SERIES: Predators Of The Khorasan – From Darunta To The Grave

Written by Nolan R Beasley

The severity of the now underway drone campaign was not fully comprehended by al-Qaida operatives. All operatives involved with External Operations, militant training, conventional and chemical weaponry, were priority targets. The expansion of the campaign was facilitated by changing opinions and faces within both the Pakistani and American governments. This allowed for an unpopular tactic to become the primary weaponry against al-Qaida. The jihadists remained willing and able to plot and conduct attacks, but were facing unprecedented pressure from within, in addition to the skies above.

Abu Sulaiman al-Jazairi

Abu Sulaiman al-Jazairi, having ostensibly assumed the mantle of External Operations chief from Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, enjoyed the promotion but very briefly.  In the midst of May, the CIA deployed a missile into the 45 year old militant’s haven, a compound in Damadola, Bajaur, killing the Algerian and at least 14 others1.  When he was slain, Abu Sulaiman al-Jazairi was operating out of the domicile of Mullah Obaidallah Akhund, the former Taliban Defense Minister and senior insurgent leader, in territory held by the TTP2. The drone campaign was yielding desired effects:  Plotters were given menial time and experience to develop operations as the drones and spy networks encroached upon their territory.  For example, Abu Sulaiman remained in Damadola, relatively exposed despite the failed airstrike just two years prior. 

Abu Sulaiman al-Jazairi was yet another vital al-Qaida militant who was unknown to mass media prior to his death, raising the question in the mind of the average American as to his actual importance.  Yet a brief history of the man can be built from intelligence officials’ statements and leaked Guantanamo files.  Most pertinent was that some media sources reported the belief that he was chief of al-Qaida’s external operations3, replacing the Egyptian Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, who had perished of hepatitis in early 20084.  When Jazairi was killed by the drone strike on May 14, 2008 in Damodola5, he had already been associated with al-Qaida and HiG since the 1990s. 

Reports that he was an explosives expert have been corroborated by the Guantanamo assessment files of captured HiG operative and al-Qaida associate, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, which stated that Jazairi trained students in explosives at both the Khaldan and Darunta camps6.  While neither was under direct control of al-Qaida, the associations and linkages seen at the camp were myriad.  Abu Sulaiman appears to have joined al-Qaida after his work at Khaldan.  American al-Qaida spokesperson, Adam Gadahn later identified the Algerian as Asadullah, and described his management of a Khaldan annex located at Darunta7. Abu Sulaiman lost his hand at Darunta in 1998, during a training exercise gone awry.  Harun Shirzad al-Afghani actually drove him to the hospital from the Jalalabad-based camp, a favor that Jazairi repaid by paying for the former’s wedding8. 

As a tangential note of importance, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, the Osama bin Laden courier and host, was said to have been working for Abu Sulaiman in the aftermath of 9/119.  After the invasion, Abu Sulaiman was also revealed to have had a role in helping to move and relocate al-Qaida and other militants from danger zones to the relative safe havens of the FATA.  Some North African militants sent their families explicitly to Abu Sulaiman in Pakistan10.  Eventually, Abu Sulaiman was based primarily in Bajaur.  In addition to his relationship with Afghani, Abu Sulaiman is said to have had a close assistant named Sufian al-Afghani and another lieutenant named Abdulbasir al-Nuristani11.  More importantly, while in Bajaur, Jazairi associated with known al-Qaida facilitator Marwan Hadid al-Suri, who was known as chief of the group’s work within their hideout of Bajaur.  Deceased militants from the 2006 Damodola strike appear to have also been close associates of Abu Sulaiman12. 

While the Pakistanis initially balked at the idea of Jazairi’s demise13, both European and American intelligence confirmed the results of the strike.  CIA Director Michael V Hayden insinuated the importance of Abu Sulaiman when he alluded to the two senior al-Qaida commanders slain thus far in 2008, and what a strategic impact the assassinations would have on the network14. Adam Gadahn later confirmed the Algerian as having fallen in the Bajaur strike15. However, intelligence sources did not explicitly name Abu Sulaiman as the external operations commander, with a European source noting that he was involved in militant training and the potential plotting against targets abroad, specifically within Europe16. European intelligence also maintained that Abu Sulaiman was a senior leader, but not one holding a “top five” position17. American sources concurred on his role as a primary terrorist instructor, and emphasized his expertise in explosives18.

In conclusion, Jazairi defied the potential prejudice that the Americans were bolstering the reputation of a low ranking jihadist to justify further drone strikes, and proved that his history resembled that of an important operative and contributor to global radicalism.  In other cases there would be no way to discern mere soldiers from commanders in the casualties of the CIA campaign, but in this case a clear victory for the war effort was obtained.  But at this early stage in the drone war, the CIA was able to locate potential targets in an easier manner, as most senior officials of the terror network had yet to go to ground.  To reiterate, this was exemplified by Abu Sulaiman’s presence in Mullah Obaidallah’s compound and his demise alongside members of the latter’s household19.  Al-Qaida commanders were still operating openly, stalked by their impending doom on the wings of drones.

Danish Embassy

Long simmering was the al-Qaida ire over Danish animations from September 2005 depicting the Prophet Mohamed. Several Danish news outlets compounded the rage by printing the cartoons yet again in February 2008, encouraging a more urgent terroristic threat and response20.  Osama bin Laden was assertive and adamant that a statement and reprisal were necessary, prompting Sheikh Said al-Masri to dispatch Atiyah Abdulrahman to Ayman al-Zawahiri to obtain a verbal public release on the matter21. By March, Zawahiri privately assured bin Laden that proper retaliation against the Danish was imminent22. Sheikh Said noted that to remain relevant, he would release the media response himself if Zawahiri was not prompt. He also cautioned that an operation would require patience and would likely occur locally within the Khorasan23. Just days after this correspondence, Zawahiri publicly addressed the issue, declaring:

“Denmark went too far in its aggression against Muslims by repeatedly slandering the Prophet, God’s peace and prayers be upon him. I urge and incite every Muslim who can harm Denmark to do so in support of the Prophet24.”

Responding to the April 21 call from Zawahiri for retaliation, Osama al-Kini (Fahd Mohamed Ali Musalam) and his crew prepared to launch an attack against the Danish Embassy in Islamabad25.  Bin Laden wrote to Zawahiri expressing gratitude for the attention to the matter, and urged his lieutenants to keep communications with the team assigned to exact vengeance26.

As Pakistani operations commander, Musalam, his deputy Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, and their men had first struck in 2008 via a suicide bombing in Rawalpindi on February 25. When a government vehicle ferrying LT General Mushtaq Baig, the Surgeon-General and director general of the Pakistani Army’s Medical Services, stopped at a red light at 1445 in the afternoon, a young operative in his 20s dashed from under a shed and into the road and detonated27. The roof of the car was ripped off, and within, the General was killed along with his guard and driver, becoming the highest ranking Pakistani military official assassinated by the terrorists28. Musalam’s network first made an attempt against Americans in Islamabad, when a grenade was sent hurtling over a wall into a popular local Italian restaurant, the Luna Caprese, on March 1529.  The explosion killed a Turkish nurse employed at the US embassy30, and five Americans were among the wounded, including four FBI agents dining together at the popular establishment31.  Having been on the FBI most wanted list for years, the pair of Musalam and Swedan found a way to target their own hunters. Now the Kenyan operative brought the threats against the Scandinavian nation to fruition. 

Displaying the interconnectedness of the network across departments, the scheme was assisted by Sheikh Said’s son, Abdullah Mustafa Othman Abu al-Yazid, known among his peers as Mohamed Khan32. Having been assigned to and placed under the instruction of Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, the ascending Abdullah was transferred to a paramilitary capacity under Khalid Habib upon Atwah’s assassination33. Accordingly he labored in operational reconnaissance, logistics, and plotting, devising methods for assaults. Of interest, simultaneously he performed the same tasks for various special operations, to include suicide bombings34, and in this case toiled under Osama al-Kini for internal Pakistani projects. As such, he was involved with intelligence and execution aspects of the Danish Embassy mission.

The selected suicide bomber, a young al-Qaida devotee from Mecca35, utilized a Toyota Corolla packed with at least 25 kg of explosives, stolen from the city of Peshawar, complete with falsified diplomatic license plates36.  Complimented in jihadist literature for his “courage”, he was Kamal Salim al-Huzali, operating under the alias Abu Gharib al-Makki37. He had only arrived in theatre the previous December38. Originally intent on participating in combat in Kashmir or Afghanistan, Sheikh Said boasted that Abu Gharib was diverted to the suicide operation due to his indignation over the Danish cartoons39. He was accompanied and assisted on the ground by Pakistani jihadists40.  The Pakistanis were helmed by an operative known as Qari Ilyas, who from a separate car signaled the suicide bomber into position for his attack41.  Apparently, Qari Ilyas was Mohamed Ilyas, a Pakistani known to have previously been incarcerated at Guantanamo as ISN 14442.  Mohamed Ilyas fought on the front lines at Kunduz before his capture, and was known to be a facilitator for Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM) training and recruiting, having issued a fatwa against American and Northern Alliance forces from Lahore43.  Now, after his release from Guantanamo, he was operating with al-Qaida and facilitating a suicide bomber.  The resulting detonation killed six, including two police, a gate guard, and bystanders, just outside of the main gate, bringing carnage and destruction to the main compound, the guardhouse and nearby facilities44.  The wall and gate were demolished but the Embassy itself was spared the worst of the effects45. The engine of the car was launched into a neighboring private sector of the city46. 

Al-Qaida rapidly announced responsibility for the incident, just two days after the blast47.  The online communique, signed by Sheikh Said, confirmed that the attack was in response to Zawahiri’s call to action against the Danish.  The Egyptian threatened more events if the Danish did not recant their blasphemy48.  Additionally, he followed up with an interview with Pakistani news agency GEO, published later in the month on 22 July, wherein he praised the bomber and expressed indifference towards the loss of local Pakistani lives, citing instead their heresy for working alongside the supposed apostates49. 

Ideologue of Concern

Current al-Qaida losses were exacerbated by the previous arrest of Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, depriving al-Qaida and their paramilitary units of experienced military leadership, with the exception of Khalid Habib.  Abdulhadi’s ambition of establishing an advisory position for the Iraqi al-Qaida franchise remained unresolved, and the recalcitrance of the Iraqi branch was manifesting tangible effects within the militant affairs of the Khorasan.  This was much to the frustration of bin Laden. Thus, Zawahiri and Sheikh Said were growing ever more concerned about the situation due to their emir’s unease, and it was heavily suggested that a court or committee be formed in order to finally achieve the aim of oversight and to resolve the differences between the core al-Qaida in the Khorasan and the Islamic State of Iraq.  Zawahiri suggested names for inclusion but stated that they would not be able to be present in person.  Atiyah was the most obvious choice, but his issues in travel had precluded him or anyone else from ever arriving in theatre.  Another choice was Abu Sulaiman al-Otaibi, newly arrived in Pakistan, and formerly the chief judge of ISI50.  Zawahiri was wary of the man because of his unfamiliarity with him, and the obfuscated details about his removal from his otherwise vital position in Iraq51. Sheikh Said described him as undisciplined52. Zawahiri compared him to a divorcee, implying unfaithfulness to his vows, and further disparaged him for his refusal to partake in an oath to al-Qaida53.  Zawahiri cautioned against utilizing Otaibi, as he feared insubordination from the new arrival, and was hesitant about the Saudi’s description and critiques of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and ISI.  The former judge was obviously disgruntled and engaged in an ideological conflict. Zawahiri simply stated that only a higher power could know if Otaibi was telling the truth54.

As a senior ideologue, who served the Islamic State of Iraq, Mohamed Saud Masad al-Thubaiti was known as Abu Sulaiman al-Otaibi55. In 2006 at the age of 26, Otaibi was a successful student of Islamic Law at the University of Mohamed bin Saud in Riyadh.  It was from here that he performed his first defection, crossing the border of the Kingdom into Iraq, and joining the ranks of al-Qaida56.  His departure in 2006 precluded him from being on a Saudi most wanted list for fighters in foreign theatres, as the initial was released in 2005.  Despite his criticisms of the Islamic State of Iraq and Abu Hamza, Otaibi accepted the occupation of primary judge in the network, being publicly revealed in March 200757.  Local al-Qaida leaders were petrified to report negative results and news to Abu Hamza and thus instead filled him with inaccuracies of a positive status58.  Furthermore, Otaibi was frustrated with the outfit fighting against other Sunnis attempting to prevent al-Qaida from taking control in their respective regions59.  All of this led him to voice his complaints to bin Laden and Zawahiri, and eventually flee again, this time to Afghanistan.  Firstly though, the Islamic State of Iraq sacked him on August 25, 2007 from his position as chief judge60.  Otaibi, however, in his mind was already departed to a new theatre. He traveled to the Khorasan that very month alongside associate Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani, assisted by Ansar al-Sunnah operatives, in order to remove himself from Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s rule and to provide a progress report to al-Qaida’s highest echelons61.  Otaibi described Abu Hamza al-Muhajir as unable to accept warranted criticism, unable to lead effectively, and prone to make drastic decisions.  According to Otaibi, Abu Hamza withdrew himself from the majority of his colleagues in order to enhance protection and was surrounded by mostly equally incompetent lieutenants62.  Otaibi blamed Abu Hamza for a disastrous excursion in Ramadi in 2007 that resulted in severe casualties for the network63.  Thus, Otaibi is often referred to as a defector from the Iraqi franchise.

Another interesting reason for Otaibi’s complaints was Abu Hamza’s religious fanaticism had led him to believe that the apocalypse was upon them all and that the world was ending soon.  Apparently this forced his hand in declaring Iraq as an Islamic State earlier than anyone would have wished64.  This misplaced fanaticism led him to make decisions not in accord with a proper battlefield commander trying to reduce casualties.  In the end he was reckless and Otaibi was but a single voice trying to expose the insanity65.  Observing from Somalia, al-Qaida official Harun Fazul described Abu Hamza as a contemporary of Zawahiri’s and member of EIJ, but that his most obvious attribute was his religious fervor and rigidity66.  Fazul stated that upon realizing that Abu Hamza was assuming control over AQI, he knew that immediate changes would be made and that chaos would ensue, with civilians endangered.  Harun Fazul declared that it is obvious that Abu Hamza would target Shia67.  His apocalyptic vision meant that no one would be safe.

Despite his reservations, Zawahiri offered a welcome to Otaibi, and had messages delivered to Iraq to verify his accusations68. This included one in November 2007, prior to Otaibi’s imminent arrival, inquiring as to why the senior official was no longer at his post and was instead departing Iraq69. This precipitated a series of three additional letters, one dated in January 2008 and the others in March, in which Zawahiri directly quoted Otaibi’s assertions and confronted Abu Hamza al-Muhajir about misguided or inferior ISI leadership personnel70. The final letter conceded that evidence was still being gathered and that Otaibi could be embellishing his story, but requested responding correspondence nonetheless71. This avenue proved to be difficult, as by April, ISI representatives had ceased communications with al-Qaida for several months72.

Otaibi was duplicitous, insinuating that he would take an oath, yet he avoided commitment and officially joining al-Qaida73. This was even though he was dispatched to assist Abu Yahya al-Libi on the Shariah Committee74. He lingered for a mere day before departing.  Otaibi instead linked with another Saudi, Abu Dhabbah al-Taifi, who ran his own autonomous militant outfit75.  Atiyah complained of Abu Dhabbah (Arabic for slaughterer) to bin Laden, describing him as a Najdi bedouin and veteran of combat in Afghanistan, who diverted from al-Qaida and reveled in the title and glory of independent command76. Zawahiri also held disdain for Abu Dhabbah, not only due to his manifesting a unique militant network, but his communicating directly with Arabs in the Peninsula without al-Qaida supervision.  Abu Dhabbah went astray from normal protocol and attempted to hold supplies and operations in the Peninsula to himself77.  Otaibi remained with Abu Dhabbah for a month under the false narrative of simply obtaining training, earning equal mistrust from senior leadership78.  When Otaibi was confronted about his responsibility of laboring for al-Qaida, Sheikh Said reported that the Saudi responded by declaring his alignment with al-Qaida, but refused obligation to the network because he had not sworn allegiance79. He then broke contact with leadership.

While Abu Hamza was incorrect about the end of the world, both controversy and existence did soon cease for Otaibi after his arrival and brief tenure in the Khorasan.  Otaibi was accompanied in death by Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani, the brother of Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, when they were killed in an American airstrike in Paktia province in May80. Later on May 11, they were eulogized by al-Qaida central command as opposed to their contemporaries in Iraq81.  This prevented Otaibi from assuming a potential senior role in the Khorasan at a time when US drone strikes were increasingly encroaching on enemy territory in Pakistan.  Whether this role would have been with al-Qaida or an independent actor such as Abu Dhabbah al-Taifi unit is an intriguing unknown. 

Slow Attrition

Al-Qaida retained other concerns, including the slow attrition of their forces from other factors, to include insubordination and combat in Afghanistan. Hamza al-Jawfi persisted as a troublesome outlier who acted and maneuvered independently82, free of constraints of the Majlis ash-Shura even though he was subject to its regulations as a member. He mendaciously acquired funds in the name of bin Laden and Zawahiri only to retain the finances for his own means83. In addition to this manipulation, Jawfi lied and accused fellow militants of falsehoods, becoming and a source of conflict among the jihadist commanders84. After gathering sufficient evidence, the Majlis ash-Shura recommended his banishment from the council and organization, turning the matter over to Zawahiri and bin Laden, requesting a public denouncement85. Sheikh Said recommended that there was no need to maintain Jawfi’s services86. Zawahiri deferred to bin Laden, citing an old interpersonal argument between the two, that had since been settled87. Atiyah also fretted over these fracturing Arabs, particularly Abu Dhabbah and Hamza al-Jawfi. He insisted that their disregard for authority could birth a reduced capacity to indoctrinate the influx of new recruits, and created the possibility that these rogue actors could intercept vital arriving assets88. Bin Laden responded to the concerns almost dismissively, and was of the opinion that an official investigation and trial of Jawfi would be detrimental to the organization. Thus, he ordered attempts at reconciliation89.

As for the situation with Abu Dhabbah and his supposed hold on the Arabian Peninsula, Sheikh Said held a conference in June 2008 in which he offered oversight of the region to Saleh al-Qarawi (Najm al-Khayr) on the condition that the Saudi officially swear to bin Laden and al-Qaida90. When Qarawi declined, opting also for independent operations, a frustrated Sheikh Said instead appointed Abdulmuhsin al-Sharikh (Sanafi al-Nasr)91.

In July, Zawahiri and Sheikh Said commenced a month wherein they eulogized many colleagues, commemorating their arrival to martyrdom with flourished statements and video issuances. Al-Qaida media production unit as-Sahab released such a video on July 8, 2008, commemorating of one of their long serving lieutenants Abu al-Hassan al-Masri (also known as Abu al-Hassan al-Saidi). While Abu Hassan’s downfall has been previously discussed, his martyrdom release provided interesting insight into al-Qaida command in 2008. Abu Entitled Commander Abu al-Hassan: Jihad and Martyrdom92, the video included speeches by three senior al-Qaida officials. Each was a Shura councilor representing a different facet of al-Qaida management.  Sheikh Said al-Masri, the internal manager, declared that Abu al-Hassan’s most remarkable aspect was his desire for martyrdom. Next was Khalid Habib, the overall paramilitary commander whom Abu al-Hassan served while specifically helming operations in Kandahar and Zabul. Finally, Abu Khalil al-Madani, was a Sudanese al-Qaida official previously unseen on video93. Internal al-Qaida documents described him as overseeing “special operations,” at this time94.  While Khalid Habib veiled his face, the others proudly displayed their own95. 

The video itself demonstrated Abu al-Hassan loading explosives into his truck of choice, but did not display an actual attack.  However, Abu Khalil claimed that Abu al-Hassan did in fact conduct a successful operation against a US convoy in the region of Paktia or Khost provinces96.  The al-Qaida officials all agreed that Abu al-Hassan was now a martyr97.  That they created such a long video for him, which includes large swathes of an interview with Abu al-Hassan himself98, indicates his importance to the organization and their acceptance of his martyrdom operation.  That being said no US deaths were reported in suicide bombings around that time, meaning that either Abu al-Hassan died in battle, was killed before his detonation, or detonated without severe casualties against the enemy. 

July also brought news of another al-Qaida demise, when Sheikh Said announced the death of Abu Abdullah al-Shami99.  The Abu Laith loyalist and Bagram escapee was killed in an American airstrike in Afghanistan sometime in the summer100.  Known also as Abu Moaz al-Suri, prior to 9/11 he was the facilitator of a Syrian guesthouse in Kabul. From the confines of this compound, Arab trainees received two-week courses in religious jurisprudence from Sheikh Issa al-Masri101. As observed by Sheikh Said in his statement dated July 14, the Syrian became a vigorous jihadist battlefield commander upon his return to action from his Bagram incarceration, earning him high praise from al-Qaida leadership at the time of his death102.  He was now the third of the escapees to be neutralized, and the second to be killed.  More importantly another Abu Laith lieutenant fell, and this contingent, while fully embraced by al-Qaida, was under the control of Abu Yahya al-Libi. 

A Mercenary Amidst Jihad

By July 2008, the US was poised for a new strategy in the drone campaign. Having already proven in the first half of the year that the increased campaign could be efficient and effective, President Bush authorized the CIA to continue the drone war unilaterally. This was aided by the support of new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and intelligence assessments that the Pakistani government would survive negative public opinions accrued from the strikes103. In fact, the new Pakistani government under President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yusef Raza Gilani were complicit in allowing the drone strikes to occur without interference, viewing the actions as beneficial in curbing the insurgency104. CIA officers informed the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, General Ashraf Kayani of the impending assault in July105. In an August 2008 meeting with US Ambassador Anne Patterson, the Pakistani Interior Minister suggested delaying drone strikes until after Pakistani military maneuvers in the FATA. Prime Minister Gilani disagreed, declaring: “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it106.” The CIA was demonstrating to the incoming Pakistani government that it could remove the “right people,” in an increasingly efficient campaign. Some militant operatives remained oblivious.

According to al-Qaida, Abu Khabbab traveled and maneuvered conspicuously, leaving warnings unheeded107. He was known to frequent compounds utilized by Uzbek militants that were already under scrutiny108. One such compound was converted into a religious educational facility for the offspring of the militants109. Herein, Abu Khabbab and his staff dwelled for an evening, while unbeknownst to them they were stalked.

Abu Khabbab al-Masri was born Midhat Mursi al-Said Omar on April 29, 1953110 in the bustling al-Asafirah sector of Alexandria, Egypt 111.  He remained in Egypt, attending Alexandria University, graduating with a degree in chemical engineering in 1975112.  Afterwards, he labored for Egypt, employed in their chemical weapons program113.  At some point he radicalized, joining the EIJ in country in 1979, and remaining in his occupation until 1987 wherein he fled to Saudi Arabia and then began his jihadist career in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion114.  It also appears that he spent some time in Egyptian custody in the aftermath of the Anwar Sadat assassination in 1981, much like several of his brethren in the EIJ115. 

His son Mohamed was born in Aqaba, Jordan in 1980116.  While Midhat Mursi operated in Afghanistan, his family dwelled in Peshawar, Pakistan, his children interacting with the bin Laden family often117.  Mursi’s wife and six children passed the time managing a café for the foreign fighters in Peshawar, while he spent most of his time away, returning to instill lessons to his children, or even to send some of them to training camps118.  This included two sons, Mohamed and Hamza, being exposed to militancy.  Mohamed for instance attended Khaldan at a very young age, although it appears his lessons focused on discipline as opposed to weaponry119.  At another point in 1988, Midhat Mursi was wounded in an accident while researching with chemical weapons, demonstrating that he was experimenting in this regard for the radicals even at this early point120.      

He appears to have spent significant time in the Khorasan on behalf of Zawahiri and the EIJ, and was accused of participating in the 1995 Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, via training and explosives121.  His son Mohamed visited his camp complex in Afghanistan at times, never participating in explosives manufacturing, but observing the scene122.  Midhat Mursi married a Pakistani in the mid-1990s123.  A consequence of this was that his family departed Peshawar in 1996, scattering around the Middle East in various occupations and conditions124.  Mohamed left his father, and participated in this carousel of professions across the region, before attempting to enter Egypt on fraudulent Yemeni documents in 2000, walking into the eagerly awaiting Egyptian authorities125.  He was incarcerated by the government his father so disdained.  The Egyptians were merely using Mohamed as a hostage of sorts, holding him in lieu of his wanted father126.  Meanwhile, Mursi and his profile increased due to his activities back in Afghanistan. 

While Midhat Mursi was not a sworn member of al-Qaida, he labored on their behalf, providing intelligent and skilled chemical and explosive expertise, and in return benefited from their finances and incentives127.  He was once reprimanded by Mohamed Atef for spending too much of the organization’s funding for a personal journey with his family to Egypt, while not tracking expenses, maintaining possession of the remainder128.  He continued to inappropriately utilize al-Qaida funding, and even abused other innocuous resources such as furniture and reading materials129.  Despite these improprieties, Mursi remained a necessary component of the EIJ and eventual ally of al-Qaida, providing vital services and infrastructure in Afghanistan in the late 1990s130.  He willingly trained operatives from al-Qaida, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and those bound for conflict in Kashmir. Additional coordination was conducted between Midhat Mursi and independent Levantine operative Abu Musab al-Suri in Afghanistan, with the latter comforting the former in April 1999 over an illness and fear stemming from the 1998 US airstrikes against al-Qaida facilities131. It is postulated though that Midhat Mursi’ services were financially motivated, as he did not share in the zeal of his peers in their hatred towards America132.  As a militant for hire, he provided his services for livelihood and a home133.

Zawahiri became fascinated in April 1999 by the idea of chemical warfare, ironically informed of the potential devastation by the American government and media, both of which continually assessed the possibility as a priority concern134.  The Shura Council accepted the proposal and research, and in May provided initial funding for Zawahiri’s vision135.  Given reason now to pursue such action, Zawahiri designated Midhat Mursi as in charge of the militant chemical weapons program, known by the moniker Project al-Zabadi136.  Discussing chemical agents, nerve gas, and other potential weaponry, Zawahiri issued Midhat Mursi his orders for the program137. By June, Mohamed Atef initiated the assembly of a facility138.

Mursi, as Abu Khabbab al-Masri, conducted his chemical research, experiments, and training at the Darunta camp, just outside of Jalalabad, giving reports to Zawahiri, who in turn relished in the efforts139.  Mursi’s kunya translated to “Father of the Trotting Horse140.”  The facility meanwhile, was named after the nearby Darunta Dam141.  As mentioned, Atef and others condoned the work but did not condone his liberal usage of the funds assigned to him142.  Analysts described the facilities as primitive and lacking the complexity to achieve the actual desired results143.  Midhat Mursi also complained about a dearth of qualified and educated assistants, recommending that al-Qaida send candidates to schooling abroad144.  Nonetheless, he produced several manuals on chemical warfare, but also focused on instruction in traditional weaponry as well145.  A disturbing video from this time period demonstrated the lethality of the chemical research.

CNN published findings from a collection of 64 al-Qaida related videos in August 2002 obtained from Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the war146. The video in question depicts an episode which garnered increased attention and caused grave concern among media and intelligence services alike147.  Found in the bombed ruins of Darunta camp, the video displayed three canines’ reactions and deaths from exposure to a nerve agent148.  The agent was not identified but some analysts predicted that it may have been sarin or another similar chemical149.  Essentially, a liquid nerve agent deployed as a gas150.  As the animals died, the presumed narrator Midhat Mursi gave orders to those dispensing the agent, and explained the fatal effects observed151. 

The evidence proving that al-Qaida had experimented with developing chemical weapons precipitated Midhat Mursi being added to the State Department’s Rewards for Justice site with a $5 million bounty152.  Journalists and intelligence officials found an abundance of evidence at Darunta, including recipes for chemical agents and references to lethal biological agents153.

Midhat Mursi was described by his students at Darunta as intelligent and knowledgeable with respect to chemistry, physics, and the manufacturing of explosives154.  In addition to cross training students, senior al-Qaida trainer Ali Said Mohamed Mustafa al-Bakri (Abdulaziz al-Masri) took advice from Midhat Mursi and utilized the gas on dogs as well155.  In fact, according to Aimen Dean, the notorious video of the dogs being poisoned was actually filmed at Tarnak Farms and narrated by Bakri as opposed to Mursi, although this cannot be confirmed156.  The two apparently worked hand in hand, once convening to spread rumors of al-Qaida nuclear capability in order to develop chaos and confusion within enemy intelligence services157. USS COLE bombing operatives were also said to have trained in explosives under Midhat Mursi at Darunta158. Infamous failed operatives were instructed directly by Midhat Mursi in Darunta as well, specifically Zacarias Moussaoui and attempted shoe-bomber Richard Colvin Reid159.

Despite his status as a mercenary for al-Qaida, Midhat Mursi remained with his dedicated jihadist peers, and fought against the American invasion at Shah I Kot in early 2002160. From there, he established himself among senior militants at a camp in the Shakai valley, South Waziristan161. His son Hamza meanwhile, was captured in Peshawar and delivered to the CIA for interrogation162. Even with the turmoil caused by Pakistani incursions, Mursi solidified his position in South Waziristan, operating explosives training infrastructure within, and laboring as one of the organization’s two most important bomb manufacturers163.

The disastrous 2006 Damadola airstrike in Bajaur was modified from early estimates of casualties into the inaccurate claim that Midhat Mursi had been killed.  Evidence eventually concluded that no important al-Qaida figures had perished and that Midhat Mursi was still alive164.  The US knew that he was not in any real leadership position other than being a superior trainer.  Students in South Waziristan were imparted explosives expertise in the mid-aughts from Midhat Mursi, representing one of his most vital contributions, including one favored pupil known as Abu Ghazwan al-Yemeni165. By 2008, Midhat Mursi remained active with his $5 Million bounty unclaimed (although the initial picture on the US State Department website proved inaccurate166).  Thus, he was a heavily pursued drone target as the campaign commenced in the expanded campaign. 

On July 28, 2008 the Predators found their mark in Zeralita village, within the Azam Warsak region of South Waziristan, killing Midhat Mursi al-Said Omar along with another of his sons (an 18-year-old), and members of his personal crew167.  A total of six were slain in the residence attached to the local mosque168. The Taliban instantly reported the assassination of Midhat Mursi, occurring the same day that Prime Minister Gilani was meeting with President Bush in Washington, DC169. His death was announced by Sheikh Said and later on August 3 via a eulogy presented by Zawahiri himself170.  He was survived by the remainder of his family, including two sons Mohamed and Hamza, both now imprisoned in Egypt171.  Although soon after their father’s demise, the two were released by Egyptian authorities172. Despite Midhat Mursi having not been an official al-Qaida member and the view that he worked for financial gain only, his dedication to jihad was evidenced by Zawahiri’s effusive praise of the militant, making special note of his perpetuation of terroristic actions through instruction173.    

As mentioned, Midhat Mursi and his son did not perish alone.  Much like Abu Laith al-Libi, the CIA was able to discover Midhat Mursi with his staff of advisors and lieutenants.  Thus, he perished with some of his closest aides. At the time of the strike, the al-Qaida Security Committee reported that Abu Khabbab was joined by Abu Islam al-Masri, Abdulwahab al-Masri, Abu Ibrahim, as well as Mursi’s two sons and a grandson174.  Abu Islam al-Masri, a companion of Midhat Mursi’s, alternately referred to as Sheikh Abu Islam, was eulogized by Sheikh Said in the days after his death in an official al-Qaida release, and later by Zawahiri175.  His real name was not given, but it was said that he fought both in Bosnia and Afghanistan and appeared to be well known to the Egyptian militant faction176.  Additionally, he was the brother-in-law to Midhat Mursi, and reported to have been a confidant concerning development and obtainment of chemical weapons177.  Abdulwahab al-Masri, alternatively referred to as a Sheikh, was also revered by Sheikh Said in his eulogy, and is referred to by Zawahiri as a life companion178.  This further suggests that the man was a venerated jihadist and close associate of the Egyptian militant circle.  He was described as patient, with Zawahiri remarking that injuries and “calamities” never deterred Abdulwahab179, suggesting that he had been fighting and waging jihad for some time. 

A third individual killed in the strike was identified variously as Ibrahim, or Abu Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abu al-Faraj al-Masri180 or Abu Mohamed al-Masri. He was revealed to be the son of former EIJ member and chief Shariah Judge Abu al-Faraj al-Masri181.   Abu al-Faraj al-Masri was in actuality Ahmed Salamah Mabruk, an important EIJ member and Zawahiri lieutenant182. Thus, his son was Ibrahim Ahmed Salamah Mabruk. Another of his sons, Musab, was executed in 1994 by the EIJ under accusations of espionage and attempting assassinations, all after being blackmailed by Egyptian intelligence officers183.  Ibrahim, however, remained with the jihadists, and was yet another companion of Midhat Mursi that was deemed of enough significance to be properly eulogized by both Sheikh Said and Zawahiri.  He is lauded as a brother and an educator, suggesting that he was a teacher and an ideologue for the group184.  Eulogizing militant and Islamist leaders referenced the fact that they had known Ibrahim from a very early age and therefore knew of his dedication and piety, watching him come of age in Yemen and Sudan among the jihadists185. Mabruk’s daughter meanwhile, was married to the aforementioned doomed Abu Islam al-Masri186. Ibrahim was raised in a militant family surrounded by these influences to mold him into the man he became and led him to his fate. 

Early drone strikes were unique in the ability to ascertain the identities and details of those slain, but as the frequency increased, a fog of war swept over much of the intelligence. With the Pakistani government condoning the drones, the CIA was eager to expand operations.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. Al-Qaeda Chief Dies in Missile Air Strike, by Jason Burke, The Guardian, May 31, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/01/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  2. Al-Qaeda Chief Dies in Missile Air Strike, by Jason Burke, The Guardian, May 31, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/01/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  3. Al-Qaeda Chief Dies in Missile Air Strike, by Jason Burke, The Guardian, May 31, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/01/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  4. U.S. believes strike in Pakistan killed key terrorist, by Josh Meyer and Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-may-24-fg-militant24-story.html ↩︎
  5. U.S. believes strike in Pakistan killed key terrorist, by Josh Meyer and Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-may-24-fg-militant24-story.html ↩︎
  6. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  7. Resurgence: The Magazine for a Resurgent Muslim Ummah, as-Sahab Media Production, Issue 2, Interview with Adam Yayihe Gadahn, Summer 2015 ↩︎
  8. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  9. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  10. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ashraf Salim Abdulsalam Sultan, ISN 263, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/263.html ↩︎
  11. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  12. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  13. U.S. believes strike in Pakistan killed key terrorist, by Josh Meyer and Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-may-24-fg-militant24-story.html ↩︎
  14. U.S. cites gains against bin Laden’s movement, by Joby Warrick, NBC News, May 29, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24885150 ↩︎
  15. Resurgence: The Magazine for a Resurgent Muslim Ummah, as-Sahab Media Production, Issue 2, Interview with Adam Yayihe Gadahn, Summer 2015 ↩︎
  16. U.S. believes strike in Pakistan killed key terrorist, by Josh Meyer and Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-may-24-fg-militant24-story.html ↩︎
  17. U.S. believes strike in Pakistan killed key terrorist, by Josh Meyer and Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-may-24-fg-militant24-story.html ↩︎
  18. U.S. believes strike in Pakistan killed key terrorist, by Josh Meyer and Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, May 24, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-may-24-fg-militant24-story.html ↩︎
  19. Al-Qaeda Chief Dies in Missile Air Strike, by Jason Burke, The Guardian, May 31, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/01/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  20. 6 killed in blast at Danish Embassy in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 1, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24926365 ↩︎
  21. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, ‘From Haji Othman to Azmarai,’ dated April 16, 2008 ↩︎
  22. Letter likely from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother, Sheikh Azmarai’, dated March 5, 2008 ↩︎
  23. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, ‘From Haji Othman to Azmarai,’ dated April 16, 2008 ↩︎
  24. 6 killed in blast at Danish Embassy in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 1, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24926365 ↩︎
  25. 9 Pakistani suspects remanded over Danish embassy attacks, Agence-France Press, January 30, 2009, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-73660 // 6 killed in blast at Danish Embassy in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 1, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24926365 ↩︎
  26. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, ‘Letter to my dear brother Sheikh Abu Mohamed,’ dated May 7, 2008 ↩︎
  27. Suicide Bomber Strikes at Pindi Mall, Kills Surgeon-General, Dawn, February 26, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/291066/suicide-bomber-strikes-at-pindi-mall-kills-army-surgeon-general ↩︎
  28. Suicide Bomber Strikes at Pindi Mall, Kills Surgeon-General, Dawn, February 26, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/291066/suicide-bomber-strikes-at-pindi-mall-kills-army-surgeon-general // Pakistan Army General Killed in Suicide Blast, NBC News via The Associated Press, February 25, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna23337367 ↩︎
  29. FBI Agents Match Explosives of Luna Caprese Attack, Dawn, October 9, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/879603/fbi-agents-match-explosives-of-luna-caprese-attack // 9 Pakistani suspects remanded over Danish embassy attacks, Agence-France Press, January 30, 2009, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-73660 ↩︎
  30. FBI Agents Match Explosives of Luna Caprese Attack, Dawn, October 9, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/879603/fbi-agents-match-explosives-of-luna-caprese-attack ↩︎
  31. FBI presence in bombed Pakistan diner adds to murk, by Simon Cameron-Moore, Reuters, March 16, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-fbi/fbi-presence-in-bombed-pakistan-diner-adds-to-murk-idUKSP12668220080317/ ↩︎
  32. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 1, The Knight and Emir Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Mohamed Khan) ↩︎
  33. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 1, The Knight and Emir Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Mohamed Khan) ↩︎
  34. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 1, The Knight and Emir Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Mohamed Khan) ↩︎
  35. Danish embassy bomber “from Mecca”-al Qaeda leader, Reuters, July 21, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP66665/ ↩︎
  36. Bomber Truck Was a Stolen Toyota Corolla, by Christina Agger, Avisen, June 3, 2008, https://www.avisen.dk/Pages/Guests/Articles/2020/ShowTemplatedArticle.aspx?ArticleID=11481&Type=11481 ↩︎
  37. Al Qaeda Calls for Attacks Against the West In New Tape, CBS News, September 5, 2008, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-calls-for-attacks-against-the-west-in-new-tape/ // Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 1, The Knight and Emir Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Mohamed Khan) ↩︎
  38. Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, April 8, 2009 ↩︎
  39. Danish embassy bomber “from Mecca”-al Qaeda leader, Reuters, July 21, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP66665/ ↩︎
  40. Al-Qaida claims it attacked Denmark Embassy, NBC News, June 4, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24976215 ↩︎
  41. Men acquitted over Pakistan bombing, Al-Jazeera, September 25, 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/9/25/men-acquitted-over-pakistan-bombing ↩︎
  42. Bin Laden’s Courier Tied to Pakistani-based Terror Group, by Thomas Joscelyn, June 24, 2011, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/06/nyt_bin_ladens_couri.php // Guantanamo Assessment File, Mohamed Ilyas, ISN 144, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/144.html ↩︎
  43. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mohamed Ilyas, ISN 144, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/144.html ↩︎
  44. 6 killed in blast at Danish Embassy in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 1, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24926365 // Danish embassy bomber “from Mecca”-al Qaeda leader, Reuters, July 21, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP66665/ ↩︎
  45. 6 killed in blast at Danish Embassy in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 1, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24926365 ↩︎
  46. 6 killed in blast at Danish Embassy in Pakistan, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 1, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24926365 ↩︎
  47. Al-Qaida claims it attacked Denmark Embassy, NBC News, June 4, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24976215 ↩︎
  48. Al-Qaida claims it attacked Denmark Embassy, NBC News, June 4, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24976215 ↩︎
  49. Danish embassy bomber “from Mecca”-al Qaeda leader, Reuters, July 21, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP66665/ ↩︎
  50. Letter likely from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother, Sheikh Azmarai’, dated March 5, 2008 // The First Defector: Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, The Islamic State, and al-Qa’ida, by Brian Fishman, CTC Sentinel, Volume 8, Issue 10, October 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-first-defector-abu-sulayman-al-utaybi-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida/ ↩︎
  51. Letter likely from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother, Sheikh Azmarai’, dated March 5, 2008 ↩︎
  52. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, “From Atiyah to Abu Abdullah,” dated March or April 2008 ↩︎
  53. Letter likely from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother, Sheikh Azmarai’, dated March 5, 2008 ↩︎
  54. Letter likely from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother, Sheikh Azmarai’, dated March 5, 2008 ↩︎
  55. The First Defector: Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, The Islamic State, and al-Qa’ida, by Brian Fishman, CTC Sentinel, Volume 8, Issue 10, October 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-first-defector-abu-sulayman-al-utaybi-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida/ ↩︎
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  63. Letters from al Qaeda Leaders Show Iraqi Effort is in Disarray, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 11, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/letters_from_al_qaed.php ↩︎
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  182. Veteran Egyptian Jihadist Now an Al Qaeda Leader in Syria, by Thomas Joscelyn, The Long War Journal, March 21, 2016, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/veteran-egyptian-jihadist-now-an-al-qaeda-leader-in-syria.php ↩︎
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