SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Dismay In The London Underground

Written by Nolan R Beasley

In the years after 9/11, al-Qaida repeatedly failed to emulate the “success” of their previous operations and strikes. The obvious loss of their camp infrastructure was compounded by Khalid Sheikh Mohamed’s unrealistic and wasteful approach to missions. Attacks were restricted to regional influence, with post-9/11 strikes only successful via third party entities or in nations with an established militant presence. Thus, operations in Western cities were essentially untenable. Striving against this reality, Hamza Rabia sought to again bring devastation into Europe and abroad.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Henchmen of Hamza Rabia

Europe was not immune to terrorist actions during this time, and was on edge after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. An independent network of jihadists based in Spain, related to Tunisian and Libyan separatists, an erstwhile al-Qaida unit, and criminal elements, converged to attack Madrid’s mass transit system in March 2004, in response to the nation’s participation in the Iraq war. The ease with which the terrorists brought catastrophe to the transit system was startling. Hamza Rabia was subsequently introduced to the concept via a Moroccan aide named Amir al-Azizi. Known as Abu Jafar al-Maghrebi, he was named as Hamza Rabia’s deputy in External Operations1.  Azizi was connected to the previous al-Qaida cell in Spain, and even recruited several of the Madrid bombing cell into the broader Spanish jihadist community before departing for the Khorasan2.

Amir al-Azizi

Owing to the attention gained from and results of the Madrid bombings, the possibility of striking soft-targets in the form of mass transit was an alluring prospect for Hamza Rabia3.  Hamza Rabia delegated responsibility and coordination of the plot to Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, another developing subordinate in terroristic endeavors. Abu Ubaidah was trusted by al-Qaida and also known as Sheikh Abdulhamid4.  He hailed from the Sharqia governorate of Egypt, though some reports claim he held Sudanese nationality5.  After a 2001 role in the defense of Kabul and subsequent retreat, Abu Ubaidah was dispatched to command al-Qaida military forces in Kunar province6.  Kunar later became one of the most restive and violent locations in the entirety of Afghanistan.  Having a reliable and respected commander in a province as such, was vital for the organization.  The actual identity of Abu Ubaidah is unknown, with the sole reference of Sheikh Abdulhamid7 suggesting a potential given name or just another alias.  Through his life Abu Ubaidah had the fortune of dwelling in both Britain and Germany, familiarizing himself with Western culture8.  In his youth, he commenced a vaunted militant career, by first waging jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.  Following this campaign, and the ousting of Arab militants from Pakistan by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto9, he fought in Bosnia and then on to Chechnya in the early to mid-1990s.   In 1995 he made his way to Germany, living in Munich and requesting asylum.  He lived in Germany, becoming fluent in the language, for the next four years.  Although the asylum was refused, he was able to network with fellow militants and jihadists, including Mohamed Abbatay, a computer science student in Germany of Moroccan descent, who later became Dr. Zawahiri’s son in law and the al-Qaida lieutenant known as Abu Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi.  Described as stocky and muscular, he was to be imprisoned until deportation, but avoided this fate, traveling back to the Khorasan region in 199910.  Therein, he became a camp instructor at al-Faruq11.  He was also said to have been involved in guesthouses for the trainees during this time period12, and also described as having a proclivity for interest in using non-conventional weapons for the furtherance of his religious causes13.  It was this position that gave him enough status to run the defenses of the front lines around Bagram Airfield north of Kabul during the American invasion, as a senior commander in Brigade 5514.  In fact, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi allowed Abu Ubaidah to control the inner perimeter protecting Kabul, while he himself controlled the outer, thus displaying the trust al-Qaida had in the Egyptian militarily15.  From Bagram, he led a retreat around Kabul and to the positions of Tora Bora16.  After the initial series of battles, he settled into his role in Kunar, and became known to American forces17.  Yet after the arrest of KSM and the ascension of Hamza Rabia to External operations chief, the Egyptian appears to have been recruited for operational responsibilities18.  It seems that Abu Ubaidah’s skill in languages and Western culture was of more importance now than his military acumen.  He then interacted and worked closely with Hamza Rabia and Abu Faraj al-Libi19.  More importantly he was now leading an operation that yet again would sow destruction in the West. 

Rashid Rauf

To act as a handler for and oversight of the selected operatives, Abu Ubaidah employed Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Kashmiri heritage.  Rauf, born in 1981 in Pakistan, immigrated with his family to England, and spent his developmental years in Birmingham among a strong community of Kashmiri activists.  In fact, Rauf’s family was heavily involved in Islamic law, community activism and politics, and in the cause of assisting the plight of those in Kashmir.  Rauf was exposed to radical elements early on, even in his high school, but appears to have had a relatively normal upbringing in England.  Interestingly, he was exposed to the traveling oration of Masud Azhar, a prominent official in the Pakistani militant organization Harakat ul-Ansar (HuA) in the 1990s, and eventual founder of the Jaish e Mohamed group20. Nonetheless, Rauf eventually enrolled at an English University, but never successfully completed studies, as in April 2002, he and a friend departed for Pakistan21.  While this in itself is not abnormal, Rauf was implicated in the stabbing death of his uncle, perhaps related to local Islamist infighting, and was perhaps deeply affected by the 9/11 attacks22.  Through rapid marriage Rauf became connected with infamous Pakistani militants including the leadership of Jaish e Mohamed; connections seeded from the entourage of Masud Azhar interacting with Rauf’s family in Birmingham23.  From this networking in Pakistan, he met and then labored for militant Amjad Hussain Faruqi, eventually accompanying him on a mission to Afghanistan in 200224.  He was introduced to Abu Faraj al-Libi, and after Faruqi’s killing by Pakistani forces in 2004, became a contact between Abu Faraj and Pakistani militants.  Abu Faraj does not appear to have utilized Rauf to any great degree, but this can be easily explained.  While Abu Faraj al-Libi was involved to a degree with external operations, they were still not his primary focus.  That would still be Hamza Rabia.  For Abu Faraj, as mentioned, he already had contacts within Britain and had no need to bring Rauf into the fold early on.  Instead, he appears to have handed him off to the actual external operations division.  Thus, Rauf was placed in North Waziristan under the auspices of Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and master bombmaker Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah.

The plot itself revolved around backpack bombs containing hydrogen peroxide powder explosives, as developed by Atwah.  Developing the detonators and explosives, Atwah found the hydrogen peroxide method to be efficient, especially given that the materials needed to yield the final product were available in household goods, to include pool chemicals and cosmetic supplies25. Abu Ubaidah oversaw the plot for Hamza Rabia, while Rauf acted as the liaison between al-Qaida leadership and the team on the ground conducting the operation26.

The Willing Participants

Utilizing a variety of British contacts, some from a similar operation in 2004 which never materialized, Rauf came across two willing participants:  Mohamed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, both British citizens of Pakistani descent27.  Siddique Khan, who referred to himself as Sid, was born and raised in Leeds, eventually conducting university studies therein28. Married by 2001 and eventually a father, he labored as a school mentor, acknowledging an adolescence of his own that was fraught with drug-usage, theft, and frequent police interaction29. This pathway apparently led him towards a stronger faith, and unfortunately into fanaticism. Actually, by this point, his surreptitious militant misconduct was already well established. An obsession with the Kashmiri conflict drove him to collecting finances for the cause and finally to the ambition of achieving militant training in Pakistan30. With each venture to the Khorasan bringing him closer to al-Qaida’s core.

Siddique Khan attempted to fight on pre-9/11 Taliban frontline at Bagram against the Northern Alliance31.  Facilitated by the Pakistani militant outfit Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) from Islamabad to Mansehra in July 2001, Siddique Khan and his friend Waheed Ali were treated as special guests with a tent of their own, better meals, and a dedicated instructor, assuredly due to their status as Westerners. After training in the militant camp near Kashmir, learning weaponry during the summer, the two transferred to Afghanistan but were only permitted to remain encamped behind the lines, due to frequent illness and obvious greenness32. Allowed eventually to observe the lines a few times, Siddique Khan experienced a revelation. This was not to be his final venture into the theatre.

Mohamed Siddique Khan

He further trained at a militant camp in Malakand district, Pakistan in July 200333.  Khan’s sojourn was coordinated by British jihadist Mohamed Qayum Khan of Luton, a cabdriver known simply as Q34, who also linked him with developing jihadist Omar Khyam35. Khan utilized the alias “Ibrahim,” while his friend Mohamed Shakil traveled as “Zubair36.” Met by an underling of Q named Salahuddin Amin upon arrival37, they were ushered by an American, Mohamed Junaid Babar, from Islamabad to the site, where they strove to become efficient in RPGs and automatic weaponry38. Dedicated, the British trainees were shuttled in the back of a truck through the mountain roads and then trekked for hours to achieve the camp39. Also in attendance were Khyam, his brother, and friend from home Jawad Akbar40. They were joined by Pakistani-Canadian Mohamed Momin Khawaja, also utilized as a courier and supply transport41. Khyam facilitated another British accomplice known as Anthony Garcia, of Algerian descent, to the camp, despite the fact that he was initially deemed as too noticeable for the region42. Babar filmed a video of the trainees for jihadist propaganda in Britain43. The American also provided the trainees with explosive powders and chemicals during the four week camp experience, preparing them not just for potential combat in Afghanistan but for jihad in Britain as well44. Khan then joined the group touring militant encampments in both South and North Waziristan. While there he was ushered to Angor Adda, the Shakai valley, and finally the Shawal valley45. Most importantly on this sojourn, he conferred directly with Abdulhadi al-Iraqi and one of his paramilitary deputies, Abu Munthir al-Maghrebi46. The latter insinuated to the group that if they were “serious” concerning jihad, that they would turn their ire towards Britain and conduct operations therein47. Abdulhadi concurred and encouraged the unit to go through with the tasking but in a simultaneous nature, displaying again his own penchant for external operational affairs48.

The inclusion of Abu Munthir al-Maghrebi in this plot is fascinating. Allegedly, the militant assigned over operations in Paktika province had previously dwelled in Luton, interacting with potential British jihadists49. This in addition to the probability that he was in Spain at some point as well, based on his sometimes being referred to as Andalusi50. Khan’s departure to Peshawar meanwhile, was likely facilitated by Abu Ubaidah51.

Operation Crevice

Omar Khyam

When Omar Khyam returned to Britain, he helmed a bombing conspiracy that intended to sow obliteration through the UK via fertilizer bombs. After dispatching cell member Anthony Garcia to gather a disturbing 600kg of ammonium nitrate in November 2003, Khyam and his crew debated on targets, which included nightclubs, trains, synagogues, and pipelines, all as a response to British involvement in the war in Iraq52. Another conspirator, Waheed Mahmood, pinpointed the locations of gas pipelines that could be accessed for destruction53. He additionally recommended poisoning a food vendor stand and placing a bomb in a shopping mall during the busiest hours54. Momin Khawaja flew from Ottawa to London in February55, in order to share his method for a remote controlled detonator with Khyam56. Seemingly, the plot was moving along well, but UK authorities were fortunate to derail the jihadists, leaving their ambitions disrupted and dismantled by spring 2004. Known as Operation Crevice, the MI5 venture initially sought to investigate the network of Q in Luton57. Inadvertently they discovered and recorded Khyam speaking to associate Salahuddin Amin over the telephone in Pakistan, concerning the construction of a fertilizer based explosive device58. MI5 rushed to tap additional lines, surveil suspects, and find the rest of the network. Listening and recording devices were placed in the homes and vehicles of conspirators to include Khyam and one of his men, Jawad Akbar59. Captured on a recording, Akbar proposed gaining employment at London’s Ministry of Sound nightclub in order to plant an explosive, stating that no one there was innocent due to their perceived promiscuity60. Authorities eventually discovered the ammonium nitrate and the communications between cell members, often conducted via drafts in a shared email account61. MI5 tracked Khyam and his men thoroughly, yet disturbingly were unable to identify two mysterious individuals whom Khyam interacted with on four occasions in February and March 2004 prior to the collapse of his plot62. They were indeed Siddique Khan and Tanweer63. Investigators continued their attempts to identify the men, whom they monitored discussing a voyage to Pakistan64, but the efforts were lax as they were considered but peripheral characters in the Khyam network65.

Momin Khawaja
Anthony Garcia
Jawad Akbar
Waheed Mahmood
Salahuddin Amin

Khyam informed Babar that prior to the attack he would flee again to Pakistan, and thus when authorities realized that Khyam intended to depart Britain in early April, they converged at once on their targets in multiple locations66. When Khawaja was taken in Ottawa, Canada, he was discovered to be in possession of the detonator, only partially constructed67. Salahuddin Amin was whisked away in Pakistan, allegedly into intense interrogation and physical abuse as overseen by US and British authorities68.

Mohamed Junaid Babar

Mohamed Junaid Babar by January and February 2004 was delivering everything from camping supplies, night-vision goggles, necessary mountain clothing and equipment, as well as funds, to senior al-Qaida leadership in South Waziristan69. When he returned home to Queens in New York City during April 2004, he was promptly arrested while walking the street70, and compelled to plead guilty to providing material support to terrorists by June71. Held first in a hotel, Babar rapidly reneged on his jihadist allegiances and was persuaded to became a cooperating witness to the FBI, assisting in their investigations, but also attempting to help the British, considering his links to and supervision of the Malakand training camp72. He reported on Khan, whom he only interacted with as “Ibrahim,” but was unable to utilize inadequate evidence that would have linked Khan to this alias73. MI5 inexplicably took a photograph of Tanweer and Siddique Khan from a petroleum station and altered it in such a manner that Tanweer was greatly obscured and Khan mostly cropped from the image, leaving Babar no real ability to identify the jihadist74.

Unaltered image of Tanweer (L) and Siddique Khan (R)

As for the Crevice conspirators, Khyam was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in the UK, along with his fellow Brits Anthony Garcia, Jawad Akbar, Waheed Mahmood, and Salahuddin Amin75. Khawaja was also found guilty and after a lengthy appeals process given a life sentence as well in Canada76.

For The Sake of Islam

Dedication to the cause was apparent in Siddique Khan, while his accomplice Tanweer was seemingly more focused on ju-jitsu and cricket than militancy, and his only legal trouble had been a 2004 arrest for disorderly conduct, from which there seemed to be no major repercussions77.

Shehzad Tanweer

Now in the aftermath of Khyam’s arrest, Siddique Khan, Tanweer, and several of their fellow Pakistani-British radicals were intent on traveling to and remaining within Pakistan for advanced militant training and missions78.  Tanweer was radicalized after viewing videos of Islamist fighters in Chechnya and brought along with him his friend, Waheed Ali.  Both were influenced by friend Sadeer Saleem, who introduced them to an Islamic bookshop and the jihadist videos within79.  Khan and Tanweer were to travel first to Pakistan and were to be joined by Ali and Saleem a few weeks later80.  Finally, another comrade, Hasib Hussain was to join last81. Siddique Khan delayed his return to Pakistan until after May 2004 when his daughter was born82. Filmed in October 2004, Siddique Khan left a video message to his newborn child, bidding her farewell and claiming that he was compelled to depart “for the sake of Islam” and jihad83. In the video, Tanweer, Hasib Hussain, and Waheed Ali all greet the young girl as if they are family84.

The two primary conspirators arrived in Pakistan in November 2004, and after careful consideration of potential surveillance, Rashid Rauf met with them in Faisalabad85.  Communications were established with ease, as Rauf acquired their cellular phone numbers via shared contacts in the British jihadist community. Rauf noted their eagerness for martyrdom, undoubtedly a byproduct of the fear of being caught due to their movements, and previous associations with known jihadists86. 

Rauf introduced the duo of Siddique Khan and Tanweer to Abu Ubaidah and they entered into more advanced explosives training87.  Abu Ubaidah convinced the men to carry out their attacks in England, and left it to Rauf to oversee them with the logistics needed and training required.  Rauf recorded their last wills and testaments, and also offered advice on acting in a Western fashion in order to avoid suspicions88.  It was another operative, Marwan Hadid al-Suri who specifically trained the duo on the hydrogen peroxide explosives89.  Rauf was in constant contact with the pair through their training in the FATA.  He assisted them in developing a potential targets list, and contemplated joining them in Britain for the operation.  Although this latter thought was for naught, as Rauf’s travel documents could not be arranged appropriately to avoid raising alarms90.  Targets of interest included not just the London transit system, but also the Bank of England and the G-8 summit in Scotland in July 200591.  The two were bashful in the recording of their last will videos in Islamabad, but were determined to conduct their mission92.  Rauf prepared the men for travel, on the code they would use to communicate, and on how to procure the needed materials for their explosives.  Importantly, he instructed them not to buy anything for three weeks in order to determine if they were being surveilled93.

Between December 16-17 2004, Hasib Hussain joined Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem, and Mohamed Shakil, on what was ostensibly a casing of London transit prior to the attacks94. They called and convened with yet another associate, Germaine Lindsay while on the journey95. As an alternative, the men instead may have merely been visiting Ali’s family, and engaging in disappointing tourist attractions to include the London Aquarium96. Nonetheless, Waheed Ali and Sadeer Saleem departed for Islamabad in their attempt to join Siddique Khan and Tanweer a mere nine days after the purported surveillance mission97.

By the time Ali and Saleem arrived in Pakistan, they too were ushered to a camp, but were eventually informed by Khan and Tanweer that the plans had altered98.  They were no longer remaining in Pakistan, as they were now tasked by their senior “brothers99”.  In February 2005, Siddique Khan and Tanweer departed for London100. By February 26, Ali and Saleem ventured home as well101. Siddique Khan’s wife expressed excitement in the change of plans that saw her husband again in England102. Tanweer’s parents in Leeds believed their son, an ardent athlete and religiously observant young man, had merely traveled to Pakistan for Quran and Arabic studies, returning upon not particularly fitting in with his peers103. Hasib Hussain meanwhile, never made it to Pakistan, but he was corralled by the duo upon their return for inclusion in their mission.   

Hasib Hussain

Hasib Hussain was a quiet, mediocre student from Leeds, whose parents were of Pakistani origin104. He abandoned secondary school in 2003, but later became a student of both religion and business. Upon completing the Hajj to Mecca, he became a staunch adherent to Islam and rapidly radicalized. In fact, he once transcribed the phrase “Al-Qaida – No Limits,” upon a religious text book105. Via nearby mosques and a gym, he became enmeshed with Khan and Tanweer. Khan once delineated to fellow contacts that should he go to Pakistan and remain for jihad, Hasib would be the primary point of contact for their developing cell in England106.

A Contingency Crew

Abu Ubaidah al-Masri was cautious, and much like other al-Qaida plots there were contingencies.  In this case, Rauf had a second crew readied for action in London.  Muktar Said Ibrahim arrived in the FATA of Pakistan in December 2004 with two colleagues, Rizwan Majid and Shakeel Ismail, and immediately drew the interest of Rauf107.  Ibrahim was an Eritrean immigrant to Britain. 

Muktar Said Ibrahim

Ibrahim was no stranger to troubles, having grown up in the tumultuous area that was to become the nascent nation of Eritrea.  In 1990 he came to Britain and subsequently gained his citizenship108.  He also spent five years in a youth detention facility for gang-related violence and was released at age 20 in 1998109.  He rapidly fell under the influence of radical imams in London, to include the infamous Abu Hamza al-Masri110.  By 2003, he reportedly departed on a venture to Sudan, but upon return persisted in bragging about receiving jihadist and militant instruction111.  In fact, some sources place him with Khan and other British nationals training with al-Qaida in northwest Pakistan at that time112.  In May 2004, he established a makeshift jihadist training camp in the Lake District of northwest England, which was actually under surveillance113. Three companions joined for the excursion, yet none were further investigated by British authorities114. Regardless of the scrutiny, Ibrahim was definitely in Pakistan in late 2004, ready to receive additional training and orders. 

Ibrahim, Majid, and Ismail drew suspicion when they departed London, but avoided detention with the ruse that they were attending a family wedding in Pakistan.  Afterward, the British requested the Pakistani ISI watch the men, a request that was met with the ISI visiting the travelers at their house.  However, after this, the Pakistanis seem to have dropped their interest in the three Londoners.  Rauf meanwhile, awaited clearance and then visited Ibrahim and his associates.  He ascertained that they had jihadist interest and credentials, being radicalized by the extremist preachers in London, and for Ibrahim, even attempting physical training.  Rauf and Abu Ubaidah had just discovered their next cell for British operations.  Abu Ubaidah took over the explosives training for Ibrahim and his men.  Ibrahim, who had boasted to associates that he would be participating in jihad and achieving martyrdom, instead watched in horror as an explosives testing event went awry, killing Rizwan Majid and Shakeel Ismail, thus robbing him of properly competent operatives115.  The experience was no doubt troubling for Ibrahim and affected his ability to comprehend the process of developing the explosives.  Unfortunately for the integrity of Rauf’s operation, he was unable to oversee all of Ibrahim’s education, and they were on a strict timeline.  Ibrahim’s visa was to expire soon, meaning that training had to be rushed before his departure.  Rauf and Ibrahim reconvened in Islamabad for the last will and testament recording, and for the exchange of codes and communications methods.  Rauf and Ibrahim had to have both understood that the latter was in no way prepared for the mission.  Yet Ibrahim was deployed to his destiny.  Ibrahim reported back to Rauf upon arrival in London, but afterwards, communications went dark. This frustrated and disappointed Rauf, as he was unable to guide the malleable Ibrahim in his efforts to construct bombs from home116.  For his other charges however, Rauf maintained consistent and purposeful communication for exactly such guidance117. 

The 7/7 Atrocity

Germaine Lindsay

Meanwhile, back in London, Siddique Khan and Tanweer solidified Hasib Hussain into their crew of suicide bombers, and had additionally recruited the Jamaican-British convert, Germaine Lindsay.  The Jamaican was a recent adherent of Islam, beginning in 2000, but was respected for his dedicated study of Arabic and the Quran118.  Nonetheless, his father was absent and his mother moved to America, leaving Lindsay’s most vital influence to be a radical imam, also of Jamaican heritage119.  He began referring to himself as Abdullah Shahid Jamal, and donned traditional Islamic garb120. Lindsay married another convert, Samantha Lewthwaite of Northern Ireland in October 2002, and began a family with her121.  However, his lack of schooling and series of menial jobs, mixed with jihadist influence, led him to living near and joining Khan and Tanweer122.  He made for an easy target for both radicalization and martyrdom recruitment, despite his status as a young father123. 

Rauf continued to communicate with them via instant messengers, emails, and phone calls, all carefully conducted to avoid drawing attention to themselves124.  They spoke often and in code, with Rauf providing logistical and technical assistance for the production of the explosives.  In the Leeds apartment where Siddique Khan was mixing the ingredients, Rauf provided vital intelligence on how to properly boil down the mixture to the proper concentration of hydrogen peroxide125. For example, between April and July 2005, Siddique Khan received a multitude of calls from public phones based in Rawalpindi126. The intended assailants purchased and collectively utilized at least 15 unregistered phones for operational communications127. Rauf was all the while facing his own obstacles, as once he even hid in the attic of a building in order to avoid a Pakistani raid128.  Despite the dangers, Rauf guided Siddique Khan and his men to their successful martyrdom on July 7, 2005.

A two-bedroom apartment was obtained and utilized as the bomb manufactory, with a plethora of cosmetic products used to acquire the necessary hydrogen peroxide. The work required respirators, as the byproducts of the process were caustic, killing plants and peeling paint inside the apartment129. Tanweer apparently engaged in concentrating the hydrogen peroxide needed for the explosives, a labor which resulted in the bleaching of his hair130. He blamed swimming pools and the Pakistani outdoors for this change, and continued to live a normal life, even conducting a rendezvous with a secret girlfriend prior to the attacks131.

The operation was initially due to proceed on the morning of July 6, in order to correspond with the expected revelation of London as the host of the 2012 Summer Olympics132. Frantic texts between Siddique Khan and Lindsay reveal that there was a delay early in the morning, which forced the July 7 date instead133. Pregnancy issues with Khan’s wife were believed to be the reasoning in his hesitance to launch the mission on time134. The resulting miscarriage135 was not enough for Siddique Khan to cancel the operation.

The attacks unleashed havoc on London, as three bombers deployed via vehicle from Leeds at 0400 and met Lindsay at Luton station, before departing by train to King’s Station in London136. Inside the Nissan that ferried the three to Luton were makeshift grenades, to be employed in case the mission was compromised early137. From their arrival in the capital, they scattered from King’s Cross station on differing trains in the London Underground for their undertaking138.  At 0850 in the morning, the simultaneous bombing attempts commenced139.  The London Underground was devastated.  The first bomber, Tanweer, detonated on a moving train between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations, slaying seven in addition to himself140.  Siddique Khan acted next, exploding on a train at Edgeware Street Station, and murdering six141.  Lindsay, destroyed a mobile train between King’s Cross and Russell Square Stations, killing 26142.  The lone American slain in the atrocity, 37 year old Michael Minh Matsushita, fell during Lindsay’s Piccadilly line attack, just four days into his new job143. He had only just moved to London in order to be close to his girlfriend144.

Hasib Hussain departed King’s Cross

Hasib Hussain surprisingly reemerged from his destination to find the station closed, which forced his adjustment. He apparently chose a bus as a target due to the chaos in the underground, as he missed his opportunity to participate in the simultaneous carnage. For some reason his bombing attempt initially failed. At King’s Cross he verified that the device in his bag was inadequate due to a faulty battery145. He next purchased a 9-volt replacement and ensured in a tense few minutes at an adjacent McDonald’s that his ability to detonate was valid146. Amidst the tumult of the underground’s evacuation, and appearing uncertain, Hasib Hussain attempted to telephone all three of his coconspirators, but failed to contact them due to their deaths during the attacks147. He next boarded the Number 91 double-decker bus, but it was a brief ride. Finally, he traversed onboard the Number 30148. Hasib Hussain accomplished his mission by detonating in the rear at 0947, killing 13 passengers near Tavistock Square149.  In all, 52 innocent civilians were slain in the atrocity.

Interestingly, in the immediate aftermath of the assault, investigators assumed Lindsay was the primary culprit, responsible for leading the others150. Additionally, Lindsay’s Fiat, abandoned at the Luton station, was revealed to contain more explosives151. Meanwhile, Hasib Hussain’s parents (with whom the young man still dwelled) went as far as to report their son unaccounted for amidst the bombings, before learning of the horrid truth152. Equally in shock were Tanweer’s parents, who never saw the signs of fanaticism in their son, believing him to be educated, focused on his university and sports153. The American informant Babar clarified the leadership of the cell when he finally was able to identify the mysterious “Ibrahim,” to his handlers, solidifying that Siddique Khan was his unaccounted for trainee154. Another call from Rawalpindi reached Khan’s cellphone later in the afternoon at 1404, presumably to verify that the explosions were the labors of the al-Qaida trained terrorists155.

The 7/21 Attempt

Ibrahim took the successful July 7 bombings as a call to action for his developing cell.  He had recruited troubled Somali immigrants Ramzi Mohamed and Yasin Omar into the fold, both of whom were radicalized by Ibrahim and their association with radical London-based imam, Abu Hamza al-Masri 156.  Yasin Omar immigrated in the early 1990s and landed in local foster care157. When he was living on his own, he ventured into radical Islam by 2001158. After 9/11 he was increasingly confrontational with family, friends, and even other Muslims over the issues of jihad and suicide bombings159. Ramzi Mohamed was raised in a refugee camp in Somalia, but by 1998 immigrated to Britain in avoidance of conscription160. Also subjected to a brief stint in the custody of British social services, Ramzi moved into his own home, drank and partied, before his own radicalization in 2003161. Despite the loss of jobs over his increasing conservative beliefs, he married and fathered two young children162. These connections extended to Ethiopian immigrant Hussain Osman, who claimed that Ibrahim coerced him into the plot163.  He was actually born Hamdi Isaac Adus in Ethiopia, but after immigrating first to Italy, lied while entering the UK by claiming the Hussain Osman name and a Somali nationality in hopes of obtaining asylum164. He previously joined Ibrahim at his Lake District camp in 2004165. A fifth individual, the Ghanaian immigrant Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, also claimed to be an unwilling participant, although he was an assistant to Yasin Omar in constructing their explosive devices166.  Likewise, Asiedu was an assumed identity, and the terrorist recruit was born in Ghana as Sumaila Abubakari167.

Yasin Omar volunteered his apartment as the manufactory of the explosives, and beginning in April 2005, collected hundreds of bottles of chemicals needed for the process168.

Ramzi Mohamed

Two weeks to the day of the first series of attacks, the next squad of bombers made a conscious decision to avoid the scrutiny of early morning traffic and congestion, instead opting to launch in the late morning to early afternoon hours169. On July 21, they convened at Ramzi Mohamed’s apartment in North Kensington, with all but Yasin Osman deploying in a Fiat to Stockwell underground station170. From Stockwell the men boarded varying trains towards what they believed would be their destiny. Near Oval station at approximately 1230, Ramzi Mohamed attempted and failed to detonate, before desperately fleeing the station ahead of pursuing angry passengers171.

Yasin Omar

Yasin Omar made his attempt as his selected train approached Warren Street station at 1237, but also failed in doing anything but creating a ruckus when his detonator, but no chemicals, exploded172. Frantic passengers and Omar scattered from the station, with the inadequate suicide bomber imploring assistance from passers-by prior to his eventual escape173.

Hussain Osman

Hussain Osman departed from the apartment on foot, traversing to Westbourne Park station and boarding his targeted train. Oddly, his bag carried both torn photographs and his gym membership ID card174. As he neared Shepherd’s Bush station after 1240, his device was also employed and only resulted in a startling noise and disoriented terrorist175. Regaining composure, Osman egressed by first attempting the roof of the train, before finally maneuvering through carriages until he reached the end and fled via the actual tracks176. After injuring his leg in the escape to the surface, he ironically took a bus to remove himself from the scene of his crime177.

Ibrahim on the bus

Ibrahim disembarked his train and instead boarded another bus, settling on the top deck178. At the intersection of Shoreditch High and Hackney roads, he also suffered malfunction179. The windows of the Number 26 bus were shattered by the detonator, but no one was wounded180. The sound of the failed explosion was enough to create a panic, and the passengers rapidly offloaded from the bus along with Ibrahim, who abandoned his ruined backpack181.

Manfo Kwaku Asiedu

The Ghanaian Asiedu meanwhile, abandoned his bomb instead of attempting a fifth attack. His device was dumped at a London park in Little Wormwood Scrubs182. Later on July 26, he surrendered himself to authorities, claiming that he had dismantled another bomb at Ibrahim’s lair, powerful enough to destroy an entire city block183.

After the failure of the bombings, the group dispersed.  Hussain Osman fled with the police a step behind. Completely departing London, he next moved to Brighton and then took the Eurostar train to Paris, and eventually Rome184.  Authorities accidently shot dead an innocent Brazilian man in the desperation to find and stop the missing assailant185.  Osman was identified by his gym membership card and his address was subsequently monitored. When Jean Charles de Menezes departed the building the next day, late for his employment as an electrician, he was methodically stalked into Stockwell station where police failed to properly announce themselves before killing the civilian186. Osman meanwhile, was eventually apprehended in his brother’s home in Rome, Italy on July 29, after investigators traced his cellular phone187.  Yasin Omar fled disguised in a burka, arriving in Birmingham to hide188.  On July 27, he was captured by a team of security forces, having to be tased and tackled due to holding what officers feared was yet another explosive device189.  Ramzi Mohamed left a suicide note extolling jihad for his wife and children, but upon surviving the botched attack, fled home without the bluster, too frightened of the British response to flee further190. He and Ibrahim and were captured together at the apartment on July 29, forced out by tear gas, ordered to disrobe, and surrendering to the surrounding authorities191.

Muktar Said Ibrahim and Ramzi Mohamed Surrendering to Authorities

Aftermath And Responsibility

The four primary assailants of 7/21 were tried over six months in 2007, and found guilty by July, just two years after their attempted murderous spree192. They were sentenced to life imprisonment with 40-year minimums193. Asiedu’s jury failed to achieve a verdict on conspiracy to commit murder and he instead plead guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions, taking a 33 year sentence and deportation to Ghana upon completion194. Only three men were ever brought to court over the initial 7/7 bombings, and in April 2008, Mohamed Shakil, Waheed Ali, and Sadeer Saleem were acquitted of conspiring with the assailants, with the primary evidence being their ostensible December 2004 reconnaissance venture; evidence failing to survive scrutiny195. Mohamed Junaid Babar was revealed in February 2011 to have been quietly released from American confinement due to his excellent standing as a cooperating witness, most likely being placed in witness protection, much to the consternation of the families of 7/7 victims196. Despite Babar naming Q from Luton as a lieutenant to Abdulhadi al-Iraqi and the facilitator of Siddique Khan’s 2003 sojourn, the mysterious man was never charged due to “insufficient evidence,” and subsequently faded from public observation197.

Siddique Khan
Tanweer

Having redundancy in the operations paid dividends for Abu Ubaidah and Rauf.  The failure of the 21 July incident was overshadowed by the initial success of 7 July.  The event catapulted Rauf into higher status in al-Qaida, and justified Hamza Rabia’s preoccupation with transit system attacks. In September, as-Sahab released the video testimony of Mohamed Siddique Khan, justifying the London attacks as a response to Western atrocities committed against Muslims. An accompanying segment featured Ayman al-Zawahiri declaring the events as revenge for British foreign policy198. Tanweer’s testimony was reserved for the anniversary of the crime, released in July 2006199. The US and UK were hesitant to assign blame to al-Qaida for the attack, assuredly due to the problematic admission of an ostensibly defeated foe having constructed and carried out yet another terrorist operation. Yet top US officials were cognizant of the network’s responsibility for the event200. A number of al-Qaida operatives could be deemed culpable for the July 2005 assaults, to include Hamza Rabia, his adjutants and assistants Amir al-Azizi and Abu Bakr al-Suri, Musa Muhsin Matwalli Atwah, Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, and Rashid Rauf.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  2. The Evidence of Al-Qa`ida’s Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack, by Fernando Reinares, CTC Sentinel, March 2012, Vol. 5, Issue 3 ↩︎
  3. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  4. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto? – The Masterminds of the Assassination, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  5. Who Killed Benazir Bhutto? – The Masterminds of the Assassination, by Ziad Zafar, Dawn, December 24, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1378568 ↩︎
  6. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  7. Core Al-Qaida in 2008: A Review, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, April 8, 2009, https://www.academia.edu/12893745/Al_Qaida_in_2008 ↩︎
  8. Alleged al-Qaeda Chief Dead, Officials Say, by Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-masri10apr10-story.html / Who is Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Why Should We Care: An Obituary, by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SITE Intelligence ↩︎
  9. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan After the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto, by Abdul Sayed, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, Volume 19, Issue 2, January 29, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/the-jihadists-war-in-pakistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-lessons-from-al-qaedas-assassination-of-benazir-bhutto/ ↩︎
  10. Alleged al-Qaeda Chief Dead, Officials Say, by Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-masri10apr10-story.html / Who is Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Why Should We Care: An Obituary, by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SITE Intelligence ↩︎
  11. Guantanamo Assessment File, Awad Khalifa Abu Uwaisha al-Barasi, ISN 695, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/695.html // Who is Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Why Should We Care: An Obituary, by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SITE Intelligence ↩︎
  12. Guantanamo Assessment File, Awad Khalifa Abu Uwaisha al-Barasi, ISN 695, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/695.html ↩︎
  13. Guantanamo Assessment File, Murtada Ali Said Makram, ISN 187, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/187.html ↩︎
  14. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahman Abdu Abu Ghaith Sulaiman, ISN 223, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/223.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Murtada Ali Said Makram, ISN 187, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/187.html ↩︎
  15. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahman Abdu Abu Ghaith Sulaiman, ISN 223, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/223.html ↩︎
  16. Guantanamo Assessment File, Murtada Ali Said Makram, ISN 187, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/187.html ↩︎
  17. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Murtada Ali Said Makram, ISN 187, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/187.html ↩︎
  18. Alleged al-Qaeda Chief Dead, Officials Say, by Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-masri10apr10-story.html // Who is Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Why Should We Care: An Obituary, by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SITE Intelligence ↩︎
  19. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  20. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  21. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  22. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  23. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  24. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  25. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  26. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  27. Documents give new details on al Qaeda’s London bombings, by Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, CNN, April 30, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/index.html / A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, July 2012, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 5, Issue 7, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
  28. Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621381 ↩︎
  29. Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621381 ↩︎
  30. Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621381 ↩︎
  31. July 7 plot accused tell of times with Taliban, by Rachel Williams, The Guardian, May 20, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/may/21/july7.uksecurity ↩︎
  32. July 7 plot accused tell of times with Taliban, by Rachel Williams, The Guardian, May 20, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/may/21/july7.uksecurity ↩︎
  33. Accounts After 2005 London Bombings Point to Al Qaeda Role From Pakistan, by Mohammed Khan and Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, August 13, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/world/europe/13qaeda.html // 7/7 accused ‘joined weapons camp’, by Dominic Casciani, BBC News, April 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7355010.stm ↩︎
  34. The phone call that asked: how do you make a bomb?, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, May 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/terrorism.politics1 // Free – the man accused of being an al-Qaida leader, aka ‘Q’, by Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, The Guardian, March 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/politics.topstories3 ↩︎
  35. Analysis: Could MI5 have stopped 7/7 bombers?, BBC News, May 6, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12629441 ↩︎
  36. US was warned about bomber’s training camp visit, court told, by Rachel Williams, April 18, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/apr/19/july7.alqaida ↩︎
  37. Free – the man accused of being an al-Qaida leader, aka ‘Q’, by Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, The Guardian, March 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/politics.topstories3 ↩︎
  38. US was warned about bomber’s training camp visit, court told, by Rachel Williams, April 18, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/apr/19/july7.alqaida ↩︎
  39. 7/7 accused ‘joined weapons camp’, by Dominic Casciani, BBC News, April 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7355010.stm ↩︎
  40. Anatomy of a bomb plot, The Guardian, April 30, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/apr/30/terrorism.world3 ↩︎
  41. Canadian convicted in Britain bomb plot, NBC News via The Associated Press, October 29, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna27439880 ↩︎
  42. Profile: Anthony Garcia, BBC News, April 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149798.stm ↩︎
  43. US was warned about bomber’s training camp visit, court told, by Rachel Williams, April 18, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/apr/19/july7.alqaida ↩︎
  44. N.Y. man admits he aided al Qaeda, set up jihad camp, by Jonathan Wald, CNN News, August 11, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/11/ny.terror.suspect/ ↩︎
  45. Accounts After 2005 London Bombings Point to Al Qaeda Role From Pakistan, by Mohammed Khan and Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, August 13, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/world/europe/13qaeda.html ↩︎
  46. Accounts After 2005 London Bombings Point to Al Qaeda Role From Pakistan, by Mohammed Khan and Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, August 13, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/world/europe/13qaeda.html ↩︎
  47. The phone call that asked: how do you make a bomb?, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, May 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/terrorism.politics1 ↩︎
  48. 5 Get Life In Prison For UK Bomb Plot, CBS News via The Associated Press, April 30, 2007, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/5-get-life-in-prison-for-uk-bomb-plot/ ↩︎
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  50. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
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  52. The phone call that asked: how do you make a bomb?, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, May 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/terrorism.politics1 ↩︎
  53. The phone call that asked: how do you make a bomb?, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, May 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/terrorism.politics1 ↩︎
  54. Profile: Waheed Mahmood, BBC News, April 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149800.stm ↩︎
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  69. N.Y. man admits he aided al Qaeda, set up jihad camp, by Jonathan Wald, CNN News, August 11, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/11/ny.terror.suspect/ ↩︎
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  77. Profile: Shehzad Tanweer, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621383 ↩︎
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  82. Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621381 ↩︎
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  95. Terror trial pair flew to Pakistan after alleged London reconnaissance, by Peter Walker, The Guardian, April 14, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/apr/14/uksecurity ↩︎
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  101. Terror trial pair flew to Pakistan after alleged London reconnaissance, by Peter Walker, The Guardian, April 14, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/apr/14/uksecurity ↩︎
  102. Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621381 ↩︎
  103. Trophy-rich athlete who turned to jihad, by Sandra Laville and Dilpazier Aslam, The Guardian, July 14, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/14/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
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  105. Profile: Hasib Hussain, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621387 ↩︎
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  109. Profile: Muktar Ibrahim, BBC News, July 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/email_news/6634901.stm ↩︎
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  119. Profile: Germaine Lindsay, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621385 ↩︎
  120. Jamaican-born convert to Islam ‘coordinated fellow bombers’, by Audrey Gillan, Ian Cobain, and Hugh Muir, The Guardian, July 15, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/16/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
  121. Profile: Germaine Lindsay, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621385 ↩︎
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  126. 7/7 gang given bomb-making advice from Pakistan, inquest hears, by Alexandra Topping, The Guardian, February 2, 2011, https://amp.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/02/7-july-inquest-pakistan-terrorism ↩︎
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  128. Documents give new details on al Qaeda’s London bombings, by Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, CNN, April 30, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents-london-bombings/index.html ↩︎
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  130. Profile: Shehzad Tanweer, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621383 ↩︎
  131. Profile: Shehzad Tanweer, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621383 ↩︎
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  133. 7 July bombers bought special mobile phones, BBC News, October 14, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11542139 ↩︎
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  143. Obituary: Michael Matsushita, BBC News, January 10, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11999111 ↩︎
  144. Obituary: Michael Matsushita, BBC News, January 10, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11999111 ↩︎
  145. 7/7 footage at inquest shows final bomber Hasib Hussain, by Karen McVeigh and Esther Addley, The Guardian, October 14, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/14/july7-bomber-cctv-footage-hussain ↩︎
  146. 7/7 footage at inquest shows final bomber Hasib Hussain, by Karen McVeigh and Esther Addley, The Guardian, October 14, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/14/july7-bomber-cctv-footage-hussain ↩︎
  147. 7/7 footage at inquest shows final bomber Hasib Hussain, by Karen McVeigh and Esther Addley, The Guardian, October 14, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/14/july7-bomber-cctv-footage-hussain ↩︎
  148. 7/7 footage at inquest shows final bomber Hasib Hussain, by Karen McVeigh and Esther Addley, The Guardian, October 14, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/14/july7-bomber-cctv-footage-hussain ↩︎
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  150. Jamaican-born convert to Islam ‘coordinated fellow bombers’, by Audrey Gillan, Ian Cobain, and Hugh Muir, The Guardian, July 15, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/16/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
  151. Jamaican-born convert to Islam ‘coordinated fellow bombers’, by Audrey Gillan, Ian Cobain, and Hugh Muir, The Guardian, July 15, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/16/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
  152. Profile: Hasib Hussain, BBC News, March 2, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12621387 ↩︎
  153. Trophy-rich athlete who turned to jihad, by Sandra Laville and Dilpazier Aslam, The Guardian, July 14, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/14/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
  154. Jihadi who helped train 7/7 bomber freed by US after just five years, by Shiv Malik, The Guardian, February 13, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/13/jihadi-train-7-7-bomber-freed ↩︎
  155. 7/7 gang given bomb-making advice from Pakistan, inquest hears, by Alexandra Topping, The Guardian, February 2, 2011, https://amp.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/02/7-july-inquest-pakistan-terrorism ↩︎
  156. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm // Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm ↩︎
  157. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm ↩︎
  158. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm ↩︎
  159. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm ↩︎
  160. Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm ↩︎
  161. Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm ↩︎
  162. Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm ↩︎
  163. Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm ↩︎
  164. Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm ↩︎
  165. Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm ↩︎
  166. Profile: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, BBC News, November 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634913.stm ↩︎
  167. Profile: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, BBC News, November 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634913.stm ↩︎
  168. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm ↩︎
  169. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  170. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
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  172. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  173. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  174. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  175. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  176. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  177. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
  178. What the would-be bombers did on July 21, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/what-the-would-be-bombers-did-on-july-21-idUSZWE958634/ ↩︎
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  180. Experts examine rucksack on bus, by Rosalind Ryan, The Guardian, July 21, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/21/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
  181. Experts examine rucksack on bus, by Rosalind Ryan, The Guardian, July 21, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/21/july7.uksecurity6 ↩︎
  182. The July 21 failed bombings, The Guardian, February 4, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/feb/04/terrorism.world1 ↩︎
  183. Profile: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, BBC News, November 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634913.stm ↩︎
  184. Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm ↩︎
  185. Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm ↩︎
  186. Q&A: The day De Menezes died, by Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, December 12, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/dec/12/de-menezes-police-shooting ↩︎
  187. Profile: Hussain Osman, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm ↩︎
  188. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm ↩︎
  189. Profile: Yassin Omar, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm ↩︎
  190. Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm ↩︎
  191. Bomb plot trial shown film of balcony arrest, by Lee Glendinning, The Guardian, February 21, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/feb/22/terrorism.world // Profile: Ramzi Mohammed, BBC News, July 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm ↩︎
  192. Four guilty over 21/7 bomb plot, BBC News, July 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6284350.stm ↩︎
  193. Fifth 21/7 London bomber jailed, BBC News, November 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7101514.stm ↩︎
  194. Fifth 21/7 London bomber jailed, BBC News, November 20, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7101514.stm ↩︎
  195. 3 acquitted of helping 2005 London bombers, NBC News via The Associated Press, April 28, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna30456583 ↩︎
  196. Jihadi who helped train 7/7 bomber freed by US after just five years, by Shiv Malik, The Guardian, February 13, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/13/jihadi-train-7-7-bomber-freed ↩︎
  197. Free – the man accused of being an al-Qaida leader, aka ‘Q’, by Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, The Guardian, March 1, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/may/01/politics.topstories3 ↩︎
  198. Al-Qaida claims London bombing, al-Jazeera, September 1, 2005, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/9/1/al-qaida-claims-london-bombing ↩︎
  199. Video of 7 July bomber released, BBC News, July 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5154714.stm ↩︎
  200. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎

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