SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Signals To Commence

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Taken together, the rise of the takfiri ideology, reemergence of once lost operatives, escalating belligerence of the Pakistani jihadists, potential destabilization of the Pakistani government, and the further alignment of extremist factions under one banner were all definite signals to commence an enhanced drone assassination campaign.

An Unlikely Escape

In the time since his arrest, and the spectacular circumstances surrounding his terroristic endeavors, Rashid Rauf endured a convoluted form of justice. Emerging from the shadows of Pakistani ISI detainment and delivered to the unsavory Adiala prison, Rauf and his counsel made accusations of jailer abuse and subsequent interrogations by foreign authorities1. Rauf was held in claustrophobic accomodations, whipped, and even electrocuted at times by the ISI2. Despite facing serious terrorism charges, Rauf was obscured and protected by the Pakistani court system, with judges both dismissing those charges against him in December 20063 and, in September 2007, ordering his release from custody4. By November the remaining lesser charges were vacated, but his plight was extended by an immediate extradition process to the UK5. It seemed the Pakistanis desired two Balochi dissidents from Britain as compensation, and thus left Rauf languishing in detainment6. By December, he was still facing perfunctory extradition proceedings periodically in Islamabad7.

On Saturday December 15, Rauf departed such a hearing in the custody of two inept, and perhaps corrupt, police officers. Traveling from the court in return to the prison in vicinity of Rawalpindi, the police suspiciously detoured to a fast food establishment8. An uncle of Rauf’s convinced the police to utilize his own van for the transport, while Rauf connived to halt the drive at the restaurant9. After a meal provided for by the uncle10, the negligent officers allowed Rauf to doff his handcuffs and enter a mosque for prayers11. Meanwhile, the guards remained stagnant in the vehicle, supposedly ignorant of Rauf’s intentions to abscond from the rear yard of the Rukhshanda mosque12. Rauf did not in fact return, and the officers failed to inform other authorities of the escape for an excessive amount of time13. Within days the two police were apprehended on suspicion of complicity14. Pakistani officials postulated that they must have been bribed15. As obvious as his escape may have been, others speculated that Rauf was merely disappeared and transferred into Pakistani ISI custody for further abusive purposes16. Rauf’s counsel, who was initially told that his client liberated himself from his shackles and fled, was incredulous upon hearing the story17. The lawyer implied that he was firmly in the belief that Rauf was in secretive custody, and would eventually be discovered deceased18. The conspiring uncle, named as Mohamed Rafiq, was arrested after disappearing with his nephew19, but Rauf was vanished, and soon to rejoin the ranks of al-Qaida operations.

Sheikh Issa al-Masri

Certain prominent extremist clerics in the Khorasan caused al-Qaida consternation, yet also radically altered the local inherent militant ideology.  Of particular note was Abu Amro Abdulhakim, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) ideologue known as Sheikh Issa al-Masri20.  Sheikh Issa had helped to indoctrinate and teach recruits at the Afghan paramilitary camps prior to the American invasion, specifically from a Syrian Guesthouse in Kabul21.  From this home, located in the Wazir Akhbar Khan neighborhood, Sheikh Issa instructed a course for Arab trainees attending the camps, specializing in legal, Shariah Law, and matters of jihadist justification22. 

Following the invasion, Sheikh Issa fled to Pakistan, but in the initial aftermath, he was interviewed by 60 Minutes, where he expressed solidarity with al-Qaida and claimed to be a senior religious official. Eventually and unsurprisingly, he arrived in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, basing in Mir Ali, North Waziristan23.  From therein he helped to spread a virulent militants ideology to the native Pashtun tribes and as well as foreign combatants24. 

American and Pakistani authorities expressed concern at the Egyptian’s establishment in the FATA, and had reason to do so25.  Sheikh Issa expressed irascible resentment against the secular Pakistani government, blaming them for the unfortunate circumstances in which the jihadists were dwelling26.  He began to proselytize to the local tribesmen and the Central Asians of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) living in the FATA, resulting in the potential for violence befalling the Pakistani establishment27. He thus held notable sway upon Mullah Sadiq Noor and Maulvi Abdulkhaliq Haqqani in North Waziristan, Tahir Yuldashev of the IMU, and Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan28. During August 2004, when Pakistani authorities were otherwise distracted by their summer of arrests and raids, Sheikh Issa was directly implicated in a disrupted plot to utilize an array of suicide bombers against senior Pakistani governing officials and the American Embassy29. An arsenal of weaponry and five affiliated operatives were detained from August 11-15, with Sheikh Issa suspected of coordinating and instigating the potential assaults on behalf of al-Qaida30.

Sheikh Issa was of the school of thought that governments and militaries were either for or against God and the Islamic faith.  As such, while some jihadist and al-Qaida figures focused on American and European targets in order to expel their influence from the Middle East, Sheikh Issa extended this wrath to any predominantly Muslim nation with a government allied or partnered with those he viewed as apostates31.  Particularly influential in Saudi Arabia and among the Pakistanis he now dwelled among, Sheikh Issa regularly condoned violence against the Pakistani and other regional regimes32.  He cited the arrests of al-Qaida members and jihadists by the Pakistanis, and he and his flock touted the devastating October 8, 2005 Kashmir earthquake as merely God’s retribution against the Pakistanis for their stance against the militants33.  His adamant position allowed for attacks against Muslim populaces.  This was counter productive for al-Qaida. Despite the fact that they consistently kill other Muslims in attacks against Western targets, they can still initially claim that they were first attacking enemies of their faith.  For those like Sheikh Issa al-Masri, the strikes targeting Pakistan were legitimate and warranted.  This led to debate within al-Qaida about the operational targeting and whether the focus should shift significantly34.  Sheikh Issa’s influence was substantial in the tribal agencies and his pedigree solid, yet he could also be viewed as problematic for al-Qaida. 

Sheikh Issa was born in 1959 in Egypt and followed a fairly basic jihadist trajectory in life for that time period.  He voraciously absorbed Islamic and religious studies, in both official and personal capacities throughout early life, eventually becoming indoctrinated into the EIJ35.  He was briefly imprisoned along with so many other EIJ members after the Anwar Sadat assassination, but was free in the mid-1980s to travel the Middle East, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, for the purpose of teaching36.  Eventually he traveled to Afghanistan in 1985, in order to disseminate his jihadist viewpoints during the insurgency37.  He became close to the militant leaders including the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, and while he departed and taught in Yemen for a while, he eventually returned to Afghanistan in 1995, as the Taliban consolidated power38.  Thus, he was in country for the rise in prominence of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida during the late 1990s39.  Sheikh Issa was a prolific writer and speaker.  One of his books in particular, was later utilized by Pakistani militants, in that it legitimized the attacking of regimes deemed as infidels40.  As mentioned, after the US invasion he even granted an interview wherein he claimed to be al-Qaida’s seniormost religious figure41. 

While this claim is dubious, his influence and connections cannot be denied.  In fact, by October 2006 jihadist-oriented al-Fajr Media was launching a website for Sheikh Issa, wherein he expressed vehement disdain for regional governments and pushed for violence42.  Sheikh Issa placed particular emphasis on struggling against leaderships of nations that in his opinion should be theocracies as opposed to secular entities43.  It was his assertion that these targets were more valid than even foreign nations that were not predominantly Muslim and had never been ruled by Islam44.  For the nascent TTP, this was a justifying ideology that allowed them to express their rage against the Pakistani government and have it approved of by a major jihadist and religious figure45.  Suddenly, the Pakistani government that had previously endorsed and approved of the Taliban next door and the internationally aimed terrorists who were not a local problem, were now faced with a threat inside their borders.  The ideology of Sheikh Issa piled secular local governments, Shiites, and non-Muslims together as infidels, offering neither truce nor respite, and apologizing for none of these harsh views46.  The Pakistani authorities were growing increasingly concerned, declaring that Sheikh Issa was responsible for a potential plot in August 2004 to bring chaos to the Pakistani independence day celebration47.  The affinity of local Pakistani militants to Sheikh Issa drew extremists normally focused only on Kashmir into the sphere of influence of al-Qaida.   Sheikh Issa remained in the FATA without any real interference or response from the Pakistanis, even as the seeds he sowed grew into the destruction levied upon the nation by the TTP, IMU, al-Qaida, and other outfits. 

Sheikh Issa and those similar to him followed a doctrine as takfiris, and defined Muslims that lack sufficient devoutness or have significant religious flaws to be infidels on the same level as their foreign enemies48.  For an Egyptian to follow this makes sense, as several ostensibly pious Muslims were abused by their government49.  Essentially, the radicals were punished, which in turn, furthered their fervor.  Sheikh Issa’s rage against Arab governments aligned with the West is thus deeply personal.  After finding himself driven from the jihadist haven of Afghanistan along with the other militants elements, his new home in the FATA provided an abundance of resources and malleable young minds to steer against the Pakistani establishment.  With this background it is very important to note that Sheikh Issa was praised by Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri50.  Sheikh Issa, as a spiritual leader, helped nurture and establish a new sense of urgency in the jihadist communities of tribal Pashtun Pakistan51.  Thus, al-Qaida was able to take advantage of this developing phenomenon, altering the trajectory of the militant movement to achieve their own ambitions. In 2007, the foreign presence in Pakistan was able to unleash the local radical elements against the influential Benazir Bhutto.

Benazir Bhutto

Assassination attempts against Benazir Bhutto were arguably the precipitating factor in the escalated CIA drone war to come.  As previously mentioned, the takfiri ideology allowed for ahderent militants to attack Muslims whom they deemed to be infidels for not being proper or pious or even extreme enough.  Thus, the incidents were the culmination of Sheikh Issa al-Masri and the significant threat posed by his preachings and influence on tribal Pakistanis, transforming them into violent operatives against their own government. 

From an operational perspective, despite the losses suffered by the al-Qaida command structure, the organization was able to realign and conduct acts in the same manner as prior years.  Resembling Abu Faraj al-Libi conducting assassination attempts against President Musharraf via Amjad Hussain Faruqi, al-Qaida now commissioned an operation to assassinate Benazir Bhutto utilizing local elements. 

Bin Laden desired the death of Bhutto and thus his men pursued the goal.  Bin Laden maintained a grudge against Bhutto dating back to 1989, when he financed an attempt to bring her to a no-confidence vote, and have her replaced as Prime Minister52.  Bhutto thwarted the plot, despite an estimated $10 million spent on the endeavor by bin Laden53.  Bhutto’s resulting phone call to the Saudi government led to bin Laden’s eventual departure from Pakistan and the failed ban on travel imposed upon him by the Saudis54.  Bhutto stood against Islamist and conservative politicians and the military establishment attempting to govern Pakistan55.  As such, she was no friend to the foreign Arab militants based in the country, and began to purge them throughout her first two terms from 1988 to 199656.  This displaced several future al-Qaida members from Pakistan into neighboring Afghanistan57.  Additionally, bin Laden is said to have financed previous assassination attempts against her in the early 1990s58.  Now though, he needed his organization to bring this effort to conclusion.  External operations chief Abu Ubaidah al-Masri initiated and oversaw the plot59.  His experience and success with these types of missions made him an obvious choice for the duty.  Specifically, following the aftermath of the Red Mosque incident, bin Laden sought to take advantage of a seemingly fragile Pakistani government, and tasked Abu Ubaidah to maintain the pressure60.  The Egyptian contracted Baitullah Mahsud and his men to actually conduct the operation61.  Abu Ubaidah commenced the October 18, 2007 attempt on Bhutto and the actual assassination on December 2762.  These missions were constructed rapidly considering that Bhutto only returned to Pakistan from extended time in Bahrain and Dubai in October 200763.  As leader of the liberal and secular Pakistan People’s Party, she was making another run to become Prime Minister of the nation64.  Having previously been challenged by internal rifts in the Pakistani government, by radical Islamists, and by the fact that she was of Shiite heritage, there was no dearth of those in country who would commit to an operation to remove her from politics65. 

October Attempt

For Abu Ubaidah’s October 18 operation, the proceedings were overseen by al-Qaida veteran Fahd Ali Musalam and his men and network of Pakistani contacts66.  Known as Osama al-Kini, Musalam was assisted by his deputy Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. Both men were wanted for their culpability in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa67. Herein exemplified here, how a few loyal Arabs and Africans sworn to bin Laden within the infrastructure of al-Qaida, operated alongside Pakistani networks to achieve these lofty operational goals.  It would have been increasingly difficult for Musalam, Abu Ubaidah, or the other primary al-Qaida to operate without local networks provided by Baitullah Mahsud and others.  Bhutto landed in Karachi on October 18 from Dubai, under a deal brokered by MI6 and the CIA between her and Musharraf68.  Previous animosities were to be set aside and the two would work in tandem for political survival69.  Musharraf could not ignore Bhutto’s popularity, even though he had charged her with corruption70.  Those charges were to be dropped, Bhutto and her husband could return and participate in elections, although they would support Musharraf’s remaining term as President71.  The militants were prepared for an alternate option.  As she traveled from Karachi through Pakistan for eight hours in an armored vehicle, she was protected by a massive police and volunteer force as arranged by her husband72.  After speaking from the top of the armored vehicle, Bhutto retreated into its confines, just as the suicide assault commenced73.  One bomber cleared a path to Bhutto’s vehicle for the second approaching assailant74. The incident killed 149, including a multitude of members of Bhutto’s PPP in Larkana, Sindh75.  Bhutto was completely protected by the vehicle76.  Musalam failed in his effort.  But al-Qaida and Abu Ubaidah were not finished. 

December Conspirators

For the successful December assassination in Rawalpindi, the network has been revealed clearly.  Below Baitullah Mahsud was the Pakistani Ibadur Rahman, known as Faruq Chattan, who was established as a planner and plotter of the attempt77.  Chattan himself was close to Abu Ubaidah, providing a key link between the Egyptian and Baitullah78.  In fact, Chattan served as a member of Abu Ubaidah’s external operations committee, placing him at the forefront for missions such as the Bhutto attack79.  From this point, Baitullah maintained contact and control of the operation through another planner contact, known as Maulvi Sahib, or Azizullah80.  Chattan commissioned a group of former students from the Darul Uloom Haqqania, the religious institution in Akora Khattak, Nowshera District, North West Frontier Province, that gave rise to the Taliban81.  The three graduates, Qari Ismail, known as Nadir Khan82, Nasrullah, known as Ahmed, and Abdullah, known as Saddam, were facilitators for the plot, and received orders, information, and the suicide vests for the operation directly from Chattan83.  Nadir Khan, or Qari Ismail was also said to have received funding from Baitullah in regards to the mission84.  Later reports indicate that Baitullah delivered at least $6,500 to Qari Ismail for the impending operation85. Baitullah and his men also provided 15 year old suicide bomber candidates for the attempt, and the three graduates traveled to South Waziristan to take possession of these impressionable and expendable pawns86.  Once in Akora Khattak, the impending bombers received religious instruction from one Maulvi Nasib87.  Nasrullah issued orders and the bombers to cousins Hasnain Gul and Mohamed Rafaqat in Rawalpindi88.  The cousins were the immediate handlers of the youthful operatives89.

Yet Nasrullah remained with them as well, and attempted to transport them to attack Bhutto at a stadium event on the evening of December 2690.  Nasrullah could not place the bombers in close proximity to Bhutto’s vehicle and thus scrapped the plan, and moved the attack to the following day, aiming to conduct the assassination at a political rally held at a park91.  Nasrullah returned the bombers to the cousins92.  Hasnain Gul was enraged at losing a friend at the siege of the Red Mosque, and thus recruited his cousin to join him in exacted revenge on the Pakistani government93.  Earlier in 2007 they traveled to South Waziristan with intentions of joining the militants, owing to the fact that Gul had previously attended jihadist training in 2005 in the North West Frontier Province94.  They were accepted and redirected to Rawalpindi to eventually receive the operatives95. 

As handlers they delivered the suicide bombers to their target at the Liaquat Bagh (a famous Pakistani National Park) on December 27, and had even conducted surveillance in anticipation of the incident96.  This task they completed and repeated while the bombers washed themselves in preparation for martyrdom as per their instructions from the TTP in South Waziristan97.  Gul then issued the bombers equipment while Rafaqat and Nasrullah finished final surveilling98.

Tribal suicide assailants Bilal and Ikramullah were ordered to different exits of the event, a political rally for Bhutto being held at the park99.  The PPP event had extra security to include metal detectors, as the ISI warned Bhutto earlier in the day that they had information indicating that a suicide assault against her was imminent100.  Hasnain positioned Bilal at the main exit, while Rafaqat placed Ikramullah at the alternate101. Additional gathered evidence later showed that Hasnain Gul and the handlers were housing a third young member of the suicide assault team named Said, also known as Abdullah102.  This was based off of two different DNA samples found at the handlers’ home, believed to match two different bombers’ corpses103.  The clothing indeed belonged to Bilal, according to sources, but it appeared that there must have been another individual in the home as well104.  The three bombers were with Nasrullah for the attempt the previous evening105.  Thus, a team of three were in the Liaquat Bagh for the attempt.

An “American Asset”

Bhutto met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Islamabad earlier in the day prior to departing for Rawalpindi106.  There she gave her speech to an enthusiastic crowd of 10,000 in the park, proclaiming her liberal positions, and after 1700 prepared to exit107.  Although she was in an armored vehicle, she stood, rising through the open roof of the vehicle to be seen by the crowds108.  The opening was actually the escape hatch of the specially constructed Land Cruiser, but this day was utilized as a way for Bhutto to interact with her followers as she departed109.  Therein, the suicide assault began.  It was Bilal who was able to get close enough to Bhutto to fire a pistol thrice in close proximity to her, striking her dead, before detonating his suicide vest110.  He had positioned himself beside the car and her security team were unable to disarm him or prevent his firing111.  It is believed that Said was also killed in Bilal’s subsequent blast112.  Ikramullah meanwhile, fled from his position after the successful attack and blended into the mayhem escaping113. 

The negative press regarding the assassination was intense, leaving Baitullah Mahsud no choice but to vehemently deny involvement, lest he lose business and funding from Sindh114.  Baitullah noted that his movement did not support the killing of females, while Maulvi Omar as spokesman publicly announced that there was no adversarial relationship with the Pakistanis, rather that their rage was reserved for the Americans in the region115.  Of course, neither statement was true.  Many years later the TTP reminisced on the event and acknowledged their deep involvement116. 

In fact, the Pakistanis were able to rapidly intercept a telephone call between Baitullah and Maulvi Sahib, in which responsibility for the assassination was clarified117.  In the call, Baitullah knew the bombers by name, as he was informed of the three by Sahib, who gave particular emphasis for the roles of Bilal and Ikramullah118.  The two congratulated each other and proclaimed how brave the attackers were in the situation, with Baitullah inviting Sahib to join him in Makin, South Waziristan119.  The Pakistanis were able to reconstruct how the suicide bombing network of Baitullah and his TTP were organized120.  This was based on the arrests of Hasnain Gul and Mohamed Rafaqat quickly after the bombing121.  Information was also garnered a month later from the arrest of a 15 year old impending suicide bomber named Aitzaz Shah in Dera Ismail Khan, as he prepared to perpetrate an atrocity against the Shiites in the district122.  Shah admitted to authorities that he was trained in South Waziristan by Baitullah Mahsud’s men, the group that eventually became the TTP123.  In October 2007 he was informed that he would participate in the attack on Bhutto, although this never materialized124.  Shah gave information on Bilal, and how he had abandoned his father, a worker in Karachi, to return home to South Waziristan and train as a suicide attacker125.  As a potential martyr, Shah met Baitullah Mahsud on several occasions. 

Al-Qaida rapidly claimed the operation, with a phone call from Mustafa Ahmed Othman Abu Yazid (Sheikh Said al-Masri) to prominent Pakistani journalist Syed Salim Shahzad on the day of the assassination126.  Sheikh Said boasted that the attack was ordered from the upper echelons of al-Qaida, indicating bin Laden’s involvement, although sources at the time suggested it was Zawahiri127.  Sheikh Said proclaimed that they were able to assassinate the Bhutto as she was an American asset to be used against the Arab mujahidin128. 

Meanwhile, internal al-Qaida communication from December 29, revealed that Abu Ubaidah informed bin Laden of a successful assassination of Bhutto, as carried out by his men as vengeance for the Red Mosque siege129.  The communique also addressed Abu Ubaidah being taxed by operating two major occupations at once, pleading that his productivity would increase with the focus on one position130.  This perhaps pertained to his roles as external operations chief while simultaneously overseeing attacks in Pakistan131.  The conclusion reached here is that Fahd Musalam then took the reins entirely concerning operations within Pakistan, as he was known to have been assigned the position in 2007132.  Yet this transfer would take some time and al-Qaida lamented that they could not properly take advantage of the situation in Pakistan and the turmoil caused by the Bhutto assassination133.  Perhaps unknown at the time was that Abu Ubaidah was facing a health emergency.  Thus, Musalam’s assumption of Pakistani duties was of the utmost importance. 

An Opening Strike

In July 2007, Sheikh Issa al-Masri suffered a stroke and was apparently immobilized134.  Despite his reduced state, the Bhutto assassination necessitated his potential assassination for the Americans and Pakistanis.  Heralding what was to come in the drone war, the CIA quietly launched a Predator strike on December 3, 2007, outside of the FATA in Jani Khel, Bannu135.  The strike was confirmed by Pakistani press later via leaked American documentation, and refers to Sheikh Issa as wounded as a result136.  His death was not obtained, but perhaps it did not truly matter, as his damaging ideology was already spread.  The strike is most notable due to its occurrence outside of the FATA, when viewed in retrospect along with the rest of the drone war.  Perhaps more notable though is the targeting of Sheikh Issa due to his obvious influence on local Pakistani factions, tangible enough to result in something as profound as the Bhutto assassination.  It is believed that the strikes were only authorized by the Pakistanis within the FATA, but the Americans moved on to territories on the outside, within Pakistan proper.  Did the Pakistanis condone the strike and more importantly, was this the final event that opened the floodgates on the drone war in the years to follow? 

APPENDIX of US DRONE STRIKES in Pakistan – 2004 – 2007:

2004: (1)

  • STRIKE 04A: June 17 – Kari Kot, South Waziristan – appox 2 killed / NEK MOHAMED WAZIR

2005: (3)

  • STRIKE 05A: May 8 – Torikhel, North Waziristan – approx 2 killed / ABU HAITHAM AL-YEMENI
  • STRIKE 05B: November 5 – Masoki, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed / family of Hamza Rabia
  • STRIKE 05C: December 1 – Asoray, North Waziristan – approx 7 killed / HAMZA RABIA and AMIR AZIZI (ABU JAFAR AL-MAGHREBI), plus RAQUEL BURGOS GARCIA (wife of Amir Azizi) and ABU BAKR (son of Abu Okasha al-Iraqi)

2006: (4* – Two instances of suspected US drone involvement)

  • STRIKE 06A: January 13 – Damodola, Bajaur – approx 18 killed / ABU IKRIMAH AL-GHAMDI, plus ALI AL-MALIKI AL-JAZIRI and ABU TALUT AL-TAIFI
  • STRIKE 06B: March 1 – Danda Saidgai, North Waziristan – purported raid against militant camp (drones may have participated)
  • STRIKE 06C: April 12 – Anghar Kalai, North Waziristan – approx 7 killed / MUSA MUHSIN MATWALLI ATWAH, plus ABU TURAB AL-PAKISTANI, ABU BAKR AL-IRAQI (AL-SURI) – (Pakistani Cobra Helicopter raid – drones may have participated)
  • STRIKE 06D: October 30 – Chenagai, Bajaur – approx 82 killed / MAULVI LIAQUAT

2007: (6)

  • STRIKE 07A: January 16 – Zamazola, South Waziristan – approx 8 killed
  • STRIKE 07B: April 26 – Saidgai, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed
  • STRIKE 07C: May 22 – Zarghar Khel, North Waziristan – approx 4 killed
  • STRIKE 07D: June 19 – Mami Rogha, North Waziristan – approx 34 killed
  • STRIKE 07E: November 2 – Danda Darpa Khel, North Waziristan – approx 5 killed
  • STRIKE 07F: December 3 – Jani Khel, Bannu – 1 wounded / aimed for and wounded Sheikh Issa al-Masri

LEGEND:

  • NORTH WAZIRISTAN
  • SOUTH WAZIRISTAN
  • BAJAUR
  • Districts outside of the FATA (BANNU, etc)

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  2. Rashid Rauf: the al-Qaida suspect caught, tortured and lost, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, September 8, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/08/rashid-rauf-terrorism-torture-pakistan ↩︎
  3. Pakistani police held over escape of British suspect, by Kamran Haider, Reuters, December 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistani-police-held-over-escape-of-british-suspect-idUSSP132720/ ↩︎
  4. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  5. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  6. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  7. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  8. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  9. Rashid Rauf Escaped With His Uncle, Dawn, December 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/280898/rashid-rauf-escaped-with-his-uncle ↩︎
  10. Rashid Rauf Escaped With His Uncle, Dawn, December 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/280898/rashid-rauf-escaped-with-his-uncle ↩︎
  11. Pakistani police held over escape of British suspect, by Kamran Haider, Reuters, December 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistani-police-held-over-escape-of-british-suspect-idUSSP132720/ ↩︎
  12. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  13. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  14. Pakistani police held over escape of British suspect, by Kamran Haider, Reuters, December 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/pakistani-police-held-over-escape-of-british-suspect-idUSSP132720/ ↩︎
  15. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  16. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  17. Terror Suspect’s Lawyer: Escape Tale ‘Fishy’, ABC News, December 16, 2007, https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=4006507 ↩︎
  18. The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, January 28, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/jan/28/pakistan.world1 ↩︎
  19. Rashid Rauf Escaped With His Uncle, Dawn, December 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/280898/rashid-rauf-escaped-with-his-uncle ↩︎
  20. Al-Qaeda Goes Back to Base, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online, November 4, 2005 ↩︎
  21. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mahsum Abdah Mohamed, ISN 330, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/330.html ↩︎
  22. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  23. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  24. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  25. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  26. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  27. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  28. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  29. Pakistan foils major Al Qaeda plot, by KJM Varma, Rediff.com, August 22, 2004, https://livechat.rediff.com/news/2004/aug/22pak.htm?zcc=rl ↩︎
  30. Pakistan foils major Al Qaeda plot, by KJM Varma, Rediff.com, August 22, 2004, https://livechat.rediff.com/news/2004/aug/22pak.htm?zcc=rl ↩︎
  31. Al-Qaeda Goes Back to Base, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online, November 4, 2005 ↩︎
  32. Al-Qaeda Goes Back to Base, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online, November 4, 2005 ↩︎
  33. Al-Qaeda Goes Back to Base, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online, November 4, 2005 ↩︎
  34. Al-Qaeda Goes Back to Base, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online, November 4, 2005 ↩︎
  35. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  36. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  37. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  38. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  39. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  40. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  41. The Hunt For Bin Laden, Interview of Sheikh Issa by George Crile, 60 Minutes II, CBS News, October 2, 2001, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/i60-minutes-ii-i-hunt-for-bin-laden/#:~:text=Osama%20bin%20Laden%20is%20the,very%20little%2C%22%20says%20Essa. ↩︎
  42. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  43. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  44. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  45. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  46. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  47. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  48. Egyptian Bombs Shake Muslim World, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, April 28, 2006 ↩︎
  49. Egyptian Bombs Shake Muslim World, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, April 28, 2006 ↩︎
  50. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  51. Al Qaeda, Taliban behind the Waziristan Accord, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 23, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/alqaeda_taliban_behi.php ↩︎
  52. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 // The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  53. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  54. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  55. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  56. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  57. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  58. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  59. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  60. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  61. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  62. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  63. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  64. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  65. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  66. 2 Qaeda Leaders Killed in U.S. Strike in Pakistan, by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, January 8, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=0 // Jan. 1 Attack By CIA Killed Two Leaders Of Al-Qaeda, by Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, January 9, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/08/AR2009010803110.html ↩︎
  67. 2 Qaeda Leaders Killed in U.S. Strike in Pakistan, by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, January 8, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=0 // Jan. 1 Attack By CIA Killed Two Leaders Of Al-Qaeda, by Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, January 9, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/08/AR2009010803110.html ↩︎
  68. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  69. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  70. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  71. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  72. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  73. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  74. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  75. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ // Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  76. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  77. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  78. Top link between al Qaeda and Taliban thought killed in US Predator strike in Khyber, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, May 30, 2010, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/top_link_between_al.php ↩︎
  79. Top link between al Qaeda and Taliban thought killed in US Predator strike in Khyber, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, May 30, 2010, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/top_link_between_al.php ↩︎
  80. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  81. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  82. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  83. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  84. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  85. Pakistani Police Accuse Militant in Bhutto Death, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, March 2, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/asia/02iht-02pstan.10615931.html ↩︎
  86. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  87. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  88. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  89. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  90. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  91. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  92. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  93. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  94. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  95. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  96. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  97. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  98. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  99. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  100. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  101. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  102. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  103. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  104. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 // The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  105. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  106. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  107. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  108. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  109. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  110. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 // The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  111. The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, excerpt from: The Bhutto Dynasty: The Struggle For Power In Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones, Yale University Press, 2020 ↩︎
  112. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  113. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  114. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  115. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  116. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  117. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  118. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  119. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  120. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  121. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  122. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 // Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  123. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  124. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  125. Questions Concerning the Murder of Benazir Bhutto, by Owen Bennett-Jones, London Review of Books, Volume 34, Number 23, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/owen-bennett-jones/questions-concerning-the-murder-of-benazir-bhutto ↩︎
  126. Al Qaeda Takes Credit For Bhutto Assassination, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, December 27, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/al_qaeda_takes_credi.php ↩︎
  127. Al Qaeda Takes Credit For Bhutto Assassination, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, December 27, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/al_qaeda_takes_credi.php ↩︎
  128. Al Qaeda Takes Credit For Bhutto Assassination, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, December 27, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/al_qaeda_takes_credi.php ↩︎
  129. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  130. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  131. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  132. 2 Qaeda Leaders Killed in U.S. Strike in Pakistan, by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, January 8, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/asia/09pstan.html?_r=0 // Jan. 1 Attack By CIA Killed Two Leaders Of Al-Qaeda, by Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, January 9, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/08/AR2009010803110.html ↩︎
  133. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  134. An Ideological and Operational Threat, by Abdul Hameed Bakier and Erich Marquardt, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 8, July 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-ideological-and-operational-threat/ ↩︎
  135. Drone Strikes Killed High-Value Targets, US Tells Pakistan, Dawn, February 9, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/855031/drone-strikes-killed-high-value-targets-us-tells-pakistan ↩︎
  136. Drone Strikes Killed High-Value Targets, US Tells Pakistan, Dawn, February 9, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/855031/drone-strikes-killed-high-value-targets-us-tells-pakistan ↩︎

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a comment