SERIES: Predators Of The Khorasan – Unilateral Assault

Written by Nolan R Beasley

American clandestine forces progressed with their unilateral offensive against al-Qaida officials based in Pakistan, unleashing a barrage of drone strikes from summer 2008 through the end of the year. The campaign against terror represented a bizarre form of warfare, in which the Americans struck significant damage against the leadership figures of al-Qaida, the Taliban and their allied movements, while these same entities responded with suicide bombings, IEDs, mass shootings from insider threats, and other surprise actions.  This point is key: the forms of violence represented here were surprise attacks conducted by each side in the conflict.  Rarely were the two sides opposed in direct battle, and when they were it was usually one-sided, with American and ISAF forces prevailing.  This phase of the war witnessed the first ground assaults into Pakistani territory, proving to the militants that no supposed haven was safe. Nonetheless, the insurgents attempted to conduct these direct assaults as part of their ambush actions, in order to face their enemy in battle. 

Khost

As an example, insurgents prepared a response to American airstrikes and occupation via a multipronged assault on Forward Operating Base Salerno near Khost City in Khost province.  On August 18, two vehicle-borne IEDs were brought to the gates of FOB Salerno by suicide bombers1.  The first detonated, but failed to breach into the base, while the second bomber was neutralized by Afghan security forces2.  The initial explosion left 10 Afghan civilians dead and 13 wounded3.  One of the killed suicide bombers was Turkish, supporting the theory that perhaps the Islamic Jihad Union and Haqqani Network were involved, although the IJU never referenced this individual4.  Another militant with the deceased second potential bomber was captured, and the base had survived the worst of that day with the early morning attack5.  During the darkness of August 19 though, the assault came6.  Between 15 and 30 militants were prepared to raid and breach FOB Salerno, led by a Saudi al-Qaida militant referred to as Abu Tayib al-Sharqi, the alias of one Tulaihan al-Mutairi7 – [A].  Later, Sheikh Said al-Masri proudly referenced the coordination between al-Qaida and the Taliban when conducting this operation and others8.  He specifically referenced that al-Qaida plotted the FOB Salerno attack with support from the Taliban, while in other cases al-Qaida provided the support for a Taliban helmed mission9.  Occurring within the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, it stands to reason that they were responsible for providing the Taliban support.

Abu Tayib al-Sharqi

The militants were armed with bolt cutters in order to penetrate into the base10.  The midnight attack commenced as mortars were launched in a diversion so that the perpetrators could close the distance to the base perimeter; among them seven prepared suicide bombers11.  ISAF and Afghan National Army forces located and engaged the militants well outside of the perimeter, resulting in the elimination of at least six suicide bombers prior to them reaching their preferred destinations12.  It is believed that the airfield at FOB Salerno was the intended target, and ironically it was air support that determined the outcome of the battle13.  Several American helicopters engaged the militants repeatedly, and held off the onslaught, while supporting ground forces and performing medical extractions of the wounded14.  In fact, the al-Qaida commander of the assault, Abu Tayib al-Sharqi was killed by air assault after the failure of the raid15, presumably by the responding helicopter gunships.  Even minor al-Qaida members and associates understood that the assault was a failure and produced poor results16.  Although Americans were wounded, none perished in the incident, and the helicopter pilots received awards for their heroic actions17.

Prior to the Khost assault, US officials made a disturbing assessment of necessity, resulting in President Bush issuing an executive order allowing incursions into Pakistan to dislodge entrenched militants18. As there was sincere consternation over the decision within the administration19, the preferred method remained the more covert Predator attacks. Thus, a string of drone strikes commenced from the summer into autumn. An August 12 incident saw four missiles target one of a pair of training camps in Bhagar, South Waziristan, some 22 miles west of Wana, killing nine to ten belligerents of Pakistani, Turkmen, and Arab origins20. Pakistani officials claimed the munitions originated from NATO or Afghan forces from across the border21, while coalition forces vehemently denied the assertion22. While immediate media sources noted the camps were established by the Hezb i Islami -Gulbuddin (HiG)23, an American assessment revealed the strike eliminated affiliates of primary South Waziristan insurgent Mullah Nazir and al-Qaida operative Fahd Mohamed Ali Musalam (Osama al-Kini – the operations commander for Pakistan)24. In a separate strike around 1900 on August 20, a drone sent two missiles careening into the compound of Yaqub Wazir, in Zari Noor, near Wana, South Waziristan, killing at least eight25. Soon after, militants of the Mullah Nazir faction secured the scene and rescued three, including a wounded Yaqub, who was a facilitator of the peace accords between the Pakistani government and militants in the FATA26. He was also said to frequently host Arabs in his residence, thus precipitating its obliteration27. The Pakistani intelligence again attempted to divert blame to US forces in Afghanistan as opposed to the stalking drones, despite the fact that rescuers witnessed the craft airborne over the razed compound28.

A week later on August 27, a drone targeted a supposed al-Qaida conference in South Waziristan, yet blundered and went astray, fortunately causing no collateral harm29. Coming full circle, an August 30 strike again aimed to eliminate the network of Osama al-Kini. At least four were killed at 1630 when a missile targeted a rental home in Gangi Khel tehsil30 near Wana, known to be utilized by foreigners31. Intriguingly, two of the deceased were stated to be Canadians of foreign descent32. The American assessment simply declared that those slain were subordinates of the Kenyan operative33. The deaths of the Canadians remained unconfirmed. The following day, a drone attacked a Dawar tribesman’s domicile in Ghundi, near Tappi, North Waziristan, killing at least six to include Uzbeks and Arabs34. Administrators in the FATA assessed eleven killed, to include foreign females and children, plus two bystanders, the wife and child of a neighbor35. While the Americans asserted that two “prominent” paramilitary officials were slain36, they failed to mention the civilian casualties or name the targeted militants.

Western Prospects

The Canadians

The idea of Canadians among the operatives of Osama al-Kini acts as a reminder of the minimal but significant community of Westerners in the Khorasan laboring for al-Qaida. In regards to Canada, three University of Manitoba students, having been self radicalized via the internet, departed Winnipeg in March 2007 for the harsh reality of jihad in the FATA and Afghanistan37.  Having agreed by December 2006 to embark on the sojourn, they had already alienated their peers with their jihadist language and propensity to view extremist videos38.  Texan Muhannad Mahmud al-Farekh joined Canadians Ferid Imam and Maiwand Yar to join al-Qaida39.  Despite the concerns of others, Farekh’s family was fully convinced that he was traveling to Pakistan for further education.  In fact, his father toured a university with him in Pakistan40.  Ferid Imam, an East African immigrant to Canada and his two conspirators, and two others had completed the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca in December 2006, perhaps precipitating the intense religious fervor in the three41.  Yar meanwhile, whose family was of Afghan origin, had been involved with drugs, specifically crack-cocaine, prior to his radicalization42. 

The three were incorporated into the training camps and operations based out of the FATA.  Ferid Imam did well enough in his training that by 2008 he was educating other Western recruits in explosives43.  Farekh became known as Abdullah al-Shami (not to be confused with the Syrian lieutenant of Abu Laith al-Libi), and was involved in both cross border attacks into Afghanistan and at least tangentially involved with external operations under Abu Saleh al-Somali44. 

At first glance, the fates of Imam and Yar could be explained in the two supposed Canadians killed in the August 30 drone strike near Wana.  However, these individuals were described as Arab-Canadians, and neither Imam nor Yar were of Arab origin45.  Further Yar’s family received a letter from their wayward son in early 2009, and via relatives in the region were able to speak with him by phone shortly thereafter46.  Pertinent to the story though and additional proof of survival, is the fact that Ferid Imam acted as a trainer for Americans planning to stage an attack in New York City47. 

The Americans

On August 28, 2008, three Americans, Najibullah Zazi, Zarein Ahmedzay, and Adis Medunjanin flew from Newark, NJ to Peshawar via Doha48.  Following a string of vetting and introductions, the men, who were seeking jihadist training, were taken to North Waziristan where they formally met Abu Saleh al-Somali 49.  Originally planning to join the Taliban, the three were targeted for recruitment by al-Qaida almost immediately after arrival in Peshawar50.  In fact their attempts at joining the Taliban were truncated when they were refused entry into Afghanistan at the border51.  From Peshawar, they were ferried to Waziristan by an enigmatic intermediary known only as “Ahmed” or “Zahid52.”  There they met with a full range of external operators serving on the committee overseeing the endeavors.  Most prominently their recruitment, handling, training and assignments were overseen not just by Abu Saleh al-Somali, but by Adnan al-Shukrijumah and Rashid Rauf as well53.  With their access to critical targets coveted, the men were met with a convoy of vehicles the day they met Abu Saleh54.  With him was Rashid Rauf, who gravely informed them that they would need to make a choice to become suicide bombers55.  Shukrijumah convinced the men to return to the US and carry out attacks, and along with Abu Saleh, conspired with them to utilize improvised explosives against mass transit in New York56.  Merely three years after the London transit bombings, Rauf was now presented with the opportunity to conduct a grandiose sequel, offering an appropriate crescendo to his year since escaping custody.  Training was conducted with the men from September to December 200857.  Basic warfare was taught to include small arms and RPGs58.  While Medunjanin departed Peshawar for Newark on September 25 after initial militant training, Zazi and Ahmedzay remained for further advanced explosives training, specifically in November 200859.  With their agreement to become suicide bombers, the trio received detailed training on bomb construction, using basic materials to include flour, oil, hydrogen peroxide, and acetone60.  Zazi was a voracious student, taking notes, and emailing them to himself upon completion61.  The external operators discussed specifics with Zazi to include target selections such as the New York Subway system62.  Upon their return, Zazi and his conspirators would continue communications with Abu Saleh al-Somali and Shukrijumah through “Ahmed” only63.

Zazi was not alone in his advanced training.  Young Pakistani jihadist Abid Nasir was also with the American in November 200864.  Nasir hailed from Peshawar, and had traveled to Britain in 2006 in order to pursue university education in Liverpool; a school in which he met a friend from Miranshah, North Waziristan named Tariq ur Rahman65.  Nasir’s roommate was Hamza Khan Shinwari, a Pashtun asylum seeker who had been in Britain since 2000, and who ironically would be potentially involved in a plot against the nation that had saved him from the Taliban66.  Both Nasir and Tariq ur Rahman conducted a return journey to Pakistan, having both dropped out of their original college courses67.  This was also during the timeframe of September to November 200868.  Nasir’s training was obviously the same as Zazi’s advanced instruction, and in November 2008, Nasir set up an email account by which to receive instructions from the same “Ahmed” as well 69.  He was then dispatched to Britain to conduct attacks in Manchester, with the same knowledge in explosives construction70. 

The Marriott Attack

Closer to the epicenter of al-Qaida infrastructure, Pakistan remained susceptible to devastating terrorist incidents. Despite the August attempts to dismantle the network of Osama al-Kini (Musalam), the operations commander for Pakistan was able to strike in resounding fashion in September, against the capital of the nation which he targeted. The Kenyan, his deputy Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, and their network of accomplices successfully bombed the Marriott Hotel of Islamabad71. Again, Musalam relied on Pakistani operators, including a Baluchi belligerent known as Qari Yasin who aided in plotting the atrocity72.

Being a mere 100 yards from the nearest roadway, the precarious nature of the hotel’s security was a source of consternation with American and other foreign security authorities, until such a time as the compound was ostensibly fortified73. However, on September 20, Musalam dispatched his operative with a massive vehicle-borne explosive device, taking advantage of laws allowing the transport of construction materials at night74. The dump truck, large enough to need six wheels for its load of bricks, was further outfitted with 1300 lbs of explosives75. Veering left from the busy street and smashing into the security gate while scattering guards, the truck was in place just 60 ft from its target, poised to devastate the six-story hotel76. As the startled guards gathered courage, they engaged the vehicle with gunfire, as seen on a security video of the indicent77. Inside the truck, the suicide operative detonated a vest, killing himself and ripping the canopy from the cabin78. The fire from the cabin spread throughout and set the vehicle ablaze79. With the truck rendered immobile at the main entrance, the fire flourished for another three minutes80. Security guards labored in futility to tamper the flames, including one with a fire-extinguisher and others with water, to prevent further chaos before fleeing81. The surrounding public became aware to the impending disaster and urged each other to safety82. Eventually at 1950, the fire ignited the lethal cargo of TNT, RDX, mortars, and aluminium powder83, disrupting the nearby security camera84, and sowing unfathomable destruction to the facility. The resulting blast obliterated the parking and loading areas where most of those murdered were located85, and was essentially an act of excavation, leaving a crater with an approximate width of 60 ft and depth of 25 ft86. The hotel itself suffered the breaking of natural gas pipes, which was followed by a major structural fire87. The roof of a hotel restaurant collapsed upon its patrons as several broke their daily Ramadan fast88. By the next day, 53 fatalities were recognized, along with 106 hospitalized victims89. The toll rose to 57 killed and 266 wounded90, with three Americans among those slain91. Two of them were servicemembers stationed at the US Embassy in Islamabad, US Air Force MAJ Rodolfo I. Rodriguez and US Navy Cryptologic Technician Third Class Petty Officer Matthew J. O’Bryant92. They were joined in death by the Czech Ambassador, Ivo Zdarek, assassinated in the blast93. Previously assigned to Vietnam, Zdarek was newly arrived in August to Pakistan94.

The Pakistanis initially placed blame upon the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi organization95 before eventually the FBI and local authorities came to the conclusion that Musalam and his network, referred to as the “al-Kini group” were culpable96. Immediately, the attack was recognized as the largest bombing within Pakistan in seven years97, while other sources held that it may have been the worst in Pakistani memory98. Musalam was now responsible for the most powerful bombing in Pakistan at the Marriott, coupled with the most lethal, his October 2007 attempt against Benazir Bhutto99. Bhutto’s widower, President Asif Zardari rapidly took to Pakistani television to commiserate with his people over the carnage and vow justice, distancing real Muslims from the religious fanatics to blame100 -[B].

Unilateral Assault

Helicopter Raids

Around 0300 on September 3, dozens of US Special Forces operators in multiple helicopters conducted the first incursion into Pakistani territory, launching a surprise assault on militants housed in Angor Adda, South Waziristan, resulting in a number of people slain101. Three Chinooks ferried 45 Navy SEALs from a squadron of SEAL Team Six into action102. One of the helicopters offloaded its cargo of lethal assailants to engage with the surprised residents, while the others maintained the perimeter and a dedicated watch103. Pakistani authorities estimated 18 were killed among four targeted homes104. Both women and men within the compounds fought against the raiders105, yet it appeared that no major al-Qaida officers resided within. Pakistani officials acknowledged that four militants were killed, but held that the rest were civilians, to include the women and even children106. NATO allies rejected the idea that they could be persuaded to joining the cross-border raids, while the Pakistani government vehemently condemned the actions107. The Pakistani military claimed not to have been forewarned of the impending assault, and General Ashfaq Kayani reiterated that no foreign incursions would be tolerated108. This was in contrast to new President Asif Ali Zardari, who had a more tepid and indifferent response to the action109.

On September 15, another raid was apparently attempted, but as two Chinooks prepared to land in vicinity of Angor Adda, locally stationed Pakistani forces opened fire on the US forces, precipitating the helicopters’ retreat into Afghanistan110. Neither US nor Pakistani authorities confirmed the event, despite tribal witnesses. Other sources noted that the Chinooks were landing in Paktika, with support from seven helicopter gunships, and attempting to send their accompanying Special Forces across the border on foot111. Regardless, the resulting hours-long gunfire from the Pakistani military and associated tribesmen, along with the risk of a broader conflict, deterred the American advancement112.

Two US helicopters next attempted to cross the border on September 21, but this time into Lwara Mundi, North Waziristan113. After being fired upon by Pakistani forces including the Frontier Corps, the helicopters hesitated and then retreated. Half an hour later they returned, but were again dissuaded by indirect groundfire114. The series of events culminated on September 25 when Pakistan forces fired flares at least towards two OH-58 Kiowa observation helicopters, leveling accusations that the aircraft were in Pakistani territory. Supporting US ground forces responded with fire of their own, although no one from either side was wounded115.

Abu Wafa al-Saudi

The attempted and failed helicopter raids did not signal a cessation in the drone campaign, and thus the operational tempo from August progressed accordingly. This is especially true given that the methods were overseen separately by the US military and CIA respectively. A duo of North Waziristan strikes in early September targeted an al-Qaida official, with the second purportedly resulting in the militant’s demise. The episode represented what was the first major inaccurate intelligence assessment of the 2008 operations. Abu Wafa al-Saudi was an obscure al-Qaida commander unknown to the mass media prior to his reported death.  His importance stemmed from his rise through the ranks during a relatively limited tour in the theatre.  From 2006 onward he thrived as a logistician within the network, responsible for communications, administrative duties within the FATA, and eventual counterintelligence stationing116.  In 2008 the Saudi was overseeing the extensive communications courier network for the organization, thus allowing safe messaging of orders between senior members117.  He counted among his contemporaries the Bagram escapee Abu Nasir al-Qahtani who assisted Abu Wafa in ventures within eastern Afghan provinces until the former’s capture in late 2006118. 

Abu Wafa al-Saudi

The ever-expanding role of Abu Wafa, whose actual name was Abdulrahman Mohamed Zafir al-Dubaisi al-Jehani119, had earned the wrath of the CIA, and they began to hunt him during the latter stages of the year.  Several of his men, reportedly up to 10, fell in a drone strike on September 2120, which while not widely reported was later revealed by a leaked Pakistani government document to have occurred in Mohamed Khel, of the Datta Khel district121. Subsequently, drones destroyed the home of a Dawar tribesman in Char Khel122 killing five militants at around 1600 on September 4, resulting in the American assessment of Abu Wafa’s elimination123. The only evidence of his supposed demise was in the form of a leaked US document, published by Pakistani press, detailing his being targeted on both occasions124.  The report nor the media actually revealed his real identity nor did al-Qaida provide any evidence of death or a eulogy.  The September 2 strike meanwhile, was only confirmed by the leaked Pakistani intelligence report years later, which concluded that the drones had attacked the house of local tribesman Bakhtawar Khan Daur in Mohamed Khel, near Miranshah, North Waziristan125.  Interestingly, this report indicated only one local was injured and does not mention casualties among foreigners126, exemplifying the rampant misinformation stemming from the drone strikes and the inability to assess the situation immediately on the ground.

Abu Wafa was eventually listed by his birth name in January 2011, on a Saudi Arabian Most Wanted Terrorist List, and later by the US in a Treasury Department terrorist designation of him127 – [C].  He was initially described as a veteran jihadist who had fought against the Russians128, but this remained unconfirmed. Sheikh Said referred to him as Abu Wafa al-Madani and cited his previous Saudi military service and five years of security experience129.  As for his role in 2008, Abu Wafa was able to grow his brand and ascend towards the Shura Council130, all while the Americans assumed that he had died that day in September.

Abu Haris al-Suri

Designed to deliver a violent message to the Haqqani Network, the next drone strike targeted and destroyed the family madrassa, known as the Manba ul Uloom, and an associated residence on September 8131. While two missiles obliterated the home, four additional projectiles leveled the madrassa132. Several pupils of the institution were in attendance at the time of the 0930 explosions, and were subsequently wounded133. Within the ruined compounds, the carnage was abundant, as Jalaluddin Haqqani lost a sister, two wives, and various other family in the assault134. His son Badruddin was fortunate and survived the collapse of the domicile, while Jalaluddin himself and favored son Sirajuddin were elsewhere during the incident135. Over score of individuals were slain, with sources estimating several outsiders were among them136. The previously referenced leaked Pakistani report confirmed the strike on the madrassa, listing 23 fatalities, to include seven male, eight female, and five child civilians137. The final three were admitted as foreign elements in the report.

Thus, Haqqani family members were not the only casualties of the devastating attack.  Initially, Arab casualties referred to as Abu Hamza, Abu Qasim, and Abu Musa were offered to the media by Pakistani intelligence138. They were said to succumb to their wounds the following day139. The most important loss though, was Abu Haris (assessed to be Abu Haris al-Suri), who according to an injured madrassa security guard, was supposedly the recently appointed al-Qaida leader overseeing affairs in the FATA140. As such, his position would have been one of some influence, but he too lingered only a day before dying141.  Even as multiple Pakistani intelligence sources acknowledged his demise with his companions, US officials quelled the idea of Abu Haris as senior al-Qaida, instead relaying that he was more of a mid-level leader than someone of great importance142.  Regardless of his specific position, the fact that Abu Haris was dwelling and basing with the Haqqani Network exemplified the close working relationship of Afghan militant entities with Arab and other foreign insurgents. 

Abu Haris al-Suri was relatively unheard of prior to the strike.  In 2007, he was revealed to be leading a contingent of approximately 250 Arab and Afghan fighters calling themselves the Jaish al-Mahdi, and operating in Helmand province, Afghanistan143.  Al-Qaida of course, claimed this unit as an extension of itself144, but this may have only been representative of coordination between two likeminded groups.  Abu Haris was believed to be Syrian and a veteran of fighting the Russians in Afghanistan145, providing a reputation of clout and substance with the radicals.  His death was initially reported by Pakistani intelligence, which had made dubious claims previously.  However, the obscurity of his identity and those of his comrades lend some credence to the assertion, as if the Pakistanis were going to make up claims, they would have chosen a more well-known commander in order to bolster their own status as an ally to America in the War on Terror.  The additional witness in the form of the guard also adds credence to the intelligence officials’ claim.  For his part, Abu Haris was never heard from again in al-Qaida or militant propaganda, meaning it is most likely that he was in fact assassinated while being sheltered by the Haqqanis. For Abu Haris and even Badruddin Haqqani, the madrassa attack displayed the militants’ willingness to maneuver openly, careless and unaware in their operational security of the rapidly increasing pace of the drone missions. 

As mentioned, Abu Haris perished with companions, and being the early stages of the drone operations, their names were also provided.  This would not always be the case as the number of strikes dramatically increased.  For the Manba ul Uloom madrassa however, witnesses and Pakistani intelligence provided some identification of the deceased.  Despite later stating that only three foreigners were slain146, the Pakistanis described the four with accompanying details. Abu Hamza was identified as a Saudi explosives expert, and overseer of al-Qaida within the Pakistani city of Peshawar147. There is no evidence of his true identity and if his name appears on a Saudi most wanted list. Pakistani intelligence assessed Abu Musa as a lowly al-Qaida soldier also of Saudi nationality148. The interviewed guard from the madrassa indicated that Abu Musa’s first name may have been Abdullah149. A separate source gave a potential surname for Abu Musa of al-Khayani150. Neither of the Saudis or their aliases have been proven to match any member of the applicable Saudi most wanted terrorists lists. Abu Qasim, stated as being Egyptian, was another operator of minimal importance killed in the strike according to the Pakistanis151. The injured guard once again provided a potential given name, referring to Abu Qasim as Zain ul Abu Qasim, without elaborating152. Described as mid-level operatives by US intelligence who acknowledged the strike, the slain militants were assessed as captains within a “decentralized” insurgency153. As members of the Jaish al-Mahdi were described as long-standing intimate associates, it is assessed that the slain Arabs were loyal to Abu Haris al-Suri as a veteran of two decades of Afghan combat, and belonged to the broader jihadist movement being molded by the Haqqanis, as opposed to the specific al-Qaida network. As mentioned, no further reference to these individuals was made within al-Qaida internal communications. Instead, Abu Haris may have labored in the FATA on behalf of the Haqqani Network in order to coalesce Arab belligerents.

Abu Ubaidah al-Tunisi

Further casualties of the campaign were reported through September.  Abu Ubaidah al-Tunisi was killed in the September 17, 2008 drone strike on South Waziristan near the Afghan border.  His death was essentially confirmed in a leaked US document detailing 2008 strikes154.  However, it must be noted that the incorrect assumption that Abu Wafa al-Saudi perished, also originated in this document.  Abu Ubaidah and his men were stated to be killed while transporting rockets to a militant camp, thus making their cargo of weapons an important target in itself155.  The leaked document describes Tunisi as a High Value Target, diminishing the thought that he was collateral to the munitions156.  His real name was never revealed but the NEFA Foundation claimed he was a veteran of the war against the Russians in Afghanistan, much as was claimed about Abu Wafa157.  In fact, Abu Ubaidah was previously profiled in internal al-Qaida documentation dating to the winter of 2005-2006, in which he was described at the time as a militant administrative figure for Mir Ali, North Waziristan158. Already aged 53, he was revered for his jihadist experience in Bosnia159. Although there was no mention of previous Afghan jihadist experience, he was said to have traveled to Kabul to join the cause in 2000. Prior he worked as a carver in Italy, and intriguingly was said to have had a middle school education from the United States160. Persistently active and exhibiting signs of youth despite his age, his patience and willingness to interact well with the local populace made him a preferred administrative official in the FATA161.

To further the idea that the Tunisian actually did perish in the September drone strike, the Pentagon revealed that an al-Qaida member had been killed in the strike along with three Taliban comrades, most likely referring to Abu Ubaidah162.  Subsequent internal al-Qaida communications, between Sheikh Said and Osama bin Laden, also revealed the Tunisian as a known figure163.  Sheikh Said, while discussing the families of lost al-Qaida members including Abu Hassan al-Masri, referenced Abu Ubaidah al-Tunisi’s widow, indicating that he had in fact perished164.  The previous documentation noted that Abu Ubaidah was in the region with his Bosnian wife and three children. Furthermore, that Sheikh Said referenced him with no explanation of his identity165 indicates that bin Laden was at least familiar with the individual and that the Tunisian must have been a close affiliate of the network.

Khalid Habib

Owing to the strikes of August in South Waziristan, paramilitary commander Khalid Habib displaced from Wana to a remote village within the agency, in hopes of avoiding assassination. Meanwhile, the Predators prowled the tribal skies. A September 30 incident in vicinity of Mir Ali, North Waziristan, in which a drone fired twice into a residence, reportedly killed five, including foreigners166 -[D].

This set the stage for dual strikes on October 3, as confirmed by American intelligence authorities167. One strike sent missiles into two homes in Datta Khel, North Waziristan, succeeding only in killing two women and a child168. The second occurred in the aftermath of militants engaging US forces across the border in Khost. Pakistani military sources attempted to deflect by saying US firepower targeted the insurgents within Afghanistan. However, the actual responding drone strike leveled a compound in North Waziristan belonging to Afghans and reportedly killed 21, including 16 of Arab and Central Asian descent169. Occurring in Mohamed Khel, within the Datta Khel tehsil near Miranshah, the Pakistanis acknowledged that the strike against the home of the immigrants killed ten locals and seven foreigners, displaying the disparity between various casualty reports during the drone war170. As locals buried the deceased, reports emerged that those slain included the two immigrant Afghans and six family members171.

Sources claimed that upwards of 30 militants, both Taliban and al-Qaida, were meeting on October 9 in a compound owned by a local sympathizer in North Waziristan, when they were selected for death172. However, almost all participants egressed from the compound naturally, 10 minutes prior to two missiles shredding the structure to debris. Initial sources stated six Arab combatants of no leadership value, and three civilians were killed173. According to the Pakistanis, five civilians perished in strike in Tappi village174. A later investigation substantiated the claim of civilian casualties and refuted the idea of a militant gathering, instead displaying an innocent local family event mistakenly targeted by the CIA175.

Next, two missiles delivered by a drone on October 11 leveled what was described as a mud-walled “shanty” structure in the Machis Colony of North Waziristan, resulting in initial reports of the deaths of an estimated five militants to include foreigners176. The location was owned by a local in the mostly abandoned Afghan refugee community, and was a known destination of militants177. While the incident reportedly wounded several, only four local militants were assessed by the Pakistanis as slain in Machis178. Next the strikes returned to South Waziristan.

Khalid Habib is attributed the quote, “If we all get killed, there is no fear for jihad, for the message was delivered (to the nation)179.”  This indicated that the state of the jihad in the Khorasan was in the hands of the new generation as the old perishes in the conflict.  The new generation would take up the cause.  The Egyptian spoke arrogantly and dismissively of death, but he was suffering from his injuries from the war thus far.  Of note, Khalid Habib had complained of successive wounds, indicating that combat or previous airstrikes had taken their toll on his physical health. In a portion of an undated letter to bin Laden, he lamented this situation and observes that his health is deteriorating180.  Khalid Habib admitted to incurring injuries just six months prior to penning the missive181. Perhaps this explains his reasoning in fleeing to the smaller village of Taparghai in South Waziristan, abandoning Wana in order to exfiltrate himself from the heavily bombarded locale182.  The paramilitary leader was already weak, and as such vulnerable.   

Transplanting to the smaller village was unwise for several reasons. He was further from Wana but closer to Makin and the foundation of Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP. He also drew significant attention, with locals recognizing his importance and bestowing the moniker “Zalfay” upon him, which was a Pashto word recognizing his longer hair183. At 1100 in the morning184 on October 16, the Egyptian’s immobile Toyota station wagon was destroyed by a drone strike, killing four and ending the arduous career of Khalid Habib185. A leaked Pakistani assessment only listed two victims, a local and a foreigner.

With him that day as an aide was Hassan Ghul, the Pakistani courier who had made his way to jihad and freedom from CIA and Pakistani custody.  As he reached out to open the car door for Habib, the missile struck and the explosion flung Ghul away, leaving him with a shattered shin and some shrapnel wounds186.  Surprisingly, Ghul survived and recovered187.  US intelligence officials estimated that Khalid Habib was the fourth most senior al-Qaida official in theatre188, an assessment that passes scrutiny due to the paramilitary nature of his position. Other operatives based in the FATA were devastated by the loss of Khalid Habib.  Jihadists commenced hagiographic stories of Khalid Habib’s corpse emitting no odors but pleasant scents from his blood189.  After the burned and ruined body was placed in a vehicle prior to burial, Abu Yahya al-Libi visited to see the remains of the militant commander190.  Other mourners included the Kunar province al-Faruq Battalion commander Abu Hassan al-Rimi, who openly lamented the loss of his superior paramilitary officer191.

Khalid Habib hailed from Egypt under the birth name Shawqi Marzuq Abdulsalam al-Dabbas192. He first arrived in the Khorasan region in 1988, partaking in training at Sada and al-Faruq camps. An exemplary student, he advanced and excelled in various levels of training, becoming proficient with a multitude of weapons. He then spent significant time as an instructor himself, while also fighting along the front lines. He ascended to the role of a respected commander, earning both the admiration of his men, and his first of many wounds. Once civil war engulfed Afghanistan and the al-Qaida infrastructure transplanted to Sudan, Khalid Habib remained in order to develop alongside Abdulwakil al-Masri (Mustafa Fadhil) the training regiment to be utilized by al-Qaida camps for years to come. He then moved to be with al-Qaida based in Africa, before returning with the entire infrastructure to Afghanistan under the new Taliban hosts in the mid-1990s.

In the late 1990s, Khalid Habib was recognized as a deputy of the al-Qaida Security Committee under Saif al-Adel, having labored as a guard and driver for bin Laden193. He was one of the few trusted traveling companions of bin Laden in the aftermath of the invasion in 2001194. However, he did not remain long or disappear into Pakistan with bin Laden, but rather joined with the failed Arab defense of Kandahar195. The battle was overseen by Saif al-Adel, and Khalid Habib participated by helping man an old tank utilized by the Egyptian Sheikh Amir al-Fateh. Despite surviving for several days, the tank was eventually targeted and destroyed by American aircraft196. Remarkably, Amir al-Fateh and his men avoided death, yet Khalid Habib suffered a shrapnel wound to the skull, resulting in the temporary paralysis of his left side.197 Reportedly, as he was carried to safety on a stretcher, he refused medical care until he could properly distribute his personal funds to the appropriate jihadists198. Despite a four month absence due to the wounds, Khalid Habib recovered and commenced developing training infrastructure in the FATA199. As we have mentioned, at this point he was stationed at Angor Adda along the South Waziristan border with Afghanistan200. During his extended time as al-Qaida paramilitary commander, Khalid Habib oversaw the evolution of al-Qaida fighters from the vestiges of the old all foreign (mostly Arab) Taliban unit Brigade 55, into a revived entity known as the Lashkar-al-Zil, absorbing belligerents from a wide variety of Pakistani militant organizations of Punjabi and Sindhi origins201. Acting in conjunction with the TTP, Haqqani Network, and other elements, as a portion of the broader Afghan Taliban insurgency, the Lashkar-al-Zil began maneuvers in 2007, becoming a feared efficient combat force202.

Bin Laden wrote to Ayman al-Zawahiri in late 2008 about the death of Khalid Habib being reported in the media, and how he had since confirmed the veracity of the claim203. This correspondence occurred after a lengthy dark period in communication from bin Laden to his lieutenants; one in which he chose not to push any public statements during the US mid-term elections204. He offered his condolences to the Haqqani family over the drone strike on their madrassa, and discussed his opinion on the Mumbai terror attacks of November205. As Sheikh Said’s intention was to have Abdullah Said al-Libi take over paramilitary command from Khalid Habib after an instructional period, there was a readily available figure to assume responsibilities. Khalid Habib was said to be slated for Pakistani duties afterwards, although it remains unknown of what exactly these consisted.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] For more on Abu Tayib al-Sharqi (Mutairi), please see the SERIES: Fugitives of the Peninsula, as he appears as number 36 out of 85 on the fifth major Saudi Arabian most wanted list of militants, referred to in Series as List E.
  • [B] Zardari had addressed the Pakistani Parliament for the first time earlier on the same day, and was scheduled to attend a dinner in the Marriott that evening during the timeframe of the bombing. Instead, the dinner was moved unexpectedly for security reasons to the Presidential residence nearby to the hotel206.
  • [C] For more on Abu Wafa al-Saudi (Jehani), please see the SERIES: Fugitives of the Peninsula, as he appears as number 22 out of 47 on the sixth major Saudi Arabian most wanted list of militants, referred to in Series as List F.
  • [D] The Pakistanis later assessed 20 civilian fatalities on this date, but were obviously not referring to this particular strike, but rather one in South Waziristan that was likely meant to be the cross-border US helicopter raid of September 3 (as opposed to September 30)207.
  1. Profile of FOB Salerno, Khowst Province, Afghanistan August 19, 2008 Attack, American Veterans Center, https://americanveteranscenter.org/2023/07/fob-salerno-khowst-province-afghanistan-19-20-august-2008/#:~:text=In%20the%20closing%20hours%20of,service%20members%20and%20detonate%20themselves. ↩︎
  2. Profile of FOB Salerno, Khowst Province, Afghanistan August 19, 2008 Attack, American Veterans Center, https://americanveteranscenter.org/2023/07/fob-salerno-khowst-province-afghanistan-19-20-august-2008/#:~:text=In%20the%20closing%20hours%20of,service%20members%20and%20detonate%20themselves. ↩︎
  3. Profile of FOB Salerno, Khowst Province, Afghanistan August 19, 2008 Attack, American Veterans Center, https://americanveteranscenter.org/2023/07/fob-salerno-khowst-province-afghanistan-19-20-august-2008/#:~:text=In%20the%20closing%20hours%20of,service%20members%20and%20detonate%20themselves. ↩︎
  4. The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, by Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 8, August 2009 ↩︎
  5. Profile of FOB Salerno, Khowst Province, Afghanistan August 19, 2008 Attack, American Veterans Center, https://americanveteranscenter.org/2023/07/fob-salerno-khowst-province-afghanistan-19-20-august-2008/#:~:text=In%20the%20closing%20hours%20of,service%20members%20and%20detonate%20themselves. // FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php ↩︎
  6. FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php // Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province ↩︎
  7. FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php // Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province // From the Khorasan to the Levant: A Profile of Sanafi al-Nasr, by Kevin Jackson, Volume 8, Issue 9, September 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-khorasan-to-the-levant-a-profile-of-sanafi-al-nasr/ ↩︎
  8. The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, by Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 8, August 2009 ↩︎
  9. The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, by Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 8, August 2009 ↩︎
  10. Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province ↩︎
  11. FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php ↩︎
  12. FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php // Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province ↩︎
  13. FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php // Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province ↩︎
  14. Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province ↩︎
  15. From the Khorasan to the Levant: A Profile of Sanafi al-Nasr, by Kevin Jackson, Volume 8, Issue 9, September 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-khorasan-to-the-levant-a-profile-of-sanafi-al-nasr/ ↩︎
  16. The Evolving Role of Uzbek-led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, by Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 8, August 2009 ↩︎
  17. FOB Salerno Withstands 2-Day Taliban Onslaught, by Matt Dupee, The Long War Journal, August 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/fob_salerno_withstan.php // Militants kill 10, wound 13 non-combatants in VBIED attack in Khost province, CJTF-101 Public Affairs Press Release, DVIDS, August 18, 2008, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/22613/militants-kill-10-wound-13-non-combatants-vbied-attack-khost-province ↩︎
  18. Bush secret order to send special forces into Pakistan, by Simon Tisdall, The Guardian, September 10, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/12/usforeignpolicy.usa ↩︎
  19. Bush secret order to send special forces into Pakistan, by Simon Tisdall, The Guardian, September 10, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/12/usforeignpolicy.usa ↩︎
  20. Missile strike kills nine militants in Pakistan, by Hafiz Wazir, Reuters, August 13, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-violence/missile-strike-kills-nine-militants-in-pakistan-idUSSP21474220080813/ // Missile Strike Kills Ten Militants, Dawn, August 13, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/415364/missile-strike-kills-ten-militants#:~:text=WANA%20At%20least%20ten%20militants,of%20two%20militant%20training%20camps ↩︎
  21. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  22. Missile strike kills nine militants in Pakistan, by Hafiz Wazir, Reuters, August 13, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-violence/missile-strike-kills-nine-militants-in-pakistan-idUSSP21474220080813/ // Missile Strike Kills Ten Militants, Dawn, August 13, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/415364/missile-strike-kills-ten-militants#:~:text=WANA%20At%20least%20ten%20militants,of%20two%20militant%20training%20camps ↩︎
  23. Missile strike kills nine militants in Pakistan, by Hafiz Wazir, Reuters, August 13, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-violence/missile-strike-kills-nine-militants-in-pakistan-idUSSP21474220080813/ // Missile Strike Kills Ten Militants, Dawn, August 13, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/415364/missile-strike-kills-ten-militants#:~:text=WANA%20At%20least%20ten%20militants,of%20two%20militant%20training%20camps ↩︎
  24. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  25. Pakistan Missile Strike Kills Eight: Officials, Agence-France Press, August 20, 2008, https://spacedaily.com/pakistan-missile-strike-kills-eight-officials-999/ // ‘Cross-Border’ Missile Strike Kills Six, Dawn, August 21, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/317604/ ↩︎
  26. Pakistan Missile Strike Kills Eight: Officials, Agence-France Press, August 20, 2008, https://spacedaily.com/pakistan-missile-strike-kills-eight-officials-999/ // ‘Cross-Border’ Missile Strike Kills Six, Dawn, August 21, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/317604/ ↩︎
  27. Pakistan Missile Strike Kills Eight: Officials, Agence-France Press, August 20, 2008, https://spacedaily.com/pakistan-missile-strike-kills-eight-officials-999/ // ‘Cross-Border’ Missile Strike Kills Six, Dawn, August 21, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/317604/ ↩︎
  28. Pakistan Missile Strike Kills Eight: Officials, Agence-France Press, August 20, 2008, https://spacedaily.com/pakistan-missile-strike-kills-eight-officials-999/ ↩︎
  29. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  30. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  31. Two Canadians Killed in Wana Missile Attack, Dawn, August 31, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/319095/two-canadians-killed-in-wana-missile-attack ↩︎
  32. Two Canadians Killed in Wana Missile Attack, Dawn, August 31, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/319095/two-canadians-killed-in-wana-missile-attack ↩︎
  33. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  34. Six Killed in N. Waziristan Missile Attack, Dawn, September 1, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/319230/six-killed-in-n-waziristan-missile-attack ↩︎
  35. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  36. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  37. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material // Family Pleads for Leniency for ex-Winnipegger Convicted of Terrorism Charges, by Katie Nicholson and Vera-Lynn Kubinec, CBS News, February 28, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/muhanad-al-farekh-terrorosm-sentencing-family-1.4554488 // From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  38. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material // Family Pleads for Leniency for ex-Winnipegger Convicted of Terrorism Charges, by Katie Nicholson and Vera-Lynn Kubinec, CBS News, February 28, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/muhanad-al-farekh-terrorosm-sentencing-family-1.4554488 // Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ // From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  39. American Citizen Sentenced To 45 Years for Conspiring to Murder U.S. Nationals and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, March 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/american-citizen-sentenced-45-years-conspiring-murder-us-nationals-and-providing-material // American al Qaeda suspect faces U.S. terrorism charges, by Nate Raymond and Mark Hosenball, Reuters, April 2, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-operative/american-al-qaeda-suspect-faces-u-s-terrorism-charges-idUSKBN0MT20N20150403/ // Family Pleads for Leniency for ex-Winnipegger Convicted of Terrorism Charges, by Katie Nicholson and Vera-Lynn Kubinec, CBS News, February 28, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/muhanad-al-farekh-terrorosm-sentencing-family-1.4554488 // Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ // From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  40. Family Pleads for Leniency for ex-Winnipegger Convicted of Terrorism Charges, by Katie Nicholson and Vera-Lynn Kubinec, CBS News, February 28, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/muhanad-al-farekh-terrorosm-sentencing-family-1.4554488 ↩︎
  41. Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ // From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  42. Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ // From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  43. American al Qaeda suspect faces U.S. terrorism charges, by Nate Raymond and Mark Hosenball, Reuters, April 2, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-operative/american-al-qaeda-suspect-faces-u-s-terrorism-charges-idUSKBN0MT20N20150403/ // Indictment Unsealed Charging Additional Member of al Qaeda Plot, Ferid Imam, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, March 15, 2011, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2011/indictment-unsealed-charging-additional-member-of-al-qaeda-plot // Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ ↩︎
  44. American Al Qaeda suspect ‘plotted attacks against the West’, by Rob Crilly, The National, September 21, 2017, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/the-americas/american-al-qaeda-suspect-plotted-attacks-against-the-west-1.630712 ↩︎
  45. Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ // From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  46. From Canada to al-Qaeda: New York trial provides a window into Winnipeg’s ‘Lost Boys,’ by Joanna Slater, The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/from-canada-to-al-qaeda-new-york-trial-provides-a-window-into-winnipegs-lost-boys/article36287149/ ↩︎
  47. Indictment Unsealed Charging Additional Member of al Qaeda Plot, Ferid Imam, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, March 15, 2011, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2011/indictment-unsealed-charging-additional-member-of-al-qaeda-plot // Mounties lay terror charges against missing Canadians, by Colin Freeze and Greg McArthur, The Globe and Mail, March 15, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/mounties-lay-terror-charges-against-missing-canadians/article572373/ ↩︎
  48. Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 25, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-charged-terror-violations-connection-new-york-subway-plot ↩︎
  49. Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in Connection with al Qaeda New York Subway Plot, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, April 23, 2010, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2010/nyfo042310.htm // Al Qaeda Operative Convicted by Jury in One of the Most Serious Terrorist Plots Against America since 9/11, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, May 1, 2012, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-convicted-jury-one-most-serious-terrorist-plots-against-america-911 ↩︎
  50. Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 22, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/najibullah-zazi-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-use-explosives-against-persons-or-property-us ↩︎
  51. Al Qaeda Operative Convicted by Jury in One of the Most Serious Terrorist Plots Against America since 9/11, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, May 1, 2012, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-convicted-jury-one-most-serious-terrorist-plots-against-america-911 ↩︎
  52. Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 25, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-charged-terror-violations-connection-new-york-subway-plot ↩︎
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  54. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
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  56. Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, July 7, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/charges-unsealed-against-five-alleged-members-al-qaeda-plot-attack-united-states-and-united ↩︎
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  59. Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 25, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-charged-terror-violations-connection-new-york-subway-plot // U.S.A. v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Naseer, Adnan el Shukrijumah, Tariq ur Rehman, FNU LNU, and Name Redacted, Indictment, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, July 7, 2010 ↩︎
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  61. Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 22, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/najibullah-zazi-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-use-explosives-against-persons-or-property-us ↩︎
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  65. Manchester, New York and Oslo: Three Centrally Directed Al-Qa`ida Plots, by Raffaello Pantucci, CTC Sentinel, Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2010, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/manchester-new-york-and-oslo-three-centrally-directed-al-qaida-plots/ ↩︎
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  72. U.S. Strike Kills High-Profile Terrorist Leader, US Department of Defense Press Release, March 25, 2017, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1130245/us-strike-kills-high-profile-terrorist-leader/ ↩︎
  73. More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.htmltheguardian.com/world/2008/sep/10/usa.pakistanF ↩︎
  74. Al-Qaida, Pakistan Taliban eyed in bomb blast, NBC News, September 20, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26803768 ↩︎
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  78. Islamabad Marriott Bombing: September 20, 2008, US Department of State Overseas Security Advisor Council, Presentation, September 22, 2008 // Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
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  80. More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.htmltheguardian.com/world/2008/sep/10/usa.pakistan ↩︎
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  83. Islamabad Marriott Bombing: September 20, 2008, US Department of State Overseas Security Advisor Council, Presentation, September 22, 2008 ↩︎
  84. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  85. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  86. More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.htmltheguardian.com/world/2008/sep/10/usa.pakistan ↩︎
  87. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  88. More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.htmltheguardian.com/world/2008/sep/10/usa.pakistan ↩︎
  89. More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.htmltheguardian.com/world/2008/sep/10/usa.pakistan ↩︎
  90. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  91. Marriott in Pakistan reopens after deadly bombing, The New York Times, November 28, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/world/asia/28iht-29pakistanhotelFW.18956047.html ↩︎
  92. U.S. Strike Kills High-Profile Terrorist Leader, US Department of Defense Press Release, March 25, 2017, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/1130245/us-strike-kills-high-profile-terrorist-leader/ ↩︎
  93. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  94. Al-Qaida, Pakistan Taliban eyed in bomb blast, NBC News, September 20, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26803768 ↩︎
  95. Marriott in Pakistan reopens after deadly bombing, The New York Times, November 28, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/world/asia/28iht-29pakistanhotelFW.18956047.html ↩︎
  96. FBI Links Marriott Bombing to Al Qaeda, Dawn, June 29, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/854608/fbi-links-marriott-bombing-to-al-qaeda ↩︎
  97. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  98. More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.htmltheguardian.com/world/2008/sep/10/usa.pakistan ↩︎
  99. Al-Qaida, Pakistan Taliban eyed in bomb blast, NBC News, September 20, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26803768 ↩︎
  100. Official: Hotel blast ‘biggest attack’ in 7 years for Pakistan, by Zein Basravi, Reza Sayah, and Tomas Etzler, CNN, September 21, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/21/pakistan.islamabad.marriott.blast/index.html ↩︎
  101. U.S. Conducts First Raid on Terrorists in Pakistan, by Jonathan Karl, Nick Schifrin, Kirit Radia, and Luis Martinez, ABC News, September 3, 2008, https://abcnews.com/International/Story?id=5718172&page=2 ↩︎
  102. Six little-known stories about secretive Joint Special Operations Command, as told in a new book, by Dan Lamothe, The Washington Post, September 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/01/six-little-known-stories-about-secretive-joint-special-operations-command-as-told-in-a-new-book/ ↩︎
  103. American Forces Attack Militants on Pakistani Soil, by Pir Zubair Shah, Eric Schmitt, and Jane Perlez, The New York Times, September 3, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/world/asia/04attack.html?em ↩︎
  104. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  105. Six little-known stories about secretive Joint Special Operations Command, as told in a new book, by Dan Lamothe, The Washington Post, September 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/01/six-little-known-stories-about-secretive-joint-special-operations-command-as-told-in-a-new-book/ ↩︎
  106. Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid, by Jane Perlez, The New York Times, September 10, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/world/asia/11pstan.html ↩︎
  107. Bush secret order to send special forces into Pakistan, by Simon Tisdall, The Guardian, September 10, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/12/usforeignpolicy.usa ↩︎
  108. Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid, by Jane Perlez, The New York Times, September 10, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/world/asia/11pstan.html ↩︎
  109. Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid, by Jane Perlez, The New York Times, September 10, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/world/asia/11pstan.html ↩︎
  110. Pakistan says troop fire turns US helicopters back, by Zeeshan Haider, Reuters, September 15, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/pakistan-says-troop-fire-turns-us-helicopters-back-idUSISL34290/ ↩︎
  111. Pakistani soldiers ‘confront US,’ BBC News, September 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7396366.stm ↩︎
  112. Pakistani soldiers ‘confront US,’ BBC News, September 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7396366.stm ↩︎
  113. Pakistani Troops Twice Repel US Choppers: Officials, Dawn, September 22, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/937559 ↩︎
  114. Pakistani Troops Twice Repel US Choppers: Officials, Dawn, September 22, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/937559 ↩︎
  115. Pakistani and American Troops Exchange Fire, by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, September 25, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/asia/26military.html?hp ↩︎
  116. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders In Syria, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, May 14, 2014, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl2396 ↩︎
  117. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders In Syria, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, May 14, 2014, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl2396 ↩︎
  118. Al-Qaeda active in Pak tribal areas: Report, Hindustan Times, October 13, 2006, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/al-qaeda-active-in-pak-tribal-areas-report/story-CeUQtvmnn6OejseIw1TzqO.html // U.S.: Senior al Qaeda leader captured in Afghanistan, CNN, November 13, 2006, https://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/11/13/afghan.capture/index.html ↩︎
  119. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders In Syria, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, May 14, 2014, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl2396 ↩︎
  120. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  121. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
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  123. 5 ‘foreigners’ killed in ‘US strike,’ Dawn, September 5, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/857068/5-foreigners-killed-in-us-strike // High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  124. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  125. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ // Leaked Pakistani report confirms high civilian death toll in CIA drone strikes, by Chris Woods, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2013-07-22/leaked-pakistani-report-confirms-high-civilian-death-toll-in-cia-drone-strikes ↩︎
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  127. Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders In Syria, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, May 14, 2014, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl2396 // Kingdom seeks Interpol help to arrest 47 terror suspects, by Muhammad al-Sulami, The Arab News, January 10, 2011,
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  128. Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, April 8, 2009 ↩︎
  129. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated February 17, 2010 ↩︎
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  131. Haqqani’s Main Madrassa Hit in North Waziristan Attack, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 9, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/haqqanis_main_madras.php // US drones bomb madrassa in NW, by Shamim Shahid, The Nation, September 9, 2008, https://www.nation.com.pk/09-Sep-2008/us-drones-bomb-madrassa-in-nw ↩︎
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  163. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  164. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  165. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
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  169. 16 Foreigners Among 21 Killed in Missile Raid, Dawn, October 3, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/323797/16-foreigners-among-21-killed-in-missile-raid ↩︎
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  179. Attachment to a letter contained in bin Laden Abbottabad documents, “A simple summary on the reality of the situation in our arena in Afghanistan and Pakistan” ↩︎
  180. Fragment of Letter from Khalid Habib to unknown recipient, dated unknown ↩︎
  181. Fragment of Letter from Khalid Habib to unknown recipient, dated unknown ↩︎
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  191. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
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  203. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Mohamed,” dated approx. December 2008 ↩︎
  204. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Mohamed,” dated approx. December 2008 ↩︎
  205. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Mohamed,” dated approx. December 2008 ↩︎
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  207. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎

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