SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 42 – Reliable Or Errant)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment XI – Mas’ul al-Amm (Chapter 42 – Reliable Or Errant)

Throughout the efforts to liberate Zinjibar, airstrikes were not relegated to Abyan, but were occurring against other viable targets throughout Yemen. Into the summer, the counterterrorism operations only increased, even as AQAP delved into their own missions abroad. Meanwhile, the Saudis continued to take custody of their wanted. To achieve this, the kingdom relied on arrests from raids as well as the hope of surrenders from abroad. For the Americans, their drone strikes included the signature variety aimed at distinct groupings of armed combatants, and now also encompassed personality strikes against provincial and regional AQAP political and paramilitary commanders. This expanded the strategy from an intent to eliminate threats to the US, to also aiming for those poised to further destabilize Yemen. These strikes were reliable at times, and errant at others, creating an inevitable hectic political and military situation on the ground.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

Internal AQAP Structure

Nasir al-Wuhaishi maintained the illusion of controlling and influencing territory via his regional commanders such as with Jalal al-Balaidi al-Marqishi, ostensibly the emir of Abyan, inasmuch as he could be with President Hadi’s military having presently vanquished the jihadist stranglehold on the region [1]. Al Khadr Hussain al-Jadani was also seen as a senior commander in the province [2]. Said al-Shehri’s traveling companion and fellow Guantanamo recidivist Turki al-Assiri (E-18) oversaw forces in Lahaj, while the haven of Shabwah was the jurisdiction of the hitherto unknown Saad Atef al-Awlaki [3,4].  Saudi most wanted List F member Walid Jarbou al-Jalidi al-Harbi (F-45) was now emir of jihadists in Marib [5].  Sarhan Abdullah Ali al-Nasi, a Yemeni known as Khishiman, held the reins for operations in the northern provinces of Jawf and Saada [6].  Sana’a province of course, was under the purview of Shawqi Ali Ahmed al-Badani [7].  Baydah was not forgotten, and the volatile Dhahab family still reigned with Qaed al-Dhahab spearheading efforts therein [8]. 

AQAP could regroup as it remained viable as a network with operatives like Shawqi al-Badani.  A return to its roots for a while, structured like the criminal organization it was within Saudi Arabia, conducting a terror campaign as opposed to a military one.  Their paramilitary force, as defeated as it was, still existed as the odd hybrid of a persistent shadow army and terrorist outfit. 

AQAP was relevant despite the lost lands, but they still considered their ghost territory a victory, as seen by Shehri on the day after the Sabeen Square bombing openly praising both al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, declaring that their combined Islamic lands stretched from Africa through the Arabian Peninsula, and the implication was clear:  Shehri was trying to protect the morale of his troops while simultaneously offering solidarity with the other franchises to ensure future support [9].  

In the background of the Abyan campaign was the continuance of American drone strikes in Yemen.  While the fighting left many middle ranking AQAP leaders deceased, there were a plethora who fell in various provinces to the previously discussed expanded drone strategy. The Americans as of April 2012 had the ability to conduct a version of signature strikes that they hoped would debilitate the AQAP war and operational mechanisms [10].  Invariably, it is almost impossible to identify every militant killed during this flurry of drone activity, or to discuss every American airstrike, but the proceeding descriptions of this Segment will attempt to discuss important instances and those with notable AQAP losses. 

Fugitives of Mukalla

The concatenation of the Abyan offensive and signature strikes in other provinces, led AQAP to furiously retaliate, such as with the Sabeen Square parade bombing of Haitham Mufreh, and Assiri and Fahd al-Quso’s failed airliner attack [11].  On the day of the opening salvo in the Yemeni effort to purge Abyan, May 12, 2012, the Americans struck concurrently in Marib in Shabwah in order to disrupt and dislodge the AQAP logistical network supporting the declared emirate [12].  The first strike occurred in al-Hasun village Marib resulting in at least five dead militants [13].  They were later named by AQAP, primarily by kunya as:  Muhsin Abdulrahman al-Yusefi, Abu Mohamed al-Shehri, Abu Abdullah al-Sanaani, Saleh Mohamed Jabir al-Shabwani, and Abu Laith al-Hadhrami [13].  From among the deceased, Abu Abdullah al-Sanaani, was actually Amin Abdullah Abdulrahman al-Othmani, one of eight militants announced as wanted by the Yemeni government in October 2010 [13] – [A]. The lattermost killed was named as Hussam Mohamed al-Amoudi, a major figure from the previous year’s Mukalla prison escape [14,15].  Amoudi, as Abu Laith al-Hadhrami, had constructed quite the jihadist dream resume.  Initially, his desire was to join his brethren in AQSA, but with an inability to travel to the Kingdom from Yemen, instead propagated their literature, such as Sawt al-Jihad, before finding himself in Iraq working and learning from senior Abu Musab al-Zarqawi deputies [14].  The nefarious Jordanian jihadist deployed Amoudi back to Yemen for particular duties where he eventually assumed a senior role in AQI, but Zarqawi’s successor upon his death, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, recalled Amoudi to Iraq [14].  It was on this journey that the Yemeni was apprehended in Syria and upon extradition found himself incarcerated in Mukalla [14].  Upon the escape, he joined AQAP, being appointed by Qasim al-Rimi to instruct courses on explosives to their soldiers [14].  His time in this position lasted less than a year before his removal via American missile [54-14].  The second strike that day also decimated a vehicle convoy, bringing about the demise of an Egyptian jihadist and nine Yemeni AQAP fighters [13] – [B].  The Egyptian was Thamir Rafat, known as Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, a relatively low-ranking but well-known contributor [16]. 

The above strikes force us to consider the diaspora of the Mukalla escapees as they resumed roles and rejoined jihadist compatriots in multiple organizations.  For example, Abdulrahman Mohamed Barashid (Abu Abdulsalam al-Hadhrami) fought American forces in Salahuddin province Iraq, was arrested by Syrian soldiers, and extradited to Yemen to serve his sentence in Mukalla [17].  Upon escape he did not join AQAP, but rather went back to Iraq where he subsequently joined the franchise within again, before falling in an American airstrike [17].  To exemplify a differing choice, we must look at Ahmed Abu Bakr al-Baiti.  Known as Abu Yahya al-Hadhrami, Baiti was also captured by Syrian forces but had himself failed to achieve entrance to the Iraqi and Afghan theatres [17].  After his early exit from imprisonment in Mukalla, he joined his native franchise of AQAP, only to become one of the numerous losses of the organization during the Abyan campaign [17].  These men represented minor forces within global jihadism, but appreciated ones nonetheless.  AQAP even took time to eulogize both [17].  This was not entirely surprising, as obscure figures often received recognition for their roles in victories such as the Mukalla escape or engagements such as the battle for Abyan.  Salim Ahmed Mohamed al-Hibah al-Sharfi was an unknown figure with the kunya Abu Furqan al-Sanaani [18].  The man spent five years incarcerated for attempting to join Al-Qaida in Iraq and with his release merely found death during the Abyan campaign [18].  Regardless of his lack of stature in the organization, he still received a eulogy in the form of the 12th issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula [18].”  AQAP, with a nimiety of adherents could continue to sacrifice men like Sharfi, while Wuhaishi, Shehri, Rimi, Abab, Rubaish, and others went unscathed.  Thus, the American drone campaign sought to break the resolve of the network with signature strikes that aimed to remove a mass of soldiers and mid-level commanders. 

Unyielding Persistence

There were times when the Americans mistakenly took chances to eliminate senior leadership. For instance, at 0045 on May 17, drones destroyed two vehicles along a road between Sayun and Shibam inside Hadhramout, killing a civilian named Motei Muhsin Bilala, and at least one local AQAP militant reported as Obaid Saleh bin Talib [19,20]. All the while the machines were apparently aiming for Qasim al-Rimi, who was not in fact within the convoy [19]. The likelihood of civilian casualties in the strikes was soaring, but the dismantling of AQAP was of the utmost importance.

To accomplish such a thing, regional leaders needed to also be targeted.  The abysmal story of Tariq al-Dhahab dragging his family into his own iniquity for political and religious gain has been discussed in detail.  Tariq’s malignancy within the family had been eliminated by his own brother, only to have additional brothers succeed him in usurping the family for AQAP [21,22].  Qaed and Nabil al-Dhahab found themselves in the precarious position of AQAP governance and thus American crosshairs.  On May 28, 2012 they were targeted for assassination as they traversed through their native Baydah province [22,23,24].  After the initial fog of war confusion, it became apparent that despite deaths of bystanders and militants alike, both Qaed and Nabil survived [22,24].  With the expanded opportunity for targets, American press doubted the necessity of assassinating the emir of Baydah province and his brother [22,24].  The entire operation seemed indicative of American interference in a local conflict as opposed to protection of the homeland and American interests [24].  It should seem apparent that any AQAP emir of a province poses a threat, but AQAP themselves provided justification upon the revelation that Qaid acted as a handler for Nigerian Omar Faruq Abdulmutallab, the original failed underwear bomber from December 2009 [25].  Qaed al-Dhahab’s participation allowed the would-be mass murderer to meet and coordinate with Anwar al-Awlaki and Wuhaishi directly [25]. The Americans regardless were still focused on curbing any AQAP territorial expansion, being aware that if the jihadist emirate were allowed to survive, it would breed interminable terrorist plots.  Qaed and Nabil were unharmed, and the survival of the brothers heralded an era of increasing American obsession with eliminating the Dhahab family.           

US aircraft, manned and unmanned, conducted sorties against AQAP positions through the end of the liberation of Abyan, a coordinated endeavor between the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) for victory [24].  The strikes did not cease once AQAP were driven from their holds, but were perpetual through the summer, unyielding in persistence.  This included a June 19 strike that truncated the career of bomb maker Saleh al-Jawhari, who produced the Mufreh explosives belt utilized in the doomed parade, and was linked to various other bombings [26,27,28].  The vehicle transporting Jawhari was reduced to debris in Baydah province, and while there were some arguments over who could be credited as the Yemeni security services took credit, locals confirmed that it was a drone strike [27,28].  Success was emulated in other theatres via arrests.

Foreign Elements Detained

The Saudi Interior Ministry reported another surrender occurring in September 2012 [29].  In fact, the statement declared eight Saudis turned themselves in from abroad and were undergoing medical checks, debriefs, and meetings with their families [29,30].  The location from which these men surrendered was not given [29,30].  Only one was from List E, and he was not named by the Interior Ministry spokesman [29].  A thorough review of the Interior Ministry website during this time however revealed that Fawzan Owaiz Atiq al-Zahimi al-Salami (E-66) was now declared as detained [31].  This statement seems to be the only admission of the Saudis taking in a wanted list member that is not specifically accounted for in media reports.  Thus, we must assume that Salami is in fact the individual who surrendered.  His status upon initial listing was that he functioned for Al-Qaida in Iraq [32].  As this particular affiliate was in a mode of repair in 2012, it provides some reasoning to Salami’s decision. 

Meanwhile, the Saudis were wary of the potential reignition of the insurgency that once plagued their Kingdom.  Their vigilance was on display in August 2012, just prior to the eight surrenders, when security forces thwarted a terrorist attack in final planning stages [33].  In Riyadh, a Saudi cell commander was apprehended, and gave up six Yemeni colleagues [33].  In Jeddah, a similar raid yielded a Saudi explosives engineer [33].  The cell was apparently taking orders from AQAP and intended to bring destruction among governmental and security targets [33].  It is unknown if Salami’s surrender was related to this event.  

Amidst the AQAP misfortunes, Mishaal al-Shadokhi maintained possession of his hostage, the Saudi Consul Abdullah al-Khalidi.  During the fighting in May, a video of Khalidi outlining the supposedly illicit activities of Saudi intelligence within Yemen was released [34].  During a second video in July, Khalidi detailed that his release was dependent upon the freedom of female prisoners in Saudi Arabia [35].  The reference was clear, Shadokhi and the captors were following the belaboring orders of the irascible Shehri, who still clung with importunity to the hope that his potential wife Haila al-Qusayir could be freed.  Interestingly, in a third video release later in October, Khalidi alluded to the fact that the Saudis apparently did release some prisoners, but informs his audience that those freed are not nearly enough [36].  Khalidi points to the Israelis releasing over a thousand prisoners for just one captive soldier [36]. 

As it happened though, AQAP militants were not just restricted to being captured within the Peninsula, and were yet again unsuccessful in carrying out an attack abroad.  Minh Quang Pham, the British citizen of Vietnamese origin, who had featured in Inspire magazine, returned to Britain with a particular goal in mind, seeded therein by his former mentor Anwar al-Awlaki:  bring destruction to his homeland in the name of AQAP [37].  His training for the task, which included attacking Heathrow Airport, was for nought [37].  Upon arrival in Britain on July 27, 2011 he was detained and searched [37].  On June 29, 2012, Pham was officially arrested [37].  Due to his association with AQAP, he was eventually extradited to the US in February 2015 [37].  In May 2016, Phan was sentenced for 40 years imprisonment for his role in providing material support to AQAP [37].  Yet another Anwar al-Awlaki disciple had been decommissioned and punished. So far authorities outside of the Peninsula had been fortunate with preventing attacks, but would it hold up continually?

Benghazi and Summer Drones

Wuhaishi had Badani’s successful network in Sana’a, but while being relegated to the tribal areas and without his previous territory, he was hard pressed to launch external operations.  Thus, in a July audio release, Harith Ghazi al-Nadhari pled with embedded jihadists in foreign cities, as well as those susceptible to propagandizing, to decide on attacking on their own [38].  But it appears AQAP was not without a foreign operation in mind, coordinating with other local al-Qaida affiliates along the way.  Wuhaishi is believed to have deployed at least three operatives to Lybia in 2012.  There they participated in the attack on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.  This event has garnered significant media attention when compared to other terrorist attacks on diplomatic settings.  The AQSA Jeddah Consulate attack in December 2004 for instance, received much less coverage. Therefore, it seems that the intensive focus and indignation over the event was political in nature as opposed to a sincere concern over diplomatic missions.  That being said, four Americans, including the US Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, and three CIA contractors perished in the attack.  Wuhaishi and Qasim al-Rimi were directly connected and coordinating with Mohamed Jamal Abdulrahim al-Kashif, and his Mohamed Jamal Network, an enterprise determined to establish a jihadist presence in the Sinai Peninsula and overall Egypt [39,40]. The Jamal infrastructure prepared suicide assailants and was greatly assisted by AQAP via the human smuggling of recruits into the MJN camps. From these locales, operatives utilized in the Benghazi attack were trained [39,40]. By May 2013, the FBI released low quality images of the three deployed AQAP fighters, within a bulletin seeking information on their whereabouts [41].  Officials believed the operatives remained in Benghazi for a couple of days after the attack and then proceeded west across Africa, eventually meeting up with another al-Qaida affiliate, a faction of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, under command of militant Mokhtar Belmokhtar, before disappearing into obscurity [41].  AQAP rapidly responded to the Benghazi debacle, urging more instances of the same, and while they did not take credit for the incident, they praised it as a repercussion for the assassination of central al-Qaida ideologue and deputy, Abu Yahya al-Libi in Pakistan [41,42].  Nadhari went on to declare that the time for protests and peace was over, and that the only acceptable way to defend the religion and even the Prophet Mohamed himself, was via violence [43].  To underscore this need, AQAP released the full will of Lufti Bahar, the squadron leader of the 2008 attack on the US Embassy in Yemen, undoubtedly to inspire additional willing combatants [44]. 

Meanwhile, the increasingly rapid and violent summer drone and air raid campaign attempted to dislodge AQAP from their last bastions of strength.  Shortly after the June strike which killed the Sabeen Square bombing suspect Saleh al-Jawhari in Baydah province, the focus again shifted to Abyan [27,45].  This centered on the province’s Mahfad district, where for example, on June 20 a series of at least six airstrikes from the Yemenis, and possibly Americans, pounded AQAP positions [46,47,48].  The militants having dissolved from their previous fortified positions were holding strong in Mahfad, and thus were targeted by the Yemenis in an effort to finalize the destruction of the network in Abyan [48].  Around 30 militants were killed in the bombings, but civilians also perished, including a Red Cross employee [46,47].  The Yemenis were invested in finally clearing the militants from the southern province, continuing to sweep through Zinjibar and Jaar as well to ensure the absence of foreign fighters [46].    

As mentioned in Segment X, the militants fleeing into Shabwah were neither safe nor content, and were followed by advancing Yemenis, as well as airstrikes.  As such, two middle ranking AQAP officials from the war in Abyan were targeted and killed on July 3, in Bayhan district, Shabwah [49].  Fahd Saleh al-Anjaf al-Harithi and Hassan Ali al-Ishaqi, with two of their men, perished when their vehicles were targeted by drones after being flushed from Abyan [49,50].  The exact nature of their responsibility within the network is currently shrouded, yet it was revealed that Anjaf was of enough importance to warrant being specifically targeted by the CIA, acquiring the moniker Objective Rhodes [51].  A previous drone strike on Anjaf in April 2012, failed to kill him but did result in militant casualties [51].  Though AQAP forces clung to Mahfad, they were continually attacked from the air throughout July. 

AQAP blamed a portion of their misfortunes on the “popular committees,” or tribal forces that had aligned with governmental troops in the retraking of Jaar and Zinjibar [52].  An essential tribal elder of these committees was Abdullatif al-Said [53].  Considered a traitor, Said abandoned AQAP in 2009 to assist Yemeni forces in uprooting the jihadist movement [53].  As a consequence, his life was continually endangered.  On August 4, a suicide bomber decimated a funeral gathering, killing 45 tribesmen of the popular committees in Jaar, prompting trepidation that AQAP may regain their supremacy over the town [52,53].  Said survived, but was targeted yet again on September 22, in Aden, as he finished dining at a restaurant and entered his vehicle [53].  Another suicide bomber flung himself at the car, but Said was sheltered enough to survive a second time in less than two months [53].

The campaign was not kind to AQAP militants in other regions of Yemen, including those not typically targeted.  This was particulary apparent in Hadhramout, where just the year prior the impressive Mukalla prisonbreak had occurred [54].  In al-Qatn, Hadhramout on August 4, a drone demolished a vehicle, killing 5 AQAP fighters regrouping in the eastern province [55].  AQAP mourned the deceased driver as a Saudi named Abu Bara’a al-Sayari [56].  Another vehicle was targeted on August 7, in Zukaika, Hadhramout, killing three [56].  It is important to note that AQAP retained the array of foreign elements that had joined them in the Abyan experiment.  This is juxtaposed to the original Saudi version of the network, AQSA, which saw its constituents as mostly Saudi natives, with a few exceptions for Chadian, or other immigrants.  For AQAP, it was common for jihadists of multiple nationalities to congregate.  This was an advantage for Wuhaishi, but also helped in placing these men in precarious situations as foreigners were easier to follow and target.  An example of this also occurred on August 7, this time in Rada’a, Baydah province when a drone obliterated a pair of vehicles, leaving seven dead in the ruins [56].  The dead included Abu Bara’a al-Sharori, a Saudi, Abu Jafar al-Iraqi, a Bahraini, Abu Hafs al-Tunisi, a Tunisian, as well as Abu Musab al-Masri and Abu Hafs al-Masri, of Egypt.  Additionally, a senior bomb maker Abdullah Awad al-Masri (alternatively Abu Osama al-Maribi, representing his assimilation into Yemeni society) and Abu Ibrahim al-Sakhi, a Yemeni were killed [56].  Jihdadists openly mourned Abu Hafs al-Tunisi, whom they named as Mohamed bin Mohamed of Benzert al-Jala’a, Tunisia [57].  Mohamed was released from years of incarceration in his native country, after the Arab Spring resulted in the overthrow of his government.  Known to speak at protests in his homeland, Mohamed left to enmesh into AQAP, bringing his vitality and vigor along [57].  These represented but a few of the foreigners joining Wuhaishi’s forces.

Errant Attempts

More Hadhramout strikes occurred as August came to a conclusion.  Two vehicles were fired upon on August 28 in Qahb al-Hisan, Hadhramout, resulting in the destruction of one of them, and the deaths of the two militants inside [58,59].  While the second vehicle escaped, AQAP lost a Saudi militant named Salim Mubarak al-Sayari in the first [58,59].  Sayari exemplifies again the myriad Saudis fighting in foreign theatres who are not on a Most Waned List.  The next strike in Khashamir village, al-Qatn, Hadhramout was of grave concern.  A local imam, Salim Ahmed Ali al-Jabir had incurred the wrath of AQAP on August 27 when he publicly denounced them from his forum [60].  On August 29, AQAP arrived in Khashamir, sending three delegates to meet with and silence the imam [60,61].  Jabir met with them in public, in a residential area, along with his protection, a local policeman and cousin, Walid Abdullah Ali al-Jabir [60,61].  The five men were engaged in debate as at least four missiles tore into the palm tree grove in which they stood, killing all [60,61].  This was another strike over which the US government was to be confronted due to collateral civilian deaths, yet the prowling drones above Hadhramout did not retreat [60].  

On August 31, a drone took aim at a vehicle containing eight heavily armed men in the Hawra region of the province [62].  In the remains of the vehicle were eight dead jihadists, including Mukalla prison escapee Khalid Muslim Batis [62].  Inexplicably, the media proclaimed Batis to be the “mastermind” of the Limburg attack in 2002 [62].  Refering to Segment I of this Series, it is seen that Batis was not in fact the coordinator of the plot, or even a named conspirator.  As a disclaimer it must be stated that Batis may well have had a small role in the attack as one of Nashiri and Harithi’s unnamed network, but it remains unknown and seems unlikely.  Indeed, in 2004 fifteen men (mostly the List G members responsible for reviving AQAP) were convicted for terrorism related events in Yemen including the Limburg attack, but Batis was not among those sentenced [63].   What is relevant however is that Batis was a known member of Hamza al-Quayti’s Yemeni Soldiers’ Brigades [64].  As a member of this portion of AQAP, he was sentenced to death along with others in Quayti’s entourage [64].  Every man sentenced, whether it had been to death or otherwise, had escaped from their Mukalla prison in 2011 [15].  Thus, while Batis was not the mastermind of the Limburg plot, he was still a dangerous AQAP figure who had found his way back into action.  Fortunately for the Yemenis, any plots this man was developing were cut short via the drone strike. Of further intrigue was the fact that his brother, Saleh Muslim Batis was the chairman of the al-Islah Party for Hadhramout, an affiliate organization of the Muslim Brotherhood [65]. Traditionally not associated with al-Qaida, al-Islah having an official with a brother perishing in such a manner displayed the familial complexities of the Yemeni conflict.

Just a couple of days later, the new patriarch of the Dhahab family, Abdulrauf, was targeted in a severely botched drone operation on September 2 [66,67].  Abdulrauf was not injured or even hit, but a minibus carrying civilians was decimated, leaving 12 charred corpses and several broken families in Radaa, Baydah [66,67].  Children were among the collateral damage [66].  Furthermore, the devastating strike only served to condition more angry youths to join AQAP against what they viewed as American aggression [66,67].  Experts on Yemen began to question why Abdulrauf was even being sought after by the CIA [67].  As the patriarch of the Dhahab family, he did hold much influence in Baydah, yet it was Qaed and his brother Nabil that acted as leadership for AQAP in the province and as important facets of their political front Ansar al-Shariah [21].  Abdulrauf as a sympathizer for his half-brothers’ venture into AQAP did not necessarily justify this attempted assassination [21]. 

Another failed attempt occurred in on September 5, in al-Ain, Hadhramout province [68].  AQAP appeared to be gaining ground within the province.  The strike ruined a domicile within the village, leaving at least seven deceased militants [68,69].  Initially, Said al-Shehri himself was declared as among the dead [70].  Yet Wuhaishi’s recidivist deputy had survived a fiery fate before.  The house appeared to contain a cache of weapons for future operations [68].  Supposedly, DNA testing was carried out on the jihadist bodies, allowing for confirmation that Shehri was not in fact among the dead [69].  A wound similar to one Shehri bore, was found on one of the corpses, leading to the initial speculation of success [69].  Again, the deputy escaped.  Shehri dismissed the assertion directly on October 20, when he released an audio message for his followers [71].  He stated that the report of his death was a redirection by the Americans, to divert focus away from the disaster of a strike in Baydah just days before [71].  He referred to current events as proof of life and even commented on the AQAP retreat from Abyan [71]. 

News of Shehri’s supposed death was fresh on September 11, 2012, the same day as the Benghazi attacks in Libya, when a car bombing occurred in Sana’a, aimed at assassinating the Yemeni Defense Minister just as his convoy was departing a Cabinet meeting [72].  Seven of General Mohamed Nasir Ahmed’s guards and five civilians died in what was described as AQAP soldiers reacting to news of Shehri’s demise [72].  This was but another attempt on the Defense Minister’s life that failed, as he was uninjured by the blast [72].

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] In addition to Othman, the other seven listed as wanted Yemenis in October 2010 were: AQAP Sanaa chieftain Shawqi Ali Ahmed al-Badani, Bashir Mohamed Ahmed al-Hulaisi, Abdulilah Ali Qasim al-Mesbahi, Abdulhamid Ahmed Mohamed al-Habishi, Mohamed Ali Abdullah al-Nashiri, Musleh Abdullah Ahmed al-Hulaisi, and Yusef Ahmed Muthana Zayed [73]
  • [B] The AQAP combatants slain in the drone strike alongside Abu Ubaidah al-Masri were the Yemenis: Abu Bilal Hamid al-Aqra, Hassan Ali Mayqan, Ali Hassan al-Shabwani, Ahmed Saleh Mohamed al-Faqir, Mohamed Saleh Mohamed al-Faqir, Muhsin Said Kharsan al-Ajdai, Mubarak al-Majeh, Aref al-Azani, and Hassan Saud al-Muaili [13]

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