SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Unity In The Lines

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Confined to al-Qaida internal politics, the year 2007 was one of great strides, especially given their ability to absorb various factions into a shared cause. This was seen twice in respect to North African contingents. These organizations were able to expand upon their operations and gain their notoriety further under the banner of al-Qaida. As various insurgent factions began to cooperate, the Americans released a Most Wanted List, and offered rewards in Afghanistan for a variety of militants. Simultaneously, the CIA and American authorities were cognizant of the need to maintain pressure against the jihadists, and were willing to allow their most effective tactics to evolve into an efficient and destructive weapon, despite any obvious flaws and mistakes. In addition to a previously discussed Special Forces Task Force designed to capture and kill on the ground, the Predator drone was now to be unleashed in a rapidly expanding fury.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Approved Signature Strikes

From January to December 2007 the CIA conducted six additional drone strikes within Pakistan, with one in South Waziristan, four in North Waziristan, and a final occurring outside of the FATA. Each strike was conducted in conjunction with the Pakistanis through approval of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). As such there was hidden negotiation process to the target selection. Within 2007, the CIA submitted a total of 15 operations to the ISI, but only three were readily approved, while a fourth received what was known as a “forced” approval, via pressure from the Americans1. Conversely, the ISI sought for the CIA to attack five select targets2. In the end, only a limited number of these operations actually proceeded. By comparison, only seven CIA strikes were sought in 2006, with four of those receiving ISI support, while a fifth was apparently was forced3. The ISI itself asked for one further incident4. Based on our previous research, it appears that only four of the strikes occurred successfully. This indicated an approach that was slowly breaking free of restraints.

In fact, in May 2006, despite the obvious public disapproval of the Damadola strike, CIA Director Michael Hayden entertained the idea of expanding the belligerence of the drone strikes. Enter the chief of the Counter Terrorism Center within the agency, a man known only as Roger, who aggressively pushed for blooming of the strikes from infrequent tools utilized against specific targets to a blanket strategy to overwhelm congregations of militants in the FATA5. By his theory, Roger advocated for such an increase in the frequency of strikes that al-Qaida would struggle to recuperate from losses to leadership and amidst the ranks alike6. Thus in 2007, the strategy of “Signature strikes” was born, allowing for the CIA under White House authority to pursue and attack such militant congregations under the assumption that they demonstrated aspects of dangerous armed units. This reversed a previous policy requiring some sort of intelligence and evidence demonstrating the existence of a high value operative in the intended strike zone7. To do this, they needed to build a more robust infrastructure and logistical network, as for example in 2006 there were times the CIA was operating only three Predator drones over the FATA8. We will discuss five of the 2007 strikes herein, leaving the final incident for another chapter.

The first operation occurred just before 0700 on January 16, targeting a remote forest camp of small compounds in the Zamazola region of South Waziristan, ostensibly overseen by Baitullah Mehsud and utilized by cross border raiders and for training purposes9. Apparently, in the past it was occupied by Arab militants, but by the time of the assault, their existence was questioned. Pakistani officials acknowledged a precision airstrike with three out of four successful missiles, and the additional presence of Pakistani helicopter gunships, indicating the likely involvement of a CIA drone strike10. Authorities boasted of 20-25 militants slain, including Arabs, yet it appeared that only 8 bodies were recovered from the three decimated compounds, a mix of five Afghans and three locals. A Pakistani parliamentarian from South Waziristan claimed that the victims merely labored as timbermen in the area as opposed to engaging in militancy, bringing into question the success and validity of the strike11. According to the Pakistani military, the camp was monitored for a fortnight and their illicit activities verified prior to the attack12. Witnesses confirmed the presence of US drones however, and conveyed a familiar story, one in which the drones deployed their lethal weaponry, only to be followed by Pakistani gunships offering a token appearance so as the Pakistani military could claim the mission as their own, veiling American involvement13. These witnesses confirmed the story that the slain were loggers that produced charcoal for purchase in neighboring villages14. The locals also produced the unexploded ordinance for reporters, in order to prove the presence of American munitions, however the weapon was a 500 pound bomb as opposed to a missile and appeared to be a much older variant15. It remains unknown exactly where the villagers actually acquired the bomb, nonetheless, their tale of an American drone strike appears truthful, representing the potential of yet another mistake in the growing campaign.

Later at 0330 on April 27, the village of Danda Saidgai was again targeted, when five missiles were launched into the Darul Uloom Hassania, a local religious institution, not long after villagers noted the presence of a drone near the Afghan border16. The madrassa was owned by Maulvi Noor Mohamed, a local militant whose home was subjected to an American cross border raid in January 2006, and who supported the peace accord of September 200617. When the missiles were launched, men were resting in the courtyard of the compound18, yet those actually slain were reportedly from a nearby damaged domicile in which a roof collapse killed the owner’s guests residing within19. Four local tribesmen were reported as the victims of the strike, with no concrete evidence of their allegiances besides their presence in the vicinity of a known militant facility20. Pakistani authorities attempted again to account for the detonations via a convenient excuse: that of an accident caused by militants producing explosives21. It is most likely that the madrassa was the primary target in order to reduce the capability of militants from utilizing the compound, with the deaths occurring as collateral casualties.

On May 22, after a failed incursion of the Pakistani military into North Waziristan, the ISI requested that the CIA strike the intended target on their behalf22. This was despite an understanding that the CIA drones would avoid functioning as an auxiliary weapon supporting Pakistani forces23. The Americans acquiesced and conducted the strike, perhaps to maintain their access to operate in Pakistani territory with the approval of Islamabad. In what was the first military venture after the signing of the peace accord, approaching Pakistani forces came under fire from militants within a camp in Zargarkhel, North Waziristan, to the south of Miranshah24. The corresponding drone strike killed four militants in reciprocation. Tribal elders were enraged and ceased cooperation with the government, threatening the stability of the peace accord in North Waziristan25. The next strike would destabilize it even further.

A June 19 strike, at 1030 in the morning, obliterated three compounds of an assessed training facility in the Mami Rogha village, Datta Khel district, of the beleaguered agency, to the west of Miranshah26. Upwards of 32 militants were reported slain, including some foreign elements27, although no affiliations were revealed nor were there senior commanders eliminated, thus encapsulating the ideal of the Signature strike aimed at known facilities with significant numbers of personnel present at the time of attack.

Again demonstrating the complexity of the signature strikes, in the final assault on North Waziristan in 2007 there is difficulty ascertaining the identity of the targeted militants. A compound in Danda Darpa Khel received direct hits from two missiles at 1330 on November 2, killing at least five belligerents28. As became common throughout the drone campaign, further militants arrives on scene and cordoned off the area, all but confirming the presence of militant casualties. Their affiliation though was in question, as the strike occurred in vicinity of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s madrassa, but the compound itself was said to be associated with a commander from South Waziristan, likely referring to Baitullah Mahsud29. Further complicating the identification, was the existence of wounded Uzbeks from the engagement. The wounded of which there were at least six were treated by their fellows and removed by those loyal to the South Waziristan chieftain30.

Twelve Most Wanted

Emergence of the signature strikes certainly did not negate the efforts to eliminate specific individuals. While the drones prowled Pakistan, the militants in Afghanistan faced the untethered abilities of coalition ground and air forces alike. In order to achieve their goals, the militant hunter-killers of Task Force 373 selected targets for assassination or arrest from a living document known as the joint prioritized effects list, or JPEL31. A glance into just who these forces considered the greatest threats within Afghanistan was offered via a relatively simple means. Within the context of the War on Terror, the US military had yet to issue their own “most wanted list”, but changed this strategy later in 2007 with the release of a twelve person issuance, focused on a variety of militants of differing entities operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan32. While acknowledging that none of the twelve men were readily known household names, the US emphasized that their importance to the insurgency was not to be underestimated, perhaps also as a method to justify the seemingly haphazard new drone strikes. The issuance included hundreds of thousands of posters and hundreds of billboards across eastern Afghanistan, where these threats were most prominent33. Between signature drone strikes and Special Forces assassins, the Americans were prepared for an unconventional offensive against these most dangerous militants in the theatre.

$200K

Chief among the names which spread across multiple organizations and for which were offered bounties of $200,000 were Siraj Haqqani, followed by Tahir Yuldashev of the IMU, the al-Qaida affiliated Afghan Dr Amin al-Haq, bin Laden aide Mohamed Rahim al-Afghani, and of course the al-Qaida and LIFG paramilitary official Abu Laith al-Libi34.

An assassination or capture of Abu Laith was assuredly required due to the attack on Vice President Cheney, plus his years of insurgent labor, resulting in the embarrassing and lethal failed attempt to eliminate him in July. As for Dr Amin al-Haq, he was according to the UN, Amin Mohamed al-Haq Saam Khan, and purportedly coordinated security for bin Laden prior to 9/11. He also was accused of funding, plotting, and facilitating the transfer of armaments to and from al-Qaida35. In 2001, the US Treasury Department identified him as a doctor, born 1960, and a native of Nangarhar province36. Originally a member of the Hezb i Islami – Khalis he assisted in and secured bin Laden’s successful transplant from Sudan to Afghanistan in 199637. This outfit, the HiK, was prominent in the 1980s militant efforts against the Soviet occupation, being led in that war by the renown Mohamed Yunis Khalis38.

Amin al-Haq and the HiK39 were instrumental in helping to facilitate the escape of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora in December 2001, and while bin Laden continued into Pakistan, Dr Amin returned to Afghanistan40. A rather inventive report followed, as leaked US military logs contained the belief that Dr Amin joined Hekmatyar Gulbuddin (of the HiG) in Iran during 2005, and on November 19 traveled to North Korea via air. By the time they arrived in Helmand province, Afghanistan on December 3, they had procured an agreement with the North Koreans to supply more advanced anti-aircraft projectiles for usage against the coalition41. The story remains unverified. However, he reappeared with his brother Sana al-Haq in 2007, dispatching loyal militants to assault coalition forces and conduct interoperable missions with various other belligerent outfits42. Dr Amin was present when the extensive fighting erupted again in Tora Bora during a coalition operation against militants in August 200743. Thus, in his native Nangarhar Dr Amin was wounded, before absconding to the Kurram agency of the FATA44. His brother Sana meanwhile, networked with industrious jihadists, and had intended to meet with Harun Shirzad al-Afghani in March (unaware of the latter’s capture), in order to procure a status update on a proposed IED design that would jam electronic countermeasures while still being able to be detonated from afar45.

The inclusion of Mohamed Rahim al-Afghani on the list is fascinating. This is because, by the time of its official issuance, he was already captured. Perhaps, he was placed on the wanted list to avoid al-Qaida senior leadership from discerning his loss and the potential windfall of any intelligence garnered from the Afghan. Perhaps the US military was simply not privy to the veracity of his arrest. Mohamed Rahim was described as a “trusted facilitator and procurement specialist” for bin Laden46. More specifically he was a courier and translator for al-Qaida operatives and bin Laden due to his fluency in Arabic, becoming a rarity as an Afghan national and member of al-Qaida47. Continuing in this role after the invasion, he also ensured safe passage for operatives between Afghanistan and Pakistan48. On June 25, 2007 Mohamed Rahim was apprehended in Pakistan, and by July was delivered to CIA custody and onward to CIA Detention Site BROWN, wherein he was uncooperative in an initial interview49. Pakistani media later noted that this Nangarhar native and “special aide” of bin Laden was apprehended in Lahore50.

The CIA felt certain that his information could direct them towards bin Laden in hiding, and thus petitioned for further usage of their enhanced interrogation techniques to be utilized against the Afghan. Remarkably, this required CIA Director Michael V Hayden lobbying President Bush for an executive order that essentially reinterpreted the Geneva Conventions in such a way as to allowed a reduced version of the techniques, to include six specific actions including sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation51. After the issuance of the executive order on July 20, Mohamed Rahim was welcomed to the enhanced interrogations the following day. Despite the reduced methods, the CIA subjected Mohamed Rahim to severe and intensive sessions of sleep deprivation, liquid only diets, and interrogation, through early September when both an extension of CIA custody was granted, and a cessation in the methods ordered52. In November the actions were resumed through and lasted into December. However all efforts ere futile, due to the Afghan’s refusal to provide relevant information or cooperate53. No actionable intelligence was obtained from the sessions54. He was held by the CIA into March before being transferred to military control. On March 14, 2008 it was announced that Mohamed Rahim was the next High Value Detainee to arrive at Guantanamo Bay detention facility55.

$100K

The subsequent tier offered rewards of $100,000 for two Afghan militants, Dost Mohamed and Anwar al-Haq56. Dost Mohamed was the primary insurgent commander in Nuristan and the northern portion of Kunar provinces57. Previously, he was the Taliban governor of Ghazni province prior to the US invasion58. Anwar al-Haq Mujahid, was the son of legendary HiK leader Mohamed Yunis Khalis, and commander of the obscure Tora Bora Military Front (an apparent breakaway unit) in Nangarhar59. Upon the father’s death in July 2006, Mujahid attempted to consolidate power in the group before declaring the Tora Bora Military Front (Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz) in February 200760.

Operating out of Nangarhar, the faction instigated a notorious sequence of events involving a special forces detachment of US Marines and taking advantage of the fear elicited during and after a suicide attack. Deployed by the Tora Bora Military Front, the perpetrator, an Afghan known as Haji Ihsanullah, veered his van towards a Marine convoy of at least three vehicles on a hectic Nangarhar highway and detonated61. The Marines were six miles from their base in Jalalabad, and fortunately only suffered a lightly injured comrade62. However, In the ensuing chaos, the Marines fled, and fired haphazardly into passing civilian vehicles and pedestrians, out of misplaced concern as to their status as militants63. The US military admitted to approximately 16 civilian deaths, later revised to 1964, but deflected blame to the insurgents65. Embarrassed and forced to make blood payments to bereaved families, American military leadership forced the premature departure of the specialist Marines, who although numbering only 120, constituted a unique rebuke and ousting66. The HiG faction proudly claimed the initial operation67, and undoubtedly drew attention towards their leader. The Marines cynically conducted their own investigation finding the four specific Marines that fired were not at fault in the situation68, thus dismaying an Afghan population, and rendering American authorities infuriated with Anwar al-Haq Mujahid. In fact, his men were targeted in the Tora Bora offensive previously mentioned from August 2007, resulting in losses for the Front69.

$50K

Upwards of $50,000 bounties were levied against Baitullah Mahsud of the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan, Mullah Sadiq Noor in North Waziristan, and one of Siraj Haqqani’s primary deputies, Darim Sedgai70. The senior Haqqani lieutenant was known for the production and transport of explosives and IEDs, plus the coordination of their usage71.  He represented yet another on this list unknown to the public. Yet he was not an entirely obscure figure.  John Walker Lindh, colloquially referred to as the American Taliban, had interacted with Sedgai upon arrival in Pakistan, with the red-bearded militant a part of a council essentially screening Lindh to ensure he was not in the militant camps for the purpose of espionage72.  Sedgai is referenced in the Guantanamo assessment of an Afghan Haqqani loyalist operating within Khost during 2002 after the US invasion.  The document asserts that Sedgai as a “principle” Haqqani commander directly led 200 militants73.  During the insurgency, Sedgai was known to be responsible for terror incidents in Kabul, and was a part of the Haqqani Network’s Miranshah Shura, their primary leadership committee based out of North Waziristan, and recognized as the most senior lieutenant of Pakistani nationality74. Experts on the Haqqani Network report that he was also the Haqqani liaison to Baitullah Mahsud75.

$20K

Finally, $20,000 rewards were offered for the Muqami Taliban commander Mullah Nazir and for Qari Baryal, an Afghan Taliban official76. Qari Baryal was an operator in Kapisa province, believed by American authorities to helm a unit of around 150 combatants77. He was said to have brandished his influence via an attempted ambush of US Special Forces in Kapisa on May 18, but managed to only lose 22 of his fighters on the field, with two others succumbing to injuries en route for treatment in Pakistan78. He was believed by the military to be oriented towards the Taliban and against local HiG influence within the province79. This is interesting, because according to sources, Qari Baryal himself, along with some of his men, were former HiG who fractured away and aligned with the Taliban80. Regardless, he was apparently listed as seventh on the Task Force 373 JPEL81. He and his men actively planned to attack congregations of coalition and Afghan forces82, and even acquired local police uniforms to assist in the undertaking83.

Overdue Merger

That Abu Laith was the only Arab foreign element listed was telling. Within the Afghan insurgency, the Arabs and al-Qaida were a minimal, but extremely influential portion. Consequently, al-Qaida needed to cement unity among the Arab militants. The need was profound to prevent the fracturing of the jihadist movement within the Khorasan, especially considering the complex mix of personalities, motives, and organizations involved in the insurgency. There were already issues. For example, a Saudi militant, Abu Dhabbah al-Taifi declared he and his men as an independent outfit, and in addition to the Khorasan were focused on issues in the Arabian Peninsula84. He was noted as an associate of Abu Okasha al-Iraqi, another semiautonomous jihadist in region85. Abu Dhabbah warned al-Qaida that any request for operations, communications, or supplies to and from the Peninsula needed to be vetted through him86. This was an increasing nuisance to Sheikh Said al-Masri.

Thus, perhaps the most vital change for al-Qaida in 2007 was the accomplishment of this official absorption of Abu Laith and his LIFG contingent.  This followed another successful unification with a North African militant organization. The Algerian jihadist outfit Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), once prominent after its formation in 1998, was fading by the early 2000s, relegated to remote areas and unpopular among the people due to effective government campaigns against the militants87. With Abdulmalik Droukdal (known as Abu Musab Abdulwadud) assuming command over the struggling organization in 2004, the focus shifted to Western targets, in tandem with al-Qaida ideology88. For the GSPC their nemesis was specifically France. Droukdal also helmed the GSPC into a successful unification with al-Qaida, becoming yet another franchise of the overall jihadist movement89. In order to ensure this, Droukdal relied upon Abdulrahman Ould Mohamed al-Hussain Ould Mohamed Salim, eventually known as Sheikh Yunis al-Mauritani, who was an officer of the GSPC since 200190. Instructing militants in weaponry by 2006 and wanted for a 2005 assault on Mauritanian troops, a decision was made to dispatch Salim as the envoy to the Khorasan in order to facilitate the official merger of GSPC with al-Qaida91. Zawahiri welcomed the pledge of allegiance from the GSPC in September 2006, and the following January the North African franchise morphed into al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Unlike the AQIM commanders, the Libyan contingent was based within the Khorasan. Thus, Sheikh Said often hosted and held operational conferences with Abu Laith, his Libyan lieutenants Abu Sahl, Abdullah Said, Abu Yahya, as well as the Saudi Abu Luqman92. Sheikh Said invited the Libyan Atiyah Abdulrahman, Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, and his own personal guard and senior al-Qaida sharia official93, Abu Mansur al-Shami, to join for these meetings also94. That Abu Yahya was attached to Abu Laith was of the utmost importance, as he became the ideological voice of al-Qaida and the jihadist movement in the Khorasan. In fact, aspiring al-Qaida idealogue Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti was also assigned first to Abu Laith and his paramilitary operation upon entering the theatre in 200795.

However, there were a variety of opinions on the matter of the long overdue merger. Sheikh Said al-Masri reported on a meeting with the Libyan faction on May 14, 2007, in order to discuss options96. The Egyptian internal manager feared that the Gadhafi regime would force imprisoned LIFG leaders in their homeland to recant, disparage, or otherwise disagree with the merger, while suffering hardships on behalf of their fellows in the Khorasan97. Abu Laith and his men countered that the public already assumed the Libyan faction in the Khorasan was aligned with al-Qaida, thus would not be impressed by their merging as individuals98. Only joining as the full entity would be appropriate. Sheikh Said considered, and preferred another option in which the Libyans would officially unite with al-Qaida, but sans a public and official announcement. Instead a different release would reveal that Abu Laith was named as in charge of al-Qaida operations in Libya, within the nominal purview of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb99. Of note, Ayman al-Zawahiri ruled that AQIM and the Libyan contingent were to remain as separate entities, allowing for al-Qaida core members in the Khorasan, to include Abu Laith, to manage the jihadist affairs of this vital nation from abroad100. Likely, this was to appease any concerns of Abu Laith in bringing his organization under additional layers of bureaucracy, and to preserve his command and venerated presence. Ostensibly, all parties involved would be pleased with the political outcome. Atiyah meanwhile, preferred the Libyans join al-Qaida as individual militants, but acknowledged the benefits of all options101.

It appears that the final option was the route initial undertaken by al-Qaida in regards to the Libyans. In fact, researchers have astutely noted that Abu Laith began to appear in April 2007 in as-Sahab releases that referenced him as a commander in al-Qaida, and in which he made it obvious that he was speaking in an official manner for the organization102. Others noted that his April 2007 release failed to focus on Libyan issues and instead aligned with al-Qaida global jihadist ideology and intense disdain of the US103. This subtle merger came without fanfare, but Osama bin Laden, from afar, desired his input to be heard on the issue as well.

In an August 17, 2007 missive to Zawahiri, bin Laden championed the idea of the Libyans merging with al-Qaida as the entity of the LIFG and not as individuals104. Bin Laden disregarded the imprisoned LIFG leadership as well as those dwelling in “apostate” nations as compromised. Therefore, having a dependable and verifiably free-willed Abu Laith make decisions for the organization was indeed appropriate, and thus he could be viewed as a proper commander and decision maker105. Bin Laden desired that a new emir for the LIFG be chosen and announced (preferably Abu Laith), and that after a period of two or three months, the formal announcement of a merger be proclaimed. This he felt, would lessen repercussions for the Libyan militants elsewhere, and negate any coerced responding statements against the united front106.

Avatar of Extremism

As the year progressed, the Libyan faction played dramatically into the political and public maneuverings of al-Qaida. Already Abu Yahya, in the most pertinent example, was morphing into the organization’s primary ideologue and spokesperson, a fact noticed and examined by the media throughout 2007. By May of that year he had appeared in six distributed videos, matching Zawahiri and garnering the expectation that he was the emerging avatar of al-Qaida107. Engaging political issues abroad, the Libyan lashed out at Palestinian terror organization Hamas, lambasting its evolution from a jihadist network to a secular government in Gaza, maintaining elections and drifting away from religious fanaticism108. He commenced vehemently vitriolic verbal assaults against the Saudi monarchy, its government, military, and security forces in response to their counterterror efforts against the al-Qaida elements within, and for their interference in the Iraqi insurgency and other jihadist theatres109. Additionally, Abu Yahya lambasted the Saudis for their permissive attitude and acceptance towards the Shiites within the Kingdom, and offered that the Shia, which he labeled as “rejectionist” and an “abomination” must eventually be defeated and annihilated110.

Seemingly because of Abu Yahya’s increasing profile, and a messaging output rivaling Zawahiri, analysts rushed to conclude that there was a corresponding rift in al-Qaida leadership over direction, falling along the lines of the Libyan and Egyptian cadres in theatre111. Sources felt that Zawahiri’s messaging against the Pakistani government after the debacle at the Red Mosque, corresponded so closely to the Pakistani Taliban suicide bombing campaign, that it must have been Zawahiri who actually ordered and coordinated the series of attacks. Thus, there was a belief that the Libyans were displeased with the sanctimonious and obnoxious ideals, plus the reckless actions, of Zawahiri, and were fearful that his radicalism would compromise their carefully constructed positions in the FATA, by bringing about the wrath of both the US and Pakistani militaries112. However, mere days after this report was published, Abu Yahya issued a statement on August 1, denouncing the Pakistani government, calling for the overthrow of the Musharraf regime, and praising those that lost their lives fighting against their forces at the Red Mosque113. It was readily apparent that Libyan and Egyptian factions were cooperating.

Diatribes aside, Abu Yahya also offered surprising insight into al-Qaida philosophical and existential thought. Rather bewilderingly, Abu Yahya provided six methods for Western authorities to combat al-Qaida in an ideological front114. In a September 10 interview, he mused on these ideas and expanded upon each. He suggested that the propagandists of his enemies first focus on the recantations of former jihadist commanders, often those imprisoned. Second, that they exaggerate mistakes made by the jihadist or construct untruths about their philosophy, to spread to the masses in an attempt to sway public opinion. Third he recommended that they obtain fatwas from respected scholars that disavow jihadist actions and combat. Fourth that they rely heavily on moderate Islamic institutions that are enmeshed into modern society and not dedicated to draconian measures or Shariah law, thus forcing the jihadists to be publicly viewed as fringe Muslims and not of normalcy. The fifth method was to assassinate, imprison, malign or slander the primary jihadists idealogues of the day, in order to render them obsolete or disreputable. The sixth and final method was to facilitate rifts and disagreements among the jihadists. It was a remarkable map presented to the coalition and their phycological operations, if only it would be utilized appropriately.

Death of a Daughter

Long was the absence of al-Qaida’s architect after his last appearance in 2007, and thus, in the interim, his subordinates were assigned to speak directly to the American people. American spokesman Adam Gadahn (Azzam al-Amriki) for instance released an ultimatum to the US populace on May 29, in which he adamantly urged the US withdrawal from Islamic culture, nations, and jihadist theatres115. This included the cessation of any psychological or propaganda efforts aimed at the religion of Islam. Gadahn implored the dismantling of support and acceptance for Israel, and the liberation of incarcerated Muslims116.

While his lieutenants produced video and audio at a prodigious and audacious rate, Osama bin Laden was notably absent, at least until an as-Sahab video release entitled “The Solution,” released on September 7, 2007117. The video acted as a proof of life and health for bin Laden, and offered a platform for him to pontificate upon current events. Despite the enhancements of as-Sahab production, the video was rife with glitches and freezing118. The audio remained constant. Bin Laden launched into a diatribe that almost leaned into leftist ideology at times, and veered into hardline religious extremism at others. For example, he spoke to the American public intenttly, explaining that global warning and the financial crises of the day were the fault of corporate greed and untethered capitalism119. He also focused extensively on the failures of political opposition to cease the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He offered that the American public must end the conflict, as the jihadists had no choice but to continue combatting the occupation120. Interestingly, he appealed to Christians in America on their common ground and beliefs to Muslims, specifically centering on the stories of Jesus and Mary121. The al-Qaida commander blamed the failures of the Americans on their reliance on greed and the mistakes of separation of church and state122. Thus, he remarkably followed the same line of thinking as several Christian extremists in the US.

Contrasting with his public flair, bin Laden maintained a rather domestic life style while in hiding with family members in his Abbottabad, Pakistan compound. Under the protection of his aide and courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, bin Laden desired to coalesce additional family members to this locale. Thus in 2007 he intended to move his daughter Khadijah, her husband Mohamed Abdullah Hassan Abu al-Khayr, and their children to the compound. The Saudi al-Khayr was known as Abdullah al-Halabi, Abdullatif, and Dawud within internal messages, and resided in the FATA of Pakistan with the Arab militant community. 

In the confusion of the exodus of Al-Qaida from Afghanistan in 2001, Halabi and Khadijah were separated from the rest of the bin Laden family.  Halabi joined the foreign elements in the FATA, engaging in various tasks for al-Qaida leadership. As 2007 progressed, Halabi worked with bin Laden and al-Qaida associates in order to prepare his immediate family for the transplant to Abbottabad.  This did not entirely come to fruition as the security situation in Pakistan was unfavorable and thwarted the attempt.  In addition, Khadijah was worried with her health due to the impending births of her next children. Eventually, Khadijah passed away in 2007 during childbirth, losing one of her twins as well as her life.  Halabi and his four surviving children were devastated but he quickly proposed to remarry.  He was apologetic to his emir for doing so without his permission, but stated that he had waited three months.  He appears to have been unable to appeal directly to bin Laden on the issue, due to the time passing between written correspondences.  The proposal however, appears to have been met with a refusal from the woman’s family.  Halabi was close to the al-Qaida associated ideologue Abu Walid al-Filistini, a Saudi born Palestinian named Khalid Fathi al-Agha, who grew to become a major religious figure in the terrorist outfit while in exile in the FATA. He encouraged Halabi to remarry.  Khadijah had even previously referenced that her brother Khalid could marry the Palestinian’s daughter.  After this, by December of 2007, his three eldest children were transferred to bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound, to be cared for and taught by their uncle Khalid, bin Laden, and his wives. In the meantime, Khalid appears to have become very preoccupied with his own impending marriage. Halabi was instrumental in arranging this for his brother in law.  Even prior to her death, Khadijah worked diligently to find her brother a wife, and eventually secured the arrangement with the daughter of a deceased Egyptian al-Qaida militant, Sami Tufankashi, known as Abu Abdulrahman BM. Thus, even as the insurgency raged, bin Laden and his family possessed the time to be preoccupied with seemingly trivial affairs.

Unification

As bin Laden struggled to reunite his family, his organization decided to celebrate a larger coalescing. A final response to the Libyan issue appeared on November 3, 2007, when as-Sahab produced an audio release in which Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith jointly proclaimed the unifying of their networks into one, with al-Qaida absorbing the LIFG123. Zawahiri introduced Abu Laith, but conveyed the message in a way to deflect criticism from the existing and imprisoned LIFG leadership, by simply praising Abu Laith and his fellows for continuing their struggle, and for his efforts related to jihad and Islam overall124. Abu Laith then heavily criticized the Gadhafi regime, offering a story in which he and his men persisted in their fight from abroad. Abu Laith acknowledged an impending, almost apocalyptic war on behalf of Islam, reasoning that he was compelled to join al-Qaida under bin Laden’s leadership to prepare and stand in this battle125. He also acknowledged the presence of AQIM in northern Africa, announcing that his efforts in Libya would also be in conjunction with these existing jihadists126.

Al-Qaida leadership rejoiced, addressing Abu Laith, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Abdullah Said al-Libi directly in response, congratulating and praising them on their decision to merge their organization with al-Qaida127. Al-Qaida leaders attempted to alleviate the Libyans’ qualms over reduced focus on their original mission in their homeland, citing the examples of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the GSPC in North Africa, having joined the global union despite unfinished business in their respective nations. The author of the congratulatory letter reminded the Libyans that they would be far more valued on the global stage, especially considering what he described as an ocean of oppression against Muslims, a plague that now the LIFG was aligned to protect and combat against128.

Abu Yahya al-Libi as part of the merger ascended to the chair of the al-Qaida Sharia or Legal Committee129, effectively replacing the position left vacant by Abu Hafs al-Mauritani so long ago. This is of interest considering that bin Laden issued orders to Sheikh Said on December 17, 2007, in which he displayed a preference for Atiyah assuming the role of the senior most ideologue in addition to becoming the spokesperson of al-Qaida and the apparent defender of their franchises throughout the region130. Despite this, and probably due to an overstressed Atiyah and the announcement of the merger, Abu Yahya remained the public face of al-Qaida and the primary justifier of their twisted fanatical ideology.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. U.S. secret: CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war, by Jonathan S Landay, McClatchy, April 26, 2013, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24747829.html ↩︎
  2. U.S. secret: CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war, by Jonathan S Landay, McClatchy, April 26, 2013, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24747829.html ↩︎
  3. U.S. secret: CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war, by Jonathan S Landay, McClatchy, April 26, 2013, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24747829.html ↩︎
  4. U.S. secret: CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war, by Jonathan S Landay, McClatchy, April 26, 2013, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24747829.html ↩︎
  5. At CIA, a Convert to Islam Leads The Terrorism Hunt, by Greg Miller, The Washington Post, March 24, 2012, At CIA, a convert to Islam leads the terrorism hunt – The Washington Post ↩︎
  6. At CIA, a Convert to Islam Leads The Terrorism Hunt, by Greg Miller, The Washington Post, March 24, 2012, At CIA, a convert to Islam leads the terrorism hunt – The Washington Post ↩︎
  7. At CIA, a Convert to Islam Leads The Terrorism Hunt, by Greg Miller, The Washington Post, March 24, 2012, At CIA, a convert to Islam leads the terrorism hunt – The Washington Post ↩︎
  8. At CIA, a Convert to Islam Leads The Terrorism Hunt, by Greg Miller, The Washington Post, March 24, 2012, At CIA, a convert to Islam leads the terrorism hunt – The Washington Post ↩︎
  9. 20 ‘militants; killed in Waziristan army blitz, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, January 17, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/228362/20 ↩︎
  10. 20 ‘militants; killed in Waziristan army blitz, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, January 17, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/228362/20 ↩︎
  11. 20 ‘militants; killed in Waziristan army blitz, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, January 17, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/228362/20 ↩︎
  12. 20 ‘militants; killed in Waziristan army blitz, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, January 17, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/228362/20 ↩︎
  13. U.S. drone attack? It was us, says Pakistan army, The Washington Post via Reuters, January 19, 2007, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/19/AR2007011900570_pf.html ↩︎
  14. U.S. drone attack? It was us, says Pakistan army, The Washington Post via Reuters, January 19, 2007, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/19/AR2007011900570_pf.html ↩︎
  15. U.S. drone attack? It was us, says Pakistan army, The Washington Post via Reuters, January 19, 2007, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/19/AR2007011900570_pf.html ↩︎
  16. Missiles fired from across border kill four in N. Waziristan, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, April 28, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244513/missiles-fired-from-across-border-kill-four-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  17. Pakistan Objects to Reported U.S. Attack That Left 8 Dead, by Mubashir Zaidi and Zulfiqar Ali, The Los Angeles Times, January 10, 2006, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-jan-10-fg-protest10-story.html  // Missiles fired from across border kill four in N. Waziristan, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, April 28, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244513/missiles-fired-from-across-border-kill-four-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  18. Missiles fired from across border kill four in N. Waziristan, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, April 28, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244513/missiles-fired-from-across-border-kill-four-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  19. Missile Strike in Pakistan Kills 4, by Bashirullah Khan, The Associated Press, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042701056.html ↩︎
  20. Missiles fired from across border kill four in N. Waziristan, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, April 28, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244513/missiles-fired-from-across-border-kill-four-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  21. Missile Strike in Pakistan Kills 4, by Bashirullah Khan, The Associated Press, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042701056.html ↩︎
  22. U.S. secret: CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war, by Jonathan S Landay, McClatchy, April 26, 2013, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24747829.html ↩︎
  23. U.S. secret: CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war, by Jonathan S Landay, McClatchy, April 26, 2013, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24747829.html ↩︎
  24. Pakistani elders resign over raid on militants, Reuters, May 25, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/25/us-pakistan-waziristan-idUSISL21511220070525/ ↩︎
  25. Pakistani elders resign over raid on militants, Reuters, May 25, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/25/us-pakistan-waziristan-idUSISL21511220070525/ ↩︎
  26. Al Qaeda Camp Struck in North Waziristan, Pakistan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, June 19, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/06/al_qaeda_camp_struck.php ↩︎
  27. Al Qaeda Camp Struck in North Waziristan, Pakistan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, June 19, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/06/al_qaeda_camp_struck.php ↩︎
  28. Drone Missile Kills Five Near Miranshah, Dawn, November 3, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/274149/drone-missile-kills-five-near-miramshah ↩︎
  29. Drone Missile Kills Five Near Miranshah, Dawn, November 3, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/274149/drone-missile-kills-five-near-miramshah ↩︎
  30. Drone Missile Kills Five Near Miranshah, Dawn, November 3, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/274149/drone-missile-kills-five-near-miramshah ↩︎
  31. Afghanistan war logs: Task Force 373 – special forces hunting top Taliban, by Nick Davies, The Guardian, July 25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/task-force-373-secret-afghanistan-taliban ↩︎
  32. US issues Afghan most wanted list, BBC News, October 1, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7021876.stm ↩︎
  33. US issues Afghan most wanted list, BBC News, October 1, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7021876.stm ↩︎
  34. U.S. Issues ‘Most-Wanted’ List Of Taliban, Al-Qaida Leaders, The Associated Press, October 1, 2007, https://www.newson6.com/story/5e367b8e2f69d76f6208e45f/us-issues-mostwanted-list-of-taliban-alqaida-leaders ↩︎
  35. United Nations Security Council Sanctions, Resolution 1267, Amin Mohamed al-Haq Saam Khan, listed on January 25, 2001, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/amin-muhammad-ul-haq-saam-khan ↩︎
  36. Treasury Department Releases List of 39 Additional Specially Designated Global Terrorists, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, October 12, 2001, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/po689 ↩︎
  37. Pakistan frees bin Laden bodyguard, NBC News, September 28, 2011, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna44704789 ↩︎
  38. Pakistan Frees al Qaeda commander: Report, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 21, 2011, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/09/pakistan_frees_al_qa.php ↩︎
  39. Pakistan frees bin Laden bodyguard, NBC News, September 28, 2011, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna44704789 ↩︎
  40. Laden paid $ 15 m to buy freedom, by Rajeev Sharma, The Tribune India, November 7, 2002, https://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20021108/main5.htm ↩︎
  41. Afghanistan war logs reveal hand of Osama bin Laden, by Simon Tisdall, The Guardian, July 26, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-osama-bin-laden ↩︎
  42. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  43. Tora Bora Offensive Continues Against Taliban, Al-Qaeda, by Duad Wafa and Mustafa Sarwar, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, August 17, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1078201.html ↩︎
  44. The Eastern Afghanistan Offensive, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/08/the_eastern_afghanis.php ↩︎
  45. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  46. Defense Department Takes Custody Of A High-Value Detainee, US Department of Defense press release, March 14, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20081211170019/http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758 ↩︎
  47. Guantanamo Detainee Profile, Mohamed Rahim, AF-10029, March 29, 2016, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10029/160428_U_ISN10029_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf ↩︎
  48. Guantanamo Detainee Profile, Mohamed Rahim, AF-10029, March 29, 2016, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10029/160428_U_ISN10029_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf ↩︎
  49. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  50. Qaeda two key figures arrested from Pakistan, by Shamim Shahid, The Nation, August 2, 2007, https://web.archive.org/web/20080317132409/http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/aug-2007/2/index16.php ↩︎
  51. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  52. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  53. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  54. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  55. Defense Department Takes Custody Of A High-Value Detainee, US Department of Defense press release, March 14, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20081211170019/http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758 ↩︎
  56. U.S. Issues ‘Most-Wanted’ List Of Taliban, Al-Qaida Leaders, The Associated Press, October 1, 2007, https://www.newson6.com/story/5e367b8e2f69d76f6208e45f/us-issues-mostwanted-list-of-taliban-alqaida-leaders ↩︎
  57. (ENEMY ACTION) SAFIRE
     RPT (Small Arms) TF PALEHORSE : 0 INJ/DAM, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks, October 7, 2009, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/46FD48BD-F162-A4E4-5645C7985B7A4461/     ↩︎
  58. United Nations Security Council Sanctions, Resolution 1267, Dost Mohamed, listed on January 25, 2001, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/dost-mohammad ↩︎
  59. Report: Tora Bora Front Leader Captured in Peshawar, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, June 7, 2009, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/06/report_tora_bora_fro.php // Afghanistan: Return to the lair of bin Laden, by Tom Coghlan, The Telegraph, August 24, 2007, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1561227/Afghanistan-Return-to-the-lair-of-bin-Laden.html ↩︎
  60. TALIBAN PROPAGANDA: WINNING THE WAR OF WORDS?, Asia Report N°158 – 24 July 2008, International Crisis Group, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/29/icg_07242008.pdf ↩︎
  61. Wounded Afghans say U.S. forces fired on civilians after suicide bomb, The Associated Press, March 4, 2007, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-03-04-afghans-civilians_N.htm ↩︎
  62. Afghanistan war logs: How US marines sanitised record of bloodbath, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 26, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100729013421/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-us-marines ↩︎
  63. Wounded Afghans say U.S. forces fired on civilians after suicide bomb, The Associated Press, March 4, 2007, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-03-04-afghans-civilians_N.htm ↩︎
  64. Afghanistan war logs: How US marines sanitised record of bloodbath, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 26, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100729013421/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-us-marines ↩︎
  65. Wounded Afghans say U.S. forces fired on civilians after suicide bomb, The Associated Press, March 4, 2007, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-03-04-afghans-civilians_N.htm ↩︎
  66. Afghanistan war logs: How US marines sanitised record of bloodbath, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 26, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100729013421/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-us-marines ↩︎
  67. Wounded Afghans say U.S. forces fired on civilians after suicide bomb, The Associated Press, March 4, 2007, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-03-04-afghans-civilians_N.htm ↩︎
  68. Afghanistan war logs: How US marines sanitised record of bloodbath, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 26, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20100729013421/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-us-marines ↩︎
  69. Afghanistan: Return to the lair of bin Laden, by Tom Coghlan, The Telegraph, August 24, 2007, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1561227/Afghanistan-Return-to-the-lair-of-bin-Laden.html ↩︎
  70. U.S. Issues ‘Most-Wanted’ List Of Taliban, Al-Qaida Leaders, The Associated Press, October 1, 2007, https://www.newson6.com/story/5e367b8e2f69d76f6208e45f/us-issues-mostwanted-list-of-taliban-alqaida-leaders ↩︎
  71. The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Afghanistan, by Imtiaz Ali, The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 6, March 24, 2008, https://jamestown.org/the-haqqani-network-and-cross-border-terrorism-in-afghanistan/ ↩︎
  72. American Taliban, Pearl Abraham, Random House Publishing Group, 2010 ↩︎
  73. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mohamed Nabi Omari, ISN 832, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/832.html ↩︎
  74. Inside the Haqqani network, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, June 3, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/03/inside-the-haqqani-network/ // The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan, by Jeffrey A Dressler, The Institute for the Study of War, The Afghanistan Report 6, October 2010 ↩︎
  75. Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity, by Thomas Ruttig, from Decoding the New Taliban. Insights from the Afghan Field, Antonio Guistozzi, Columbia: Hurst, 2009 ↩︎
  76. U.S. Issues ‘Most-Wanted’ List Of Taliban, Al-Qaida Leaders, The Associated Press, October 1, 2007, https://www.newson6.com/story/5e367b8e2f69d76f6208e45f/us-issues-mostwanted-list-of-taliban-alqaida-leaders ↩︎
  77. 110830ZAPR07 TF Gladius Key Leader Engagement, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks, April 11, 2007, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7822651E-FCAA-44E8-B9E1-DBBEAB7DC0BD/ ↩︎
  78. 230530ZMAY07 TF Gladius Kapisa Secuirty Council Meeting, WarDiaries, Wikileaks, May 23, 2007, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/B81DB852-A590-4F72-9520-6CDCCB637DC8/ ↩︎
  79. 200530ZJUN07 TF Gladius Conducts the Kapisa Provincial Security Meeting, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks, June 20, 2007, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/88AAD241-ACC2-4560-B72D-4089B5313173/ ↩︎
  80. Office Call between the Director General of National Directorate of Security and Commander of Regional Command-East, WarDiaries, Wikileaks, March 8, 2008, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/BE841896-FBA8-46CE-9E03-33D851927585/ ↩︎
  81. Afghanistan war logs: Task Force 373 – special forces hunting top Taliban, by Nick Davies, The Guardian, July 25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/task-force-373-secret-afghanistan-taliban ↩︎
  82. 050530Z TF Glaidus conducts Kapisa PSC, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks, March 5, 2008, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7F730BDD-FCA7-4BC5-9DF7-5BC6B7017B8B/ ↩︎
  83. 26 0430Z Gladius Conducts Security Meeting with Parwan PSC, WarDiaries, Wikileaks, August 26, 2007, https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/8427C907-9BCF-4D07-9949-E67C71898C6C/ ↩︎
  84. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother Sheikh Azmarai,’ dated March 5, 2008 ↩︎
  85. Letter from senior al-Qaida leadership (likely Sheikh Said al-Masri or Atiyah Abdulrahman), likely to Nasir al-Wuhaishi of AQAP, ‘Summary of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan,’ dated approximately April 2010 ↩︎
  86. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, ‘Dear Honorable Brother Sheikh Azmarai,’ dated March 5, 2008 ↩︎
  87. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad, by Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The Combating Terrorism Center United States Military Academy West Point, April 2007 ↩︎
  88. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad, by Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The Combating Terrorism Center United States Military Academy West Point, April 2007 ↩︎
  89. The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa’ida’s Global Jihad, by Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The Combating Terrorism Center United States Military Academy West Point, April 2007 ↩︎
  90. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%93%20The%20U.S.%20Department%20of,and%20operative%20Mustafa%20Hajji%20Muhammad ↩︎
  91. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%93%20The%20U.S.%20Department%20of,and%20operative%20Mustafa%20Hajji%20Muhammad ↩︎
  92. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  93. Jordanian militant’s death confirmed by brother, Dawn, January 12, 2010, https://www.dawn.com/news/914595/jordanian-militants-death-confirmed-by-brother ↩︎
  94. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  95. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  96. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  97. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  98. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  99. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  100. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  101. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  102. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  103. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  104. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Mohamed,” dated August 17, 2007 ↩︎
  105. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Mohamed,” dated August 17, 2007 ↩︎
  106. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter to Sheikh Mohamed,” dated August 17, 2007 ↩︎
  107. Is North African militant new face of al-Qaida?, by Robert Windrem, NBC News, May 30, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna18942722 ↩︎
  108. Hamas has Dug its Own Grave, statement by Abu Yahya al-Libi, Islamic Renewal Organization, February 1, 2007 // Palestine: Warning Call and Caution Cry, statement by Abu Yahya al-Libi, al-Fajr Media Center, April 30, 2007
    ↩︎
  109. as-Sahab Media production, Monotheism of the al-Saud and True Monotheism, Abu Yahya al-Libi, May 29, 2007 ↩︎
  110. as-Sahab Media production, The Fire of the Magi in the Arabian Peninsula, Abu Yahya al-Libi, January 9, 2007 ↩︎
  111. Al Qaeda: Internal Power Struggle Looms, by Sami Yousafzai, Newsweek, July 29, 2007, https://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-internal-power-struggle-looms-104615 ↩︎
  112. Al Qaeda: Internal Power Struggle Looms, by Sami Yousafzai, Newsweek, July 29, 2007, https://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-internal-power-struggle-looms-104615 ↩︎
  113. The Masters of the Martyrs, statement by Abu Yahya al-Libi, as-Sahab media production, August 1, 2007 ↩︎
  114. as-Sahab media production, Dots on the Letters, as-Sahab’s 2nd Interview with Sheikh Abu Yahya at-Libi,
    Two Years After His Deliverance from Bagram Prison, September 9, 2007     ↩︎
  115. as-Sahab Media production, Legitimate Demands, Adam Gadahn, May 29, 2007 ↩︎
  116. as-Sahab Media production, Legitimate Demands, Adam Gadahn, May 29, 2007 ↩︎
  117. as-Sahab Media production, The Solution, Osama bin Laden, September 7, 2007 ↩︎
  118. as-Sahab Media production, The Solution, Osama bin Laden, September 7, 2007 ↩︎
  119. as-Sahab Media production, The Solution, Osama bin Laden, September 7, 2007 ↩︎
  120. as-Sahab Media production, The Solution, Osama bin Laden, September 7, 2007 ↩︎
  121. as-Sahab Media production, The Solution, Osama bin Laden, September 7, 2007 ↩︎
  122. as-Sahab Media production, The Solution, Osama bin Laden, September 7, 2007 ↩︎
  123. as-Sahab Media production, Unity in the Lines, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins Al-Qaida, November 3, 2007 ↩︎
  124. as-Sahab Media production, Unity in the Lines, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins Al-Qaida, November 3, 2007 ↩︎
  125. as-Sahab Media production, Unity in the Lines, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins Al-Qaida, November 3, 2007 ↩︎
  126. as-Sahab Media production, Unity in the Lines, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group joins Al-Qaida, November 3, 2007 ↩︎
  127. Letter to Sheikh Abu Laith, Sheikh Abu Yahya, and Sheikh Abdullah Said al-Libi, dated approximately 2007 ↩︎
  128. Letter to Sheikh Abu Laith, Sheikh Abu Yahya, and Sheikh Abdullah Said al-Libi, dated approximately 2007 ↩︎
  129. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  130. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Sheikh Said al-Masri, ‘Letter to Abu Abdullah al-Hajj Othman,’ dated December 17, 2007 ↩︎

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