Jihadist Proxies: Assaults in Pakistan and The Assassination of Khalil Haqqani

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Pakistan has continued to face the burden of unrestricted militants thriving across the border in Afghanistan, devoid of inhibitions, while being entirely dedicated to sowing chaos and destruction. In light of this we will examine the further cycle comprised of combat, assaults, retaliations, and assassinations. We commence in 2024 after the previously analyzed March raid and airstrikes – [A]. Yet another marauding of Pakistani forces demonstrated the deteriorating situation between the two nations, one a regional and nuclear power, one a haven for terrorists and hive of religious radicalism.

The July 15, 2024 assault against a cantonment in the Bannu district of Pakistani’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province was deemed the responsibility of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Network1. Located near the border with restive North Waziristan, the compound was described as a British colonial military structure, and was probably targeted due to its utilization in counterterrorism raids2. Pakistan presented the attack as a failure to breach the security of the military establishment3. Further they hailed their counter maneuver as preventative and successful in thwarting additional carnage4. In all, ten assailants were killed, believed to be the total of the antagonizing force5. However, the incident was incredibly similar to previous attacks supported or directed by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and/or the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within Pakistan, indicating that for the militants, it was a successful operation. These instances were becoming more frequent. In fact, it was estimated that the TTP and those under their purview conducted 1,210 attacks within Pakistani territory in 2023 alone6. With 573 in 2021 and 715 in 20227, the trend is obvious: subsequent to the Taliban conquest of Afghanistan, the TTP and their ilk have enjoyed unrestricted movements and support in order to launch assaults such as what occurred on July 15.

At time 0440 that morning, a suicide bomber drove into the perimeter of the fortress, detonated, and the resulting damage collapsed portions of the structure, crushing and killing eight Pakistani soldiers8. From the aperture created by the blast, militants penetrated into the compound9. Described as engaging in a significant gun battle, four of the militants were subsequently slain10. In another display of obvious chaos, the remaining militants made their way into the civilian districts encircling the base, wounding approximately 141, before being neutralized, in a battle that was prolonged for 26 hours11. The militants carried small arms, suicide vests, and RPGs into the fray12. Apparently, even attack helicopters were used in the government response13. Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s Jaish-i-Fursan-i-Mohamed faction acknowledged their role in orchestrating the attempted massacre14. Other sources placed the Pakistani military death toll at twelve15, while global media maintained the original eight count16. Pakistani government officials decried the haven enjoyed by these militants in Taliban controlled Afghanistan. A Foreign Ministry spokeswoman demanded that the Afghan Taliban deal with the threat posed by militants sheltering under their protection, noting Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s responsibility17. This after it was revealed that two of the perpetrators were actually Afghan citizens18.

In what may have been a follow-on attack, another squad of belligerents ambushed medical laborers at a clinic in nearby Dera Ismail Khan, in what was yet another shocking and disgusting act by religious extremists against healthcare providers19. Two female providers died along with two of their juvenile patients and a security guard, before Pakistani forces could engage the extremists20. The results of that exchange were three of the militants slain along with two soldiers21.

Pakistan angrily summoned the deputy chief of the Afghan Embassy to lodge a demarche over the violence and to demand swift and decisive action against the terrorists and militants within the neighboring nation22. The Pakistanis continued to insinuate that they could and would launch cross border attacks in response to these actions against TTP targets in Afghanistan23. The occurrence was a replica of the March 2024 exchange between Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s forces and the resulting Pakistani airstrikes, which we have previously chronicled along with a brief biography of Gul Bahadur24.

In order to potentially remove these factions from the reach of Pakistan, and to reward them with sanctuary, the Taliban, specifically the Haqqani Network, established four permanent settlements in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province for the militants and their families25. Despite a supposed surreptitious relationship, media outlets have garnered information displaying the symbiotic union. This relationship exists up to the upper echelons of leadership. TTP commander Noor Wali Mehsud has even boasted that he met directly with the emir of the Taliban26. Further, there are but nominal restraints on these militant populations27. They are supported and encouraged, as the Afghan Taliban prefers to work with these networks in the face of the threat posed by ISIS-Khorasan. For example, it has been noted that the Afghan Taliban will allow ISIS-Khorasan prisoners liberty, under the condition that they enlist with the TTP instead28.

As for these new communities, simply stated they are inhabited by extremists. Each of the Ghazni settlements was provided with religious and educational amenities, with one specifically constructed for al-Qaida, and the remaining three meant for the TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur29. The three settlements constructed for the TTP carried their own disturbing stories. One in Dasht-e Bagh-e Attar, Qarabagh district, was meant for 1,000 TTP members and their families, with the domiciles built upon Shiite Hazara lands, displacing the former residents30. The Hazara calls for justice have thus far gone unheard31. A second, located in Dasht-e Kabuli, Waghaz district was initiated along a primary Hazara trading route, with the local Shiites under the impression that the new settlers were war ravaged refugees and not battle-hardened religious and political extremists32. Some 500 TTP and their families claimed this parcel of Hazara land33. The last settlement replaced a very specific township in the Khwaja Omari district along the border with Wardak province34. This was the Ghazni Teachers’ Residential Township, developed for local educators, but now sacrificed to soldiers loyal not to advancements in intelligence, but jihadist ambitions35. The area was previously abandoned and heavily guarded by the Taliban since their conquest, readied to be inhabited by the TTP36.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur became emboldened after being removed from the border area, claiming that the predominantly Pashtun neighboring Pakistani province would soon fall under the sway of the Islamic Emirate (meaning the Taliban)37. However, the move was preordained by a diplomatic meeting between Pakistani and Taliban officials, hoping that the removal of the militants from the border region into deeper, further away portions of Afghanistan would offer a reprieve to the forces in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa38. In addition to the attacks that precipitated this, a UN sanctions report described an Egyptian al-Qaida operative known only as Hakim al-Masri who was training and readying TTP fighters for cross border raids from bases established in the Afghan border province of Kunar39. The subsequent report referenced well over 6,000 sworn TTP combatants sheltering in the country and preparing for religious and political violence40. This made them the largest militant organization stationed within the Taliban realm41. The monitoring team reiterated that there was a willingness from the Afghan Taliban to tolerate and support the TTP, with whom they maintained a close relationship, and whom they did not consider as terrorists42. TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud received a stipend from the Taliban in order to maintain his loyalty and prevent collaboration with ISIS-Khorasan Province, whom the Taliban considered a potentially formidable insurgent opponent43.

Pakistani responses were slight at the time, with the airstrikes in March, discussed in this series’ previous article, and the demarche and threats mentioned above as their predominant actions. They have not killed or captured significant al-Qaida or TTP commanders in some time. However, the al-Qaida linked Amin Mohamed al-Haq Saam Khan, known as Dr. Amin al-Haq, was apprehended on weapons charges (revealed in July 2024) as he crossed the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan44. While this was an interesting development, it in no way actually hindered any militant operations. The TTP was further supported by the local al-Qaida franchise which was itself focused on Pakistan and the surrounding regions: AQIS (al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent)45.

The TTP suffered their first major casualty in the exchanges, not through direct military action, but through subterfuge and duplicity. The commander was Shahid Omar (whose real name was Rahimullah), and on December 3, 2024, he was hosted for a meal by Afghan Taliban official Qari Khalid46. Once engaged in the luncheon, within the Shegal district of Kunar province, one of Qari Khalid’s associates departed and returned with a handgun fitted with a suppressor. Therein he assassinated Shahid Omar and two of his men, Khaksar and Adnan. A third guard, Tariq, although mortally wounded, was able to fell the assailant47. Shahid Omar was no random TTP official, but rather was a cousin to the infamous Mullah Faqir Mohamed of Bajaur. He was born and raised in Chenagai, Bajaur, site of the notorious 2006 drone strike, and became a militant at 19 in 200248. Local Pakistani press reported that he spent eight years incarcerated in Bagram for his affiliation, before achieving freedom upon release in 202149. In fact, Shahid Omar was apprehended while traversing Nangarhar province in February 2013 alongside his cousin Faqir Mohamed, resulting in their detention50. During his TTP career, Shahid Omar held a multitude of militant titles. In June 2021 after his release he was declared TTP shadow governor of Bajaur, followed in 2022 by responsibility for the Dera Ismail Khan Division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, which remarkably included the former South Waziristan agency and original bastion of the TTP51. An even later 2022 appointment included oversight of the Malakand Division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (comprised of notable TTP influenced districts and former agencies like Bajaur, Swat, and Malakand). Perhaps most importantly, a January 2024 release named him paramilitary commander over the TTP “Northern Zone” of their Military Commission52. It was in this role that he was targeted for assassination. Qari Khalid was apprehended by Afghan Taliban and TTP authorities due to his alleged participation in the plot. The TTP also alleged that Pakistani’s intelligence agencies were intimately involved in the murder53. It should also be noted that several militants of Bajaur previously defected to the ISIS regional province, which itself presented a serious security threat, or according to some allegations an exploitable assets.

In the midst of surging conflict and hostile rhetoric between the Taliban of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan, there were assessments and accusations of state sponsorship and support of terrorist organizations. The Taliban were obviously facilitating the TTP endeavors in Pakistan, while Pakistan in turn purportedly assisted ISIS-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K or ISKP) in destabilizing Taliban control. This may well have been Taliban slander against the Pakistan government, as previous reporting noted that the Pakistanis were surreptitiously assisting the Afghan regime against the ISIS threat54. At this point in time, Sanaullah Ghafari (known also as Shahab al-Muhajir) was the designated commander of ISKP, having ascended to the position in June 202055. He had no qualms about attacking the Taliban, whether or not it was meant to benefit the Pakistanis.

Assassination of a Haqqani

The ISKP intervention in the conflict was never more apparent than in December 2024 when the extremists turned their ire upon Afghanistan’s most influential family. In this case their target was Khalil Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Refugees and Repatriation. Born in the late 1950s or mid-1960s56, Khalil Haqqani was a brother to the family’s patriarch Jalaluddin, and a representative on the Miranshah Shura, the regional Taliban command in North Waziristan, which was comprised of the autonomous Haqqani family and its adherents57. With the coming of the War on Terror came infamy for the Haqqanis.

Early in the conflict in 2002, after the US invasion of Afghanistan, Khalil dispatched forces to fortify al-Qaida positions in Paktia province, wherein his family had substantial influence58. He fell in line under the command of his nephew Sirajuddin, and by 2009 was overseeing prisoners and hostages obtained by his family and other Taliban elements59. From both the Middle East and Asia, Khalil obtained funding for the network, sometimes via his own direct travel to these regions60. In fact, by September 2009 he had journeyed to Dubai for such financial efforts61. Khalil was also accused of delivering financial support to militants in Logar province during 2010 on behalf of his family. In fact, he commanded 160 insurgents therein62. This act earned him a terrorist designation from the US Department of the Treasury on February 9, 201163, which was followed by a $5 million bounty as proposed by the US Department of State Rewards for Justice program under the name Khalil ur-Rahman Haqqani64. Also on February 9, 2011 he was sanctioned by the UN Security Council under the name Khalid Ahmed Haqqani65.

Some reports claim that in 2010 he was under a form of protection by the Pakistani government (as opposed to any sort of incarceration)66. This may have been so that he could be utilized to negotiate with violent anti-government factions such as the TTP and refocus them away from Pakistani targets. He reportedly requested that the TTP consider entering into a peace accord with the Pakistani authorities67.

Khalil faced no justice during the entire war, and emerged again during the US withdrawal. In this new era, he was helming efforts to provide security to Kabul68, a monumental task amidst the chaotic transition, and one viewed warily by the populace due to his allegiances to a militant outfit69. Nonetheless, when he emerged, surrounded by guards donning the abandoned gear of the erstwhile Afghan government, he was greeted by an adoring crowd as he orated within the largest mosque in Kabul70. He promised not just security, but economic prosperity, freedom of the press, education for men and women, and no further discrimination71. In a choreographed interview, Khalil was rapid in reassuring the people that the Taliban would care for and protect all Afghans in unity, offering amnesty throughout the land, and firmly laying blame for the brutal war with the departing Americans instead of Taliban atrocities and hostility72.

Khalil Haqqani in his role as a Taliban Minister

Even the former US supported government officials would benefit from this newfound generosity of the Taliban and Haqqanis. For example, Khalil attempted to convince the fleeing Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his security detail that their safety would be ensured under Taliban rule73. Declaring that defeating a superpower qualified his organization to ensure security, Khalil himself, though, arrived to this al-Jazeera interview in August 2021 surrounded by the now familiar heavily armed professional militants74. He implored the populace not to depart and abandon Afghanistan, noting that only they, and not foreign interlopers, could reconstruct the battered nation together75. In addition, reports in the aftermath of the Taliban conquest noted that Khalil was laboring to achieve a ceasefire with Ahmed Masoud (son of murdered Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Masoud), and to bring his rebel forces into the fold of the new government76. Khalil failed to convince the younger Masoud to capitulate.

Khalil, despite his impressive security contingent, had freedom to maneuver in Kabul and was ostensibly dwelling in safety, without the threat of bombings or airstrikes. ISKP, the only viable adversary at that moment, soon proved they could touch the capital and conducted a suicide bombing on September 2, 2024 wherein an operative detonated his vest amidst a crowd in the Qala-i-Bakhtiar neighborhood of Kabul. At the workday’s conclusion the bomber intended to murder government employees, particularly those involved in the prosecution of criminals77. ISKP then declared the event as vengeance for their imprisoned comrades78. Ironically, suicide bombings were down now that the Taliban were actually in power, and were tactics used by the violent religious extremists determined to destabilize their rule.

Khalil was later named to a cabinet position, assuming the responsibilities of the Minister of Refugees and Repatriation79. The physical building housing this Ministry was the site of an attack in December 2024, well into the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On December 11, 2024, an ISKP suicide operative lingered in a waiting area adjacent to Khalil’s office, detonating his device when the Haqqani Minister departed with his staff80. Intending to meet with visitors in vicinity of the mosque within the compound81, Khalil was instead faced with the wrath of radicals, manifested by bomber Abu Osman al-Khorasani82. Seven were killed, including Khalil and six staffers83. Speculation initially diverted to the prospect of an internal conflict within the Taliban, between the hardliners and the politically savvy Haqqani family. In fact, just days prior to the assault on December 8, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani openly confronted the Taliban commander Hibatullah Akhundzada for his stubbornness, totalitarian nature, and insistence on religious conservative proclamations during a time in which the Afghan government was striving for international legitimacy84. Sirajuddin warned against using religion as an exclusionary tactic85, defying Taliban leadership and making it plausible that a violent response to the Haqqani family came from within the Afghan government.

However, the ISIS Amaq “news agency” rapidly declared responsibility for the assassination, prompting immediate concerns with their increasing influence in the region86. A likely scenario is that ISKP simply wished to destabilize the Taliban government and exacerbate the already tenuous balance between the factions. An altogether more sinister conclusion is that Pakistani intelligence helped to orchestrate the assassination via proxy, a hypothesis proposed by Afghan officials87. Thousands grieved Khalil at his subsequent funeral in Paktia province88. At least 30 of his security detail were detained in the aftermath, and noticeably, the senior-most Taliban officials forewent attending the funeral89. Khalil joined other Taliban figures assassinated by ISKP, but was by far the most significant. These included Mohamed Dawud Muzammil, governor of Balkh province, killed by a suicide operative who penetrated his office in Mizar I Sharif on March 9, 202390. Nisar Ahmed Ahmedi, governor of Badakhstan province, was later killed along with his driver when a suicide car bomber detonated adjacent to their vehicle on June 6, 202391. The death of Khalil Haqqani harkened to the numerous Taliban directed assassinations against Afghan government officials over the previous two decades of warfare. Suspiciously, the TTP responded in kind, resulting in yet another round of severe violence between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be discussed in our next article.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. Bannu Cantt attack undertaken by Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which operates from Afghanistan: ISPR, Business Recorder, July 16, 2024, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40313105 ↩︎
  2. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  3. Bannu Cantt attack undertaken by Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which operates from Afghanistan: ISPR, Business Recorder, July 16, 2024, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40313105 ↩︎
  4. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  5. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  6. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  7. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  8. Bannu Cantt attack undertaken by Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which operates from Afghanistan: ISPR, Business Recorder, July 16, 2024, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40313105 ↩︎
  9. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  10. 3 killed in car bomb-and-gun attack on Pakistan military compound, by Ayuz Gul, Voice of America, July 15, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/car-bomb-and-gun-attack-on-pakistan-military-compound/7698526.html ↩︎
  11. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  12. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  13. Bannu Cantt attack undertaken by Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, which operates from Afghanistan: ISPR, Business Recorder, July 16, 2024, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40313105 ↩︎
  14. Deadly Assault on Bannu Cantt in Pakistan Claims 12 Soldiers’ Lives, One India, July 15, 2024, https://www.oneindia.com/videos/explosive-attack-bannu-cantt-khyber-
    pakhtunkhwa-4162748.html ↩︎
  15. Deadly Assault on Bannu Cantt in Pakistan Claims 12 Soldiers’ Lives, One India, July 15, 2024, https://www.oneindia.com/videos/explosive-attack-bannu-cantt-khyber-
    pakhtunkhwa-4162748.html ↩︎
  16. At least 8 Pakistani soldiers killed in military base suicide attack, Al-Jazeera, July 16, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/16/at-least-8-pakistani-soldiers-killed-in-military-base-
    suicide-attack     ↩︎
  17. Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s faction persistently uses Afghanistan’s soil against Pakistan, claims official, by Fidel Rahmati, The Khaama Press, July 19, 2024, https://www.khaama.com/hafiz-gul-bahadurs-faction-persistently-uses-afghanistans-soil-against-pakistan-claims-official/ ↩︎
  18. Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s faction persistently uses Afghanistan’s soil against Pakistan, claims official, by Fidel Rahmati, The Khaama Press, July 19, 2024, https://www.khaama.com/hafiz-gul-bahadurs-faction-persistently-uses-afghanistans-soil-against-pakistan-claims-official/ ↩︎
  19. Pakistan: Attack on northwestern health facility killed 5 civilians, 2 soldiers, by Ayaz Gul, Voice of America, July 16, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-reports-8-fatalities-in-monday-attack-on-military-compound-/7699977.html ↩︎
  20. Pakistan: Attack on northwestern health facility killed 5 civilians, 2 soldiers, by Ayaz Gul, Voice of America, July 16, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-reports-8-fatalities-in-monday-attack-on-military-compound-/7699977.html ↩︎
  21. Pakistan: Attack on northwestern health facility killed 5 civilians, 2 soldiers, by Ayaz Gul, Voice of America, July 16, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-reports-8-fatalities-in-monday-attack-on-military-compound-/7699977.html ↩︎
  22. Afghan govt against Bannu attack culprits, by Abdullah Momand, Dawn, July 17, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1846375 ↩︎
  23. Afghan govt against Bannu attack culprits, by Abdullah Momand, Dawn, July 17, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1846375 ↩︎
  24. Afghan govt against Bannu attack culprits, by Abdullah Momand, Dawn, July 17, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1846375 ↩︎
  25. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  26. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  27. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  28. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  29. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  30. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  31. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  32. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  33. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  34. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  35. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  36. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  37. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  38. The Taliban Host Terrorist Groups: Four New Settlements Built for Al-Qaeda and TTP, by Amin Kawa, Hasht-e Subh Daily, June 30, 2024, https://8am.media/eng/the-taliban-host-terrorist-groups-four-new-settlements-built-for-al-qaeda-and-ttp/ ↩︎
  39. 33rd UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on ISIS and al-Qaida, January 29, 2024 ↩︎
  40. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  41. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  42. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  43. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  44. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 // Pakistan arrests Al-Qaeda leader listed by United Nations, by Mubasher Bukhari, Reuters, July 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-arrests-al-qaeda-leader-sabotage-plans-2024-07-19/ ↩︎
  45. 15th UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on the Taliban and Afghanistan, July 8, 2024 ↩︎
  46. Key TTP ‘commander’ killed in Afghanistan, by Adam Khan Wazir, Dawn, December 4, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1876594 ↩︎
  47. Shahid Umar: Senior-Most TTP Commander Killed in Afghanistan to Date in Apparent Assassination, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 11, June 30, 2025, https://jamestown.org/shahid-umar-senior-most-ttp-commander-killed-in-afghanistan-to-date-in-apparent-assassination/ ↩︎
  48. Shahid Umar: Senior-Most TTP Commander Killed in Afghanistan to Date in Apparent Assassination, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 11, June 30, 2025, https://jamestown.org/shahid-umar-senior-most-ttp-commander-killed-in-afghanistan-to-date-in-apparent-assassination/ ↩︎
  49. Key TTP ‘commander’ killed in Afghanistan, by Adam Khan Wazir, Dawn, December 4, 2024, https://www.dawn.com/news/1876594 ↩︎
  50. Shahid Umar: Senior-Most TTP Commander Killed in Afghanistan to Date in Apparent Assassination, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 11, June 30, 2025, https://jamestown.org/shahid-umar-senior-most-ttp-commander-killed-in-afghanistan-to-date-in-apparent-assassination/ ↩︎
  51. Shahid Umar: Senior-Most TTP Commander Killed in Afghanistan to Date in Apparent Assassination, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 11, June 30, 2025, https://jamestown.org/shahid-umar-senior-most-ttp-commander-killed-in-afghanistan-to-date-in-apparent-assassination/ ↩︎
  52. Shahid Umar: Senior-Most TTP Commander Killed in Afghanistan to Date in Apparent Assassination, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 11, June 30, 2025, https://jamestown.org/shahid-umar-senior-most-ttp-commander-killed-in-afghanistan-to-date-in-apparent-assassination/ ↩︎
  53. Shahid Umar: Senior-Most TTP Commander Killed in Afghanistan to Date in Apparent Assassination, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 11, June 30, 2025, https://jamestown.org/shahid-umar-senior-most-ttp-commander-killed-in-afghanistan-to-date-in-apparent-assassination/ ↩︎
  54. To fight ISIS-K in Afghanistan, Pakistan is using informal intelligence channels to prop up Taliban against ISIS, by Susannah George, Joby Warrick, and Karen DeYoung,The Washington Post, October 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/10/23/afghanistan-isis-pakistan-intelligence/ ↩︎
  55. Rewards for Justice – Reward Offer for Information on ISIS-K Leader Sanaullah Ghafari and Kabul Airport Attack, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson Press Release, February 7, 2022, https://2021-2025.state.gov/rewards-for-justice-reward-offer-for-information-on-isis-k-leader-sanaullah-ghafari-and-kabul-airport-attack/ ↩︎
  56. Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program Profile, August 20, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20231016032443/https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/khalil-haqqani/ ↩︎
  57. The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al‐Qa’ida, by Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Harmony Program, July 14, 2011, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/ctc-haqqani-report_rassler-brown-final_web.pdf // Inside the Haqqani Network, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, June 3, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/03/inside-the-haqqani-network/ ↩︎
  58. Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program Profile, August 20, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20231016032443/https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/khalil-haqqani/ ↩︎
  59. Treasury Targets the Financial And Support Networks of Al Qa’ida and the Taliban, Haqqani Network Leadership, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, February 9, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1055 ↩︎
  60. Khalil Ahmed Haqqani, United Nations Security Council Committee Sanctions List for Resolution 1988, listed February 9, 2011, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/khalil-ahmed-haqqani ↩︎
  61. Treasury Targets the Financial And Support Networks of Al Qa’ida and the Taliban, Haqqani Network Leadership, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, February 9, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1055 ↩︎
  62. Khalil Ahmed Haqqani, United Nations Security Council Committee Sanctions List for Resolution 1988, listed February 9, 2011, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/khalil-ahmed-haqqani ↩︎
  63. Treasury Targets the Financial And Support Networks of Al Qa’ida and the Taliban, Haqqani Network Leadership, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, February 9, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1055 ↩︎
  64. Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program Profile, August 20, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20231016032443/https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/khalil-haqqani/ ↩︎
  65. Khalil Ahmed Haqqani, United Nations Security Council Committee Sanctions List for Resolution 1988, listed February 9, 2011, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/khalil-ahmed-haqqani ↩︎
  66. US Designates Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network Leaders as Terrorists, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, February 9, 2011, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/02/us_designates_al_qae.php ↩︎
  67. Pakistani Taliban signal willingness to conduct peace talks, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, October 10, 2011, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/10/pakistani_taliban_si.php ↩︎
  68. New Taliban head of security for Kabul is wanted by U.S. as terrorist, by Ken Dilanian, NBC News, August 26, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/new-taliban-head-security-kabul-wanted-u-s-terrorist-n1277700 ↩︎
  69. ‘All Afghans’ should feel safe under Taliban, says security chief, by Ali M Latifi, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/22/all-afghans-should-feel-safe-under-taliban-says-security-chief ↩︎
  70. Khalil Haqqani: long on America’s terrorist list, is welcomed by cheering crowds in Kabul, by Jim Huylebroek and Marc Santora, The New York Times, August 21, 2021, Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan: Afghanistan: U.S. May Seek Airlines’ Help in Evacuation Effort – The New York Times ↩︎
  71. Khalil Haqqani: long on America’s terrorist list, is welcomed by cheering crowds in Kabul, by Jim Huylebroek and Marc Santora, The New York Times, August 21, 2021, Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan: Afghanistan: U.S. May Seek Airlines’ Help in Evacuation Effort – The New York Times ↩︎
  72. ‘All Afghans’ should feel safe under Taliban, says security chief, by Ali M Latifi, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/22/all-afghans-should-feel-safe-under-taliban-says-security-chief ↩︎
  73. ‘All Afghans’ should feel safe under Taliban, says security chief, by Ali M Latifi, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/22/all-afghans-should-feel-safe-under-taliban-says-security-chief ↩︎
  74. ‘All Afghans’ should feel safe under Taliban, says security chief, by Ali M Latifi, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/22/all-afghans-should-feel-safe-under-taliban-says-security-chief ↩︎
  75. ‘All Afghans’ should feel safe under Taliban, says security chief, by Ali M Latifi, Al Jazeera, August 22, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/22/all-afghans-should-feel-safe-under-taliban-says-security-chief ↩︎
  76. Taliban, the Next Generation: an Interview with Anas Haqqani, by Ahmed Waleed Kakar, New Lines Magazine, August 30, 2021, https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/taliban-the-next-generation/ ↩︎
  77. ISIL claims responsibility for deadly Kabul attack, Al Jazeera, September 3, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/3/isil-claims-responsibility-for-deadly-kabul-attack ↩︎
  78. ISIL claims responsibility for deadly Kabul attack, Al Jazeera, September 3, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/3/isil-claims-responsibility-for-deadly-kabul-attack ↩︎
  79. Taliban’s Government includes Designated Terrorists, Ex-Guantanamo Detainees, by Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 8, 2021, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/09/talibans-government-includes-designated-terrorists-ex-guantanamo-detainees.php // Funeral held for slain Afghan Taliban minister; IS-K claims credit for killing, by Ayaz Gul, VOA News, December 12, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/funeral-held-for-slain-afghan-taliban-minister-is-k-claims-credit-for-killing/7898958.html ↩︎
  80. Suicide Bomb Kills Taliban Minister in Kabul, by Caroline Davies and Simon Fraser, BBC News, December 11, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg952q81x8o ↩︎
  81. Taliban arrest 30 following Khalil Haqqani’s assassination: Sources, by Qaseem Azizi, Amu TV, December 20, 2024, https://amu.tv/145200/ ↩︎
  82. ISKP Claims Responsibility for Attack that Killed Taliban Minister for Refugees, KabulNow, December 12, 2024, https://kabulnow.com/2024/12/iskp-claims-responsibility-for-attack-that-killed-taliban-minister-for-refugees/ ↩︎
  83. Taliban minister’s killing raises concerns about IS terror group’s expansion, by Ayaz Gul, VOA News, December 13, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-minister-s-killing-raises-concerns-about-is-terror-group-s-expansion/7900252.html // Suicide Bomb Kills Taliban Minister in Kabul, by Caroline Davies and Simon Fraser, BBC News, December 11, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg952q81x8o ↩︎
  84. An explosion in the Afghan capital kills the Taliban refugee minister, NPR News via The Associated Press, December 12, 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/12/12/g-s1-37842/explosion-kills-taliban-refugee-minister ↩︎
  85. Senior Taliban leader Haqqani warns against religious exclusivity, by Siyar Sirat, Amu TV, December 8, 2024, https://amu.tv/142470/ ↩︎
  86. Taliban minister’s killing raises concerns about IS terror group’s expansion, by Ayaz Gul, VOA News, December 13, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-minister-s-killing-raises-concerns-about-is-terror-group-s-expansion/7900252.html // Suicide Bomb Kills Taliban Minister in Kabul, by Caroline Davies and Simon Fraser, BBC News, December 11, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg952q81x8o ↩︎
  87. Taliban arrest 30 following Khalil Haqqani’s assassination: Sources, by Qaseem Azizi, Amu TV, December 20, 2024, https://amu.tv/145200/ ↩︎
  88. Funeral held for slain Afghan Taliban minister; IS-K claims credit for killing, by Ayaz Gul, VOA News, December 12, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/funeral-held-for-slain-afghan-taliban-minister-is-k-claims-credit-for-killing/7898958.html ↩︎
  89. Taliban arrest 30 following Khalil Haqqani’s assassination: Sources, by Qaseem Azizi, Amu TV, December 20, 2024, https://amu.tv/145200/ ↩︎
  90. Afghanistan blast: Taliban governor killed in his office, by Kelly Ng and Barbara Plett Usher, BBC News, March 9, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64899335 ↩︎
  91. Afghan provincial governor killed in car bombing, Al Jazeera, June 6, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/6/afghan-provincial-governor-killed-in-car-bombing ↩︎

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