SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 43 – Convoy of Martyrs)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment XI – Mas’ul al-Amm (Chapter 43 – Convoy of Martyrs)

Those targeted by the expanding drone campaign in Yemen began to encompass a variety of narratives, and not just those of dedicated militants and terrorists, but those radicalized in prisons, and even by family. More and more, the associates suffered the fates intended for their leadership, as the campaign aimed to cripple AQAP infrastructure. These individuals represented the widening reach of the AQAP and Ansar al-Shariah messaging and branding, and the complexity of warring against such ideologies in a nation such as Yemen. The targets, this so-called convoy of martyrs, included the insidious ideologues that preached hatred as well as those susceptible to such influence.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

A Carousel of Ideologues

With the routing of Al-Qaida in Abyan, they had been forced deep into Shabwah province.  Adel Abdullah Thabit al-Abab found himself on October 4, 2012 with Saad Atef al-Awlaki, the AQAP emir of this province of refuge [1,2,3,4,5].  Described as the fourth most senior member of the franchise, behind only Qasim al-Rimi, Said al-Shehri, and Nasir al-Wuhaishi, the important ideologue had not released a statement since the desperate fleeing from Abyan [2,3].  Born in al-Radmah district of Ibb province [2], his father labored as an imam in Sana’a [1]. Eventually, Abab was educated in Salafism that evolved into radicalism at a Shariah institution in the Yemeni capital [1]. Becoming the caretaker of the center’s library, he engaged fellow students in deliberations concerning his extremist views. When Wuhaishi and his cohorts escaped from prison, Abab yearned to join them, and by July 2007 he had, resulting in the arrests of his father and brothers in a government effort to force his capitulation [1]. Instead, he became the primary AQAP ideologue. His last arguments were to justify suicide bombings, claiming they were a methodology of last resort only, and that the Yemeni authorities and soldiers should recognize their own flaws and lay down arms before situations warrant such drastic actions [6,7].  Now the arguments had gone silent.  Despite this quiet period, Abab was still being tracked by his enemies. Sometime in August 2012, Abab joined the infamous Dhahab family via marriage, taking as a wife the sister widowed by the assassination of fellow ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki [2].

Late in the morning on October 4, Abab was with an Egyptian aide named Abu Musab al-Masri when he gained visual on a drone above the rugged al-Said region of Shabwah [2].  The Egyptian was recently liberated due to the release of prisoners in Egypt during the Arab Spring, having been sentenced to 21 years imprisonment for Egyptian Islamic Jihad activities, and was now a rising AQAP official [2]. Fear overtook the militants as Abab fled in the vehicle, sprinting from justice, as he had in June upon abandoning AQAP’s so-called Emirate.  As the vehicle was destroyed by the initial projectile, Abab appeared to have escaped yet again, fleeing the wreckage into a ravine some distance away and abandoning the corpse of Abu Musab al-Masri [2]. But his fate was reversed when shrapnel from a second explosion pierced his skull [2,8].  Abab lingered for hours before death, and was entombed with the Egyptian in al-Said, while other victims were delivered to their homes [8].  Saad Atef al-Awlaki, although initially reported as killed along with an aide, actually survived [4,5].  Abdulrazaq al-Jamal, the oft AQAP embedded reporter, announced Abab’s demise on October 19 [3].  Abab failed to bring permanent sharia law to his homeland, perishing on a day where the US officially designated Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen as merely a portion of Al-Qaida [9].  A fact already well established in reality. 

Abab had reminisced that Ansar al-Shariah was devised as a way for the jihadists to introduce themselves calmly to the local populace in regions they were attempting to rule and to provide for, presumably to prevent the stigma that potentially came with the name al-Qaida [10].  To further this, Abab built an extensive team of fundamentalists to herald Ansar al-Shariah and its AQAP emirate.  As an example of what he intended to build, one such was a young protégé, a Saudi known only as Abu Hakim al-Najdi [11].  The young imam from Riyadh was to be included in Abab’s circle of trusted proselytizers [11].  Yet the young man insisted on participating in the protection of Abyan, instead of delving immediately into a media presence [11].  As such, he was shot in the head and killed during the Yemeni battle to free the captured province, thus depriving Abab of the potential of having a youthful voice in the AQAP religious rantings [11].  While Abu Hakim al-Najdi’s real identity remains unverified it can be concluded that since he did not depart the Kingdom until AQAP asserted dominance over Abyan in 2011/2012, he most likely appeared on neither List E nor F [11].  The religious justifiers of AQAP were collapsing, and now with both Anwar al-Awlaki and Abab deceased, Ibrahim al-Rubaish moved to be the primary ideologue of the franchise, assisted by Harith Ghazi al-Nadhari, and with taking this mantle, they properly eulogized Abab in a video March of the following year [12].  Yet the ideologues had in fact been joined by an even more intriguing figure.

Nasir Ali al-Ansi, although not formally introduced by AQAP until much later in November 2013 (in an interview with journalist Abdulrazzaq al-Jamal detailing his history [13]), had actually arrived in Yemen in 2011, returning only to be incarcerated for a half-year, before fulfilling his desire to join the Arabian jihadists [14].  Ansi, from the Yemeni city of Taiz, had spent his formative jihadi years in Bosnia, fighting the Serbians, beginning in 1995 [14].  From there he progressed to Kashmir, and from there to Afghanistan [14].  In the Taliban controlled country, he met with Osama bin Laden and subsequently joined al-Qaida [14,15].  Under the kunya Abduljalil, he became a trusted al-Qaida official, to the point where he was placed in charge of a guesthouse at the behest of bin Laden in 1998 [14,15].  It was a short-lived appointment, but only due to the fact that bin Laden deployed Ansi to the Philippines for an undisclosed purpose [14,15].  There are confusing narratives of his activities in the interim, but it is assessed that he returned to and operated in the Khorasan, rejoining with al-Qaida [15] -[A]. Eventually in Yemen, AQAP held Ansi in reserve, a boon to their strength and cause, in that a trusted al-Qaida member had returned home, ready to represent the organization.  Bin Laden obviously preferred having men he knew and trusted in important positions, and while he was no longer there to direct Wuhaishi, he had inadvertently provided him with another respected colleague, strengthening their jihadist reputation. 

AQAP expanded on this concept of furthering their credentials, and in 2012 also began to directly reach out to Western journalists [16].  While Ansi represented a venerated jihadist, speaking to and for the religious radicals, and Inspire connected with potential English-speaking soldiers or converts, this third avenue allowed AQAP to correspond directly with English speaking journalists, providing a means for them to communicate their message and justifications to a media that was rightfully hostile towards them.  To do this, a young Egyptian named Muhannad Ghallab was dispatched in 2012, contacting a freelance journalist named Iona Craig, whose occupation had brought her to Sana’a [16].  The Egyptian was amiable with the reporter, and had come to join AQAP the year prior, after the Arab Spring threw Egypt into political disarray [16].  Ghallab claimed the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan as his springboard into jihadism, inevitably leading to his capture in Egypt in 2005 as he attempted to join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s forces in Iraq [16].  Ghallab’s three-year prison ordeal and his education in Egypt made him a suitable candidate to be vested with the responsibility of distilling the AQAP message and story to a Western audience [16].  Wuhaishi knew that Western media could be an ally, especially in regards to the popular disdain of the increasing drone campaign. 

Convoy of Martyrs

October in Yemen was witness to more the lethal strikes.  On October 18, several missiles slammed into a farmhouse in Jaar, Abyan province leaving Nadir Haider Nasir al-Shadadi, the AQAP administrator for Jaar, dead with eight more of his men [17,18,19].  It appeared that the dawn air raid helped to avoid violence and suicide bombings that gathering jihadists were plotting [20].  Local sources named seven of the dead as AQAP militants under Shadadi [20].  Shadadi’s death was celebrated by the populace of Jaar who blamed him for the miseries the town had faced in the war between AQAP and the Yemeni government [19].  A further strike in Wadi Abida, Marib on October 21 killed four more militants in a moving vehicle [21]. Among those who perished was Sanad Abdullah al-Aqili, the brother of deceased AQAP official Hassan Abdullah al-Aqili [22].

The persistence of the strikes was impressive, but AQAP central leadership continued undaunted.  On October 22, Rubaish released a plea to a rival cleric to renounce and retract a fatwa he had released to speak against AQAP [23].  He attempted to give justifications as to why AQAP violence sometimes led to the deaths of other Muslims [23].  Seemingly it was normal business for the uppermost AQAP echelon.  This changed with the next drone operation.

A rarity in that the next strike that it was aimed at Saada province [24].  It seemed that Saada was becoming a transport hub for the network, from Marib and Jawf above, to Shabwah and Abyan below, particularly via the village of Wadi Abu Jabara [25].  The strike even drew the condemnation of the Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi given that his rebels were based therein [26]. The October 28 incident sent missiles screaming into structures in the village, killing three militants, reportedly including two Saudi financers of AQAP [24,25]. A Yemeni leader of the network was said to have been targeted and wounded, and was named by reports as Omar Saleh al-Tais [24,25].  It may have transpired that Said al-Shehri once again came under fire in the relentless campaign to silence him.  He was assessed as having survived a strike in late 2012 [27]. However, this strike was costly for Wuhaishi’s deputy, and he was severely wounded, losing a portion of his cranium, along with his right ear and eye [28].  Being that it was rare for the missiles to fall in Saada, it makes sense that such a high value AQAP official was present.  Yet Shehri, although seriously wounded, was able to be ferried to safety. 

Even former President Saleh’s ancestral village of Bait al-Ahmar, a suburb of Sanaa itself was not safe from the drone activity.  A cloud of controversy hung over the ruined car of Adnan al-Qadhi on November 7 [29,30,31,32] .  Qadhi and an AQAP companion, Radwan al-Hashidi perished in the strike [29,30,31,32].  Qadhi stood outside his vehicle in the evening air, speaking to his wife over the phone, and with the exclaimation that she heard, no doubt foresaw the means of his own death [29].  Hashidi was his local bodyguard and sheikh who supported AQAP [29].  Another AQAP member, Rabi Hamud Lahib left the scene just prior to the attack [29].  As a LT Colonel in the 1st Armored Division, under the command of the influential General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the necessity to kill Qadhi was immediately questioned [31].  His cousin was a member of parliament, and his neighborhood housed very important Yemeni politicians [29].  His position though had freed him once before, in 2008 when he was arrested for alleged involvement in the September 2008 US Embassy attack in Sana’a [29,30].  After six months, Qadhi was released, after being detained for his connection to the license plates of vehicles utilized in the attack [29].  As pointed out by Yemeni expert Gregory Johnsen though, the entirety of that perpetrating cell hailed from Hudaidah, the port on the Red Sea, making it unlikely Qadhi actually plotted with them [31].  Perhaps Qadhi had allowed for the attack to commence in some manner or provided support to it via his position in the capital and within the military structure.  The vehicular connection provides some credence for this idea that Qadhi was vital to the logistics of the event. Qadhi was a known AQAP sympathizer, who had been dispatched to levy with Tariq al-Dhahab during the crisis in Radaa, Baydah province [29].  Successful only in such a way as to prevent further American intervention in the region, Qadhi helped convince Tariq to retreat from the conquered town [29].  Qadhi also proudly displayed an al-Qaida flag in his home, but this still offered no evidence of his ongoing complicity in plots against American interests [29].  A reporter that met Qadhi’s brother confirmed that Radwan al-Hashidi was the only other casualty, but continued to demand answers as to why his brother was not arrested instead of being assassinated [32].  With such a prominent position, Qadhi lived openly, leaving his family incredulous as to his fate [32].  Others argued against this very idea, explaining that Qadhi’s close tribal affiliations coupled with his AQAP connections made it nearly impossible for the Yemeni government to capture him without incident [140-29].  As we have seen, even military officers have shifting allegiances within the troubled nation.  A military officer with distinct ties to AQAP, and who had previously fought the Russians in Afghanistan displayed a sincere willingness to subvert authority, recruit, and act for nefarious purposes [29].  A negotiator between AQAP and the government Qadhi appears to have been influencing the locals to join the cause [29].  It makes sense that his carefully positioned loyalties made it difficult for an ineffective Yemeni government to make a proper arrest.  As such, the Americans decided upon death for the LT Colonel, and the drone relied on accurate data from a tracking device planted on Qadhi’s vehicle by an adjutant of the Republican Guard named Hifdullah Mohamed al-Kulaibi and his youthful son Baraq [33,34].  The two were captured and labeled as spies in an AQAP propaganda production [33,34]. They admitted to placing another device in the home of Qadhi, and revealed the Yemeni military officers that instructed them on their usage [33,34].  It must be noted that the production clarifies that AQAP viewed Qadhi as a local commander within Sana’a [33,34].  The video ended with the insinuation that the father and son were executed as a result of their conspiracy [33,34].  The drone campaign was deep into the fabric of Yemen now, with Qadhi’s killing forcing journalists and others to delve into the question of the sanctity of American rules of engagement [31].  The juxtaposition of Qadhi’s assassination with that of a previously killed militant like Khalid Muslim Batis, who was sentenced to death for crimes already, is stark, but demonstrates how ingrained in Yemeni society and institutions the radicals had become. 

Arguably more important than Batis was his compatriot in the sentencing of Hamza al-Quayti’s Tarim cell: Abdullah Ali Saleh Bawazir [35].  The militant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment as opposed to death for his role in the Yemeni Soldiers’ Brigade (YSB) [35], yet he plotted relentlessly for liberation, and as such is credited with developing and coordinating the Mukalla prison escape [36,37].  Yet even before his YSB days and Tarim cell arrest and trial, Bawazir was a known fighter for al-Qaida in Iraq [36].  In particular he engaged in the Iraqi city of Samarra against the Americans [38].  He was apprehended in Syria and upon his return to Yemen, the militant was incarcerated in Mukalla [38].  Yet Bawazir forged ahead, adding to his jihadist career milestones.  After his escape, AQAP released two videos detailing their second major successful prisonbreak, with Bawazir in a prominent role, including “Story of Salvation.” [36,38].  On Christmas Eve 2012, this newest chapter for Bawazir came to an abrupt end [36]. 

A Sanaa native and AQAP militant named Amin Abdullah Mohamed al-Mualimi surreptitiously placed trackers with Bawazir and his comrades [39]. Recruited by Saudi intelligence while in Sweden, Mualimi conducted his betrayal at the behest of American operatives [39]. In the Shehr region of Hadhramout, just outside of Mukalla, missiles devastated a group of armed men on motorcycles in vicinity of a community soccer field, an event which also wounded surrounding civilians [40,41,42].  Bawazir was eliminated with six other militants, including fellow Mukalla escapees Nabil al-Khalidi and Musad al-Nahdi [36,37,43,44,45].  His peers initially mourned Bawazir and Khaldi only, but added additional names a day later [36,43,44]. Swiss Human Rights organization al-Karama stated that Nabil al-Khalidi was innocent and had been suspiciously and unnecessarily incarcerated in Mukalla without charge [42]. However, it must be noted that his participation in the escape [45], his continued presence with Bawazir, and his inclusion on the initial AQAP eulogy [43] indicate otherwise.

In what was described as a hub for AQAP in the region, Wuhaishi was robbed of a budding group of new and dedicated soldiers for his cause, under the leadership of Bawazir, known to them as Abu Khalid al-Hadhrami [36,43,44].  Bawazir was later given recognition in the 14th edition of the AQAP series “Martyrs of the Peninsula,” with this detailed biography penned by renowned AQAP religious chanter and fellow Mukalla escapee Ghalib Baqaiti (Abu Hajir al-Hadhrami) [38].  Bawazir was perhaps more important than he seemed, being yet another Al-Qaida in Iraq veteran inserting his experience into the Yemeni version of this ceaseless war, and providing Wuhaishi with a pathway to Hadramout.  However, the AQAP focus on Mukalla and Hadramout was not to cease with Bawazir’s demise.  By the later portion of 2013, the former Abyan emir, Khalid Said Batarfi, was transplanted from a Political Security prison in Sanaa to one in Mukalla [46].  Having been arrested in Taiz in 2010 while visiting family, he was sidelined during the actual battles for Abyan [46].  Now incarcerated in Mukalla, he patiently awaited his time of ascendency and rescue. 

Christmas Eve did not bode well for another middle ranking AQAP militant either.  Having been an important portion of the organization from its earliest days, Abdulrauf Nassib had seen the evolution of Yemeni militancy.  Having been an intelligence officer, he represented the original close ties of the Saleh regime with the jihadists [47].  In a post 9/11 world, this relationship could not be so conspicuous.  Nassib had survived the assassination of Abu Ali al-Harithi in 2002, been arrested assisting the Egyptian Islamic Jihad founder Said Imam al-Sharif, and been released from prison shortly after Wuhaishi’s mass escape from political prison in February 2006 [47,48,49].  Although staying in the shadows, and not being an operational member, Nassib was no doubt vital in allowing the group to coordinate with sympathetic government elements.  He dwelled in Lawdr, within the AQAP emirate, until its fall in May earlier in the year [50].  Having fled to Baydah province, it is unknown exactly how safe Nassib felt, but his record had thus far been remarkably fortunate [50].  The drone strike destroyed a vehicle, leading to news that a Jordanian was killed, alongside yet another Mukalla escapee [50,51].  Yet Nassib’s relatives revealed that he was the actual second victim [154-50].  The run of escapes ended in the fire and flames of a demolished vehicle, much of the same sort that he had avoided in 2002.  His demise was closure in an unusual character’s chapter in the annals of AQAP.  Others remained shrouded in mystery.  For example, one could only wonder about the whereabouts of Jamal al-Badawi, the USS COLE bombing conspirator, and Mohamed Hamdi al-Ahdal, who had taken credit for the MV Limburg strike.  Both were prominent during the early iterations of the Arabian al-Qaida franchise, and now appeared to be dormant associates.  Perhaps they continued to persevere as jihadists behind the metaphorical curtain, and perhaps they were ever present in the minds of the Americans who sought them out for justice.  In the meantime, AQAP associates like Nassib fell to the onslaught. 

Neither did the attacking drones forget Abdulrauf al-Dhahab.  A December 29 strike in Radaa, Baydah killed three men including one alleged AQAP member, Saleh Mohamed al-Ameri [52,53].  Truthfully, the Ameri family in Radaa was closely interconnected with Abdulrauf al-Dhahab and his family, unfortunately placing them in the direct line of fire against the Dhahab patriarch [54].  The US pursued Dhahab at great cost to the local families in which the AQAP sympathizer had enmeshed, with no real evidence yet that Abdulrauf was actively participating in AQAP operations. [52,53].  The year opened with the initial strike of 2013 also occurring in Radaa, Baydah.  While Dhahab was the sought-after prize, it was a brother in law of his, Tariq, Qaed, and Nabil that perished.  Muqbil Abad al-Zawbah, described as another AQAP member within the family, died along with two of his fighters [55,56].  It was an operation conducted without collateral damage this time, in the hunt for Dhahab and his brothers.

These strikes were diminishing Wuhaishi’ ranks, but it was still, in reality, of minimal effect.  Furthermore, the Saudi wanted lists had not seen a reduction in some time from the drone campaign.  The first strike in a late January cluster of events, helped to change this.  On January 19, 2013, in what appeared to be a running chase of drone against vehicle, a number of militants were eventually killed [57,58].  Ismail Said Jamil al-Obaidi, the brother of former leading AQAP militant Ali Said Jamil al-Obaidi (Abu Muwahid al-Maribi) was among the dead in an incident located in Wadi Abida, Marib province [59].  Ali Mohamed Sufyan al-Amari, known as Abu Yusef, perished in the flames, only to be memorialized in the 16th issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula,” for his history of imprisonment for abduction and bombing plots, his attempts at travel to Afghanistan, and his eventual obedience to Wuhaishi [60].

Yet also counted among the dead were two Saudi AQAP operatives [57].  Both of these casualties factored into List F. The first was Abdullah Ali Abdulaziz al-Suwaid (F-28), while the second was Walid Jarbou Eid al-Jalidi al-Harbi (F-45) [58].  Described as a low ranking soldier, Suwaid trained at a camp in al-Majalah in Abyan, before assuming duties working in their media and administration networks [58].  He held an interest in maintaining reports on the imprisoned AQAP members in Saudi Arabia, informing his superiors on the status of incarcerated comrades and forebearers such as Faris al-Zahrani [58].  Harbi meanwhile, was known to his fellows as Abu Zubair al-Qasimi [58].  In the previously discussed story of Ibrahim al-Khalifa (Abu Jandal al-Qasimi), a deceased AQAP fighter, it was revealed that Harbi was imprisoned in the aftermath of the battle of al-Ras in Saudi Arabia [58,61].  After his time at Safra prison, he departed the Kingdom radicalized, and bringing his friend Khalifa with him found a home with the revitalized AQAP [61].  Harbi rose through the ranks, commanding a unit during the Abyan battles, and finding himself wounded fighting for Zinjibar [58].  In his recovery he was named emir of Marib province for AQAP [58].  This appointment makes sense as the drone strike resulted in the death of the previous Marib emir’s brother.  Harbi and Abu Muwahid al-Maribi had seemingly switched roles during the fighting in Abyan with the latter eventually perishing in battle there while the former recovered and filled in as the point man for the province [62].  It was in this role that he met his death.  The US drones had reduced the newest Saudi wanted list by two.  For a certainty the original 16 men of List F suspected to be in Yemen was now lessened by three killed, including the two described above as well as the suicide bomber Turki al-Shahrani (F-8), who had been recently eulogized in October 2012 in the 11th issue of the AQAP release “Martyrs of the Peninsula [63].”  At least two others can be surmised as having surrendered from Yemen, as mentioned in Segment IX (Abdulsalam Abdulaziz al-Farraj F-23 and Khalid Hadal al-Qahtani F-13).  This still left Wuhaishi with a sizeable contingent of wanted Saudis. 

Both Suwaid and Harbi were honored in the second iteration of the AQAP video series Convoy of Martyrs, released in July 2013 [64].  This edition was subtitled in English.  In addition to the above List F members, several known AQAP casualties were profiled, but the video also contained the revelation that Abdullah Hamid Hamad Mohamed al-Jadani (F-25) had been shot down during the fierce Abyan campaign, a casualty of the Yemeni defeat of the AQAP emirate [64].  His corpse was shown to the sound of Islamic chanting among scenes of his more vivacious earlier days [64].  The Saudis of AQAP decreased again, but Jadani was soldier, not a leadership figure. 

A Family Suffering

The toll of both the iniquity of AQAP and the devastating drone strikes was evident throughout Yemen.  A primary example is found with the al-Hassani family.  Their young daughter Abeer fled the confines of an unwanted marriage only for her older brother Bandar al-Hassani to force her into the grip of Omar Ahmed Omar al-Hubishi (H-5) [65,66].  Hubishi was obviously known, having been on List H, to be involved with the jihadists [66].  As 20 years her senior, Hubishi dominated the young girl, abusing her and their eventual children [65].  In public though, he was charismatic, recruiting young men to the ranks of AQAP [65].  His own contributions to AQAP went further than recruiting, as he participated in AQAP propagandizing and lent his voice as a munshid, or chanter to their video releases [65]. Hubishi became famous in the jihadist circles for this voice [65].  Eventually he recruited Abeer’s brothers to the cause:  Bandar, and even her younger siblings Abdulmajid and Abdullah [65].  Hubishi distributed funds from wealthy donors to the families of martyrs in combat theatres, and to assisting those wounded therein [65].  Abeer was able to also escape this marriage in 2010 via divorce [65].  Hubishi lingered in Yemen with AQAP until early 2014, wherein he fled to Syria, and joined ISIS (infamous Islamist terror network that broke away from al-Qaida) as the munshid Abu Osayed al-Madani [65].  But Hubishi had committed irrevocable damage to the al-Hassani family already.  Bandar was jailed in the custody of Political Security agents in 2004 and kept for two years alongside of al-Qaida militants [65].  His release in 2006 coincided with Wuhaishi’s prison escape and Bandar seems to have given his loyalty to the evolving AQAP in Yemen.  By 2009, Abdulmajid was jailed for his allegiance to the network, and himself remained imprisoned until 2012 [65].  Upon release, Abdulmajid was obsessed with the idea of martyrdom and tortured by anger against his own nation [65].  He joined with Bandar in Marib before moving on to a training camp in Jawf [65].  As for Abdullah, Abeer and her family made futile attempts to get the young militant to abandon his new cause [65].  Abdullah was transformed into a loyal jihadist, providing medical aid to fighters in the battle for Abyan [65].  Despite the family visiting him in Jaar in 2012, Abdullah chose to remain behind [65].  A short time later, Abdullah was killed when the Yemenis liberated the fallen province [65]. 

Bandar and Abdulmajid fared even less well.  A January 20 drone strike on a vehicle on the highway between Marib province and Sana’a, and Jawf beyond left Bandar dead [65,67,68].  Along with him were two low ranking Yemeni jihadists named Qasim Nasir Tuayman and Ali Saleh Tuayman [67].  These men had been imprisoned prior for their willingness to fight for Wuhaishi, and upon release had rejoined AQAP in defending Abyan [67].  Having survived the battle, they now perished alongside of Bandar on the highway [67].  Interestingly, Abdulmajid died the very next day, in a drone strike that killed three fighters in a training camp in Jawf province [65,68,69].  A family lay in ruins, Bandar’s child orphaned, and Abeer struggling to understand the reason her brothers had to die for such a perverted cause [65]. 

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

[A] One report claims that Ansi is the individual Abduljalil, praised by Atiyah Abdulrahman within internal al-Qaida communications to bin Laden and proposed for the position of second deputy [15]. However, we assess this is almost certainly a younger Saudi militant operating under the alias Abduljalil al-Hijazi [70] as opposed to Ansi. It was Abduljalil al-Hijazi who was captured in 2001 by the Northern Alliance General Sayyaf and held in Kabul for three years with fellow militants Abdullah Azzam al-Zahrani and Ahmed Omar Abdulrahman (Saifullah), before being released and ascending the al-Qaida ranks.

© Copyright 2026 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a Reply