ↩︎
  42. Pakistan arrests suspect in London bombings, The New York Times, January 22, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/asia/22iht-pakistan.1.19587664.html // ‘Al-Qaida members’ arrested in Pakistan raid, by Saeed Shah, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, January 22, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/al-qaida-pakistan-raid ↩︎
  43. ‘Al-Qaida members’ arrested in Pakistan raid, by Saeed Shah, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Matthew Weaver, The Guardian, January 22, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/al-qaida-pakistan-raid ↩︎
  44. Letter from Atiyah to Osama bin Laden, dated March 2008 ↩︎
  45. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Nasir al-Wuhaishi, “Summary on Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated approx May 2010 ↩︎
  46. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Nasir al-Wuhaishi, “Summary on Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated approx May 2010 ↩︎
  47. Pakistan detained senior Shadow Army commander, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, May 24, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/pakistan_detained_se.php ↩︎
  48. Pakistan detained senior Shadow Army commander, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, May 24, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/pakistan_detained_se.php ↩︎
  49. Pakistan detained senior Shadow Army commander, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, May 24, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/pakistan_detained_se.php ↩︎
  50. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  51. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Nasir al-Wuhaishi, “Summary on Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated approx May 2010 ↩︎
  52. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Nasir al-Wuhaishi, “Summary on Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated approx May 2010 ↩︎
  53. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  54. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Nasir al-Wuhaishi, “Summary on Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated approx May 2010 ↩︎
  55. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  56. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Nasir al-Wuhaishi, “Summary on Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” dated approx May 2010 ↩︎
  57. Pakistan detained senior Shadow Army commander, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, May 24, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/pakistan_detained_se.php ↩︎
  58. Guilty Plea Reveals Trail From U.S. Suburb to Al-Qaida Plotter, Tampa Bay Times via The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The Associated Press, July 23, 2009, https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2009/07/23/guilty-plea-reveals-trail-from-u-s-suburb-to-al-qaida-plotter/?outputType=amp ↩︎
  59. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  60. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  61. Two Yemeni Nationals Charged with Conspiring to Murder United States Nationals Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, January 20, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-yemeni-nationals-charged-conspiring-murder-united-states-nationals-abroad-and-providing // Qaeda Member Pleads Guilty in Brooklyn on Terrorism Charges, by Stephanie Clifford, The New York Times, May 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/nyregion/qaeda-member-pleads-guilty-in-brooklyn-on-terrorism-charges.html ↩︎
  62. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 // Two Yemeni Nationals Charged with Conspiring to Murder United States Nationals Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, January 20, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-yemeni-nationals-charged-conspiring-murder-united-states-nationals-abroad-and-providing // Qaeda Member Pleads Guilty in Brooklyn on Terrorism Charges, by Stephanie Clifford, The New York Times, May 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/nyregion/qaeda-member-pleads-guilty-in-brooklyn-on-terrorism-charges.html ↩︎
  63. Yemeni Pleads Guilty in U.S. to Supporting Al Qaeda, Newsweek via The Associated Press, January 19, 2016, https://www.newsweek.com/yemen-al-qaeda-ali-alvi-al-hamidi-417517 // United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  64. Yemeni Pleads Guilty in U.S. to Supporting Al Qaeda, Newsweek via The Associated Press, January 19, 2016, https://www.newsweek.com/yemen-al-qaeda-ali-alvi-al-hamidi-417517 // Yemeni Pleads Guilty in U.S. to Supporting Al Qaeda, Newsweek via The Associated Press, January 19, 2016, https://www.newsweek.com/yemen-al-qaeda-ali-alvi-al-hamidi-417517 ↩︎
  65. Victim of Obama’s first drone strike: ‘I am the living example of what drones are,’ by Spencer Ackerman, The Guardian, January 23, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/23/drone-strike-victim-barack-obama ↩︎
  66. Victim of Obama’s first drone strike: ‘I am the living example of what drones are,’ by Spencer Ackerman, The Guardian, January 23, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/23/drone-strike-victim-barack-obama // Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  67. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ // Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Daniel Klaidman, Mariner Books, 2013 ↩︎
  68. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Daniel Klaidman, Mariner Books, 2013 ↩︎
  69. 2 U.S. Airstrikes Offer a Concrete Sign of Obama’s Pakistan Policy, by R Jeffrey Smith, Candace Rondeaux, and Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, January 24, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/national/2009/01/24/2-us-airstrikes-offer-a-concrete-sign-of-obamas-pakistan-policy/6ae13765-c37a-470a-a05d-9bdef18f6a27/ ↩︎
  70. Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency, Daniel Klaidman, Mariner Books, 2013 ↩︎
  71. U.S. missile strike kills 25 militants in Pakistan, by Hafiz Wazir, Reuters, February 14, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE51D0XH20090214/ ↩︎
  72. U.S. missile strike kills 25 militants in Pakistan, by Hafiz Wazir, Reuters, February 14, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE51D0XH20090214/ ↩︎
  73. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1 ↩︎
  74. U.S. Airstrike Kills 30 in Pakistan, by Pir Zubair Shah, The New York Times, February 14, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/world/asia/15pstan.html ↩︎
  75. After the Dead Are Counted: U.S. and Pakistani Responsibilities to Victims of Drone Strikes, Open Society Foundations, November 2014 // Over 160 children reported among drone deaths, by Chris Woods, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, August 11, 2011, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2011-08-11/over-160-children-reported-among-drone-deaths ↩︎
  76. Photo exhibit shows alleged US drone strike deaths, San Diego Union-Tribune, July 19, 2011, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/2011/07/19/photo-exhibit-shows-alleged-us-drone-strike-deaths/ ↩︎
  77. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1 // US airstrike in Pakistan’s Kurram tribal agency kills 30, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, February 16, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/us_airstrike_in_paki.php ↩︎
  78. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1 // US airstrike in Pakistan’s Kurram tribal agency kills 30, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, February 16, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/us_airstrike_in_paki.php ↩︎
  79. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material ↩︎
  80. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material ↩︎
  81. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material ↩︎
  82. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material ↩︎
  83. U.S. Debates Drone Strike on American Terrorism Suspect in Pakistan, by Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, February 10, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/world/asia/us-debates-drone-strike-on-american-terror-suspect-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  84. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  85. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  86. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, dated June 11, 2009 ↩︎
  87. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  88. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  89. Gunmen kidnap Iranian diplomat in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, November 13, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna27707881 ↩︎
  90. Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Pakistan, News 18 India, November 14, 2008, https://www.news18.com/news/india/iranian-kidnap-ians-301702.html#google_vignette ↩︎
  91. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, dated June 11, 2009 ↩︎
  92. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  93. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  94. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  95. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  96. Drone Strikes Killed High-Value Targets, US Tells Pakistan, Dawn, February 9, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/855031/drone-strikes-killed-high-value-targets-us-tells-pakistan ↩︎
  97. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  98. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  99. Senior al Qaeda Leader Leaves Pakistan, Directs Iraq Operations from Syria, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 21, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/08/senior_al_qaeda_lead_5.php ↩︎
  100. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Sheikh Azmarai,” dated January 9, 2009 ↩︎
  101. Senior al Qaeda Leader Leaves Pakistan, Directs Iraq Operations from Syria, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 21, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/08/senior_al_qaeda_lead_5.php ↩︎
  102. Senior al Qaeda Leader Leaves Pakistan, Directs Iraq Operations from Syria, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 21, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/08/senior_al_qaeda_lead_5.php // U.S. claims key al-Qaida leader killed in Iraq, NBC News via The Associated Press, January 28, 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna35128091 ↩︎
  103. Senior al Qaeda Leader Leaves Pakistan, Directs Iraq Operations from Syria, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 21, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/08/senior_al_qaeda_lead_5.php ↩︎
  104. U.S. claims key al-Qaida leader killed in Iraq, NBC News via The Associated Press, January 28, 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna35128091 ↩︎
  105. Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, January 16, 2009, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1360 ↩︎
  106. Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, January 16, 2009, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1360 ↩︎
  107. Letter from Anas al-Subayi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 13, 2010 ↩︎
  108. Letter from Anas al-Subayi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 13, 2010 ↩︎
  109. Letter from Anas al-Subayi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 13, 2010 ↩︎
  110. Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, January 16, 2009, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1360 ↩︎
  111. Osama bin Laden’s family on the run: ‘I never stopped praying our lives might return to normal, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Guardian, May 6, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/osama-bin-laden-family-on-the-run-after-9-11 ↩︎
  112. Letter from Saad bin Laden to Osama bin Laden, “To My Precious Father,” dated August 15, 2008 ↩︎
  113. Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, January 16, 2009, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1360 ↩︎
  114. Spy Chief Says Bin Laden Son Left Iran, Likely Is in Pakistan, by Siobhan Gorman, The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123214632242491755 ↩︎
  115. Spy Chief Says Bin Laden Son Left Iran, Likely Is in Pakistan, by Siobhan Gorman, The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123214632242491755 ↩︎
  116. ‘Desperation’ led CIA, Jordan to trust bomber, by Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, NBC News, January 15, 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34890929 ↩︎
  117. ‘Desperation’ led CIA, Jordan to trust bomber, by Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, NBC News, January 15, 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34890929 ↩︎
  118. ‘Qaeda’ Tape Urges Iraqi Attacks, CBS News, August 19, 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qaeda-tape-urges-iraqi-attacks/ // Guantanamo Assessment File, Yusef Mohamed Mubarak al-Jubeiri al-Shehri, ISN 114, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/114.html ↩︎
  119. ATC Sends Nine High Profile Terror Suspects to Adiala Jail, Business Recorder, January 31, 2009, https://www.brecorder.com/news/amp/3598656 ↩︎

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