SERIES: Predators of the Khorasan – A Formidable Farewell

Written by Nolan R Beasley

As a fitting finale for their portion of the War on Terror, the last several months of the Bush Administration proved to be efficient, productive, and lethal. These months were a formidable farewell from the government tasked with directly engaging al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their affiliates. By no means was this an overwhelming victory, but rather a successful change in strategy that diverted from the normal and allowed for the critical wounding of the al-Qaida upper echelon. This secured the Bush legacy and cemented his status as a warrior President against the terrorist network. Al-Qaida could absorb such losses to a point, but they were nonetheless substantial. Further, 2008 provided a blueprint to the incoming administration, who themselves fully embraced and expanded upon the drone campaign.

During a November 12 conference in Pakistan, precipitated by the extreme unpopularity of the drone strikes among the Pakistani public, CIA Director Michael V Hayden discussed the tactic with Pakistani President Asif Zardari. Notably, Zardari nonchalantly dismissed concerns of civilian collateral casualties, expressing instead the desire to dismantle the militant command structure1. This despite the fact that publicly Zardari chastised USCENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, declaring the drone assaults as “counterproductive,” and a threat to diplomacy2. Director Hayden also alluded to a recent incident in which the CIA believed several Westerners and perhaps even Americans were killed in North Waziristan3.

The drone strike in question occurred on November 7, 2008 in Kumsham, North Waziristan. Reportedly, the target was a militant training facility, impacted by four missiles and destroyed, resulting in approximately 14 killed4. Among them were an estimated seven al-Qaida operatives as well as local Taliban5. Pakistani intelligence initially hailed the successful strike against the camp6, located close to the South Waziristan border and seemingly in the sphere of influence of Baitullah Mehsud. There was no initial word of Westerners among those slain, and the Pakistanis later only acknowledged eleven civilian deaths7. Despite providing cartographic descriptions of the campaign to the Pakistani government, the potential Western deaths were not explicitly written, but rather only spoken of cryptically at the conference8.

There was no respite, and on November 14, a drone strike was conducted in Garyum, North Waziristan. According to local press, nine foreign element fighters and four locals perished in the incident9. The home was owned by tribesman Amir Khan, whose connection to the insurgency included losing his father in battle against NATO troops the year prior in Afghanistan10.

Abdullah Azzam al-Zahrani

On November 19, 2008, the drones breached outside of the FATA for only the second time, slightly deeper into Pakistan, obliterating a tribesman’s home in Jani Khel, Bannu district11.  The leveled structure contained the bodies of five foreign militants, including that of Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi, the known deputy to Sheikh Said al-Masri who operated in Bannu, Pakistan12.  Despite the potential stress caused by a strike outside of the FATA, Bannu was in very close proximity.  The assassinated Saudi lieutenant’s actual name was Mujab Atiyah al-Zahrani and he would appear on the Saudi Arabian list of 85 most wanted militants later in February 200913.  The listing was not an indication of Zahrani’s survival because he indeed had perished in the November strike on Bannu14.  This was confirmed in a eulogy by his close contemporary and reliable source, the Saudi Sanafi al-Nasir, who noted that the Saudis listed Zahrani as wanted even though he was deceased15.  Zahrani was described as having been a recruiter, trainer and liaison between al-Qaida and Taliban elements in Pakistan16.  Zahrani was assessed as the conduit through which all new recruits entered the fight in the FATA17.  Captured German operative Aleem Nasir confirmed that Zahrani was very close to Mustafa Abu Yazid and that he was based in Jani Khel, Bannu, along with al-Qaida’s central bank or the Bait al-Mal18.  Aleem Nasir physically met with Zahrani in 2006 and 2007 while delivering money and supplies for the insurgency19.  Through the Aleem Nasir connection, Zahrani was also revealed as an associate of Khalid Habib, the former primary Al-Qaida paramilitary commander20. Born in Jabour, Saudi Arabia, Zahrani previously labored in the Saudi military before being recruited to travel to al-Qaida camps and join the organization21.  Specifically, he was associated with their Naval forces as a policeman, but did not complete his tenure therein.

At one point after the US invasion of Afghanistan Zahrani was imprisoned in Kabul by Northern Alliance officials (namely the Pashtun warlord Abdulrasul Sayyaf), alongside Ahmed Omar Abdulrahman (Egyptian militant and son of the infamous Blind Shaikh), and rising militant Abduljalil al-Hijazi before eventually being released22.  He was liberated in 2005, and at just 23 years old, made his way to Pakistan in order to provide an important logistical role within the group, initially as a deputy to Sheikh Amir al-Fateh in managing the armaments and ammunition stockpiles for the organization23. With persistent health issues, al-Qaida focused on his abilities within administrative duties as opposed to paramilitary. Internal documentation described him as theologically and intellectually compromised, destined to remain at the level of a mere weapons depot manager24. Remarkably, the Saudi either labored to prove his superiors wrong, or the steady attrition from losses forced his promotion. Thus, he became important, both for recruits and concerning relations between the foreign elements and the Taliban25.  As a deputy of Sheikh Said, himself the former financial officer of al-Qaida, it made sense for Zahrani to be located with the Bait al-Mal.  Saudi eulogist Sanafi al-Nasir expressed in forlorn details his sorrow at learning of his friend’s demise, but suggested that Zahrani had foreshadowed the event by dreaming of his own death in an explosion just a month prior26.  Sanafi al-Nasir described being in Helmand province Afghanistan upon receiving the news and named two of the other deceased in the drone strike as Hakim and Abu Shahid27.  The previous arrest in Pakistan of Aleem Nasir in June 2007, assuredly provided details on Zahrani and his location both physically and within the al-Qaida hierarchy28.  Captured American operative Bryant Neal Vinas also revealed to his interrogators the location of the Bait al-Mal in Jani Khel and its function of processing incoming Arab militants to the theatre. Vinas discussed the senior al-Qaida official (assessed as Zahrani) who oversaw the venture. While Zahrani may have operated in obscurity prior, the new details placed him within the sights and range of the CIA drone program in 2008.  His death was confirmed by US officials, yet the Saudis have not removed his name from their wanted list as they do not yet have a body. 

Abu Zubair al-Masri and Rashid Rauf

The twilight days of the Bush Administration saw their chances beginning to wane of further degrading al-Qaida, and this directly correlated with more frequent drone strikes.  Just days after the assassination of Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi, two hellfire missiles slammed into a fortified Taliban compound in Ali Khel, North Waziristan, at 0430 in the morning of November 2229, resulting in the death of a highly sought prize.  The night of 21 November saw vehicles arriving at the home south of Mir Ali, a structure owned by Mullah Sadiq Noor, the Dawar militant and associate of Hafiz Gul Bahadur known for his draconian implementation of Shariah law in the agency.  Noor was allowing al-Qaida operatives to meet and conduct business out of the building30.  This was described as an operational conference by media sources31. Among them was an operative that former TSA Administrator Kip Hawley later described as having haunted him during his time leading the agency.  There in Sadiq Noor’s compound was the Austrian Abu Zubair al-Masri, (the assumed identity of Abdulrahman Hussain Hilal). 

Abu Zubair was a legitimately valuable target for the campaign, later cited in British media as the primary target of the strike. Thus, his potential assassination served two dominant purposes, the first of which was to ensure the legacy of the outgoing Bush Administration and enshrine their successful efforts against al-Qaida. The other was preventative in nature, as there existed a narrative that al-Qaida could launch an assault to test and shake the incoming Obama Administration.  The sense of dread he draped upon American officials was lifted upon news of his death in the strike on November 22, 2008 in Ali Khel.  Men loyal to Hafiz Gul Bahadar attempted rescue, but the building was too unstable and collapsed in on itself amidst the flames.  The young Austrian, described as similar in looks to Nicholas Cage, and whose appearance but more so his skill, was more than capable of carrying out operations in the West was now neutralized.  The Bush administration desperately wanted his death, even though he was unknown to the mass media prior to his demise, due to his previous associations and European connections.  The blonde Austrian was given enough posthumous importance that he was even postulated to be the new External Operations chief, yet this was untrue, and as previously described, it was more accurate to describe him as a component of a committee.  His looks and history made him a prime candidate for operations against airliners, and the Americans were very cognizant of this potential.  As was al-Qaida, and thus as has been chronicled, he rapidly associated with the likes of Abu Yahya al-Libi, Khalid Habib and others.  Yes, he may have ascended to a senior role with planning, but his primary contributions were vastly based around his explosive capabilities and his Western cultural knowledge.  He had watched as three of his Egyptian seniors fell to either counterterrorism operations or disease.  Despite the death around him, he continued forward to achieve his supposed destiny.  He had the intelligence to case out and select target airliners and to infiltrate a European or American city.  After the demise of Abu Ubaidah due to disease, and the assassination of Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri in quick succession, Abu Zubair and his partner Rauf must have been derailed in their plotting responsibilities.  They were promoted by necessity and experience, but not apparently above the role of External Operations committee.  While the committee method seems to be what al-Qaida went with during this time period, the most senior member was neither Abu Zubair nor Rauf, but the previously discussed Somali militant deeply entrenched with al-Qaida:  Abdulrazzaq Abdi Saleh, alias Abu Saleh al-Somali. Nonetheless, Abu Zubair and Rauf were the most efficient external operators.

It was serendipitous given their relationship that the Americans may have removed two key external operators in the same instance.  For it was revealed that Abu Zubair perished alongside Rashid Rauf. In fact, Pakistani and foreign press focused on Rauf’s death first among the five fatalities of the strike, only giving cursory reference to the fallen Abu Zubair32. Nonetheless, there was considerable consternation and debate to come over the fate of Rauf. His family, legal counselors, and others affiliated with Rauf remained in disbelief of the assassination narrative, with some instead claiming that he was returned to Pakistani ISI custody and later murdered33. In April 2009, sources linked Rauf to an intended suicide bomber in Brussels, resulting in the conclusion from across authorities and media alike that he remained a viable al-Qaida asset34. Even British intelligence services MI5 and MI6 were bold enough to predict that Rauf had maybe survived and was still thriving and plotting by September 200935. However, in October 2012, the Rauf family based in Birmingham, England, announced impending litigation against the British government due to their role in coordinating with American authorities in order to achieve the assassination36. Thus, despite initial denials from the family, they now acted with certainty as to their kin’s demise. While Western authorities struggled to gain fidelity on the reports of Rashid Rauf, al-Qaida internal communications were much clearer. Atiyah Abdulrahman lamented the losses of both Rashid Rauf and Abu Zubair (whom he referred to as Anas) to bin Laden in an August 2009 missive describing the degraded state of external operations resulting from the November strike37. Atiyah described Abu Zubair as previously trained and overseen by Abu Ubaidah al-Masri38. Atiyah insinuated that despite other candidates, the most adequate individuals who could have ascended into external operations command were now erased. Certainly both of these eliminations would ensure the legacy of the Bush Administration.

Perhaps most interesting in the story of the targeting of Abu Zubair and Rashid Rauf was the timing.  While Bryant Neal Vinas claimed to have never interacted with Rauf, and by default Abu Zubair neither, they were still essential to Abu Saleh’s goals and it is quite possible that the knowledge Vinas possessed on Abu Saleh’s network infrastructure resulted in the critical drone strike39.  Vinas and his cooperation were so appreciated by American authorities that at a court hearing in 2017 he was sentenced to time served and released, with prosecutors acknowledging his immense role in damaging al-Qaida40. Vinas later directly indicated that he was in fact responsible for drone strikes subsequent to his capture41.  

Fahd Mohamed Ali Musalam and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan

The effects of the drone campaign were positive for counterterrorism authorities, and the frequency was increasing. Many strikes were not explicitly aiming for high value personnel. In North Waziristan, the incidents were becoming increasingly commonplace. At the residence of local Taj Mohamed in Chashma village, just to the north of Miranshah on November 29, a missile impact rendered at least two other local men dead42. Among the wounded were a couple that were said to have no affiliation with the militants43. Two missiles wrought destruction in Khushali village, in vicinity of Mir Ali on December 5, damaging a compound and slaying three Turkmen militants, while wounding numerous other individuals44. Pakistani authorities in the FATA later acknowledged a separate portion of the incident in Khushali that day in which a vehicle was also destroyed, killing four local militants45. A December 15 strike against the residence of tribesman Ghuncha Gul in Tappi, Tol Khel, resulted in two locals deceased, according to a witnessing neighbor and intelligence officials46. Militants cordoned the area, retrieved corpses, and spirited away the maimed, indicating that their nameless comrades may have been the victims47.

In South Waziristan, there was an apparent influx of Punjabi combatants, who themselves became targets. For instance, at 2140 on December 11, a missile impacted a domicile adjoining a madrassa in Azam Warzak, resulting in approximately seven deaths48. While Pakistani authorities postulated that foreign elements may have been slain, the consensus was that the majority of those eliminated were Punjabi aggressors, with a leaked document recognizing the Pakistani nationalities of six victims49. Furthermore, two December 22 incidents were conducted against Punjabi militant vehicles in Ghwaikhai and Azam Warzak, South Waziristan, resulting in five personnel neutralized50. In Ghwaikhai, the targeted vehicle left three deceased. In Azam Warzak, the next vehicle delivered six Punjabi militants to a bazaar. Two guarded the truck while their compatriots shopped, and were killed in the missile strike51. The Punjabis were reportedly deployed to assist in downing the roving Predator drones. Elements loyal to Mullah Nazir, whose South Waziristan network the Punjabis were presumably assisting, vowed swift retribution52.

CIA Director Michael V Hayden was conspicuous in acknowledging the successful campaign.  As the Bush Administration came to its conclusion, Hayden praised the work of his agency in its war against al-Qaida, declaring: “In the past year alone, a powerful blow has been struck against Al Qaeda. Its operational capability has been damaged and its ideological strength eroded,” Hayden told his spies. “Our ops tempo has been unrelenting.”

CIA Director Hayden was awoken on New Year’s Day 2009 while viewing the Orange Bowl, and informed that a primary target was within his grasp.  CIA operatives searching for the al-Kini Group53 finally determined the location of Fahd Mohamed Ali Musalam (Osama al-Kini) within the FATA.  The al-Qaida Pakistani operations chief was meeting with his lieutenant and long-term companion Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan in an abandoned girl’s school near Karikot, in Sultana, Ladha Tehsil, South Waziristan54.  While the TTP had long since closed the girls’ schools and restricted their education, the facilities were utilized for explosives training for foreign elements55.  In this case, the al-Kini Group was using the locale for a meeting. 

Born February 19, 1976, Musalam was raised in Mombasa in the cramped Majengo neighborhood, described as overrun with houses and shops and decaying streets56. Musalam displayed promise in soccer and swimming, even being fielded as a starter for the local Black Panthers football team57.  Musalam’s father Mohamed was a local businessman of moderate wealth and when his son Fahd abandoned high school studies after his second year, recommended a return to their family’s ancestral home in Yemen58.  Previously he worked along with other family members in his father’s clothing shop59. Recruited into the Yemeni military, Musalam showed a preference for another type of combatant experience, and traveled instead to Pakistan and eventually Afghanistan for his militant training in 199460.  In his book detailing this time period and the Embassy bombings, Abu Mohamed al-Masri described Musalam as being instructed at al-Faruq camp, possessing command qualities, and excelling in weapons, explosives, urban tactics, surveillance, and topography61. Musalam’s father died in 1994 right before Musalam returned home to Mombasa the first time62.  Musalam displayed a renewed religious vigor after his time at the camps, one that initially was viewed with respect by his family63.  Now speaking Arabic, he enforced stringent religious rules on his mother and sister, including precluding his sister from her schooling64.  Instead of caring for his family, he spent his time with another eventual fanatic, the Kenyan Shaikh Ahmed Salim Swedan65. 

Swedan was older than Musalam, born April 9, in either 1960 or 196966, yet they shared a variety of similarities allowing Swedan to both mold Musalam and support him as a lieutenant in his zealotry.  Swedan was also raised in Majengo, having lost his father, a mason, back in 198567.  Yet Swedan indulged in khat and marijuana initially as opposed to religious fanaticism68.  Swedan was also a dropout from school, having never even attended high school69.  By the mid-1990s he managed a trucking business in Mombasa70.  Together they encouraged and influenced each other into extremism. 

Musalam grew irate at what he viewed as American meddling and immorality in East Africa71.  His indignance at their presence nearly led him to commit an assault on his own against the Americans in Kenya72.  Soon Musalam conducted another sojourn to Afghanistan in the name of his religion and jihad, in order to channel his rage. 

As a Kenyan with Yemeni ancestry, Musalam was undoubtedly drawn to bin Laden and his faction.  Furthermore, for his second stint in Afghanistan, Musalam received advanced instruction at the Jihad Wal camp in Khost province prior to traveling to Jalalabad in order to interact with al-Qaida seniors at the urging of his instructors73.  As part of a Kenyan contingent, Musalam met with Abu Mohamed al-Masri and the upper echelon of al-Qaida, expressing to them his need for action against Americans in East Africa74.  His piety, propriety, determination, and disdain for the American presence satisfied and intrigued al-Qaida officers, among whom Abu Mohamed noted that they were some of the greatest to enmesh with the organization at the time75. 

During Musalam’s two-month indoctrination with al-Qaida, he explained his irascible state of mind concerning American interference in East Africa, and particularly in his home of Mombasa, Kenya76.  According to Musalam, US military presence in East Africa was harmful to the local populace and thus rendered them a worthy and prudent target77.  Giving justification and encouragement to plans already in motion concerning al-Qaida in East Africa, Musalam implored his new superiors to provide him with the means, funds, and support to strike American interests, while he provided loyal service and logistics to the plot78. 

The idea of attacking in East Africa was now foremost on the agenda, and with Abu Mohamed al-Masri overseeing the operation, bin Laden met with Musalam before he was dispatched home to Kenya79. 

In East Africa, Abu Mohamed al-Masri coalesced the network responsible for the impending Embassy bombings, and he tasked both Musalam and Swedan with obtaining and transporting the explosives, and purchasing, registering, and altering the vehicles to be used to carry the bombs80. After some consternation, the two were able to obtain ample amounts of the required explosives. Musalam was also involved in surveillance of the targets, while Swedan additionally established safehouses for the conspiracy81. While Musalam was already vetted and approved, Swedan was also viewed as vital to the plot, due to his abilities as a local facilitator for the network.

In July 1998, Musalam and Swedan purchased the Toyota Dyna in Mombasa to be utilized for the Nairobi attack, and commenced altering the vehicle for the explosives82. Separately, Swedan and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani purchased a Nissan Atlas refrigeration truck at the latter’s residence in Dar Es Salaam, to be altered and used for the bombing in that city83. Musalam was one of the operatives who specifically met with and prepared the Dar Es Salaam suicide bomber in the days before the attack84. Swedan and Musalam fled from Nairobi and Mombasa on August 2 and 3 respectively for Pakistan85. Together they were among five indicted by the US for their roles in the bombings on December 16, 199886. Post-9/11, both Musalam and Swedan featured on the October 10, 2001 published list of the FBI 22 Most Wanted Terrorists87.

After the invasion, Musalam commanded paramilitary forces in Zabul before assuming responsibility for Pakistani operations. He coordinated with Qari Ilyas and a network of local militants for his operations88. He never lost interest in East Africa, and was also accused of simultaneously providing logistics to militants therein89. Swedan meanwhile, was inaccurately and widely reported as captured in Pakistan during 2002. In fact, Human Rights Watch perpetuated this supposed incarceration, by expanding that Swedan was captured on July 11, 2002 in Karachi during a combined Pakistani and American operation, before being delivered to full US custody later in the same year90. In reality, Swedan was the active deputy of his longtime associate Musalam, as the two Kenyans spread chaos with their Pakistani subordinates.

This so-called al-Kini Group was said to be the culprits in seven suicide attacks, among other incidents, throughout Pakistan91. These are assessed as the October 18, 2007 dual suicide bombing and attempted assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Karachi; the February 4, 2008 suicide attack against a bus of military medical personnel, and the February 25 suicide attack assassination of Brigadier General Mushtaq Baig, both in Rawalpindi; the March 15 Luna Caprese restaurant grenade attack, the June 1 suicide bombing of the Danish Embassy, the July 6 Melody Market suicide bombing, the September 20 Marriott Hotel suicide bombing, all in Islamabad92. Their successes made them primary targets for disruption. As such, Swedan was discovered by the CIA in late December 2008, and the agency began to meticulously track his movements, in hopes of dismantling the al-Kini group93. Swedan then led his pursuers directly to their desired prey.

On January 2, 2009, Musalam and Swedan disappeared into the abandoned girl’s primary school, and the watchers above informed Director Hayden.  Without hesitation, the former general issued orders for a 500-pound device (GBU – Guided Bomb Unit) to be engaged against the meeting94.  The facility was obliterated and Musalam and Swedan were slain, bringing an end to their reign of terror in Pakistan95.  Initially described as a 100-pound hellfire96, the choice to fire such an excessive device displays the need felt by the CIA to eliminate the targets.  This was to be the last drone strike of the Bush Administration.  It was massively successful and reduced the FBI most wanted terrorist list by two. The incident was celebrated by the CIA and Administration alike, as one of their predominant successes.

The Obama Administration inherited a war against an al-Qaida with a different management cadre, and essentially a different face. Even though bin Laden and Zawahiri remained steadfast, their lieutenants were evolving. While Sheikh Said maintained control over internal operations, direct contact with bin Laden was shifting to Atiyah Abdulrahman. As the Bush Administration exited and handed over the conflict to new hands, al-Qaida looked to their remainders and reinforcements, veterans and novices, hosts and affiliates to maintain the infrastructure of a strained but not completely defeated organization.

Suspected US Drone Strikes in Pakistan – 2008: (38)

  • STRIKE 08A: January 29 – IVO Mir Ali, North Waziristan – 12 killed / ABU LAITH AL-LIBI, plus deputy ABU SAHL AL-LIBI, ABU UBAIDAH AL-KUWAITI, ABU SALAMAH AL-LIBI, ABU KHAWLA AL-NAJDI, ABU SULAIMAN AL-SURI, ABU ABBAS AL-JAZIRA
  • STRIKE 08B: February 28 – Kalosha, IVO Azam Warzak, South Waziristan – approx 10 killed (at least 8 militants) / aimed at unidentified senior Egyptian, while Abu Talha al-Almani narrowly escaped
  • STRIKE 08C: March 12 – Lwara Mundi, North Waziristan – approx 4 civilians and numerous Haqqani militants killed
  • STRIKE 08D: March 16 – Dhuk Pir Bagh, South Waziristan – approx 18 Haqqani militants killed / DR ARSHAD WAHEED
  • STRIKE 08E: May 14 – Damadola, Bajaur – approx 15 killed / ABU SULAIMAN AL-JAZIRI
  • STRIKE 08F: June 14 – Makeen, South Waziristan – approx 1 killed / allegedly aimed at TTP leader Baitullah Mahsud
  • STRIKE 08G: July 28 – Zeralita, IVO Azam Warzak, South Waziristan – approx 6 killed / MIDHAT MURSI (ABU KHABAB AL-MASRI), plus Staff ABDULWAHAB AL-MASRI, ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI, and IBRAHIM MABRUK
  • STRIKE 08H: August 12 – Baghar, South Waziristan – approx 12 killed / aimed at Osama al-Kini and Mullah Nazir associates
  • STRIKE 08I: August 20 – Zari Noor IVO Wana, South Waziristan – approx 8 killed
  • STRIKE 08J: August 27 – Gangi Khel, South Waziristan – none killed
  • STRIKE 08K: August 30 – Gangi Khel, South Waziristan – approx 4 killed / aimed at subordinates of Osama al-Kini
  • STRIKE 08L: August 31 – Tappi, IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 11 killed
  • STRIKE 08M: September 2 – Mohamed Khel, Datta Khel, North Waziristan – approx 10 killed, aimed at Abu Wafa al-Saudi
  • STRIKE 08N: September 4 – Char Khel, North Waziristan – approx 5 killed / aimed at Abu Wafa al-Saudi
  • STRIKE 08O: September 5 – al Mast, Gurwak region Afghan on border with North Waziristan – approx 6-12 killed
  • STRIKE 08P: September 8 – Danda Darpa Khel (Haqqani Family Madrassa), North Waziristan – approx 23 killed / ABU HARIS AL-SURI, plus ABU MUSA of Saudi Arabia, ABU HAMZA of Saudi Arabia, and ABU QASIM AL-HAKAIMI of Egypt
  • STRIKE 08Q: September 12 – Tol Khel IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 12 killed / aimed at Badr Mansur group
  • STRIKE 08R: September 17 – Baghar, South Waziristan (militant border camp) – approx 5 killed / ABU UBAIDAH AL-TUNISI
  • STRIKE 08S: September 30 – Khushali, Toori Khel, North Waziristan – approx 5-8 killed
  • STRIKE 08T: October 3 – Mohamed Khel, North Waziristan – approx 17-21 killed (7-16 foreigners)
  • STRIKE 08U: October 3 – Datta Khel, North Waziristan – approx 3 killed (civilians)
  • STRIKE 08V: October 9 – Tappi IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 5 killed (civilians)
  • STRIKE 08W: October 11 – abandoned refugee camp IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed
  • STRIKE 08X: October 16 – Taparghai, South Waziristan (station wagon vehicle) – approx 2-4 killed / KHALID HABIB
  • STRIKE 08Y: October 23 – Danda Darpa Khel (Haqqani seminary), North Waziristan – approx 8 killed
  • STRIKE 08Z: October 26 – Mandatta, Shakai valley, South Waziristan – approx 18 killed / aimed at Haji Omar Khan
  • STRIKE 08A2: October 31 – Karikot, South Waziristan – approx 1 killed (initially reported as 12) / aimed at Mullah Nazir
  • STRIKE 08B2: October 31 – Asoray, near Mir Ali, North Waziristan – approx 23 killed / MOHAMED HASSAN KHALIL AL-HAKIMI (ABU JIHAD AL-MASRI), plus ABU HASSAN AL-RIMI, and ABU THABIT AL-KUWAITI
  • STRIKE 08C2: November 7 – Kumsham, North Waziristan – approx 14 killed / unconfirmed Westerners
  • STRIKE 08D2: November 14 – Garyum IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 13 killed (approx 9 foreigners)
  • STRIKE 08E2: November 19 – Jani Khel, Bannu – approx 5 killed / MUJAB ATIYAH AL-ZAHRANI (ABDULLAH AZZAM AL-SAUDI)
  • STRIKE 08F2: November 22 – Ali Khel IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 5 killed / ABDULRAHMAN HILAL HUSSAIN (ABU ZUBAIR AL-MASRI) and RASHID RAUF
  • STRIKE 08G2: November 29 – Chashma IVO Miranshah, North Waziristan – approx 3 killed
  • STRIKE 08H2: December 5 – Khushali, Toori Khel IVO Mir Ali, North Waziristan – approx 7 killed (including 3 Turkmen)
  • STRIKE 08I2: December 11 – Azam Warzak, South Waziristan – approx 6-7 killed (mostly Punjabis)
  • STRIKE 08J2: December 15 – Tappi, North Waziristan – approx 2 killed
  • STRIKE 08K2: December 22 – Ghwaikhai, South Waziristan (anti-aircraft weapon in vehicle) – approx 3 killed
  • STRIKE 08L2: December 22 – Azam Warzak, South Waziristan (anti-aircraft weapon in vehicle) – approx 2 killed

2009: (Final Strike of Bush Administration)

  • STRIKE 09A: January 2 – Sultana, Ladha, South Waziristan – approx 3 killed / OSAMA AL-KINI (FAHD MOHAMED ALI MUSALAM) and YAHYA AL-KINI (SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN)

LEGEND:

  • NORTH WAZIRISTAN
  • BAJAUR
  • SOUTH WAZIRISTAN
  • DISTRICT OUTSIDE OF FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. CIA drones killed U.S. citizens in Pakistan, book says, by Jeff Stein, The Washington Post, September 22, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/09/cia_drones_killed_us_citizens.html ↩︎
  2. Up to 14 dead in suspected US missile strike in Pakistan: officials, Agence-France Press, November 7, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20110315175351/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jlbsctRKE5_0vBDyyTTr7nkLW0yg ↩︎
  3. CIA drones killed U.S. citizens in Pakistan, book says, by Jeff Stein, The Washington Post, September 22, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/09/cia_drones_killed_us_citizens.html ↩︎
  4. Up to 14 dead in suspected US missile strike in Pakistan: officials, Agence-France Press, November 7, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20110315175351/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jlbsctRKE5_0vBDyyTTr7nkLW0yg ↩︎
  5. Up to 14 dead in suspected US missile strike in Pakistan: officials, Agence-France Press, November 7, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20110315175351/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jlbsctRKE5_0vBDyyTTr7nkLW0yg ↩︎
  6. Up to 14 dead in suspected US missile strike in Pakistan: officials, Agence-France Press, November 7, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20110315175351/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jlbsctRKE5_0vBDyyTTr7nkLW0yg ↩︎
  7. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  8. CIA drones killed U.S. citizens in Pakistan, book says, by Jeff Stein, The Washington Post, September 22, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/09/cia_drones_killed_us_citizens.html ↩︎
  9. Nine Arabs Among 13 Killed in Drone Attack, Dawn, November 14, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/428512/nine-arabs-among-13-killed-in-drone-attack ↩︎
  10. Nine Arabs Among 13 Killed in Drone Attack, Dawn, November 14, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/428512/nine-arabs-among-13-killed-in-drone-attack ↩︎
  11. Senior al Qaeda leader targeted in airstrike in Bannu, Pakistan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_3.php#ixzz2gbSytFuJ ↩︎
  12. Senior al Qaeda leader targeted in airstrike in Bannu, Pakistan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_3.php#ixzz2gbSytFuJ ↩︎
  13. Mujab al-Zahrani: Dead and Wanted, a jihadist internet release, analysis of eulogy written by Sanafi al-Nasir, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, March 2009, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/50-march09 ↩︎
  14. Mujab al-Zahrani: Dead and Wanted, a jihadist internet release, analysis of eulogy written by Sanafi al-Nasir, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, March 2009, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/50-march09 ↩︎
  15. Mujab al-Zahrani: Dead and Wanted, a jihadist internet release, analysis of eulogy written by Sanafi al-Nasir, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, March 2009, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/50-march09 ↩︎
  16. Senior al Qaeda leader targeted in airstrike in Bannu, Pakistan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 19, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_3.php#ixzz2gbSytFuJ ↩︎
  17. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  18. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  19. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  20. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  21. Mujab al-Zahrani: Dead and Wanted, a jihadist internet release, analysis of eulogy written by Sanafi al-Nasir, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, March 2009, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/50-march09 ↩︎
  22. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden (Abu Abdullah), dated July 17, 2010 // Nineteen al-Qaida Reports on militant leadership prospects, dated between Dec 2005 – Jan 2006, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bios.pdf ↩︎
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  29. Rashid Rauf Among Five Killed in US Attack, Dawn, November 23, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/331358/rashid-rauf-among-five-killed-in-us-attack ↩︎
  30. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  31. Airlines plot: al-Qaeda mastermind ‘is still alive,’ by Duncan Gardham, The Telegraph, September 9, 2009, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6024678/Airlines-plot-al-Qaeda-mastermind-is-still-alive.html ↩︎
  32. Rashid Rauf Among Five Killed in US Attack, Dawn, November 23, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/331358/rashid-rauf-among-five-killed-in-us-attack // Top British Terror Suspect Killed in US Missile Strike, by Jason Burke, The Guardian, November 22, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/23/alqaida-pakistan ↩︎
  33. Rashid Rauf: the al-Qaida suspect caught, tortured and lost, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, September 8, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/08/rashid-rauf-terrorism-torture-pakistan ↩︎
  34. Al Qaeda Operative Rashid Rauf Survived US Strike, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, April 12, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/04/al_qaeda_operative_r_1.php ↩︎
  35. Airlines plot: al-Qaeda mastermind ‘is still alive,’ by Duncan Gardham, The Telegraph, September 9, 2009, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6024678/Airlines-plot-al-Qaeda-mastermind-is-still-alive.html ↩︎
  36. Family of Al Qaida terrorist Rashid Rauf to sue British Government for murder, by Amardeep Bassey, The Birmingham Mail, October 27, 2012, https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/local-news/al-qaida-terrorist-rashid-raufs-270221 ↩︎
  37. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, dated August 22, 2009 ↩︎
  38. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Osama bin Laden, dated August 22, 2009 ↩︎
  39. Al-Qa`ida’s First American Foreign Fighter after 9/11, by Bryant Neal Viñas and Mitchell D Silber, CTC Sentinel, Volume 11, Issue 8, September 2018 ↩︎
  40. American al Qaeda recruit to be released from prison, by Aaron Cooper and Eric Levenson, CNN News, May 11, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/11/us/bryant-neal-vinas-sentence ↩︎
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  46. Pakistan: US missile strike suspected in 2 deaths, by Zarar Khan, The Associated Press, December 16, 2008, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/2008/12/16/pakistan-us-missile-strike-suspected-in-2-deaths/ ↩︎
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  48. Suspected U.S. drone strike in Pakistan kills 7, by Zeeshan Haidar, Reuters, December 11, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idINISL23166720081211/ // Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
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  51. Five ‘Punjabi Taliban’ Killed in Drone Attacks, Dawn, December 23, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/335481/five ↩︎
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  53. FBI Links Marriott Bombing to Al Qaeda, Dawn, June 28, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/854608/fbi-links-marriott-bombing-to-al-qaeda ↩︎
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  65. Al Qaeda lures, transforms young dropouts, The Washington Times, June 23, 2004, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jun/23/20040623-100111-9771r/ ↩︎
  66. Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, FBI Wanted Poster, FBI Most Wanted Terrorists, https://web.archive.org/web/20060310055447/http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/terswedan.htm ↩︎
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  83. Defendant connected to alleged Tanzania bombers, by Phil Hirschkorn and Deborah Feyerick, CNN, March 14, 2001, https://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/03/14/embassy.bombing.trial.01/ ↩︎
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  86. 5 Fugitives Indicted in Embassy Bombings, by John Mintz, The Washington Post, December 17, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/indict121798.htm ↩︎
  87. A NATION CHALLENGED: THE HUNTED; The 22 Most Wanted Suspects, in a Five-Act Drama of Global Terror, The New York Times, October 14, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/14/world/nation-challenged-hunted-22-most-wanted-suspects-five-act-drama-global-terror.html ↩︎
  88. 2 Qaeda Leaders Killed in U.S. Strike in Pakistan, by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, January 8, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=0 // Jan. 1 Attack By CIA Killed Two Leaders Of Al-Qaeda, by Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, January 9, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/08/AR2009010803110.html ↩︎
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  90. U.S. Responsibility for Enforced Disappearances in the “War on Terror,” List of Detainees, Human Rights Watch, June 2007, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/ct0607/index.htm ↩︎
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