SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Signals To Commence

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Taken together, the rise of the takfiri ideology, reemergence of once lost operatives, escalating belligerence of the Pakistani jihadists, potential destabilization of the Pakistani government, and the further alignment of extremist factions under one banner were all definite signals to commence an enhanced drone assassination campaign.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

An Unlikely Escape

In the time since his arrest, and the spectacular circumstances surrounding his terroristic endeavors, Rashid Rauf endured a convoluted form of justice. Emerging from the shadows of Pakistani ISI detainment and delivered to the unsavory Adiala prison, Rauf and his counsel made accusations of jailer abuse and subsequent interrogations by foreign authorities1. Rauf was held in claustrophobic accomodations, whipped, and even electrocuted at times by the ISI2. Despite facing serious terrorism charges, Rauf was obscured and protected by the Pakistani court system, with judges both dismissing those charges against him in December 20063 and, in September 2007, ordering his release from custody4. By November the remaining lesser charges were vacated, but his plight was extended by an immediate extradition process to the UK5. It seemed the Pakistanis desired two Balochi dissidents from Britain as compensation, and thus left Rauf languishing in detainment6. By December, he was still facing perfunctory extradition proceedings periodically in Islamabad7.

On Saturday December 15, Rauf departed such a hearing in the custody of two inept, and perhaps corrupt, police officers. Traveling from the court in return to the prison in vicinity of Rawalpindi, the police suspiciously detoured to a fast food establishment8. An uncle of Rauf’s convinced the police to utilize his own van for the transport, while Rauf connived to halt the drive at the restaurant9. After a meal provided for by the uncle10, the negligent officers allowed Rauf to doff his handcuffs and enter a mosque for prayers11. Meanwhile, the guards remained stagnant in the vehicle, supposedly ignorant of Rauf’s intentions to abscond from the rear yard of the Rukhshanda mosque12. Rauf did not in fact return, and the officers failed to inform other authorities of the escape for an excessive amount of time13. Within days the two police were apprehended on suspicion of complicity14. Pakistani officials postulated that they must have been bribed15. As obvious as his escape may have been, others speculated that Rauf was merely disappeared and transferred into Pakistani ISI custody for further abusive purposes16. Rauf’s counsel, who was initially told that his client liberated himself from his shackles and fled, was incredulous upon hearing the story17. The lawyer implied that he was firmly in the belief that Rauf was in secretive custody, and would eventually be discovered deceased18. The conspiring uncle, named as Mohamed Rafiq, was arrested after disappearing with his nephew19, but Rauf was vanished, and soon to rejoin the ranks of al-Qaida operations.

Sheikh Issa al-Masri

Certain prominent extremist clerics in the Khorasan caused al-Qaida consternation, yet also radically altered the local inherent militant ideology.  Of particular note was Abu Amro Abdulhakim, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) ideologue known better as Sheikh Issa al-Masri20.  Sheikh Issa had helped to indoctrinate and teach recruits at the Afghan paramilitary camps prior to the American invasion, specifically from a Syrian Guesthouse in Kabul21.  From this home, located in the Wazir Akhbar Khan neighborhood, Sheikh Issa instructed a course for Arab trainees attending the camps, specializing in legal, Shariah Law, and matters of jihadist justification22. 

Following the invasion, Sheikh Issa fled to Pakistan, but in the initial aftermath, he was interviewed by 60 Minutes, where he expressed solidarity with al-Qaida and claimed to be a senior religious official. In fact, American al-Qaida operative Adam Gadahn later identified him also as Marjan Salim or Abdulhakim Hassan, and named him as the Mufti (Islamic legal official) of the EIJ23. Eventually and unsurprisingly, Sheikh Issa arrived in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, basing in Mir Ali, North Waziristan24.  From therein he helped to spread a virulent militants ideology to the native Pashtun tribes and as well as foreign combatants25. 

American and Pakistani authorities expressed concern at the Egyptian’s establishment in the FATA, and had reason to do so26.  Sheikh Issa expressed irascible resentment against the secular Pakistani government, blaming them for the unfortunate circumstances in which the jihadists were dwelling27.  He began to proselytize to the local tribesmen and the Central Asians of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) living in the FATA, resulting in the potential for violence befalling the Pakistani establishment28. He thus held notable sway upon Mullah Sadiq Noor and Maulvi Abdulkhaliq Haqqani in North Waziristan, Tahir Yuldashev of the IMU, and Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan29. During August 2004, when Pakistani authorities were otherwise distracted by their summer of arrests and raids, Sheikh Issa was directly implicated in a disrupted plot to utilize an array of suicide bombers against senior Pakistani governing officials and the American Embassy30. An arsenal of weaponry and five affiliated operatives were detained from August 11-15, with Sheikh Issa suspected of coordinating and instigating the potential assaults on behalf of al-Qaida31.

Sheikh Issa was of the school of thought that governments and militaries were either for or against God and the Islamic faith.  As such, while some jihadist and al-Qaida figures focused on American and European targets in order to expel their influence from the Middle East, Sheikh Issa extended this wrath to any predominantly Muslim nation with a government allied or partnered with those he viewed as apostates32.  Particularly influential in Saudi Arabia and among the Pakistanis he now dwelled among, Sheikh Issa regularly condoned violence against the Pakistani and other regional regimes33.  He cited the arrests of al-Qaida members and jihadists by the Pakistanis, and he and his flock touted the devastating October 8, 2005 Kashmir earthquake as merely God’s retribution against the Pakistanis for their stance against the militants34.  His adamant position allowed for attacks against Muslim populaces.  This was counter productive for al-Qaida. Despite the fact that they consistently kill other Muslims in attacks against Western targets, they can still initially claim that they were first attacking enemies of their faith.  For those like Sheikh Issa al-Masri, the strikes targeting Pakistan were legitimate and warranted.  This led to debate within al-Qaida about the operational targeting and whether the focus should shift significantly35.  Sheikh Issa’s influence was substantial in the tribal agencies and his pedigree solid, yet he could also be viewed as problematic for al-Qaida. 

Sheikh Issa was born in 1959 in Egypt and followed a fairly basic jihadist trajectory in life for that time period.  He voraciously absorbed Islamic and religious studies, in both official and personal capacities throughout early life, eventually becoming indoctrinated into the EIJ36.  He was briefly imprisoned along with so many other EIJ members after the Anwar Sadat assassination, but was free in the mid-1980s to travel the Middle East, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, for the purpose of teaching37.  Eventually he traveled to Afghanistan in 1985, in order to disseminate his jihadist viewpoints during the insurgency38.  He became close to the militant leaders including the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, and while he departed and taught in Yemen for a while, he eventually returned to Afghanistan in 1995, as the Taliban consolidated power39.  Thus, he was in country for the rise in prominence of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida during the late 1990s40.  Sheikh Issa was a prolific writer and speaker.  One of his books in particular, was later utilized by Pakistani militants, in that it legitimized the attacking of regimes deemed as infidels41.  As mentioned, after the US invasion he even granted an interview wherein he claimed to be al-Qaida’s senior most religious figure42. 

While this claim is dubious, his influence and connections cannot be denied.  In fact, by October 2006 jihadist-oriented al-Fajr Media was launching a website for Sheikh Issa, wherein he expressed vehement disdain for regional governments and pushed for violence43.  Sheikh Issa placed particular emphasis on struggling against leaderships of nations that in his opinion should be theocracies as opposed to secular entities44.  It was his assertion that these targets were more valid than even foreign nations that were not predominantly Muslim and had never been ruled by Islam45.  For the nascent TTP, this was a justifying ideology that allowed them to express their rage against the Pakistani government and have it approved of by a major jihadist and religious figure46.  Suddenly, the Pakistani government that had previously endorsed and approved of the Taliban next door and the internationally aimed terrorists who were not a local problem, were now faced with a threat inside their borders.  The ideology of Sheikh Issa piled secular local governments, Shiites, and non-Muslims together as infidels, offering neither truce nor respite, and apologizing for none of these harsh views47.  The Pakistani authorities were growing increasingly concerned, declaring that Sheikh Issa was responsible for a potential plot in August 2004 to bring chaos to the Pakistani independence day celebration48.  The affinity of local Pakistani militants to Sheikh Issa drew extremists normally focused only on Kashmir into the sphere of influence of al-Qaida.   Sheikh Issa remained in the FATA without any real interference or response from the Pakistanis, even as the seeds he sowed grew into the destruction levied upon the nation by the TTP, IMU, al-Qaida, and other outfits. 

Sheikh Issa and those similar to him followed a doctrine as takfiris, and defined Muslims that lack sufficient devoutness or have significant religious flaws to be infidels on the same level as their foreign enemies49.  For an Egyptian to follow this makes sense, as several ostensibly pious Muslims were abused by their government50.  Essentially, the radicals were punished, which in turn, furthered their fervor.  Sheikh Issa’s rage against Arab governments aligned with the West is thus deeply personal.  After finding himself driven from the jihadist haven of Afghanistan along with the other militants elements, his new home in the FATA provided an abundance of resources and malleable young minds to steer against the Pakistani establishment.  With this background it is very important to note that Sheikh Issa was praised by Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri51.  Sheikh Issa, as a spiritual leader, helped nurture and establish a new sense of urgency in the jihadist communities of tribal Pashtun Pakistan52.  Thus, al-Qaida was able to take advantage of this developing phenomenon, altering the trajectory of the militant movement to achieve their own ambitions. In 2007, the foreign presence in Pakistan was able to unleash the local radical elements against the influential Benazir Bhutto.

Benazir Bhutto

Assassination attempts against Benazir Bhutto were arguably the precipitating factor in the escalated CIA drone war to come.  As previously mentioned, the takfiri ideology allowed for ahderent militants to attack Muslims whom they deemed to be infidels for not being proper or pious or even extreme enough.  Thus, the incidents were the culmination of Sheikh Issa al-Masri and the significant threat posed by his preachings and influence on tribal Pakistanis, transforming them into violent operatives against their own government. 

From an operational perspective, despite the losses suffered by the al-Qaida command structure, the organization was able to realign and conduct acts in the same manner as prior years.  Resembling Abu Faraj al-Libi conducting assassination attempts against President Musharraf via Amjad Hussain Faruqi, al-Qaida now commissioned an operation to assassinate Benazir Bhutto utilizing local elements. 

Bin Laden desired the death of Bhutto and thus his men pursued the goal.  Bin Laden maintained a grudge against Bhutto dating back to 1989, when he financed an attempt to bring her to a no-confidence vote, and have her replaced as Prime Minister53.  Bhutto thwarted the plot, despite an estimated $10 million spent on the endeavor by bin Laden54.  Bhutto’s resulting phone call to the Saudi government led to bin Laden’s eventual departure from Pakistan and the failed ban on travel imposed upon him by the Saudis55.  Bhutto stood against Islamist and conservative politicians and the military establishment attempting to govern Pakistan56.  As such, she was no friend to the foreign Arab militants based in the country, and began to purge them throughout her first two terms from 1988 to 199657.  This displaced several future al-Qaida members from Pakistan into neighboring Afghanistan58.  Additionally, bin Laden is said to have financed previous assassination attempts against her in the early 1990s59.  Now though, he needed his organization to bring this effort to conclusion.  External operations chief Abu Ubaidah al-Masri initiated and oversaw the plot60.  His experience and success with these types of missions made him an obvious choice for the duty.  Specifically, following the aftermath of the Red Mosque incident, bin Laden sought to take advantage of a seemingly fragile Pakistani government, and tasked Abu Ubaidah to maintain the pressure61.  The Egyptian contracted Baitullah Mahsud and his men to actually conduct the operation62.  Abu Ubaidah commenced the October 18, 2007 attempt on Bhutto and the actual assassination on December 2763.  These missions were constructed rapidly considering that Bhutto only returned to Pakistan from extended time in Bahrain and Dubai in October 200764.  As leader of the liberal and secular Pakistan People’s Party, she was making another run to become Prime Minister of the nation65.  Having previously been challenged by internal rifts in the Pakistani government, by radical Islamists, and by the fact that she was of Shiite heritage, there was no dearth of those in country who would commit to an operation to remove her from politics66. 

October Attempt

For Abu Ubaidah’s October 18 operation, the proceedings were overseen by al-Qaida veteran Fahd Mohamed Ali Musalam and his men and network of Pakistani contacts67.  Known as Osama al-Kini, Musalam was assisted by his deputy Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. Both men were wanted for their culpability in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa68. Herein exemplified here, how a few loyal Arabs and Africans sworn to bin Laden within the infrastructure of al-Qaida, operated alongside Pakistani networks to achieve these lofty operational goals.  It would have been increasingly difficult for Musalam, Abu Ubaidah, or the other primary al-Qaida to operate without local networks provided by Baitullah Mahsud and others.  Bhutto landed in Karachi on October 18 from Dubai, under a deal brokered by MI6 and the CIA between her and Musharraf69.  Previous animosities were to be set aside and the two would work in tandem for political survival70.  Musharraf could not ignore Bhutto’s popularity, even though he had charged her with corruption71.  Those charges were to be dropped, Bhutto and her husband could return and participate in elections, although they would support Musharraf’s remaining term as President72.  The militants were prepared for an alternate option.  As she traveled from Karachi through Pakistan for eight hours in an armored vehicle, she was protected by a massive police and volunteer force as arranged by her husband73.  After speaking from the top of the armored vehicle, Bhutto retreated into its confines, just as the suicide assault commenced74.  One bomber cleared a path to Bhutto’s vehicle for the second approaching assailant75. The incident killed 149, including a multitude of members of Bhutto’s PPP in Larkana, Sindh76.  Bhutto was completely protected by the vehicle77.  Musalam failed in his effort.  But al-Qaida and Abu Ubaidah were not finished. 

December Conspirators

For the successful December assassination in Rawalpindi, the network has been revealed clearly.  Below Baitullah Mahsud was the Pakistani Ibadur Rahman, known as Faruq Chattan, who was established as a planner and plotter of the attempt78.  Chattan himself was close to Abu Ubaidah, providing a key link between the Egyptian and Baitullah79.  In fact, Chattan served as a member of Abu Ubaidah’s external operations committee, placing him at the forefront for missions such as the Bhutto attack80.  From this point, Baitullah maintained contact and control of the operation through another planner contact, known as Maulvi Sahib, or Azizullah81.  Chattan commissioned a group of former students from the Darul Uloom Haqqania, the religious institution in Akora Khattak, Nowshera District, North West Frontier Province, that gave rise to the Taliban82.  The three graduates, Qari Ismail, known as Nadir Khan83, Nasrullah, known as Ahmed, and Abdullah, known as Saddam, were facilitators for the plot, and received orders, information, and the suicide vests for the operation directly from Chattan84.  Nadir Khan, or Qari Ismail was also said to have received funding from Baitullah in regards to the mission85.  Later reports indicate that Baitullah delivered at least $6,500 to Qari Ismail for the impending operation86. Baitullah and his men also provided 15 year old suicide bomber candidates for the attempt, and the three graduates traveled to South Waziristan to take possession of these impressionable and expendable pawns87.  Once in Akora Khattak, the impending bombers received religious instruction from one Maulvi Nasib88.  Nasrullah issued orders and the bombers to cousins Hasnain Gul and Mohamed Rafaqat in Rawalpindi89.  The cousins were the immediate handlers of the youthful operatives90.

Yet Nasrullah remained with them as well, and attempted to transport them to attack Bhutto at a stadium event on the evening of December 2691.  Nasrullah could not place the bombers in close proximity to Bhutto’s vehicle and thus scrapped the plan, and moved the attack to the following day, aiming to conduct the assassination at a political rally held at a park92.  Nasrullah returned the bombers to the cousins93.  Hasnain Gul was enraged at losing a friend at the siege of the Red Mosque, and thus recruited his cousin to join him in exacted revenge on the Pakistani government94.  Earlier in 2007 they traveled to South Waziristan with intentions of joining the militants, owing to the fact that Gul had previously attended jihadist training in 2005 in the North West Frontier Province95.  They were accepted and redirected to Rawalpindi to eventually receive the operatives96. 

As handlers they delivered the suicide bombers to their target at the Liaquat Bagh (a famous Pakistani National Park) on December 27, and had even conducted surveillance in anticipation of the incident97.  This task they completed and repeated while the bombers washed themselves in preparation for martyrdom as per their instructions from the TTP in South Waziristan98.  Gul then issued the bombers equipment while Rafaqat and Nasrullah finished final surveilling99.

Tribal suicide assailants Bilal and Ikramullah were ordered to different exits of the event, a political rally for Bhutto being held at the park100.  The PPP event had extra security to include metal detectors, as the ISI warned Bhutto earlier in the day that they had information indicating that a suicide assault against her was imminent101.  Hasnain positioned Bilal at the main exit, while Rafaqat placed Ikramullah at the alternate102. Additional gathered evidence later showed that Hasnain Gul and the handlers were housing a third young member of the suicide assault team named Said, also known as Abdullah103.  This was based off of two different DNA samples found at the handlers’ home, believed to match two different bombers’ corpses104.  The clothing indeed belonged to Bilal, according to sources, but it appeared that there must have been another individual in the home as well105.  The three bombers were with Nasrullah for the attempt the previous evening106.  Thus, a team of three were in the Liaquat Bagh for the attempt.

An “American Asset”

Bhutto met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Islamabad earlier in the day prior to departing for Rawalpindi107.  There she gave her speech to an enthusiastic crowd of 10,000 in the park, proclaiming her liberal positions, and after 1700 prepared to exit108.  Although she was in an armored vehicle, she stood, rising through the open roof of the vehicle to be seen by the crowds109.  The opening was actually the escape hatch of the specially constructed Land Cruiser, but this day was utilized as a way for Bhutto to interact with her followers as she departed110.  Therein, the suicide assault began.  It was Bilal who was able to get close enough to Bhutto to fire a pistol thrice in close proximity to her, striking her dead, before detonating his suicide vest111.  He had positioned himself beside the car and her security team were unable to disarm him or prevent his firing112.  It is believed that Said was also killed in Bilal’s subsequent blast113.  Ikramullah meanwhile, fled from his position after the successful attack and blended into the mayhem escaping114. 

The negative press regarding the assassination was intense, leaving Baitullah Mahsud no choice but to vehemently deny involvement, lest he lose business and funding from Sindh115.  Baitullah noted that his movement did not support the killing of females, while Maulvi Omar as spokesman publicly announced that there was no adversarial relationship with the Pakistanis, rather that their rage was reserved for the Americans in the region116.  Of course, neither statement was true.  Many years later the TTP reminisced on the event and acknowledged their deep involvement117. 

In fact, the Pakistanis were able to rapidly intercept a telephone call between Baitullah and Maulvi Sahib, in which responsibility for the assassination was clarified118.  In the call, Baitullah knew the bombers by name, as he was informed of the three by Sahib, who gave particular emphasis for the roles of Bilal and Ikramullah119.  The two congratulated each other and proclaimed how brave the attackers were in the situation, with Baitullah inviting Sahib to join him in Makin, South Waziristan120.  The Pakistanis were able to reconstruct how the suicide bombing network of Baitullah and his TTP were organized121.  This was based on the arrests of Hasnain Gul and Mohamed Rafaqat quickly after the bombing122.  Information was also garnered a month later from the arrest of a 15 year old impending suicide bomber named Aitzaz Shah in Dera Ismail Khan, as he prepared to perpetrate an atrocity against the Shiites in the district123.  Shah admitted to authorities that he was trained in South Waziristan by Baitullah Mahsud’s men, the group that eventually became the TTP124.  In October 2007 he was informed that he would participate in the attack on Bhutto, although this never materialized125.  Shah gave information on Bilal, and how he had abandoned his father, a worker in Karachi, to return home to South Waziristan and train as a suicide attacker126.  As a potential martyr, Shah met Baitullah Mahsud on several occasions. 

Al-Qaida rapidly claimed the operation, with a phone call from Mustafa Ahmed Othman Abu al-Yazid (Sheikh Said al-Masri) to prominent Pakistani journalist Syed Salim Shahzad on the day of the assassination127.  Sheikh Said boasted that the attack was ordered from the upper echelons of al-Qaida, indicating bin Laden’s involvement, although sources at the time suggested it was Zawahiri128.  Sheikh Said proclaimed that they were able to assassinate the Bhutto as she was an American asset to be used against the Arab mujahidin129. 

Meanwhile, internal al-Qaida communication from December 29, revealed that Abu Ubaidah informed bin Laden of a successful assassination of Bhutto, as carried out by his men as vengeance for the Red Mosque siege130.  The communique also addressed Abu Ubaidah being taxed by operating two major occupations at once, pleading that his productivity would increase with the focus on one position131.  This perhaps pertained to his roles as external operations chief while simultaneously overseeing attacks in Pakistan132.  The conclusion reached here is that Fahd Musalam then took the reins entirely concerning operations within Pakistan, as he was known to have been assigned the position in 2007133.  Yet this transfer would take some time and al-Qaida lamented that they could not properly take advantage of the situation in Pakistan and the turmoil caused by the Bhutto assassination134.  Perhaps unknown at the time was that Abu Ubaidah was facing a health emergency.  Thus, Musalam’s assumption of Pakistani duties was of the utmost importance. 

An Empty Threat and Expired Passport

As 2007 waned, American al-Qaida Adam Gadahn filmed another religious and political diatribe on behalf of his organization. Released later on January 6, 2008, Gadahn ranted against the US government, and implored his audience to welcome President George W Bush to the region on his impending visit with attacks and explosions135, a dream surely to never be realized. Along the same line, Gadahn argued that American foreign policy was a failure, to include the efforts in Iraq, drawing attention to the number of Bush Administration cabinet members and officials who were removed from their positions during the course of the war136. Later in the recording, Gadahn defiled and tore his US Passport in a show of defiance137. He later clarified that he only did so because it was expired and he was already a wanted fugitive, therefore nullifying the document’s usefulness. Further, he recommended that unknown jihadist combatants retain their passports in case the need arises to displace from nation to nation138.

Intriguingly, Gadahn takes a portion of the release to focus on Christianity. As a former Christian himself, he pointed out the inconsistencies of the religion as he saw them. Extolling Islam as pure monotheism, Gadahn was extremely critical of Christianity as he viewed it as inherently polytheistic, such as the concept of the trinity, and accused the religion of the practice of idolatry139. He emphasized the absurdity of the worship of human beings, in the form of Jesus and Mary, but also included the reverence held towards the Pope and Priests140. He railed against the rituals and traditions of Christianity as having been assimilated from pagans and other cultures, citing the absorption of Roman Saturnalia and the Persian birth of Mithra to form Christmas141.

Even as Gadahn attempted to manifest attacks against his own countrymen, the US was poised to move with alacrity and determination against the al-Qaida threat, launching a drone campaign against the very ideologues and officials that justified the religious violence rampant in the war.

An Opening Strike

In July 2007, Sheikh Issa al-Masri suffered a stroke and was apparently immobilized142.  Despite his reduced state, the Bhutto assassination necessitated his potential assassination for the Americans and Pakistanis.  Heralding what was to come in the drone war, the CIA quietly launched a Predator strike on December 3, 2007, outside of the FATA in Jani Khel, Bannu143.  The strike was confirmed by Pakistani press later via leaked American documentation, and refers to Sheikh Issa as wounded as a result144.  His death was not obtained, but perhaps it did not truly matter, as his damaging ideology was already spread.  The strike is most notable due to its occurrence outside of the FATA, when viewed in retrospect along with the rest of the drone war.  Perhaps more notable though is the targeting of Sheikh Issa due to his obvious influence on local Pakistani factions, tangible enough to result in something as profound as the Bhutto assassination.  It is believed that the strikes were only authorized by the Pakistanis within the FATA, but the Americans moved on to territories on the outside, within Pakistan proper.  Did the Pakistanis condone the strike and more importantly, was this the final event that opened the floodgates on the drone war in the years to follow? 

APPENDIX of US DRONE STRIKES in Pakistan – 2004 – 2007:

2004: (1)

  • STRIKE 04A: June 17 – Kari Kot, South Waziristan – appox 2 killed / NEK MOHAMED WAZIR

2005: (3)

  • STRIKE 05A: May 8 – Torikhel, North Waziristan – approx 2 killed / ABU HAITHAM AL-YEMENI
  • STRIKE 05B: November 5 – Masoki, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed / family of Hamza Rabia
  • STRIKE 05C: December 1 – Asoray, North Waziristan – approx 7 killed / HAMZA RABIA and AMIR AZIZI (ABU JAFAR AL-MAGHREBI), plus RAQUEL BURGOS GARCIA (wife of Amir Azizi) and ABU BAKR (son of Abu Okasha al-Iraqi)

2006: (4* – Two instances of suspected US drone involvement)

  • STRIKE 06A: January 13 – Damodola, Bajaur – approx 18 killed / ABU IKRIMAH AL-GHAMDI, plus ALI AL-MALIKI AL-JAZAIRI and ABU TALUT AL-TAIFI
  • STRIKE 06B: March 1 – Danda Saidgai, North Waziristan – purported raid against militant camp (drones may have participated)
  • STRIKE 06C: April 12 – Anghar Kalai, North Waziristan – approx 7 killed / MUSA MUHSIN MATWALLI ATWAH, plus ABU TURAB AL-PAKISTANI, ABU BAKR AL-IRAQI (AL-SURI) – (Pakistani Cobra Helicopter raid – drones may have participated)
  • STRIKE 06D: October 30 – Chenagai, Bajaur – approx 82 killed / MAULVI LIAQUAT

2007: (6)

  • STRIKE 07A: January 16 – Zamazola, South Waziristan – approx 8 killed
  • STRIKE 07B: April 26 – Saidgai, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed
  • STRIKE 07C: May 22 – Zarghar Khel, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed
  • STRIKE 07D: June 19 – Mami Rogha, North Waziristan – approx 34 killed
  • STRIKE 07E: November 2 – Danda Darpa Khel, North Waziristan – approx 5 killed
  • STRIKE 07F: December 3 – Jani Khel, Bannu – 1 wounded / aimed for and wounded Sheikh Issa al-Masri

LEGEND:

  • NORTH WAZIRISTAN
  • SOUTH WAZIRISTAN
  • BAJAUR
  • Districts outside of the FATA (BANNU, etc)

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  2. Rashid Rauf: the al-Qaida suspect caught, tortured and lost, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, September 8, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/08/rashid-rauf-terrorism-torture-pakistan ↩︎
  3. Pakistani police held over escape of British suspect, by Kamran Haider, Reuters, December 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistani-police-held-over-escape-of-british-suspect-idUSSP132720/ ↩︎
  4. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  5. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  6. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  7. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  8. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  9. Rashid Rauf Escaped With His Uncle, Dawn, December 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/280898/rashid-rauf-escaped-with-his-uncle ↩︎
  10. Rashid Rauf Escaped With His Uncle, Dawn, December 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/280898/rashid-rauf-escaped-with-his-uncle ↩︎
  11. Pakistani police held over escape of British suspect, by Kamran Haider, Reuters, December 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistani-police-held-over-escape-of-british-suspect-idUSSP132720/ ↩︎
  12. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  13. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  14. Pakistani police held over escape of British suspect, by Kamran Haider, Reuters, December 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistani-police-held-over-escape-of-british-suspect-idUSSP132720/ ↩︎
  15. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  16. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
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