SERIES: Exiles Of Jihad: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Coalescing The TTP

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Rivaling the influence of al-Qaida, the local Taliban or religious extremist movements of the FATA were expanding in stature and violence. Despite assertions to the opposite, these entities did not yet represent a cohesive bonding of militant networks under one Taliban umbrella. Each operated with its own ambitions, motives, and influences. The notion of a Pakistani Taliban remained but a scattered and fragmented movement until the end of 2007. Events during the year precipitated action and merging among these militants, and the fragile peace accords implemented by the Pakistani government dissolved.

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Farcical Peace Accord

The local militant networks of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) shared an overall ideology and intent on dislodging the American presence in Afghanistan, but tribal divides eventually developed into pronounced political maneuvering. Differences became more apparent within the Mahsud tribe, specifically between the Baitullah and Abdullah Mahsud factions as the year 2007 progressed.  Baitullah was described now as the unquestioned Taliban leader of the Mahsuds in South Waziristan, with his tribal lashkar faction numbering up to 30,000.  Abdullah Mahsud meanwhile, led a powerful contingent of 5,000 fighters focused on cross-border raids, attacks on government sympathizers, and cooperation with Tahir Yuldashev’s Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)1.  Baitullah surpassed Abdullah in popularity and influence, but the latter remained active and operational. The primary intention of all such units was combat in Afghanistan against coalition troops. In December 2006, for instance, Baitullah hosted militants, families of fallen jihadists, and government officials alike for a presentation in which certificates of commendation were awarded to the kin of 175 South Waziristan natives killed in battle in Afghanistan since February 20052. Approximately 50 were of his own Mahsud tribe, while the remainder were Ahmadzai Wazirs. South Waziristan was obviously exporting their fighters, but this did not preclude the militant factions from turning their ire on their own government.

Baitullah Mahsud swore vengeance and response due to airstrikes within the FATA, specifically an incident in Zamazola, South Waziristan, on January 163. Suspiciously, suicide bombings only resumed after this occurrence. Journalists were given access to view the strike’s aftermath, and upon request one BBC crew was allowed to meet with Baitullah. They were driven at high speeds by a brash young Baitullah loyalist known as Zulfiqar4. During the January interview with the BBC, Baitullah proclaimed that “only jihad can bring peace to the world5,” providing an insight into his philosophy via the startling contradiction. By February investigators had linked a Dera Ismail Khan-based network plotting suicide attacks in Pakistani cities directly to Baitullah, who harbored deep resentment of the Pakistani government’s complicity in the killing of Pashtun tribesmen, during incursions, drone strikes, and other airstrikes. One suicide attack was an attempt to bring carnage to the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on January 26, however the young bomber was thwarted by security at the lobby entrance, and the resulting explosion only killed a guard and the assailant6. Hailing from South Waziristan, the teenaged operative was affiliated with the Dera Ismail Khan unit, and his facial features were surgically reconstructed after the attack to provide identification7. Another teenager approached one of the much maligned security checkpoints of the region on January 29 and refused to be searched by authorities. Instead the operative detonated his vest in Dera Ismail Khan, killing a guard and a pedestrian8.

Authorities confidently linked Baitullah to these two bombings, plus a third in Mir Ali, resulting in the North West Frontier Province governor dispatching a tribal jirga to convene directly with the powerful jihadist9. A failed suicide bombing at the Islamabad Airport on February 6 cost just the bomber himself his life, as security pursued him through a parking area after his refusal to consent to a search. Security sources revealed that the operative may have been there to assassinate Prime Minister Shuakat Aziz within the airport10, and with government officials potentially targeted, the meeting with Baitullah was all the more pertinent. Interestingly, during the March conference, Baitullah acquiesced, and vowed to maintain the principles of the pre-existing peace accord with the government11.

Within the month, the situation escalated, and another tribal jirga deployed to Baitullah, this time in hopes of quelling unrest in the district of Tank along the eastern border with South Waziristan. Towards the end of March, militants were sweeping schools in Tank, gathering young children for jihadist indoctrination. One school resisted, leading to the principal and his brother being abducted, and precipitating a series of violent exchanges between the militants and local security forces12. Eventually the insurgents turned their wrath on government structures and banks. This necessitated both Pakistani military intervention and the request to Baitullah. Authorities coordinated with Baitullah, even though intelligence sources were confident that his forces were responsible for the conflict13.

Despite the earlier conference being presented as a final chance for Baitullah, the blatant disregard for peace persisted. Nonetheless, both sides seemingly benefited from the tenuous agreement. For Baitullah, he remained unmolested and in power through the simple act of “renouncing” and denying the very violence he had fostered and ordered. As Baitullah enjoyed this remarkable immunity, Pakistani authorities meanwhile, likely gained information from the relationship to assist in removing what they considered a larger scourge.

Firefight in Zhob

Abdullah Mahsud was already considered culpable in suicide bombings internal to Pakistan. For example, authorities concluded that his men in Wana, including a cousin, facilitated Lashkar-e-Jhangvi operatives in carrying out a July 14, 2006 suicide bombing in Karachi. A young indoctrinated Bengali operative detonated outside the home of prominent Shiite cleric Allama Hassan Turabi, slaying him and his nephew14. Assaulting public figures remained on the tribal militant’s agenda. On April 28, 2007, Abdullah Mahsud dispatched a suicide bomber to a political gathering in Charsadda district of the NWFP of Pakistan, in order to assassinate Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao15.  The bomber detonated in close proximity to the Minister, but failed to kill Sherpao, who despite obvious wounds, immediately spoke to the press and placed the blame on the Abdullah Mahsud faction16.  At least 31 people were killed in the blast, attributed to advanced explosives within the assailant’s vest17. 

While Baitullah maintained control of the Mahsud radicals within South Waziristan, Abdullah continued to operate outside of the boundaries of the FATA and the Taliban governed regions he fought so diligently for.  In fact, on July 24, 2007, he was residing with the local political leader from the JUI in the Zhob district of Balochistan18.  The JUI was a wing of the MMA, Pakistan’s conservative Islamist party in opposition to the current government19.  That this party was supporting militant factions was both telling and unsurprising.  With the Americans insinuating that Pakistani military action against the radical jihadists had to increase and become more efficient, else American military action on Pakistani soil remained an option, the Musharraf administration advanced pressure on the likes of Abdullah Mahsud20.  Pakistani security forces comprising law enforcement, ISI, and antiterrorism units, descended upon the Zhob location after tracing Abdullah Mahsud for the prior couple of days21.  A firefight ensued, resulting in the captures of two of Abdullah’s brothers, the brother and nephew of the JUI leader, and a local Taliban commander22.  Several other militants perished fighting against the Pakistani law enforcement raid23.  Surrounded, Abdullah Mahsud made the fateful decision to never face incarceration or interrogation again.  Having been detained at Guantanamo and in Dostum’s shipping containers after the battle of Kunduz, Abdullah was not going to see the same again.  He held a hand grenade to his person and detonated, dying in the manner that he had previously instructed his men to do24.  His reign was brief and he was considered more of a factional paramilitary than political leader, but he had brought angst to the Pakistani government.  His career now was over, not in his home of South Waziristan, or the battlefields of Afghanistan, but in Balochistan, at his own hand, encircled by law enforcement.  Thus ended the saga of Noor Alam, known variously as a mere disabled Taliban conscript while in Guantanamo (Said Mohamed Alam Shah – ISN9225), and by his men in Pakistan as Abdullah Mahsud, the feared and brutal combatant.    

Baitullah maintained his farcical connection to the Pakistani government, as evidenced by his supposed adherence to the previous peace accord, but was primarily utilizing the agreement in order to assert his authority and influence over his tribe, South Waziristan, the FATA, and beyond. Rivals were targets, and Baitullah was directly accused of providing the intelligence as to the whereabouts of Abdullah26. Pakistani authorities were eager to remove Abdullah after the embarrassing episode in which he abducted two Chinese engineers in 2005. Another Mahsud senior, named Masood ur Rahman, made these claims publicly before he was assassinated by explosives in his vehicle in South Waziristan27. His son, Qari Zainuddin Mahsud was vocal in implicating Baitullah in this series of deaths, which also included another leadership candidate known as Saifullah Mahsud28. Thus, Qari Zainuddin took control of Abdullah’s faction and attempted to gain support among his tribe against Baitullah. It proved to be a futile endeavor.

Aside from American pressure and retribution for the Chinese incident, the timing of the Abdullah Mahsud raid was undoubtedly influenced by a fanatical crisis in Pakistan that erupted in July. A successful removal of a threatening militant was a needed victory for the Pakistanis in an otherwise miserable month. To fully comprehend the destabilizing event, one must first observe the unraveling security situations, tribal travails, political intrigue, and fragile peace within several locations throughout the NWFP and the FATA.

Rifts in South Waziristan

Further tribal rifts emerged concerning the abundance of Central Asians in the FATA. For the Uzbek militants that remained with Tahir Yuldashev and his organization, life in South Waziristan was accommodating. The Pashtun populace welcomed the Uzbeks and many of the foreigners purchased and/or accepted property and farms, succeeding financially at the eventual expense of their hosts29. Yuldashev meanwhile, was openly observed as a desired guest orator at local religious institutions30.

When the Pakistani military first attempted to dislodge the Uzbeks from South Waziristan on June 22, 2002, the local tribesmen allied with and aided the foreigners, as eleven Pakistani soldiers and six IMU militants perished in Azam Warzak31. The locals remained defenders of the Uzbeks into 2004, but the previously documented Battle of Wana and Pakistani incursions into the Shakai valley that year, resulted in the breaking of the delicate balance, surging Yuldashev and his men into irrevocable conflict with the Pakistani forces. The engagements were detrimental physically to the local Pashtuns and their livelihoods32. There were also economic repercussions. Throughout 2004 the Uzbeks either supplanted indigenous farmers, were delinquent on adequate rental payments, or caused harm via an agricultural prohibition on goods from South Waziristan precipitated by their continued presence in the agency33. Thus, the situation became untenable, and after Nek Mohamed Wazir’s assassination in 2004, feudal culture in the region reappeared, allowing tribal and clan differences to dominate internal politics among the militants.

As a result of the strain, Taliban officials from Afghanistan ventured into South Waziristan to settle any disputes and select an appropriate commander, in attempts to maintain the militant stronghold and appease the unsettled tribal elders34. In November 2006, the relatively unknown Maulvi Nazir Ahmed (hereafter known as Mullah Nazir) was appointed as leader of the Taliban in South Waziristan35. There were perhaps political and sinister reasons for his selection to helm the movement.  

From a sub-clan of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe that held minimal sway, Mullah Nazir was not poised to be an apparent officiator of jihad. Born 1975 in Birmal, Paktika province, Afghanistan, he appears to have relocated to Wana, South Waziristan due to the perpetual state of war in which Afghanistan was embroiled through his developmental years36. It was in Wana that Nazir was religiously indoctrinated and radicalized at local madrassas. As such, he was susceptible to the call of the Taliban across the border, and even though still young and receiving an education, he journeyed in 1995 through 1996 to the aid of Mullah Mohamed Omar as a militant37. No longer a student, Nazir became a full-time combatant for the Taliban, and participated in eight military maneuvers from 1996 to 2001. However, the US invasion proved overwhelming, forcing Nazir to abscond across the border to the familiarity of Wana38.

In late 2001 after his retreat, Mullah Nazir led a charge against American troops in Machadad across the border from South Waziristan, in what was said to be his initial foray39. Likely a hyperbolic claim, Mullah Nazir supposedly followed this with another successful crossing into Afghanistan and attacked Afghan forces in Shakin, Paktika, resulting in the executions by immolation of 18 soldiers40. These were among the highlights of his early career. Initially, Nazir desired the monetary benefits of sheltering the foreign elements, including those of the IMU, that inundated South Waziristan41. Nazir furthermore declared Pakistani forces as legitimate foes in 2002, as a response to Pakistani military incursions into the FATA beginning in 200242.

However, Mullah Nazir’s views drastically altered and he was subsequently aligned with the Pakistani government. Declared as one of Pakistan’s most wanted militants during 2003, he prudently chose to capitulate in early 200443. Surprisingly, he was determined not to be a threat and was liberated, seemingly as a beneficiary of the government’s peace accord with Nek Mohamed Wazir44. Analysts however, insinuated that Mullah Nazir was instead turned into a government asset during his brief incarceration, freed only upon agreeing to both assist in removing the Uzbeks and refraining from assaults on Pakistani forces45. While Mullah Nazir remained a non-factor for the next two years, his eventual rise was a positive and sought-after development for the government. Upon his appointment over the militants of South Waziristan, Mullah Nazir addressed the issue of the Uzbeks via two conferences wherein Yuldashev’s deputy Osman Adel attended and made a declaration to fall in line with Pashtun authority in the agency46. These promises proved false.

Thus, Mullah Nazir supplanted Haji Omar Khan and his fellows of the Wana Five as the most senior and influential Pakistani Taliban chieftain, relegating them to the proverbial corners due to their support of the IMU47. Some hypothesize that hailing from differing sub-clans of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe helped to fuel the disdain and animosity between Haji Omar Khan and Mullah Nazir48. Both were constituents of the Zalikhel clan of the tribe, which was influential, controlling Wana, and thus the administration of South Waziristan49. Specifically, the Yargulkhel sub-clan retained the most power, and was the entity from which Nek Mohamed Wazir and the Wana Five hailed. By contrast, Mullah Nazir was of the Kakakhel, the least significant sub-clan50. Despite this, and due to the support and approval from junior and senior Taliban militants, Mullah Nazir had a firm grip on the western or Waziri portion of South Waziristan by the dawn of 2007. As such, he implemented draconian and primitive Shariah law observance upon the populace, with himself acting as a senior judge51.

Acquiescence to the Uzbek presence in the FATA was replaced with disdain for the foreigners. While the Uzbeks remained aligned with Haji Omar Khan, Mullah Nazir took advantage of the popular sentiment against the Central Asians52. Throughout their time in South Waziristan, the Uzbeks reportedly participated in over 200 assassinations of government affiliated clerics and tribal elders, as well as spies53.

Resistance to the killings and disgust with Uzbek manipulation and financial benefit, developed into action. During a March 6 incident, Uzbeks attempted another assassination in Azam Warsak, and failed, resulting in twelve deceased Central Asians and seven locals54. The real catalyst for hostilities occurred a week later on March 13, when Uzbeks intercepted a Saudi known as Saif al-Asad (or Sheikh Asadullah), a hitherto unknown figure who supposedly replaced Ahmed Said al-Khadr as the primary Arab liaison with tribal affiliates and militias55. He was conveying funds to a widow of another foreign element in South Waziristan when he was halted and subsequently executed. His fellow traveler, a militant belonging to Mullah Nazir’s faction spread the story56. Rapidly the situation devolved into chaos.

In response Mullah Nazir issued an ultimatum to Yuldashev and the IMU to disarm and depart57. Within days, Nazir and his men killed 42 Uzbeks and apprehended another 2758. As early as March 22, reports emerged declaring that Nazir was receiving direct assistance from the Pakistani military in the attempted purge of the Uzbeks59. From a tribal sense, Nazir was joined by two primary lieutenants, Malik Abdulhanan, known as Haji Hanan, and Maulvi Mohamed Iqbal60. Prior to intervention from Baitullah Mahsud in April, which resulted in a ceasefire, Mullah Nazir and his men managed to slay at least 250 Uzbek combatants and expel the remainder from Wana61. In fact, reports stated that Baitullah was diverted from operating in Helmand province, Afghanistan, and was deployed by Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah in order to bring various hostilities to cessation62. This demonstrated obvious interoperability between the Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani analogues.

An estimated 2,000 of the nuisance Central Asians were displaced, but at the urging of Siraj Haqqani, were awarded refuge by Baitullah within his Mahsud domain in South Waziristan63. Inherently, this strained the relationship between Mullah Nazir and Baitullah, but there were other rivals to contend with at that moment, namely the Wana Five, with whom he had directly crossed swords during the skirmishes. Haji Sharif and Haji Omar Khan appeared to flee with the Uzbeks and settled in Miranshah as a component of Baitullah’s organization. Yet by September, conflict over continued Uzbek hostilities in the south drove Haji Sharif to return to Mullah Nazir and reposition to Wana, while Haji Omar remained in the north64. Their brother Noor Islam, also exiled from Wana, prepared alongside Baitullah for future engagements against Mullah Nazir65. Maulvi Abbas, cousin to these commanders, endured the same fate of being driven away from his home and into the ranks of the Mahsud militants66.

Disagreements on personnel and foreign influence aside, Mullah Nazir also differed from Baitullah and the Afghan Taliban on tactics. These sentiments were displayed later during June, as Mullah Nazir reacted with dismay at the Taliban utilization of children as suicide bombers, and implored senior militants to cease the practice. He was promptly ignored67.

Strain in North Waziristan

In North Waziristan, the September 2006 peace accord held fast for several months. It was strained on January 22, 2007, when a suicide bomber intercepted the first vehicle of a Pakistani military convoy at the Khajori checkpoint just east of Mir Ali68. The resulting detonation of the assailant’s own vehicle killed three paramilitary forces, one military member, and one female civilian in an adjacent car. Local militant commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Sadiq Noor rushed to convene a militant council and deny responsibility for the act69. Foreign elements were deemed as culpable due to their influence in Mir Ali70, although Baitullah Mahsud had of course recently promised to respond to the Zamazola airstrike. Baitullah was not only eventually viewed as responsible for the attack, but had established an outpost in Danda Darpa Khel71. Nonetheless, the foreigners were estimated more likely to imperil the peace accord.

For example, Abu Okasha al-Iraqi, having declared his intention to depart the FATA altogether in November 2006, instead continued to dwell in Wana. The open combat between Mullah Nazir and the IMU compelled Abu Okasha to again displace and return to his original homestead near Mir Ali, North Waziristan72. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was subsequently troubled by the recently arrived Abu Okasha in March73. As Hafiz Gul Bahadur began a campaign to extract tinted windows from vehicles, in an effort to suppress criminal element activity stemming from such automobiles in North Waziristan, the militants around Abu Okasha in Mir Ali aggressively disagreed74. This action was a direct response to the January 22 suicide bombing75, and was representative of Hafiz Gul Bahadur acting upon governmental desires. In Miranshah, Taliban forces rallied to Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the two commanders, local versus Arab, took elevated positions and faced one another in near battle. However, Baitullah Mahsud interjected by March 11 and prevented any unnecessary violence76. At least one source assesses that Uzbeks loyal to Najimuddin Jalolov of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and dependent upon the Haqqani Network, constituted some of the foreign aggressors, striking a startling parallel to the happenings of South Waziristan77. However, the true collapse of ostensible peace in the agency was still to come.

Bajaur and Swat

Despite instability caused by the disastrous Chenagai airstrike in October 2006, the Pakistani government managed to achieve a separate peace accord in Bajaur during March 2007, essentially capitulating to militants under Maulvi Faqir Mohamed78. A reinvigorated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM) was not keen to actually abide by the requirements. The TNSM, as an extremist religious organization, was founded by Afghan jihad veteran and political operative Sufi Mohamed bin Hassan Mahmud in 198979.

His persistent and raucous attempts to drag Malakand, Swat, and Chitral districts under Shariah law in the mid-1990s were met with tepid responses from the Pakistani government, perhaps emboldening Sufi Mohamed80. An eventual bungled counter resulted in violence, fatalities, and the acquiescence to the implementation of many draconian measures in the region. The Pakistani government mostly disregarded Sufi Mohamed and his movement, but allowed him the freedom to operate, while expecting his influence to dissipate.

After 9/11, the TNSM actively recruited from among the easily manipulated populace for fighters to send to Afghanistan for the defense of the Taliban81. Sufi Mohamed took at least 8,000 such inadequate combatants across the border, only for the force to be obliterated by the American invasion. Upon defeat and retreat into Pakistan, Sufi Mohamed and his dramatically reduced followers were captured by displeased Pakistani forces. In January 2002, the TNSM was outlawed, and in April Sufi Mohamed was sentenced to seven years incarceration82. His son-in-law, known as Mullah Fazlullah, also survived the Afghan sojourn and was arrested upon his return. Yet he was released from a prison in Dera Ismail Khan only for his radical fervor to be unleashed upon the local populace83. He held more expertise in agriculture than in formal religious study, but as an adherent of Sufi Mohamed, he used his own charisma and oration skills to maintain the TNSM and propagate his religious authority across his home district of Swat84.

From 2004-2005 forward Mullah Fazlullah produced and transmitted an illegal radio show, earning him the moniker of Mullah FM or Radio Mullah85. From his illegal broadcasts, Fazlullah offered rants against American and European culture, and disparaged polio vaccination campaigns. He intervened in political proceedings, demanded that the people come to him for judgements, intimidated rivals, and frightened the population into obedience86. In March 2007 a police operation intended to apprehend him was cancelled after a multitude of armed followers came to his aid and discouraged the authorities from continuing. He utilized his subsequent Friday edition to denounce the police and threaten them with violence if they were to attempt another arrest87. His thousands of listeners transformed the region into an enclave of radical Islamist culture, suppressing women’s rights and education, and enticing them to sell their possessions in order to donate to his cause. The men grew beards and abandoned certain forms of technology and convenience, ironically even those of mass communication88.

Eventually, Mullah Fazlullah signed his own Swat version of a peace accord with the government, which authorized his radio broadcast, but required him to dismantle militant infrastructure and allow for polio vaccinations89. This was separate from what his comrade Maulvi Faqir Mohamed agreed to in Bajaur. A native of Bajaur, from his early 20s in 1993, Faqir Mohamed was a disciple of Sufi Mohamed and his TNSM. Later he fought on the Bagram frontline in Afghanistan, and became enmeshed with Arabs across the border from Bajaur in Kunar90. As previously described, he was a notable ally and host to al-Qaida after the invasion once he was re-established in Bajaur.

Lal Masjid Siege and Militant Responses

The true turning point for militancy in Pakistan was the government’s ill-fated adventure with the radicals of the Lal Masjid mosque (known as the Red Mosque) in Islamabad. Championed by brothers Abdulrashid and Abdulaziz Ghazi, the zealous students of the compound took to the streets of Islamabad in earnest, intent on restructuring the city’s culture by implementing severe Shariah law and radical Islamic observances. They conducted a campaign of intimidation, abductions, the occupation of a children’s library, and the establishment of a strict Shariah court91. In doing so they taunted the government, which was seemingly hesitant to appropriately respond. While the students were ostensibly taking up the cause of preventing the demolition of illegally constructed mosques in the capital, they forced President Musharraf into action in June when they abducted Chinese citizens accused of prostitution92. All were immediately released, but Musharraf and government forces were compelled to respond. By July 3, 2007, the situation devolved into lethal battle between the students and Pakistani forces resulting in an impasse and standoff. Abdulaziz was subsequently apprehended while cowardly disguised in a burka attempting to escape the compound. Abdulrashid and his most staunch followers took armed positions on the mosque grounds. With American support, the Pakistanis conducted Operation Silence on July 10-11, which constituted a brutal raid to take the compound and dislodge the occupants93. An initial government figure counted 91 militants and civilians killed inside the mosque, along with 10 of the military raiders94. Abdulrashid was killed in a hail of gunfire, but not before gaining sympathy by calling to major news outlets before the final assault95.

The moment was monumental for the tribal Pashtun militants of the FATA and elsewhere in the North West Frontier Province. All semblance of Baitullah’s peace accord disintegrated, and the jihadist response caused much carnage in the FATA. In Swat, even during the midst of the standoff, Mullah Fazlullah utilized his radio transmission to implore his followers into operations against the government, to include suicide bombings96. Researchers tallied at least 20 suicide assaults within Pakistan from July 12 to the end of August (of those, eight in the FATA, nine elsewhere in the NWFP, two in Islamabad, and one in Baluchistan)97. Beginning on July 12, two suicide assailants targeted a police vehicle in vicinity of a bridge near Mingora, Swat, slaying three officers98. Like the Mingora attack, ten of the others resulted in single digit fatalities, and one more with zero. Other instances in this period were regrettably notable. On July 14, a vehicle-borne suicide bomber impacted and devastated a military convoy north of Miranshah, on a route from Ramzak to Bannu, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers and signaling irreparable damage in the chances of maintaining peace in the agency99. The following day on July 15, a suicide bomber in Dera Ismail Khan entered a police recruiting facility, killing 28, to include twelve officers100. In Matta, Swat, on the same day, a Pakistani Army convoy was sandwiched by two suicide operatives in vehicles, resulting in 16 soldiers and five civilians slain101. Islamabad saw devastation as well. In a parking lot outside of a courthouse on July 17, a suicide attack was conducted against a crowd in vicinity of a stage awaiting a rally speech from Pakistan’s suspended chief judge102. Unexpectedly in the town of Parachinar in Kurram agency on August 4, a vehicle-borne suicide operative detonated amidst a crowded bus station, leaving ten civilians deceased103.

The idea of the February 2005 South Waziristan peace accord was already comical, but it was now rendered useless. Notably, Baitullah did not immediately remove himself from the agreement, and despite the ongoing series of assaults, it was also in July that Baitullah was able to remove his rival Abdullah Mahsud via supposed cooperation with the government. When the accord officially crumbled in August, journalists astutely noted that Baitullah had manipulated the peace in order to strengthen himself, his followers, and their arsenal104. Desperate authorities attempted to contradict the failing of the accord, but Zulfiqar Mahsud, a Baitullah stalwart, announced the collapse on August 18, claiming that the militants were compelled by Pakistani government actions and manuevers. He also admitted to an ambush two days prior in South Waziristan, in which eleven soldiers were slain105. Soon thereafter at the end of August, a 16-vehicle military convoy protecting food supplies and traversing the road between Wana and Ladha was subjected to an ambuscade106. The Baitullah lieutenant Zulfiqar led the assault, solidified his reputation, and acquired 260 captive Pakistani regular soldiers107. Failed attempts to negotiate and free the prisoners were followed in November by Pakistan trading 25 of Baitullah’s compatriots in exchange for 211 of the soldiers108.

With North Waziristan subjected to the bombing campaign, it only made sense their own specific agreement was also compromised. On July 15, the North Waziristan peace accord finally collapsed, with Hafiz Gul Bahadur announcing its dissolution due to the reappearance of Pakistani military checkpoints in the agency109. According to a North Waziristan spokesman, authorities were culpable in attacks and were not subsequently or adequately reimbursing tribal families for their losses110. The timing is suspicious in that the announcement occurred just days after the Lal Masjid incident, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur was obviously attempting to portray the failure as the fault of the Pakistani authorities, as opposed to a choice by the militants themselves.

Another, more visceral indication of the accord’s collapse, was the brazen acknowledgement of the bombing campaign by militant Abdulkhaliq Haqqani on July 21. Abdulkhaliq swore vengeance for the Lal Masjid victims, while denigrating President Musharraf and the Pakistani military111. His views and open hostility also perturbed Hafiz Gul Bahadur112. The FATA contained so many jihadists active in militancy, but there were others for whom the Lal Masjid event was a catalyst to rejoin violent action.

A pertinent example of such a dormant militant reactivating was observed in Ilyas Kashmiri, who was a notorious former Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HuJI) paramilitary official, formerly given command of the organization’s missions in Jammu and Kashmir. A Taliban loyalist, Kashmiri avoided governmental harassment and further detention in post-9/11 Pakistan, by transplanting to Ramzak, North Waziristan, and dwelling mostly in quiet circumstances113. However, the July incidents reinvigorated his fervor, resulting in his reappearance in the militant realm.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

In response to the unrest over the Lal Masjid raid and the encroachment of Pakistani authorities in the NWFP – [A], Baitullah Mahsud gained significant strength and standing. Ultimately, on December 14, 2007, he announced the coalescing of an umbrella Taliban network in the FATA known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP114. An unlikely entity, it comprised a 40-member shura council, but was strictly commanded by Baitullah. As deputies, representing other formerly independent but similarly aligned units, were Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Maulana Faqir Mohamed115. This clearly signaled the dissolution of Faqir Mohamed’s accord with the government also. Close associates of Baitullah, other Mahsud tribesmen, maintained vital functions of the network. For example, Waliur Rahman Mahsud, a respected local educator, controlled the finances, while Qari Hussain Mahsud, complete with a violent reputation, oversaw an impressive array of encampments in which he indoctrinated and prepared myriad suicide operatives116.

The TTP was much more than a South Waziristan or Mahsud tribal outfit, and championed militants hailing from each of the FATA agencies in addition to various other North West Frontier Province districts to include Swat, Malakand, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan117. North and South Waziristan and Bajaur were overseen by the triumvirate atop the TTP. Meanwhile, the agencies of Kurram, Khyber, and Orakzai fell under the command of a single Baitullah kinsman, known as Hakimullah Mahsud, assigned to direct the TTP in these three neglected regions118. Hakimullah was Baitullah’s former driver and bodyguard Zulfiqar, who had assumed the new alias in October during his brief stint as his superior’s spokesperson119. In Mohmand, Omar Khalid al-Khorasani, who boasted 3,000 combatants under his control, was appointed to helm the TTP presence within the agency120. He achieved this after gaining recognition in late July by overwhelming and occupying the Haji Sahib Turangzai shrine (dedicated to the Pashtun revolutionary of that name) in Mohmand along with dozens of militants and rebranding the compound’s mosque in retaliation for the Lal Masjid siege121. Omar Khalid, of Mohmand’s Safi tribe, was initially affiliated with the Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM), and fought for that outfit in Kashmir, before shifting focus to Afghanistan post-9/11122.

As a movement, the TTP demands were as predictable as they were stringent: a dismantling of all military checkpoints; the cessation of military maneuvers in both North Waziristan and Swat; the liberation of the surviving Lal Masjid imam Abdulaziz; offensive measures against the coalition in Afghanistan coupled with defensive measures against the Pakistanis; an avoidance of peace accords; and of course, the implementation of Shariah law123. Of vast importance was the fact that Baitullah maintained a vow of loyalty to Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Mohamed Omar124, nominally placing the new TTP within the broader Taliban movement, despite their unapproved focus on conflict with Pakistani authorities.

Even with seemingly irreparable differences, exemplified by the founding ideals of the TTP, Hafiz Gul Bahadur maintained a positive relationship with the Pakistanis, including the supposed resurrection of a peace accord in North Waziristan, established on December 18125. The nature of such an agreement is blatantly contradictory with Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s tenuous inclusion with the TTP. It may simply have represented the desire and attempt to prevent North Waziristan from incurring the further wrath of either the government or Baitullah Mahsud. Restricting the impending conflict to the south may have been the motivation.

The reality, however, was that the militants were determined to continue reaching into Pakistan. As such, on December 21, a young worshipper in the first lines of adherents in a mosque within the palatial home of Aftab Sherpao began to sing126. This day, Eid al-Adha, was being observed by upwards of a thousand guests in the Sherpao residence, in the identically named village, near Peshawar in the NWFP127. When the young man detonated his vest containing nails, ball bearings, and approximately 7 kg of explosives, at least 55 were killed, including worshippers and guards128. Sherpao himself was spared, even though the bomber was in his vicinity, although his son and dozens of others were injured129. Sherpao was no longer the Pakistani Interior Minister, having lost that occupation with the dissolution of the Musharraf government. He was now heading the political party of Benazir Bhutto, the returning former prime minister, whose aspirations saw her contesting for leadership yet again. She too, remained in the crosshairs of the militants, including the newly established TTP.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] A late 2007 Pakistani foray into Swat, designed to diminish the threat posed by Mullah Fazlullah, will be discussed at length in the Series: Predators of Khorasan, along with 2008 Pakistani military maneuvers. Here though, it is vital to note that the devolving situation in Swat directly influenced the unification of local jihadists.
  1. The Pakistani Taliban Org Chart, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, January 9, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the_pakistani_taliba.php ↩︎
  2. Taleban in Pakistan commend dead, by M Ilyas Khan, BBC News, January 12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6255345.stm ↩︎
  3. ‘Those killed were innocent woodcutters,’ Gulf News, January 20, 2007, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/those-killed-were-innocent-woodcutters-1.155827 ↩︎
  4. Pakistan Taleban Vow More Violence, BBC News, January 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6292061.stm ↩︎
  5. Pakistan Taleban Vow More Violence, BBC News, January 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6292061.stm ↩︎
  6. Guard killed in Pakistani hotel suicide bombing, ABC News via AFP/Reuters, January 26, 2007, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-01-26/guard-killed-in-pakistani-hotel-suicide-bombing/2180676 ↩︎
  7. ‘Taliban behind suicide attacks;’ Marriot bomber’s sketch released, Dawn, February 1, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/230753/ ↩︎
  8. ‘Three killed’ in Pakistan blast, BBC News, January 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6309965.stm ↩︎
  9. Baitullah Pledges to Abide by Peace Deal, by Zulfiqar Ali, Dawn, March 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/235823/baitullah-pledges-to-abide-by-peace-deal ↩︎
  10. Suicide Bombing at Islamabad Airport, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, February 6, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/02/suicide_bombing_at_i.php ↩︎
  11. Baitullah Pledges to Abide by Peace Deal, by Zulfiqar Ali, Dawn, March 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/235823/baitullah-pledges-to-abide-by-peace-deal ↩︎
  12. Militants wreak havoc in Tank: Army called in to enforce govt’s writ, Dawn, March 29, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/239866/militants-wreak-havoc-in-tank-army-called-in-to-enforce-govt-s-writ ↩︎
  13. Militants wreak havoc in Tank: Army called in to enforce govt’s writ, Dawn, March 29, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/239866/militants-wreak-havoc-in-tank-army-called-in-to-enforce-govt-s-writ ↩︎
  14. Top Pakistani cleric killed in suicide bombing, NBC News, July 14, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna13856757 // Qaeda-LJ link in terror attacks, by Abbas Naqvi, The Daily Times, January 1, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\01\story_1-1-2007_pg1_1 via https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1761584/posts?page=19 ↩︎
  15. Mehsud Behind Attack: Sherpao, Dawn, April 30, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244781/mehsud-behind-attack-sherpao ↩︎
  16. Mehsud Behind Attack: Sherpao, Dawn, April 30, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244781/mehsud-behind-attack-sherpao ↩︎
  17. Charsadda Blast Toll Rise To 31, Dawn, April 30, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/244792/charsadda-blast-toll-rises-to-31 ↩︎
  18. Pakistani Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Killed During Raid, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, July 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistani_taliban_co.php ↩︎
  19. Pakistani Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Killed During Raid, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, July 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistani_taliban_co.php ↩︎
  20. Senior Taliban militant kills himself during police raid, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, July 24, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24iht-24stan.6801698.html ↩︎
  21. Senior Taliban militant kills himself during police raid, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, July 24, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24iht-24stan.6801698.html ↩︎
  22. Pakistani Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Killed During Raid, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, July 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistani_taliban_co.php ↩︎
  23. Pakistani Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Killed During Raid, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, July 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistani_taliban_co.php ↩︎
  24. Pakistani Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Killed During Raid, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, July 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistani_taliban_co.php // Senior Taliban militant kills himself during police raid, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, July 24, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/asia/24iht-24stan.6801698.html ↩︎
  25. Guantanamo Assessment File, Said Mohamed Alam Shah, ISN 92, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/92.html ↩︎
  26. Mehsuds watch bid to isolate Baitullah from the fence, Dawn, June 16, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/959200/mehsuds-watch-bid-to-isolate-baitullah-from-the-fence ↩︎
  27. Double games don’t work in Pakistan, by Hamid Mir, Rediff, June 22, 2009, https://news.rediff.com/column/2009/jun/22/hamid-mir-double-games-dont-work-in-pakistan.htm ↩︎
  28. The Significance of Qari Zain’s Assassination in Pakistan, by Rahimullah Yusufzai, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 7, June 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-significance-of-qari-zains-assassination-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  29. Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, by David Witter, The Institute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/uzbek-militancy-pakistans-tribal-region ↩︎
  30. Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, by David Witter, The Institute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/uzbek-militancy-pakistans-tribal-region // The Game is Up for Uzbeks, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, April 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/240842/the-game-is-up-for-uzbeks ↩︎
  31. Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, by David Witter, The Institute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/uzbek-militancy-pakistans-tribal-region ↩︎
  32. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  33. Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, by David Witter, The Institute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/uzbek-militancy-pakistans-tribal-region ↩︎
  34. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  35. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  36. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  37. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  38. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  39. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  40. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  41. Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, by David Witter, The Institute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/uzbek-militancy-pakistans-tribal-region ↩︎
  42. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  43. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  44. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  45. Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, by David Witter, The Institute for the Study of War, January 27, 2011, https://www.understandingwar.org/report/uzbek-militancy-pakistans-tribal-region ↩︎
  46. The Game is Up for Uzbeks, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, April 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/240842/the-game-is-up-for-uzbeks ↩︎
  47. The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban, by Rahimullah Yusufzai, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor Volume 6, Issue 3, February 11, 2008, https://jamestown.org/the-impact-of-pashtun-tribal-differences-on-the-pakistani-taliban/ ↩︎
  48. The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban, by Rahimullah Yusufzai, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor Volume 6, Issue 3, February 11, 2008, https://jamestown.org/the-impact-of-pashtun-tribal-differences-on-the-pakistani-taliban/ ↩︎
  49. Accusations that Yuldashev killed 200 Pashtuns – Pakistan’s tribals – who is killing who?, by M Ilyas Khan, BBC News, April 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6529147.stm ↩︎
  50. Accusations that Yuldashev killed 200 Pashtuns – Pakistan’s tribals – who is killing who?, by M Ilyas Khan, BBC News, April 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6529147.stm ↩︎
  51. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  52. The Game is Up for Uzbeks, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, April 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/240842/the-game-is-up-for-uzbeks ↩︎
  53. The Game is Up for Uzbeks, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, April 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/240842/the-game-is-up-for-uzbeks ↩︎
  54. Accusations that Yuldashev killed 200 Pashtuns – Pakistan’s tribals – who is killing who?, by M Ilyas Khan, BBC News, April 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6529147.stm ↩︎
  55. The Game is Up for Uzbeks, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, April 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/240842/the-game-is-up-for-uzbeks ↩︎
  56. The Game is Up for Uzbeks, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, April 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/240842/the-game-is-up-for-uzbeks ↩︎
  57. Central Asia: Has IMU Reached The End Of The Line?, by Daniel Kimmage, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 30, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1075600.html ↩︎
  58. 42 Uzbeks Among 58 dead: Fierce Clashes in S. Waziristan, Dawn, March 21, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/238481/42-uzbeks-among-58-dead-fierce-clashes-in-s-waziristan ↩︎
  59. Central Asia: Has IMU Reached The End Of The Line?, by Daniel Kimmage, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 30, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1075600.html ↩︎
  60. A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part One – North and South Waziristan, by Rahimullah Yusufzai, Jamestown Foundation Terrorisim Monitor Volume 6, Issue 18, September 22, 2008, https://jamestown.org/a-whos-who-of-the-insurgency-in-pakistans-north-west-frontier-province-part-one-north-and-south-waziristan/ // The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban, by Rahimullah Yusufzai, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor Volume 6, Issue 3, February 11, 2008, https://jamestown.org/the-impact-of-pashtun-tribal-differences-on-the-pakistani-taliban/ ↩︎
  61. Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, by Chris Harnisch, Critical Threats, July 17, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad ↩︎
  62. Warizistan Jihadi wage war on each other, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, The Asia Times, March 13, 2007 ↩︎
  63. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, OUP USA, 2013 ↩︎
  64. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, OUP USA, 2013 ↩︎
  65. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, OUP USA, 2013 ↩︎
  66. Blast in Wana Kills Militant Commander, three others, by Zahir Shah Sherazi, Dawn, December 21, 2012, https://www.dawn.com/news/772938/blast-in-wana-kills-militant-commander-three-others ↩︎
  67. Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007), September 1, 2007, United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf ↩︎
  68. Suicide Bomber Kills Five in N. Waziristan, Dawn, January 23, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/229369/suicide-bomber-kills-five-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  69. Suicide Bomber Kills Five in N. Waziristan, Dawn, January 23, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/229369/suicide-bomber-kills-five-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  70. Suicide Bomber Kills Five in N. Waziristan, Dawn, January 23, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/229369/suicide-bomber-kills-five-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  71. Baitullah Pledges to Abide by Peace Deal, by Zulfiqar Ali, Dawn, March 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/235823/baitullah-pledges-to-abide-by-peace-deal // Suicide Bomber Kills Five in N. Waziristan, Dawn, January 23, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/229369/suicide-bomber-kills-five-in-n-waziristan ↩︎
  72. Abu Okash al-Iraqi: AQ’s Arab Broker in North Waziristan, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 10, October 29, 2010, https://jamestown.org/abu-okash-al-iraqi-aqs-arab-broker-in-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  73. Abu Okash al-Iraqi: AQ’s Arab Broker in North Waziristan, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 10, October 29, 2010, https://jamestown.org/abu-okash-al-iraqi-aqs-arab-broker-in-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  74. Abu Okash al-Iraqi: AQ’s Arab Broker in North Waziristan, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 10, October 29, 2010, https://jamestown.org/abu-okash-al-iraqi-aqs-arab-broker-in-north-waziristan/ // Clash Between Taliban, Foreign Militants Averted, Dawn, March 11, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/236918/clash-between-taliban-foreign-militants-averted ↩︎
  75. Clash Between Taliban, Foreign Militants Averted, Dawn, March 11, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/236918/clash-between-taliban-foreign-militants-averted ↩︎
  76. Abu Okash al-Iraqi: AQ’s Arab Broker in North Waziristan, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 10, October 29, 2010, https://jamestown.org/abu-okash-al-iraqi-aqs-arab-broker-in-north-waziristan/ // Clash Between Taliban, Foreign Militants Averted, Dawn, March 11, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/236918/clash-between-taliban-foreign-militants-averted ↩︎
  77. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  78. Pakistan Signs The Bajaur Accord, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, March 17, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/pakistan_signs_the_b.php // Elders agree Afghan border pact, Al Jazeera, March 18, 2007, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/3/18/elders-agree-afghan-border-pact ↩︎
  79. The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The Rise of TNSM in Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 23, November 30, 2006, https://jamestown.org/the-black-turbaned-brigade-the-rise-of-tnsm-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  80. The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The Rise of TNSM in Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 23, November 30, 2006, https://jamestown.org/the-black-turbaned-brigade-the-rise-of-tnsm-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  81. Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, Mohamed Rafiq, ISN 495, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/495.html ↩︎
  82. The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The Rise of TNSM in Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 23, November 30, 2006, https://jamestown.org/the-black-turbaned-brigade-the-rise-of-tnsm-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  83. Revolt in Pakistan’s NWFP: A Profile of Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, by Afzal Khan, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, November 20, 2007, https://jamestown.org/brief/revolt-in-pakistans-nwfp-a-profile-of-maulana-fazlullah-of-swat/ ↩︎
  84. Revolt in Pakistan’s NWFP: A Profile of Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, by Afzal Khan, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, November 20, 2007, https://jamestown.org/brief/revolt-in-pakistans-nwfp-a-profile-of-maulana-fazlullah-of-swat/ ↩︎
  85. The FM Mullahs and the Taliban’s Propaganda War in Pakistan, by Mukhtar A Khan, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 14, May 26, 2009, https://jamestown.org/the-fm-mullahs-and-the-talibans-propaganda-war-in-pakistan/ // Revolt in Pakistan’s NWFP: A Profile of Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, by Afzal Khan, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, November 20, 2007, https://jamestown.org/brief/revolt-in-pakistans-nwfp-a-profile-of-maulana-fazlullah-of-swat/ ↩︎
  86. Imam Warns Police Against his Arrest; FIR registered, Dawn, March 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/235740/imam-warns-police-against-his-arrest-fir-registered // The FM Mullahs and the Taliban’s Propaganda War in Pakistan, by Mukhtar A Khan, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 14, May 26, 2009, https://jamestown.org/the-fm-mullahs-and-the-talibans-propaganda-war-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  87. Imam Warns Police Against his Arrest; FIR registered, Dawn, March 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/235740/imam-warns-police-against-his-arrest-fir-registered ↩︎
  88. Revolt in Pakistan’s NWFP: A Profile of Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, by Afzal Khan, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, November 20, 2007, https://jamestown.org/brief/revolt-in-pakistans-nwfp-a-profile-of-maulana-fazlullah-of-swat/ // Imam Warns Police Against his Arrest; FIR registered, Dawn, March 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/235740/imam-warns-police-against-his-arrest-fir-registered ↩︎
  89. Swat Joins Talibanistan, by Bill Roggio, July 7, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/swat_joins_talibanis.php ↩︎
  90. Al-Zawahiri’s Pakistani Ally: Profile of Maulana Faqir Mohammed, by Sohail Abdul Nasir, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 3, February 9, 2006, https://jamestown.org/al-zawahiris-pakistani-ally-profile-of-maulana-faqir-mohammed/ ↩︎
  91. A Chronology of the Lal Masjid Standoff, Dawn, July 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/254702/a-chronology-of-the-lal-masjid-standoff ↩︎
  92. A Chronology of the Lal Masjid Standoff, Dawn, July 4, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/254702/a-chronology-of-the-lal-masjid-standoff ↩︎
  93. Siege of Pakistan’s Lal Masjid ends, Al Jazeera, July 11, 2007, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/7/11/siege-of-pakistans-lal-masjid-ends ↩︎
  94. Lal Masjid women, children also killed; G-6 curfew to be lifted today, by Syed Irfan Raza, Dawn, July 13, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/256342/lal-masjid-women-children-also-killed-g-6-curfew-to-be-lifted-today ↩︎
  95. Red Mosque siege declared over, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 11, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/11/pakistan.declanwalsh ↩︎
  96. Swat Attack Leaves Two Policemen, 4 Others Dead, Dawn, July 5, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/254906/swat-attacks-leave-two-policemen-4-others-dead ↩︎
  97. Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero, Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, Reaktion Books, 2011 ↩︎
  98. PESHAWAR: 160 killed in 21 suicide bombings in Swat, Dawn, January 25, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/971358/peshawar-160-killed-in-21-suicide-bombings-in-swat ↩︎
  99. 24 Troops Die in Pakistan Suicide Attack, NPR via The Associated Press, July 14, 2007, https://www.npr.org/2007/07/14/11981926/24-troops-die-in-pakistan-suicide-attack // 24 Pak soldiers killed in suicide attack, by KJM Varma, Rediff, July 14, 2007, https://m.rediff.com/news/report/pak/20070714.htm ↩︎
  100. Suicide attacks on forces intensify; 49 killed, by Hameedullah Khan and Irfan Mughal, Dawn, July 16, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/256624/suicide-attacks-on-forces-intensify-49-dead-by-hameedullah-khan-irfan-mughal ↩︎
  101. Suicide attacks on forces intensify; 49 killed, by Hameedullah Khan and Irfan Mughal, Dawn, July 16, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/256624/suicide-attacks-on-forces-intensify-49-dead-by-hameedullah-khan-irfan-mughal ↩︎
  102. Suicide bomber kills 13 at rally for Pakistan judge, by Zeeshan Haider, Reuters, July 17, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/suicide-bomber-kills-13-at-rally-for-pakistan-judge-idUSL17830131/ ↩︎
  103. Car Bomb In NW Pakistan Kills 10, CBS News via The Associated Press, August 4, 2007, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/car-bomb-in-nw-pakistan-kills-10/ ↩︎
  104. Baitullah Mehsud: Who is he?, by Qurat ul Ain Siddiqui, Dawn, March 31, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/453867/baitullah-mehsud-who-is-he // Baitullah Mehsud – The Taliban’s New Leader in Pakistan, by Imtiaz Ali, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, January 9, 2008, https://jamestown.org/baitullah-mehsud-the-talibans-new-leader-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  105. Baitullah calls off S. Waziristan deal: Govt claims accord is intact, Dawn, August 19, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/261972/baitullah-calls-off-s-waziristan-deal-govt-claims-accord-is-intact ↩︎
  106. Pakistani Soldiers Ambushed, Kidnapped In Tribal Region, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 30, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1078438.html // Pakistani soldiers ‘to be released’, Al Jazeera, August 31, 2007, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/8/31/pakistani-soldiers-to-be-released ↩︎
  107. Pakistan Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud is alive, says spy agency, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, April 28, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/28/hakimullah-mehsud-survives-cia-drone // Profile: Hakimullah Mehsud, by Syed Shoaib Hasan, BBC News, May 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8219223.stm // Deal to free 260 Pakistani troops goes sour, NBC News via The Associated Press, September 10, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna20697743 ↩︎
  108. Deal to free 260 Pakistani troops goes sour, NBC News via The Associated Press, September 10, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna20697743 // Pakistani troops freed by tribe, Al Jazeera, November 4, 2007, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/11/4/pakistani-troops-freed-by-tribe ↩︎
  109. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  110. Pakistani Militants Tear Up Truce, Launch Attacks, NPR via The Associated Press, July 16, 2007, https://www.npr.org/2007/07/16/11993848/pakistani-militants-tear-up-truce-launch-attacks ↩︎
  111. Militans Own Up to Attacks, Dawn, July 22, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/257592/militants-own-up-to-attacks ↩︎
  112. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  113. Al-Qa`ida’s Key Operative: A Profile of Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri, by Seth Nye, CTC Sentinel, Volume 3, Issue 9, September 2010, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-qaidas-key-operative-a-profile-of-mohammed-ilyas-kashmiri/ ↩︎
  114. Pakistani Taliban Unites Under Baitullah Mehsud, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, December 15, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/pakistani_taliban_un.php // A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan/ ↩︎
  115. A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan/ ↩︎
  116. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, OUP USA, 2013 ↩︎
  117. A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan/ ↩︎
  118. Pakistan’s Challenges in Orakzai Agency, by Tayyab Ali Shah, CTC Sentinel, Volume 3, Issue 7, July 2010, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/pakistans-challenges-in-orakzai-agency/ ↩︎
  119. Profile: Hakimullah Mehsud, by Syed Shoaib Hasan, BBC News, May 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8219223.stm ↩︎
  120. From Foot Soldier to Terrorist Mastermind: Pakistani Taliban Leader Omar Khalid Khorasani, by Abubakar Siddique, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 2, March 5, 2014, https://jamestown.org/from-foot-soldier-to-terrorist-mastermind-pakistani-taliban-leader-omar-khalid-khorasani/ // The Emerging Militancy in Pakistan’s Mohmand Agency, by Imtiaz Ali, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 2, January 25, 2008, https://jamestown.org/the-emerging-militancy-in-pakistans-mohmand-agency/ ↩︎
  121. PESHAWAR: ‘Taliban’ asked to vacate Turangzai’s Shrine, Dawn, August 1, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/259069/peshawar-taliban-asked-to-vacate-turangzai-s-shrine // Taliban’s Mohmand Chief Killed, by Fauzee Khan Mohmand, Dawn, January 22, 2009, https://www.dawn.com/news/339870/taliban-s-mohmand-chief-killed ↩︎
  122. The Emerging Militancy in Pakistan’s Mohmand Agency, by Imtiaz Ali, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 2, January 25, 2008, https://jamestown.org/the-emerging-militancy-in-pakistans-mohmand-agency/ ↩︎
  123. A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, by Hassan Abbas, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-profile-of-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan/ ↩︎
  124. Baitullah Mehsud – The Taliban’s New Leader in Pakistan, by Imtiaz Ali, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, January 9, 2008, https://jamestown.org/baitullah-mehsud-the-talibans-new-leader-in-pakistan/ ↩︎
  125. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  126. Pakistan suicide bomber kills 55 at mosque, by Randeep Ramesh, The Guardian, December 21, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/21/pakistan // Pakistan suicide blast ‘kills 50’, BBC News, December 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7155161.stm ↩︎
  127. Pakistan suicide blast ‘kills 50’, BBC News, December 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7155161.stm // Pakistan suicide bomber kills 55 at mosque, by Randeep Ramesh, The Guardian, December 21, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/21/pakistan ↩︎
  128. Pakistan suicide blast ‘kills 50’, BBC News, December 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7155161.stm // Pakistan suicide bomber kills 55 at mosque, by Randeep Ramesh, The Guardian, December 21, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/21/pakistan ↩︎
  129. Pakistan suicide bomber kills 55 at mosque, by Randeep Ramesh, The Guardian, December 21, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/21/pakistan ↩︎

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