SERIES: Predators Of Khorasan – The Obscure Yet Relevant

Written by Nolan R Beasley

An inevitable result of an enhanced unilateral drone campaign in Pakistan was the assassination of obscure militant figures, who upon first reporting seemed to have little consequence to the overall function of al-Qaida. Yet upon further analysis these individuals were revealed to have been relevant to the wide array of al-Qaida logistical, paramilitary, external, and internal operations. Beyond the well known personalities in the organization, there were numerous militants laboring diligently behind the scenes during the war. Sometimes, a reported militant in a drone strike was given a name and nothing else, leaving room for an investigation of applicable evidence, both current and future, to examine and determine exactly who they were and what significant position they held. Other figures were deeply enmeshed in jihadist communities well outside of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, and thus relevant in other nations as well.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/exiles-of-jihad-and-predators-of-khorasan/

Al-Badar Group

From obscurity emerged pertinent jihadist commanders from within Pakistan as well. Badar Mansur was the alias of Punjabi militant Fakher Zaman, a militant of the Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM)1. Owing to interpersonal conflict with HuM leadership, Badar Mansur separated from the organization during the fallout from the Lal Masjid mosque raid of 20072. In 2008, Badar Mansur arrived in North Waziristan as the chieftain of 200 combatants3. Enmeshing in North Waziristan with training facilities and encampments throughout Mir Ali, Miranshah, Datta Khel, Tappi, etc, the al-Badar group coalesced as another malleable unit supported and facilitated by the Haqqani Network and al-Qaida. This included mentorship from Sheikh Issa al-Masri4. Badar Mansur also received approval of Hafiz Gul Bahadur while operating in his territory5. It was one of these facilities, overseen by instructor Qari Imran and encompassing an abandoned school in Tol Khel, just west of Miranshah, North Waziristan, that was subjected to a drone strike on September 126. The structure was obliterated and a dozen militants, mostly Punjaibs were slain7. Pakistani sources later admitted to three male civilians among those killed8. Badar Mansur meanwhile, went unscathed, maneuvering in the shadows. He was one of many fitting the role of an unknown militant efficiently fulfilling the needs of the greater jihadist community.

Abu Ubaidah al-Tunisi

Another fitting representative of this concept was seen among the further casualties of the campaign reported through September.  Abu Ubaidah al-Tunisi was killed in a September 17, 2008 drone strike on South Waziristan near the Afghan border.  His death was essentially confirmed in a leaked US document detailing 2008 strikes9.  However, it must be noted that the incorrect assumption that Abu Wafa al-Saudi perished, also originated in this document.  Abu Ubaidah and his men were stated to be killed while transporting rockets to a militant camp, thus making their cargo of weapons an important target in itself10.  The leaked document describes Tunisi as a High Value Target, diminishing the thought that he was collateral to the munitions11.  His real name was never revealed but the NEFA Foundation claimed he was a veteran of the war against the Russians in Afghanistan, much as was claimed about Abu Wafa12.  It seemed that this figure was destined to remain as an obscure target of the drone campaign. However, Abu Ubaidah was previously profiled in internal al-Qaida documentation dating to the winter of 2005-2006, in which he was described at the time as a militant administrative figure for Mir Ali, North Waziristan13. Already aged 53, he was revered for his jihadist experience in Bosnia14. Although there was no mention of previous Afghan jihadist experience, he was said to have traveled to Kabul to join the cause in 2000. Prior he worked as a carver in Italy, and intriguingly was said to have had a middle school education from the United States15. Persistently active and exhibiting signs of youth despite his age, his patience and willingness to interact well with the local populace made him a preferred administrative official in the FATA16.

To further the idea that the Tunisian actually did perish in the September drone strike, the Pentagon revealed that an al-Qaida member had been killed in the strike along with three Taliban comrades, most likely referring to Abu Ubaidah17.  A later Pakistani report verified four foreign fighters and one local militant comprised the deceased18. Subsequent internal al-Qaida communications, between Sheikh Said al-Masri and Osama bin Laden, also revealed the Tunisian as a known figure19.  Sheikh Said, while discussing the families of lost al-Qaida members including Abu Hassan al-Masri, referenced Abu Ubaidah al-Tunisi’s widow, indicating that he had in fact perished20.  The previous documentation noted that Abu Ubaidah was in the region with his Bosnian wife and three children. Furthermore, that Sheikh Said referenced him with no explanation of his identity21 indicates that bin Laden was at least familiar with the individual and that the Tunisian must have been a close affiliate of the network.

Khalid Habib

Owing to the previous strikes of August in South Waziristan, paramilitary commander Khalid Habib displaced from Wana to a remote village within the agency, in hopes of avoiding assassination. Meanwhile, the Predators prowled the tribal skies. A September 30 incident in vicinity of Mir Ali, North Waziristan, in which a drone fired two to four projectiles into a residence, reportedly killed five to eight, including foreigners22 -[A].

This set the stage for dual strikes on October 3, as confirmed by American intelligence authorities23. One strike sent missiles into two homes in Datta Khel, North Waziristan, succeeding only in killing two women and a child24. The second occurred in the aftermath of militants engaging US forces across the border in Khost. Pakistani military sources attempted to deflect by saying US firepower targeted the insurgents within Afghanistan. However, the actual responding drone strike leveled a compound in North Waziristan belonging to Afghans and reportedly killed 21, including 16 of Arab and Central Asian descent25. The facility was said to be associated with and occupied by the al-Badar group26. Occurring in Mohamed Khel, within the Datta Khel tehsil near Miranshah, the Pakistanis acknowledged that the strike against the home of the immigrants killed ten locals and seven foreigners, displaying the disparity between various casualty reports during the drone war27. As locals buried the deceased, reports emerged that those slain included the two immigrant Afghans and six family members28.

Sources claimed that upwards of 30 militants, both Taliban and al-Qaida, were meeting on October 9 in a compound owned by a local sympathizer in North Waziristan, when they were selected for death29. However, almost all participants egressed from the compound naturally, 10 minutes prior to two missiles shredding the structure to debris. Initial sources stated six Arab combatants of no leadership value, and three civilians were killed30. According to the Pakistanis, five civilians perished in strike in Tappi village31. A later investigation substantiated the claim of civilian casualties and refuted the idea of a militant gathering, instead displaying an innocent local family event mistakenly targeted by the CIA32.

Next, two missiles delivered by a drone on October 11 leveled what was described as a mud-walled “shanty” structure in the Machis Colony of North Waziristan, resulting in initial reports of the deaths of an estimated five militants to include foreigners33. The location was owned by a local in the mostly abandoned Afghan refugee community, and was a known destination of militants34. While the incident reportedly wounded several, only four local militants were assessed by the Pakistanis as slain in Machis35. The strikes then returned to South Waziristan, wherein the al-Qaida paramilitary commander remained ostensibly hidden.

Khalid Habib is attributed the quote, “If we all get killed, there is no fear for jihad, for the message was delivered (to the nation)36.”  This indicated that the state of the jihad in the Khorasan was in the hands of the new generation as the old perishes in the conflict.  The new generation would take up the cause.  The Egyptian spoke arrogantly and dismissively of death, but he was suffering from his injuries from the war thus far.  Of note, Khalid Habib complained of successive wounds, indicating that combat or previous airstrikes had taken their toll on his physical health. In a portion of an undated letter to bin Laden, he lamented this situation and observes that his health is deteriorating37.  Khalid Habib admitted to incurring injuries just six months prior to penning the missive38. Perhaps this explains his reasoning in fleeing to the smaller village of Taparghai in South Waziristan, abandoning Wana in order to exfiltrate himself from the heavily bombarded locale39.  The paramilitary leader was already weak, and as such vulnerable.   

Transplanting to the smaller village was unwise for several reasons. He was further from Wana but closer to Makin and the foundation of Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP. He also drew significant attention, with locals recognizing his importance and bestowing the moniker “Zalfay” upon him, which was a Pashto word recognizing his longer hair40. At 1100 in the morning41 on October 16, the Egyptian’s immobile Toyota station wagon was destroyed by a drone strike, killing four and ending the arduous career of Khalid Habib42. A leaked Pakistani assessment only listed two victims, a local and a foreigner.

With him that day as an aide was Hassan Ghul, the Pakistani courier who had made his way to jihad and freedom from CIA and Pakistani custody.  As he reached out to open the car door for Habib, the missile struck and the explosion flung Ghul away, leaving him with a shattered shin and some shrapnel wounds43.  Surprisingly, Ghul survived and recovered44.  US intelligence officials estimated that Khalid Habib was the fourth most senior al-Qaida official in theatre45, an assessment that passes scrutiny due to the paramilitary nature of his position. Other operatives based in the FATA were devastated by the loss of Khalid Habib.  Jihadists commenced hagiographic stories of Khalid Habib’s corpse emitting no odors but pleasant scents from his blood46.  After the burned and ruined body was placed in a vehicle prior to burial, Abu Yahya al-Libi visited to see the remains of the militant commander47.  Other mourners included the Kunar province al-Faruq Battalion commander Abu Hassan al-Rimi, who openly lamented the loss of his superior paramilitary officer48.

Khalid Habib hailed from Egypt under the birth name Shawqi Marzuq Abdulsalam al-Dabbas49. He first arrived in the Khorasan region in 1988, partaking in training at Sada and al-Faruq camps. An exemplary student, he advanced and excelled in various levels of training, becoming proficient with a multitude of weapons50. He then spent significant time as an instructor himself, while also fighting along the front lines. Due to this role, he became efficient with surface-to-air missiles, as delivered from shoulder-launchers, and instructed in their utilization as well51. As a testament to this, a photograph of him wielding such a rocket launcher was prominently displayed in a tome written by al-Qaida stalwart Abu Khubaib al-Sudani, chronicling the history of the organization52. He ascended to the role of a respected commander, earning both the admiration and loyalty of his men, reportedly maintaining a focus for their care and comfort. Frequently combatting the Najibullah Afghan government, Khalid Habib received the first of his many wounds, this to his hand53. Once civil war engulfed Afghanistan and the al-Qaida infrastructure transplanted to Sudan, Khalid Habib remained in order to develop alongside Abdulwakil al-Masri (Mustafa Fadhil) the training regiment to be utilized by al-Qaida camps for years to come54. He then moved to be with al-Qaida based in Africa, before returning with the entire infrastructure to Afghanistan under the new Taliban hosts in the mid-1990s. As a sign of the trust placed with him, Khalid Habib was initially chosen as one of those to personally attend to and accompany Osama bin Laden on his sojourn from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, although this retinue was eventually altered55.

In the late 1990s, Khalid Habib was recognized as a deputy of the al-Qaida Security Committee under Saif al-Adel, having labored as a guard and driver for bin Laden56. He was one of the few trusted traveling companions of bin Laden in the aftermath of the invasion in 200157. However, he did not remain long or disappear into Pakistan with bin Laden, but rather joined with the failed Arab defense of Kandahar58. The battle was overseen by Saif al-Adel, and Khalid Habib participated by helping man an old tank utilized by the Egyptian Sheikh Amir al-Fateh. Despite surviving for several days, the tank was eventually targeted and destroyed by American aircraft59. Remarkably, Amir al-Fateh and his men avoided death, yet Khalid Habib suffered a shrapnel wound to the skull, resulting in the temporary paralysis of his left side.60 Reportedly, as he was carried to safety on a stretcher, he refused medical care until he could properly distribute his personal funds to the appropriate jihadists61. Despite a four month absence due to the wounds, Khalid Habib recovered and commenced developing training infrastructure in the FATA62. As we have mentioned, at this point he was stationed at Angor Adda along the South Waziristan border with Afghanistan63.

In one anecdote, Khalid Habib was said to have joined Shariah Committee member Abu Mansur al-Shami in observing a training camp in 2005, during which the latter provided a sermon and requested repentance from the pupils. During the session, Khalid Habib openly denounced the concepts of takfir and talaq (excommunication and divorce), but was in turn gently reprimanded by Abu Mansur, who informed him that these ideas, as part of the overall Shariah, had their appropriate place and usage64. Instead of being angered by the correction from a subordinate, Khalid Habib reportedly deferred to his comrade, intently accepting the message and displaying reverence for the fanatical religious authority.

During his extended time as al-Qaida paramilitary commander, Khalid Habib oversaw the evolution of al-Qaida fighters from the vestiges of the old all foreign (mostly Arab) Taliban unit Brigade 55, into a revived entity known as the Lashkar-al-Zil, absorbing belligerents from a wide variety of Pakistani militant organizations of Punjabi and Sindhi origins65. Acting in conjunction with the TTP, Haqqani Network, and other elements, as a portion of the broader Afghan Taliban insurgency, the Lashkar-al-Zil began maneuvers in 2007, becoming a feared efficient combat force66.

Bin Laden wrote to Ayman al-Zawahiri in late 2008 about the death of Khalid Habib being reported in the media, and how he had since confirmed the veracity of the claim67. This correspondence occurred after a lengthy dark period in communication from bin Laden to his lieutenants; one in which he chose not to push any public statements during the US mid-term elections68. He offered his condolences to the Haqqani family over the drone strike on their madrassa, and discussed his opinion on the Mumbai terror attacks of November69. As Sheikh Said’s intention was to have Abdullah Said al-Libi take over paramilitary command from Khalid Habib after an instructional period, there was a readily available figure to assume responsibilities. Khalid Habib was said to be slated for Pakistani duties afterwards, although it remains unknown of what exactly these consisted.

A Focus on Locals

Primarily, the focus of the departing Bush Administration and the CIA was on dismantling the al-Qaida presence in the FATA, yet there were some varied attempts against the local militant components that provided the Arabs their haven, personnel, and logistics. By 2008 of course, these local forces were a militant scourge in their own right. Confusion reigned on October 23, 2008, after a drone delivered a missile into the Sirajul Uloom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, North Waziristan70. The victims were variously reported as locals and militants, demonstrating the difficulty in ascertaining the true casualty count of such events. There was also speculation that the drone was specifically targeted the Haqqani Network within the village yet again71. The Pakistani government however later acknowledged only eight civilian deaths72. The day prior, a secret joint session of the Pakistani parliament passed a resolution to review national security strategy and potentially rebuke the Americans and intercept future drone flights73. This method of course, did not come to fruition.

Two strikes in South Waziristan followed. On October 26, a compound owned by Haji Omar Khan (reported in local press as Mohamed Omar) was leveled in the Shakai valley village of Mandatta.74 Haji Omar, the Taliban stalwart and compatriot to Nek Mohamed Wazir, was initially believed slain in the event75, but this narrative proved false. There were 18 tribal locals confirmed by the Pakistanis as killed76, although media sources insinuated that they were comprised of militants77. Later on October 31, two missiles were launched into the residence of Harun Wazir in Doag village, outside of Wana, South Waziristan, in an attempt to assassinate the agency’s primary Taliban commander, Mullah Nazir78. Local authorities initially estimated twelve militants perished79, but later Pakistani reports listed only one fatality80. Interestingly, Mullah Nazir was reportedly in the home and survived despite incurring some wounds, and needing some hospital care81. This strike followed another October 31 attempt in North Waziristan, against al-Qaida paramilitary and security commanders.

Security and Intelligence

Locating Abu Jihad

When news arrived to bin Laden in early 2008 that Atiyah Abdulrahman and Abu Jihad al-Masri had been forced back from their attempted journeys to Iraq and missions within Iran, Abu Jihad was described as restless and refusing to accept failure.  As previously discussed, communications implied that he was reckless, not heeding counsel on the methodology of the travel.  The conclusion was foregone however, and the political conditions forced him to retreat into the Khorasan.  Regardless of this fault, Abu Jihad was a source of knowledge regarding Egyptian jihad, a consultant on the Iraqi debacle, and further, was previously able to report on living conditions for those al-Qaida officials imprisoned in Iran. US intelligence noted his presence within the Shia theocratic nation, accusing Abu Jihad of operating out of Iran in the US State Department’s Rewards for Justice release concerning the Egyptian82. The Pakistanis believed he was based in Iran until 200683. The truth seems more nuanced, and revolved around his previously discussed first attempted escape from the invasion, merger with al-Qaida, and eventual excursion back to Iran as part of an attempt to rein in the Mesopotamian insurgency.

While attempting travel to the Iraqi theatre, command of the security apparatus fell to another individual84, but was assumed again by Abu Jihad prior to his own death85. There was even a suspicion that Abu Jihad had assumed the role of external operations coordinator, as the State Department’s Rewards for Justice page explicitly announced that Abu Jihad could have taken over the position86. Further analysts ran with the announcement, assuming that Abu Jihad followed Abu Sulaiman al-Jazairi as external operations chieftain87, obfuscating the roles of those who actually were conducting the acts.  This assessment likely stems from his contacts within the Egyptian jihadist community, his attempted recruitment of other Egyptians for actions in his former homeland88, and his reported involvement in three previous Egyptian terrorist incidents in 2004 and 200589.

Abu Jihad can be confirmed located in the Pakistani-Afghan theatre through his coordination to bring Abu Laith al-Libi into the al-Qaida fold sometime after 200290, and his own direct merging of Egyptian elements with al-Qaida in 200691. In 2006, An Islamist center in London recanted their 2004 belief that Abu Jihad had been extradited from Iran to Egypt. Abu Jihad directly contacted them and provided a biography in which he described escaping authorities in Iran and revealed that he was actually operating elsewhere at the time of writing92. His wording made it seem as if he had only absconded from Iran two years prior, while he was probably just refuting the 2004 extradition report, while describing his escape from the Iranian sweeps of 2002-2003. Media and government sources held to the idea that he remained in Iran until 2005 or 200693. Alternatively, he may have traversed in and out of Iran frequently, as evidenced by his later confirmed journey. Abu Jihad confirmed his own affiliation with human trafficking and smuggling networks that would have been utilized for such conduct94. In fact, in 2004 Zawahiri referred to Abu Jihad as an option to negotiate for the release of imprisoned al-Qaida, as well as associated jihadist and political prisoners of the Iranians, indicating some degree of possibility that Abu Jihad was laboring within Iran, or at least had freedom of movement in the nation95.

Previously in 2007, Abu Jihad directly refuted the assertion of his being based in Iran, blaming the misinformation on Egyptian authorities96.  His family though, was said to be sheltering in a Sunni municipality within Iran, and his son Jihad had been captured and detained by Iranian authorities with other al-Qaida members and their families97.

Myth of Delusion and Writings

With his command of al-Qaida security and intelligence, Abu Jihad wrote prolifically. His most recognized work was entitled “Myth of Delusion,” released shortly after the merger of his Gama’a al-Islamiya faction with al-Qaida in August 2006. By October it was being analyzed and critiqued online98. The document was not a religious diatribe, but rather an in depth attempt to describe and analyze the methods, strengths, faults, limitations, and infrastructure of the US intelligence apparatus99. His research was exhaustive but dependent on available resources online, resulting in inevitable mistakes. Nonetheless, he provided historical example and context for his analysis and represented a novel approach of critiquing the American bureaucratic complex as opposed to basic attacks on religion and culture. Thus, he sought to profile the imperfections of the US intelligence apparatus, in order to prove the feasibility of openly engaging and overcoming such a seemingly overwhelming entity100.

On February 12, 2008 Abu Jihad wrote to bin Laden describing his return as an avoidance of Iranian intelligence apparatus, an opportunity to convene with the External Affairs Committee, a way to assure discussion of Egyptian matters with bin Laden, and to ascertain from Sheikh Said why six of his correspondences never were delivered101. As it turned out, Sheikh Said maintained possession of five letters for an unknown reason, but had forwarded one to bin Laden already.

In terms of Egyptian intrigue, Abu Jihad bemoaned to bin Laden the recent incarcerations of two groups of young Egyptian men with whom he conversed, with their arrests due to irresponsible internet activities on monitored jihadist websites102. Abu Jihad had his own experience with such domains, as several of his works were published in the mid-2000s on the website Al-Thabitun Ala al-Ahd, to include autobiographical content, condemnation of Hamas attempts at democracy, praise for Somali theocratic efforts, and verbal assaults on the American intelligence community103. In January 2007, the website administrator Walid Abdulhamid al-Sharqawi al-Mihdar al-Idrisi al-Alawi (known as Abu al-Harith al-Mihdar) was briefly detained by British authorities and the site shuttered. This developed into only a pause, and the website reappeared elsewhere, with Abu Jihad continuing to distribute his vitriol.

As far as new potential operational forces, Abu Jihad already contacted another group within Egypt and was communicating via Nasir al-Wuhaishi of AQAP in Yemen with yet another104. A messenger between Abu Jihad and Wuhaishi facilitated the connection. This latter contingent was composed of a failed excursion attempting to travel from Egypt to Iraq via Yemen, but whom were now being groomed and diverted to the whims of Abu Jihad105. An Egyptian network was devised by Abu Jihad to include a branch of recruiting, indoctrination, training, and infrastructure. Another branch was to be responsible for reconnaissance, while the final was to be composed of foreigners to Egypt, posing as tourists, able to enter the country and perpetrate operations against the regime106.

The bulk of Abu Jihad’s February letter though is dedicated to the conditions within Egyptian penitentiaries for jihadist political prisoners, and the circumstances surrounded several particular individuals. For example, it offered brief insight into the incarcerated status of Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri’s brother Mohamed. It also dealt with the aftermath of the recantations of Sayid Imam (Dr Fadl), the former Egyptian Islamic Jihad primary ideologue and confidant to Zawahiri, and his renouncement of violent jihad. Dr Fadl published his recantations in a November 2007 book, in which he actively refuted his earlier jihadist issuances via legal basis, disparaged the idea of attacking governments, and provided non-violent methods instead. Notable Egyptian jihadists, Nabil Naim and Abdulaziz al-Jamal, joined Dr Fadl in distributing the recantations and publicly speaking to the incarcerated militants. Abu Jihad’s missive to bin Laden was obviously an attempt to allay fears that the entire imprisoned jihadist network in Egypt was accommodating the peaceful message.

To counteract the peaceful initiative of Dr. Fadl, Abu Jihad strongly implored bin Laden to distribute a video recognizing the righteousness and authority of a committee of Salafist, jihadist ideologues entrenched in Shariah law. Specifically, he asked for men already ensconced on al-Qaida’s official Shariah Committee and overall leadership, including Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Mansur al-Shami, and Atiyah Abdulrahman, as well as an associated Palestinian ideologue called Abu Walid al-Ansari107. Assuming that he had permission, Abu Jihad went on to inform bin Laden that he was mobilizing as-Sahab media to record statements from each of these men refuting Dr. Fadl and his recantations, advancing the extremist philosophy, and presenting evidence of a widespread conspiracy to account for fatwa retractions across the region.

Abu Jihad described his situation in Iran perilous due to the increased state surveillance, particularly while he was in Mashhad attempting to move to Tehran. He was startled by the presence of Ali Larijani, an envoy of the Ayatollah, in Egypt, actively meeting and negotiating with Egyptian officials in December 2007, and by Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s communications with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak108. Normalization of relations between the countries was believed to have partially hinged on security issues, meaning that a wanted Egyptian such as Abu Jihad operating in Iran was now especially endangered109.

As for his mission in dealing with the troublesome Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Jihad provided a perfunctory and terse report. In his opinion, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir needed to distance the ISI from al-Qaida, and thus recommended that he proclaim and reiterate the abolishment of al-Qaida in Iraq and its absorption by the ISI. Thus, other hesitant factions could join in loyalty to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the supposed emir the ISI. At this point, Abu Omar could resign out of necessity and leave his position open to other Iraqis desiring to lead the insurgency. If Ansar al-Sunnah continued to refuse to join the coalition, Abu Jihad suggested leaving them as an al-Qaida specific unit that could be utilized for operations as the Americans withdraw from the nation. In the end, Ansar al-Sunnah leadership could then declare for both bin Laden and the ISI.

The Targeted Vehicle

Experts on al-Qaida and jihadists predicted the ascension of Abu Jihad al-Masri in the militant ranks, owing to his dedicated approach of observing and deciphering his American and Western enemies and their capabilities110. As chair of the Security Committee in 2008, he was another rising but obscure figure destined to be met by drone warfare. Thus, with autumn progressing the drone campaign efficiently, Halloween 2008 arrived heralding the death of Mohamed Khalil Hassan al-Hakimi, the birth identity of Abu Jihad111. Yet another Egyptian in the leadership structure of al-Qaida was now fallen. The strike was conducted on a vehicle outside of Mir Ali, North Waziristan, destroying the truck and eliminating Abu Jihad and two others112. Initial reports were confused and claimed that upwards of 20 people, including militant Abu Okasha al-Iraqi, were slain in a compound also targeted by the strike in Asoray, near Mir Ali113. The Predators were observed during the daylight hours, and were even engaged by ground fire from the angry locals, but gave no indication that their intention was to attack the residence of a Dawar tribesman, located four kilometers from Mir Ali114. Abu Okasha was believed inside the compound when two missiles impacted around 2030 in the evening115.

Pakistani press reported that the vehicle outside belonged to the Iraqi and was destroyed in the attack while parked116. However, further reports claimed that after the Asoray compound was decimated, the vehicle carrying Abu Jihad and his two fellow militants was destroyed as it egressed from the fiery debris117. A total of approximately 23 were killed in the incident according to these reports, not just the three insurgents, but civilians to include women and children in the home118. A leaked Pakistani assessment acknowledged the 20 civilian deaths in the compound119. As for Abu Okasha, authorities rapidly confirmed that he had avoided a grisly fate in the strike and was still operating in North Waziristan120. He may have been in vicinity of the compound, as this was the very village where his son perished alongside former external operations commander Hamza Rabia121.

The Passengers

Less clear were the identities of the two companions inside the vehicle with Abu Jihad. Later reports indicated that another obscure Arab of importance was neutralized during the autumn of 2008, but circumstances of the drone strike involving the Arab al-Qaida fighter Abu Hassan al-Rimi were less than obvious.  Publicly, not much was known about this particular militant.  Prior to reports of his death, the name was not mentioned in the mass media.  US officials in 2009 however, confirmed their belief in the demise of this “emir” during the enhanced campaign122. At the time, it was strange that an unknown individual was described with such a title in the report. This could have just corresponded to his being a mid-level leader in operations in Afghanistan, commanding his own platoon of combatants, or indicative of another rising operative in the undefeated insurgency.  The latter option proved true, as the public and media were simply unaware of the intelligence that Abu Hassan al-Rimi had taken command of the al-Faruq Battalion in Kunar, helming al-Qaida forces in the unstable province123.  To bolster the 2009 claim, he was also described as a leader of cross-border infiltrations from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and a date for his death, specifically October 8, 2008, was later postulated by the Pakistani press124.

Internal al-Qaida documents from the time detail payments from a “late” Abu Hassan al-Rimi, which verified that an individual by the name labored and died for the organization, but provide no further detail125. Later in 2016, al-Qaida finally gave a eulogy for Abu Hassan al-Rimi, confirming his identity and importance126.  Born in 1980 as Ali Abdullah Ibrahim al-Rimi, he traveled to Afghanistan for training in 1999127.  Training at al-Faruq prepared him for the coming invasion, and he appears to have been very busy during the war coordinating efforts in various provinces against the Americans128. By 2005 he fought in a unit within Nuristan province, before being assigned to lead in Wardak129. Earning a reputation for his diligence and dedication, he was given command of the Omar al-Faruq Battalion in Kunar province next130. Thus, his purported title as an emir was verified.  He was responsible for ensuring that Kunar was an untenable position for the Americans and brought much consternation and harassment to the coalition forces131.  The eulogy contradicts the claim of his death on October 8 though, providing clarification that he was killed in North Waziristan after the assassination of Khalid Habib132.  One academic researcher noted that the Abu Hassan was on a foray into Pakistan from his realm of operations in Kunar, when the strike occurred133. Abu Hassan al-Rimi was targeted and slain alongside his father-in-law Abu Jihad, at the end of the month, along with an additional militant, presumably belonging to his battalion, Abu Thabit al-Kuwaiti134. The narrative of Abu Hassan al-Rimi offers an example of the complexity in determining exactly who is slain in the multitudinous drone strikes of this period, due to lack of information, proliferation of misinformation, and substantial time between releases of relevant evidence.

As a portion of the targeted al-Qaida officers were not publicly discussed or known names prior to their reported deaths, some skepticism then might be warranted to the claims of their affiliations and importance.  However, such importance is often displayed within internal al-Qaida documents, eulogies, and communications as was the case with Abu Hassan.  Thus, intelligence services were cognizant of their roles and activities, or their association and presence with well known militants precipitated their own demise.  The much maligned US intelligence apparatus was proving that its research, tracking, and targeting capabilities were efficient and lethal.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] The Pakistanis later assessed 20 civilian fatalities on this date, but were obviously not referring to this particular strike, but rather one in South Waziristan that was likely meant to be the cross-border US helicopter raid of September 3 (as opposed to September 30)135.
  1. Badar Mansoor or The Confusion of Words, Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis of Terrorism, 2012 ↩︎
  2. Badar Mansoor or The Confusion of Words, Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis of Terrorism, 2012 ↩︎
  3. Senior al-Qaeda leader killed in drone strike in Pakistan, by Rob Crilly, The Telegraph, February 9, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9072027/Senior-al-Qaeda-leader-killed-in-drone-strike-in-Pakistan.html ↩︎
  4. Badar Mansoor or The Confusion of Words, Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis of Terrorism, 2012 ↩︎
  5. Badar Mansoor or The Confusion of Words, Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis of Terrorism, 2012 ↩︎
  6. New US Attack Mocks Talk of Sovereignty: Missile Kills 12 in North Waziristan, Dawn, September 13, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/321000/new-us-attack-mocks-talk-of-sovereignty-missile-kills-12-in-north-waziristan // High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  7. New US Attack Mocks Talk of Sovereignty: Missile Kills 12 in North Waziristan, Dawn, September 13, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/321000/new-us-attack-mocks-talk-of-sovereignty-missile-kills-12-in-north-waziristan ↩︎
  8. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  9. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  10. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  11. High Value Targets Hit By Drones: US Paper, Dawn, June 2, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/853661/high-value-targets-hit-by-drones-us-paper ↩︎
  12. Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, April 8, 2009 ↩︎
  13. Nineteen al-Qaida Reports on militant leadership prospects, dated between Dec 2005 – Jan 2006, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bios.pdf ↩︎
  14. Nineteen al-Qaida Reports on militant leadership prospects, dated between Dec 2005 – Jan 2006, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bios.pdf ↩︎
  15. Nineteen al-Qaida Reports on militant leadership prospects, dated between Dec 2005 – Jan 2006, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bios.pdf ↩︎
  16. Nineteen al-Qaida Reports on militant leadership prospects, dated between Dec 2005 – Jan 2006, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bios.pdf ↩︎
  17. Seven killed in U.S. missile strike in South Waziristan, GEO Pakistan News, September 17, 2008 ↩︎
  18. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  19. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  20. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  21. Letter from Sheikh Said to Osama bin Laden, “From Hajji Othman to Azmarai,” dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  22. US drone strike kills five in Pakistan – officials, by Haji Mujtaba and Alamgir Bitani, Reuters, September 30, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/us-drone-strike-kills-five-in-pakistan-officials-idUSISL354951/ // 16 Foreigners Among 21 Killed in Missile Raid, Dawn, October 3, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/323797/16-foreigners-among-21-killed-in-missile-raid ↩︎
  23. US conducts 2 strikes in North Waziristan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, October 3, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/10/us_conducts_two_stri.php ↩︎
  24. NATO launches airstrike near Pakistan-Afghan border, by Augustine Anthony, Reuters, October 3, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/03/us-pakistan-usa-airstrike-idUSTRE4925MS20081003/?sp=true ↩︎
  25. 16 Foreigners Among 21 Killed in Missile Raid, Dawn, October 3, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/323797/16-foreigners-among-21-killed-in-missile-raid ↩︎
  26. Badar Mansoor or The Confusion of Words, Geneva Centre for Training and Analysis of Terrorism, 2012 ↩︎
  27. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  28. 21 Buried, Dawn, October 5, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/323894/us-strike-21-buried ↩︎
  29. al-Qaeda commanders escape Pakistan missile strike, Agence-France Press, October 10, 2008, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-58144 ↩︎
  30. al-Qaeda commanders escape Pakistan missile strike, Agence-France Press, October 10, 2008, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-58144 ↩︎
  31. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  32. The Situation in Afghanistan: The Use of Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Reprieve, The Foundation of Fundamental Rights, and Leigh Day Solicitors, February 2014, https://www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/old_site/File/Use_of_Drone_Strikes_in_Pakistan.pdf ↩︎
  33. Five Killed in US Missile Attack in Pakistan, Dawn, October 12, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/937921/five-killed-in-us-missile-attack-in-pakistan ↩︎
  34. Drone Attack Kills Four, Dawn, October 12, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/324979/drone-attack-kills-four // Five Killed in US Missile Attack in Pakistan, Dawn, October 12, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/937921/five-killed-in-us-missile-attack-in-pakistan ↩︎
  35. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  36. Attachment to a letter contained in bin Laden Abbottabad documents, “A simple summary on the reality of the situation in our arena in Afghanistan and Pakistan” ↩︎
  37. Fragment of Letter from Khalid Habib to unknown recipient, dated unknown ↩︎
  38. Fragment of Letter from Khalid Habib to unknown recipient, dated unknown ↩︎
  39. U.S. Strike Is Said to Kill Qaeda Figure in Pakistan, by Pir Zubair Shah, The New York Times, October 17, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/world/asia/18pstan.html ↩︎
  40. U.S. Strike Is Said to Kill Qaeda Figure in Pakistan, by Pir Zubair Shah, The New York Times, October 17, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/world/asia/18pstan.html ↩︎
  41. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  42. U.S. Strike Is Said to Kill Qaeda Figure in Pakistan, by Pir Zubair Shah, The New York Times, October 17, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/world/asia/18pstan.html ↩︎
  43. Scent of Helps Trace Hassan Ghul, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, October 19, 2014 ↩︎
  44. Scent of Helps Trace Hassan Ghul, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, October 19, 2014 ↩︎
  45. U.S. Strike Is Said to Kill Qaeda Figure in Pakistan, by Pir Zubair Shah, The New York Times, October 17, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/world/asia/18pstan.html ↩︎
  46. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  47. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  48. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  49. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abu Faraj al-Libi (Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Uzaybi), ISN 10017, http://wikileaks.ch/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  50. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  51. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  52. Fragments from the History of al-Qaida, Second Edition, Sheikh Abu Khubaib al-Sudani, June 2023, https://jihadology.net/2023/06/30/new-release-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsulas-shaykh-khubayb-al-sudani-fragments-from-the-history-of-al-qaidah-second-edition/ ↩︎
  53. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  54. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  55. The Road to Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, Abu Mohamed al-Masri, August 2023, https://jihadology.net/?s=road+to+nairobi ↩︎
  56. Evidence Collection, Statements of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Saqar al-Jadawi) to the FBI, May 18, 2002 ↩︎
  57. The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 911 and the War Against Al-Qaeda, Ali Soufan, W.W. Norton and Company, 2011 ↩︎
  58. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad, Compilation and Commentary by David Aaron, (Chapter 2: Life in Jihad – Al Qaeda and the Battle of Kandahar, by Saif al-Adel), RAND Corporation, 2008 ↩︎
  59. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad, Compilation and Commentary by David Aaron, (Chapter 2: Life in Jihad – Al Qaeda and the Battle of Kandahar, by Saif al-Adel), RAND Corporation, 2008 ↩︎
  60. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad, Compilation and Commentary by David Aaron, (Chapter 2: Life in Jihad – Al Qaeda and the Battle of Kandahar, by Saif al-Adel), RAND Corporation, 2008 ↩︎
  61. Eulogy of Khalid Habib, “Venerable Staff Officer Khalid al-Habib,” Vanguards of the Khorasan no 16, March 31, 2010 ↩︎
  62. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad, Compilation and Commentary by David Aaron, (Chapter 2: Life in Jihad – Al Qaeda and the Battle of Kandahar, by Saif al-Adel), RAND Corporation, 2008 ↩︎
  63. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  64. Resurgence: The Magazine for a Resurgent Muslim Ummah, as-Sahab Media Production, Issue 1, The Story of a Tranquil Soul, Fall 2014 ↩︎
  65. Lashkar-e-Zil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force, by Farhan Zahid, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 23, December 5, 2014, https://jamestown.org/lashkar-e-zil-al-qaedas-shock-and-awe-force/ ↩︎
  66. Lashkar-e-Zil: Al-Qaeda’s ‘Shock and Awe’ Force, by Farhan Zahid, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 23, December 5, 2014, https://jamestown.org/lashkar-e-zil-al-qaedas-shock-and-awe-force/ ↩︎
  67. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Mohamed,” dated approx. December 2008 ↩︎
  68. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Mohamed,” dated approx. December 2008 ↩︎
  69. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Abu Mohamed,” dated approx. December 2008 ↩︎
  70. Senate Condemns Drone Raid, Dawn, October 25, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/848979/senate-condemns-drone-raid ↩︎
  71. Strike on Village In Pakistan Kills 4; Drone Is Suspected, The New York Times via Reuters, October 22, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/world/asia/23drone.html ↩︎
  72. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  73. Senate Condemns Drone Raid, Dawn, October 25, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/848979/senate-condemns-drone-raid ↩︎
  74. Commander Among 20 Killed in US Drone Raid, Dawn, October 28, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/425825/commander-among-20-killed-in-us-drone-raid // ‘US strike’ kills Taleban leader, BBC News, October 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7692373.stm ↩︎
  75. Commander Among 20 Killed in US Drone Raid, Dawn, October 28, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/425825/commander-among-20-killed-in-us-drone-raid // ‘US strike’ kills Taleban leader, BBC News, October 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7692373.stm ↩︎
  76. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  77. Commander Among 20 Killed in US Drone Raid, Dawn, October 28, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/425825/commander-among-20-killed-in-us-drone-raid // ‘US strike’ kills Taleban leader, BBC News, October 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7692373.stm ↩︎
  78. US drone attacks kill 37 in Waziristan, The Nation, November 1, 2008, https://archive.ph/rzw3T#selection-2193.0-2193.38 ↩︎
  79. US drone attacks kill 37 in Waziristan, The Nation, November 1, 2008, https://archive.ph/rzw3T#selection-2193.0-2193.38 ↩︎
  80. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  81. US drone attacks kill 37 in Waziristan, The Nation, November 1, 2008, https://archive.ph/rzw3T#selection-2193.0-2193.38 ↩︎
  82. Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim a.k.a. Abu Jihad al Masri, US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program, https://web.archive.org/web/20080516002336/http:/www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=abu_jihad&language=english ↩︎
  83. Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike: officials, Agence-France Press, November 1, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20120627084323/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hFRj05wy4-L2HckvAXmlqSQKJ-yQ ↩︎
  84. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Othman Abu Yazid) to bin Laden, dated March 1, 2006 ↩︎
  85. Al-Qaida Security Committee Report, dated 2010 ↩︎
  86. Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim a.k.a. Abu Jihad al Masri, US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program, https://web.archive.org/web/20080516002336/http:/www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=abu_jihad&language=english ↩︎
  87. Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, April 8, 2009 ↩︎
  88. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  89. Senior al Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan Strike, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 1, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_2.php ↩︎
  90. as-Sahab Media Production, Winds of Paradise, Part 3, Eulogizing Abu Laith al-Libi, February 10, 2009 ↩︎
  91. Today’s Al Qaeda Tape: Ayman al Zawahiri and the “Islamic Group,” Laura Mansfield, Laura Mansfield Strategic Translations, August 5, 2006, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1678518/posts ↩︎
  92. Profile of Mohamed Khalil al-Hakimi (Abu Jihad), Al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies in London, August 1, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070321160307/http:/www.almaqreze.com/bayanat/artcl032.html ↩︎
  93. Senior al Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan Strike, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 1, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_2.php // Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike: officials, Agence-France Press, November 1, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20120627084323/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hFRj05wy4-L2HckvAXmlqSQKJ-yQ ↩︎
  94. Senior al Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan Strike, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 1, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_2.php ↩︎
  95. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
  96. Senior al Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan Strike, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, November 1, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_2.php ↩︎
  97. Profile of Mohamed Khalil al-Hakimi (Abu Jihad), Al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies in London, August 1, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070321160307/http:/www.almaqreze.com/bayanat/artcl032.html // Letter from Nazeh Abdulhamid al-Ruqayi (Anas al-Subayi) to Osama bin Laden, dated October 13, 2010 ↩︎
  98. Al-Qa’ida’s Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community, by Brian Fishman, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 6, 2006, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-qaidas-spymaster-analyzes-the-u-s-intelligence-community/ ↩︎
  99. Al-Qa’ida’s Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community, by Brian Fishman, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 6, 2006, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-qaidas-spymaster-analyzes-the-u-s-intelligence-community/ ↩︎
  100. Al-Qa’ida’s Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community, by Brian Fishman, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 6, 2006, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-qaidas-spymaster-analyzes-the-u-s-intelligence-community/ ↩︎
  101. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  102. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  103. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  104. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  105. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  106. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  107. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  108. Iran says ties with Egypt improving, Al Jazeera, January 1, 2008, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/1/1/iran-says-ties-with-egypt-improving // Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  109. Letter from Haji Harun (Abu Jihad al-Masri) to Osama bin Laden “Our Honorable Sheikh…,” dated February 12, 2008 ↩︎
  110. Al-Qa’ida’s Spymaster Analyzes the U.S. Intelligence Community, by Brian Fishman, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 6, 2006, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-qaidas-spymaster-analyzes-the-u-s-intelligence-community/ ↩︎
  111. Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike: officials, Agence-France Press, November 1, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20120627084323/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hFRj05wy4-L2HckvAXmlqSQKJ-yQ ↩︎
  112. Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike: officials, Agence-France Press, November 1, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20120627084323/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hFRj05wy4-L2HckvAXmlqSQKJ-yQ ↩︎
  113. ‘US strikes’ on Pakistan villages, BBC News, October 31, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7702679.stm // US Double Blow Kills 21 in Waziristan, Dawn, November 1, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/426409/us-double-blow-kills-21-in-waziristan ↩︎
  114. US Double Blow Kills 21 in Waziristan, Dawn, November 1, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/426409/us-double-blow-kills-21-in-waziristan ↩︎
  115. ‘US strikes’ on Pakistan villages, BBC News, October 31, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7702679.stm ↩︎
  116. US Double Blow Kills 21 in Waziristan, Dawn, November 1, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/426409/us-double-blow-kills-21-in-waziristan ↩︎
  117. US carries out more airstrikes in Pakistan, by James Cogan, World Socialist Web Site, November 3, 2008, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/11/paki-n03.html ↩︎
  118. US carries out more airstrikes in Pakistan, by James Cogan, World Socialist Web Site, November 3, 2008, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/11/paki-n03.html ↩︎
  119. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎
  120. Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike: officials, Agence-France Press, November 1, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20120627084323/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hFRj05wy4-L2HckvAXmlqSQKJ-yQ ↩︎
  121. US Double Blow Kills 21 in Waziristan, Dawn, November 1, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/426409/us-double-blow-kills-21-in-waziristan ↩︎
  122. Predators and Civilians, The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124743959026229517.html ↩︎
  123. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  124. Sources: Missile strike kills top al-Qaida leader, NBC News, March 17, 2010, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna35917212 // 50th al-Qaeda leader killed in 338th drone strike, by Amir Mir, The News International, December 3, 2012, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-146255-50th-al-Qaeda-leader-killed-in-338th-drone-strike ↩︎
  125. Al-Qaida Accounting Ledger, unknown date ↩︎
  126. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  127. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  128. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  129. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  130. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  131. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  132. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  133. Series of X posts discussing Faruq al-Qahtani, by Wesley Morgan, August 2, 2022, https://x.com/wesleysmorgan/status/1554507919567294464 ↩︎
  134. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 4, The Martyred Commander Abu al-Hassan al-Rimi ↩︎
  135. Detail of Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA, Leaked Pakistani Government – Administration of FATA Document, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 22, 2013, https://embed.documentcloud.org/documents/1010104-tbij-fata-doc-redacted1/ ↩︎

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