SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – External Structure Under KSM

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Having examined the state of al-Qaida internal management in the immediate aftermath of the US invasion into their haven and stronghold of Afghanistan, we must shift to the jihadist network’s operational responses and potential continuing terrorist plots. These missions were the external operations of al-Qaida. Previously overseen by a special operations sub-council of the network’s Military Committee, these activities were the purview of Mohamed Atef and Saif al-Adel. With Atef assassinated in Kabul during the invasion, and Adel entrapped in Iran (plus having initially objected to an assault on the American homeland), externals came under the command of the operative in charge of the 9/11 attacks, the Baluchi-Kuwaiti Khalid Sheikh Mohamed.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Facilitators in Pakistan

Of interest, even in current writings and official history of the entire Afghanistan war (Operation Enduring Freedom), the Palestinian militant Zayn al-Abidin Mohamed Hussain (Abu Zubaydah), is reported to have been the external operations commander of al-Qaida in the post-9/11 era1.  Yet this persistent, oft repeated untruth veils Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the actual appointed commander for terrorist operations. KSM benefited from bin Laden’s splicing of responsibilities between internal and external concerns. In 2002, KSM found himself in Karachi, Pakistan, having fled Afghanistan to his safehouses, responsible for deploying operatives globally, and employed in conducting even more successful al-Qaida missions.

Khalid Sheikh Mohamed began the arduous task of moving and protecting al-Qaida operatives, soldiers, and managers out of Afghanistan and through his network in Pakistan, upon his own exit from the war theatre in December 20012.  His nephew, Ammar al-Baluchi was a vital piece in the KSM network coordinating these movements3.  They acquired and used al-Qaida funds provided by Sheikh Said al-Masri, the chief financier on the Majlis ash-Shura, in order to accomplish the labor4.  Another local nephew of KSM, Abdulkarim Yusef5 (Abu Musab al-Baluchi), maintained some of the most sensitive information and conducted logistics for operatives within Pakistan and also for those being deployed back to their homelands6.   Various other operatives were belabored with taskings from KSM during the post invasion chaos, in both logistics and operations to enable the escapes. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani contributed via document forgery, preparing passports, visas, etc for militants and their immediate families, with the Tanzanian being one of the only available forgers7.  Guyanese Adnan Gulshair al-Shrukrijumah8, a veteran of jihad in Bosnia9, was maintained by KSM. He too assisted with the manipulation of travel documents10. The Saudi financial aide Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi was assigned to Sheikh Said to assist with pecuniary matters in March 200211. KSM needed these services for successful migrations of militants; he also needed adequately managed safehouses.

With Kandahar conquered in late 2001 and no longer a refuge, KSM dispatched orders splitting off several of his men to Iran, among them 9/11 co-conspirator Ramzi Binalshibh12.  Remaining in Iran for six weeks, Binalshibh avoided the early Iranian sweeps and retreated back into Pakistan, linking again with KSM in Karachi in early 200213.  KSM initially intended for Binalshibh to finally achieve his aviation goals, sending him to flight school in Pakistan for further hijacking related operations, either of a small or large aircraft14.  Yet Binalshibh’s martyrdom video, found in the remains of Mohamed Atef’s safehouse and broadcast to the world by the FBI, precluded his inclusion in such instruction15.  KSM housed Binalshibh with several other operatives within the network of safehouses managed by his subordinates the Rabbani brothers16.

KSM had utilized al-Qaida facilitator Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani as a driver in Pakistan17.   Rabbani’s brother Abdulrahim was later responsible for managing Pakistani safehouses alongside him18.  Among their havens were locations known as Defense View, Tariq Road, and Gulshan e Iqbal19.  A multitude of al-Qaida officials from bin Laden down through Saif al-Adel, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Walid bin Attash (Khallad), and Abdulrahim al-Nashiri had previously utilized the safehouses at various times20. The nephews of KSM were also well acquainted with the sites21.  Prior to the atrocities, the Rabbanis helped to facilitate and move most of the 9/11 hijackers (17 of 19), to and from Afghanistan22.  Other facilitators operated within this network including Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani’s brother in law, a Pakistani operative known as Hassan Ghul23. 

In Karachi, the Yemeni Abdah Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (Riyadh the Facilitator) strove to move fleeing militants to their home nations24.  Prior to 9/11 Sharqawi had relocated to Kandahar, and often worked in Kabul, but the war forced him back to the Karachi safehouses of al-Qaida25.  He fled through Tora Bora, and remained linked with al-Qaida seniors, most importantly COLE bombing conspirator Abdulrahim al-Nashiri26.  He was convinced to resume facilitation operations after Tora Bora by another coordinator [A], and was joined by Nashiri in the same home27. KSM and Binalshibh arrived in January 2002 to Sharqawi’s guesthouse in Karachi, in order to establish the operation and finances of moving militants from the region to their destinations28.  Sharqawi successfully facilitated over 100 foreign militants in their homeward journeys29. 

Beginning in December 2001, the Rabbanis began to ensure the safe travel of over 50 al-Qaida operatives returning to their home nations or being deployed for operations30.  They were well funded by KSM, Binalshibh, and Ammar al-Baluchi31.  Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani was privy to multiple fanciful and some realistic plots as hatched by KSM and his men during this time32.  Rabbani also used one of his safehouses as a location deemed proper and secure enough to utilize the internet for news sources, then forwarding his findings to operatives in Afghanistan33.  More important than media documents, Rabbani facilitated the transport of materials for IED manufacturing to operatives in order to assist an insurgency in Afghanistan34. 

Other locations maintained assistance networks for the fleeing militants also. For example, another Yemeni, Omar al-Hadhrami, was said to be responsible for facilitation of foreign fighters moving through Lahore [B]35.  The Palestinian Marwan Ibrahim Ali al-Jabour was entrusted by al-Qaida in the same endeavor36. All of this to say, that the foreign elements in 2002 and early 2003 had options for assistance and eventual escape in the major cities of Pakistan, whether it was for operational purposes or just to depart an incredibly volatile situation. For KSM in Karachi, the ambition was solely operational.

Shod in Terror

Even before the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan fell, KSM was dispatching terrorists. The Iraqi-Canadian Mohamed Mansur Jabarah was funded by KSM in Afghanistan in August and departed the very day prior to 9/11 for Manila, where he was to link with local militant outfit Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and plot against American and Israeli interests to include their Embassies37. The Qatari Ali Saleh Mohamed Kahlah al-Marri was to be a covert operative within the US, researching the potential to hack into banking computers38. He also researched cyanide for usage in developing plots39. KSM viewed Marri as an ideal hidden asset, owing to ease of travel and lack of a criminal history40. Under the name Abdulrahman al-Qatari, he attended training camps in Afghanistan from 1998 through 2001, receiving instructions from KSM, before obtaining a student visa to enter the US41. Enroute he retrieved $10,000 from Mustafa al-Hawsawi in Dubai42. He arrived in America on September 10, with the intention of obtaining a degree in information systems to assist his plot43. He was to also usher additional operatives into the country44. The Qatari’s career was truncated upon his arrest on December 1845, for communications discovered with Hawsawi46. Promptly, he was incarcerated at the Naval brig in Charleston, SC47.

Some operatives were foisted upon KSM.  On November 17, 2001 after Mohamed Atef’s assassination, senior al-Qaida officials met to discuss contingencies, evacuation, and even additional plots48. Saif al-Adel, having assumed Atef’s responsibilities, assigned the British candidate Richard Colvin Reid to KSM, who was bewildered by the apparently ill-equipped operative, as he appeared disheveled and admitted to prohibited drug-related activities49. However, his ability to travel with ease precluded any concerns from higher authorities50. In fact, in his association with Atef and Adel, Reid was used to scout targets in Egypt, Israel, and Turkey51. Also, despite his obvious ineptitude, Reid was a veteran of militant instruction, having trained at the Khaldan camp52. 

Richard Reid

A miscreant and delinquent youth, he converted to Islam in a detention facility, before delving deep into the religion with fanatics in Britain 53. In the late 1990s he vanished from home and began his meandering journey through the Islamic world, to include the training camps of Afghanistan54. His presence in Afghanistan was confirmed by various Guantanamo detainees who were acquainted with him55.  Reid trained at a variety of other camps as well.  This included a facility in the vicinity of the Moroccan Tarik camp in Bagram56.  It was from this location that Reid was eventually deployed to KSM in order to meet his destiny57. 

Saajid Badat

KSM, while less than impressed with the Brit, designated Ammar al-Baluchi to instruct and facilitate both Reid and another British operative, Saajid Badat, assisting in their funding, travels, and communications abilities58.  Saajid Mohamed Badat, of Malawian origin, came to Afghanistan for militant training at 21 in 1999, and met with bin Laden on multiple occasions59. Yet another British operative, Dhiren Barot, known as Abu Issa al-Hindi, was also assisted in this manner in December 200160.

KSM directly dispatched his intended British suicide bombers, Reid and Badat, in late 2001, and was reportedly the final al-Qaida commander that the pair interacted with prior to their mission61. KSM ordered Reid to shave and to appear presentable, with further instruction to ignite the fuse of the bomb within the airplane lavatory as opposed to in the open while drawing suspicions62. They were given instructions as to their most minute actions, including between themselves 63 With the skills they obtained from Ammar al-Baluchi, the pair were given explosives hidden in shoes to be used in the downing of aircraft. From the militant camps of Afghanistan, they managed to covertly transport their explosives to Europe64. They fled Kandahar for Karachi and filtered out into the world. They were joined by Malaysian operatives under the command of KSM, to whom Badat gave a third shoe device 65. In Belgium, the two Brits applied for new passports at the British Embassy under the false assertion that their originals were lost66.

The plan developed rapidly after the mid-November conference and deployment of the shoe bombers, and Reid became the first to strike just over a month later. It was December 21 when Reid aroused suspicions attempting to board a flight in Paris, primarily due to a combination of lack of luggage and his unusual behavior, precipitating screenings and interviews that prevented Reid from boarding 67. However, the delay only resulted in Reid conducting a second attempt, and on December 22, 2001, Reid successfully boarded American Airlines Flight 63 from Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris, France to Miami, Florida, wherein he intended to detonate the explosive hidden within his shoe and destroy the aircraft68. There were 14 crew and 183 other passengers onboard. However, over an hour into the flight, Reid attempted twice, unsuccessfully, to light a fuse to the bomb with matches, and was ultimately engaged in physical conflict with flight attendants and fellow passengers who restrained him as the flight diverted to Boston, Massachusetts69. Disregarding his orders, Reid overtly labored to detonate the device while still seated in the cabin. With instincts instilled by the 9/11 attacks, a rapid and concerted response enabled the crew and passengers to react swiftly70. Reid, despite his fervent attempts, threats, and even biting a flight attendant was doused in water and tied down with sundry items from throughout the passenger compartment71 The bomb was composed of triacetone triperoxide,72 and Reid’s shoes having accumulated moisture during the initial delay, resulted in a faulty fuse and dysfunctional device73.

Badat meanwhile, arrived in Britain on December 10, 2001, having accepted his destiny as a suicide bomber74. He even donned his device on the flight from the Netherlands75. Rapidly reneging, Badat, on December 14, communicated to his al-Qaida superiors through one of the many false emails he had created that he was withdrawing from the plot 76. After his change and Reid’s failure, Badat stored the bomb away in his room and attempted to blend into normalcy again77 [C]. Meanwhile, KSM railed against the incompetence of his captured operative78.

The Journalist in Karachi

Reid’s history was subsequently examined, resulting in the revelation that he was trained in explosives by senior al-Qaida experts in their camps.  This included instruction directly from the Egyptian explosives specialist Midhat Mursi at the Darunta camp in Afghanistan79.  The story was mesmerizing, and gained the undivided attention of the Wall Street Journal’s South Asia bureau chief, Daniel Pearl, leading to the reporter’s departure from his assigned base in India80. Despite suspicions, there was no clear evidence of al-Qaida involvement in the plot, and Pearl was not deterred by the severity of the situation.

Pearl was intrigued by Reid’s radicalization. He rapidly deployed to Pakistan and to Karachi on the misinformation that a local cleric was Reid’s handler, and was intent on gaining an interview81. Instead, Ahmed Omar Said Sheikh, a radical Pakistani militant of the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) freed in the December 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking82, and indicted by the US for a 1994 abduction of an American83, was poised to obfuscate the information Pearl was relying upon, lure, and then confine the journalist. Ahmed Omar Said Sheikh himself relied upon a network of Karachi established Pakistani militants of the Lashkar e Jhangvi group, principally Amjad Hussain Faruqi and Attaur Rahman, who helped prepare, coordinate, and to provide subordinates and logistics84. Matiur Rahman, of the Harakat ul Jihad I Islami (HuJI) group also assisted in coordination and planning85. Pearl was abducted on January 23, 2002 in Karachi, under the false impression that he was meeting with Reid’s handler86.

Saif al-Adel, as a Shura councilor and superior, continued to have influence upon KSM even from Iran, and pressured the external commander to ensure al-Qaida involvement in the Pearl abduction87. Prior to this unexpected telephone conversation with Adel, KSM was unaware of the culprits in the situation. The interwoven jihadist networks in Karachi though, provided al-Qaida with an inroads to the operation. Once ordered and linked, KSM traveled to the holding safehouse outside of Karachi, apparently accompanied by Ammar al-Baluchi and Abu Musab al-Baluchi88 (who had extensive relationships with the local militants). In fact they were brought there by one Saud Memon, a local garment manufacturer and businessman, the financial officer of al-Akhtar Trust, which acted as a front to funnel money designated for charity to jihadist causes instead89. It was Saud Memon who actually owned the property where Pearl was held90. Together they coordinated with the local guards, and the nephews video-taped, interviewed, and eased Pearl, having him read a scripted statement against US policies91. Later, the three foreign arrivals surprised the hostage, and with Pearl subdued, KSM decapitated him brutally. His nephews assisted but failed to properly record the murder, forcing a hastily performed second scene, attempting to display Pearl as still living before the beheading92.

KSM weighed his options and determined that mutilating Pearl would guarantee his own execution in case of capture, and would provide a boon in jihadist media propaganda for the fleeing militant network93. Thus KSM directly decapitated Pearl for this intended effect94. The FBI later matched his veins to the veins on the hand of the video-taped executioner95. Purportedly and bewilderingly, bin Laden did not appreciate the “negative” attention bestowed upon al-Qaida96. Of note, it is of interest who actually supported the action. Adel, despite his insistence on al-Qaida involvement, was hesitant to condone the murder97. Perhaps this was in anticipation of bin Laden’s disapproval. In Karachi, Shura member Sheikh Said al-Masri affirmed the choice of execution for the journalist, providing KSM with senior support98.  Pearl lost his life as a result of his fascination with Reid, never knowing that he was to be entrapped in a scheme inadvertently leading to KSM.

The Second Wave and the Malaysian Contingent

There was of course the third shoe bomb. The so-called Second Wave of the planned KSM attacks was the responsibility of the Malaysian contingent in possession of the device, which was led by Masran bin Arshad, under orders from KSM to use his shoe bomb as a method to commandeer an airliner and disrupt security precautions for the cockpit99.  Arshad was then to crash the plane into a large building in California100. This became known as the West Coast Airlines Plot101.  Malaysians were selected for the assault as al-Qaida senior leadership held the belief that Arabs would now be restricted in movements and travel within the US102.  JI official and al-Qaida conduit to southeast Asia, Ridduan Isamuddin (Hambali), provided some of his trusted deputies for the operation103.  KSM and Hambali selected Masran bin Arshad to command the hijacking crew while in Afghanistan104.  Hambali utilized several Malaysians with him at what was known as the Philippine Guesthouse in Kandahar105.  The JI members with Arshad were Mohamed Farik bin Amin (known as Zubair), Abdulrahman Mustafa Afifi, and Bashir bin Lap (known as Lillie)106.  Amin, from the village of Kajang, Malaysia, worked a variety of jobs utilizing his degrees in electronics and telecommunications during the 1990s107.  Internal religious conflict in southeast Asia compelled him to seek Islamist militant training in Afghanistan108.  Lillie, from Muar village, gained his degree in architecture, also working a variety of roles, but his journey also saw him employed by and trained by the Malaysian military for a brief stint109.  Lillie became obsessed with the idea of jihad, idealizing those who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan110.  With Hambali traveling and orating through the region, Lillie convinced his friend Amin to join him, and they endeavored to hear the lectures of the JI executive 111.  They then became acquainted with the militant and shared with him their desire to wage jihad112.  Eventually, after preparation and facilitation from Hambali, Amin and Lillie departed Malaysia on June 26, 2000, migrating to Karachi, and with further assistance from Hambali and his al-Qaida contacts, traversed Pakistan and onto Kandahar113.  The two nascent operatives trained at al-Faruq through September 2000 before being assembled with the other Malaysians and reconnected with Hambali at the Philippine Guesthouse114.  Lillie joined Brigade 55 and fought along the front lines at Kabul and Bagram, but illnesses and an eventually wounding from a landmine, forced him into an armorer role at al-Faruq115.

“Lillie”
“Zubair”

After 9/11, the men were chosen and approached by Hambali on behalf of KSM to become suicide assailants116.  Hambali wrote to Lillie to return from his placement with militants from al-Faruq outside of Kandahar, to Nibras Guesthouse to hear the plea117.  The militants readily agreed to the proposal for martyrdom118.  They received initial instruction from KSM rapidly after the agreement119.  Hambali then funneled the four militants to Kabul through Mohamed Atef, and onward for a meeting with bin Laden and Zawahiri, in which the Malaysians swore bayat and became loyal al-Qaida operatives120.  At this point, the Malaysians were held in reserve and told that their orders were to be issued by Atef121.  KSM placed Arshad in charge of the crew, but was also informed that there was another contingent for the attack, that would actually fly the hijacked plane122.  Arshad took his men out of Afghanistan avoiding combat due to their operational status, making their way to Karachi, KSM, and his safehouses123. This was of course alongside of Reid and Badat124.  Arshad deployed his contingent to return to Malaysia in anticipation of the planned attacks and to gather the appropriate documentation for travel to America125.  On January 20, 2002, Amin, Lillie, and Afifi departed Arshad, traveling to Thailand to set up for their potential mission126.  The plot itself was of course disrupted by Reid’s miscalculation and failure in December127.  The operatives were under the impression that they would not be able to carry out an attack involving a shoe bomb128.  As for Arshad, he was arrested in January 2002 in Sri Lanka129. This was shortly after the departure of his three man crew to southeast Asia from Karachi130.  Arshad insinuated via email to Lillie that his situation was compromised, giving indication to the others that the plot was truly derailed131.  To his captors, Arshad admitted that the plot was only minimally advanced132.  Once he was in custody, he was given time with his interrogators in order to build trust, including eating and praying with them133.  Thus, by July 2002, he was offering significant intelligence on KSM and his West Coast plot, as well as other Malaysian operatives134.  Another of the plotters, Zaini Zakaria, a native of Kalentan, surrendered to Malaysian authorities on December 18, 2002, after failing to follow through on his orders from al-Qaida to conduct flight lessons and acquire the license to pilot airliners135.  While Arshad was the commander of the plot, Zakaria was delegated as the pilot for the hijacking unit136.  However, Zakaria, known to KSM as Musa, reneged on his responsibilities and vanished with his funds until his appearance in custody137.

Detonation in Djerba

As KSM was in a rush to carry out more external operations that were just not materializing, he pushed for assets all over the globe to activate and carry out latent orders.  This included taking advantage of trusted local agents.  In March 2002, he brought a new Pakistani into the fold138.  Mohamed Naim Noor Khan, was a native of Karachi, and possessed a technical acumen of value139. To the network he was known as Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and KSM assigned him a variety of taskings140. Nizar Mohamed Nasir Nawar meanwhile, was a distant operative, poised to strike abroad.  The Tunisian was unsuspecting, with family and friends unaware of his foray into radicalism.  However, at al-Qaida camps he gained the attention and respect of members such as Christian Ganczarski and Harun Fazul141.  Of note, Nizar received his explosives instruction at Ibn Sheikh al-Libi’s independent Khaldan camp142.  Yet the camp must have been inundated with al-Qaida associates and members as Harun Fazul marveled at Nizar’s techniques and ability to act as a lone operative143.  Ganczarski also acquainted himself with Nizar herein. 

Christian Ganczarski

Born in Poland in 1966, Ganczarski immigrated to Germany at age ten.  He was converted to Islam by an African coworker in the late 1980s while working in a German factory144.  In 1992, he was selected by a radical religious figure to attend a university in Medina, Saudi Arabia145.  Eventually radicalized, between 1999 and 2001 he traveled to Afghanistan on at least five occasions, becoming acquainted with and dedicated to senior al-Qaida leadership146.  Ganczarski was a trusted al-Qaida member, working closely with Mohamed Atef, Saif al-Adel, and Khalid Sheikh Mohamed.  During a January 2000 sermon by bin Laden at Tarnak Farms, Ganczarski sat in the front row, absorbing the diatribe, while simultaneously holding Saif al-Adel’s young son147.  The European asset was assigned as the handler for a plot revolving around Nizar, and held similar travel patterns to the persistent operative148.

Although the Tunisian departed in 1999, he returned often to Afghanistan for additional instruction149.  He was determined to carry out a mission.  He was dispatched for a final time from Afghanistan on September 4, 2001 150.  Perhaps this is coincidence, but most likely he was sent at this time on purpose by KSM.  There is concrete evidence to support the fact that KSM ordered and facilitated the plot.  While Nizar was known to work alone, wiretaps later revealed that he was consistently communicating via pay phone and satellite phone with KSM151.  Nizar used his family in such a way as to link them to the plot.  He managed to implicate his brother Walid Nawar by having him purchase a satellite phone for him while in Paris through an intermediary152.  The phone, purchased in January 2002, became Nizar’s primary form of communication with Ganczarski and KSM153.  It is telling that the international terrorist mastermind was freely using such forms of communication, and may represent a level of arrogance or a sincere lack of understanding on the vulnerabilities of such technology.  Meanwhile in January 2002, Nizar had established a viable front, where he now owned an import/export business, thus necessitating a large truck154.  In this manner, he engaged his unsuspecting uncle in the plot by having him weld a large storage tank to the truck, ostensibly for the transport of olive oil155. As for the complexities of funding the attacks, KSM utilized one of his associates in Karachi, a Pakistani-Canadian by the name of Issa Ismail Mohamed156.  This individual had a business relationship with a ceramics businessman in Spain named Enrique Cerda Ibanez157.  Known in Spain as Isaac de Karachi, the KSM associate faxed to Ibanez to expect to be contacted by a friend who would be the recipient of thousands of euros158.  Rather than an extremist, Ibanez appears to have been a corrupt businessman.  With individuals like Isaac de Karachi funneling funds to his business, he gladly maintained some profit, even if it meant he needed to transfer money to potential criminals, even terrorist networks159.  Nizar himself had received a phone number for Ibanez from KSM, and contacted the Spaniard for his money transfer in March160.  There was a delay in the transfer which resulted in Ibanez receiving prodding from Nizar’s brother Walid, and yet another fax from Isaac de Karachi161.  Yet another financial co-conspirator was Ahmed Rukhsar, a Spaniard of Pakistani descent who owned and operated a call center and food store162.  He was also implicated in funneling money to extremists via the likes of Isaac de Karachi.  Rukhsar apparently funneled over 2 million dollars in a short period of time163.  After the second fax from Pakistan, Ibanez and Rukhsar began transferring funds to Nizar, including on April 10, the penultimate day of Nizar’s life164. 

At the point of no return on April 11, Nizar made additional calls to his superiors.  One was to Christian Ganczarski at 0618 that morning requesting permission to carry forth with the bombing165.  Ganczarski answered in the affirmative giving him a religious blessing prior166.  Nizar also dialed KSM.  Around the same time, Ganczarski too called the external operations commander167.  For his bomb, Nizar filled his supposed olive oil tank with propane rigged to explode168.  For his target he chose the al-Ghriba synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, one of Africa’s oldest synagogues and a constant tourist attraction169.  Nizar drove the truck past security officers caught off guard and plowed into the wall of the synagogue.  The resulting explosion not only killed Nizar, but 14 German tourists, two French tourists, and at least three Tunisians170.  Rapidly, a claim of responsibility was faxed to Arabic language newspapers on April 16, containing Nizar’s martyrdom statement from all the way back in July 2000171.  The fax referred to Nizar by his full name and his kunya, Saifuddin al-Tunisi, and cited the ongoing plight of the Palestinians as the justification. While this did not immediately spark concern among Westerners, in June 2002, a familiar face claimed responsibility for the attack via video.  Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, the spokesman for al-Qaida discussed the incident in a video broadcast on al-Jazeera, claiming the attack, as well as extolling Nizar as a member of al-Qaida172.  He stated again that the debacle in Palestine was the justification of the synagogue strike173.  Previously Tunisia had suggested that the explosion may have been an accident, before they were forced to admit that it was indeed an intentional assault174.  By August, European authorities had connected Nizar to KSM through the satellite phone calls175.  The world now knew that al-Qaida was still in the process of lashing out against US, Israeli, and European interests. 

Ibanez and Rukhsar were arrested and charged in 2003176, before eventually being convicted and jailed in 2006177.  Nizar’s family, specifically his brother Walid, uncle Biljakim, and the friend who acted as an intermediary to procure the phone were all rounded up by the French for their roles in the attack, all the while claiming that they had no idea of Nizar’s nefarious intentions178.  Ganczarski and KSM were not available for immediate justice.

Responsibility and Ambitions

US officials made known their belief that the attack was orchestrated via al-Qaida officials in Iran, and included the operational debut of Saad bin Laden, one of Osama’s older sons179.  This intelligence claimed that Saad had organized and activated the plot180.  While Saad was known to associate in Iran initially with Saif al-Adel and other senior officials, he had been given responsibility over the bin Laden family in exile, which would seem to have been his primary focus181.  Furthermore, Saad was known to be autistic and unlikely to be acting independently of his family182.  This does not preclude Saif al-Adel’s involvement, as at the time he was the superior of KSM, ordering and overseeing operations183.  Sulaiman Abu Ghaith’s ability to create a video in Iran and have it broadcast demonstrates freedom of movement and communication within the Shiite nation at that time184.  The evidence however confirms that KSM was the actual mastermind and initiator of the plot.

Militants in Afghanistan rejoiced at the news of a successful external operation.  For example, in April, insurgent paramilitary captain Abu Laith al-Libi praised Nizar and the operation as conducted by al-Qaida185. Yet the attack was a paltry victory when compared to the lofty expectations of the vainglorious KSM. Many of his ambitions were unrealistic, multi-pronged, and cumbersome; unlikely to progress or succeed. He yearned for attacks against the FBI, CIA, American nuclear facilities, and skyscrapers186 [D]. His desires included plans in Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Maldives187. He entrusted Kashmiri operative Iyman Faris with severing the suspension cables of the Brooklyn Bridge188. He employed Abu Talha al-Pakistani in a complex plot to bring destruction to Heathrow Airport in London189. Shukrijumah had been tasked with surveilling for ship-borne attacks against the Panama Canal; as well as casing various targets in America190. Previously, KSM deployed the British Dhiren Barot in April 2001 to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance on potential targets within the United States, to include financial institutions191. Some plots were targets of opportunity, as he assigned the operative and former militant camp instructor Hamza al-Zubair to assail targets within Karachi itself192. Other plots were pragmatic and self-serving.

KSM was clearly aware of his surroundings and what local threats were presented to his haven.  With Pakistan now the training and operational epicenter of al-Qaida, he needed to shift the politics of the nation’s government.  To void this menace, KSM cooperated with al-Qaida paramilitary commander Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, in order to convene in spring 2002 and plot an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf193.  This solidifies that KSM was in direct communication with al-Qaida internal officials based in the Pakistani tribal agencies along the Afghan border. Both men would benefit from the removal of Musharraf, offering KSM some protection or relief in Karachi and other cities, while Abdulhadi gained reprieve in his region planning the insurgency in Afghanistan.  Despite this obvious need, KSM was not a tactician and thus he and his subordinates continued to focus on the increasingly elaborate strikes.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] This was the Saudi Mohamed Abdulrahman Saad al-Qahtani, known as Abu al-Maali, a known facilitator himself194, who was later assigned by KSM to shore up support among conservative Saudi ideologues for al Qaida Arabian operations, before being captured by the very nation he was targeting195.
  • [B] Of interest, Omar al-Hadhrami insinuated to Sharqawi that he was aware of al-Qaida operatives responsible for the 2001 Anthrax attacks196. KSM meanwhile, was only tangentially involved with anthrax, being aware of the Malaysian Yazid Sufaat, who was utilizing the guesthouse network and attempting to weaponize the bacteria for al-Qaida. KSM had also assisted Mohamed Atef in specific projects that enhanced this particular ambition197. It appears that he only officially took over the program after the assassination of Atef198
  • [C] Badat was arrested in Britain on November 27, 2003, remarkably still in possession of his device, which was subsequently proven a match to the one Reid carried199. Badat became a cooperating witness in several terrorism trials200.
  • [D] These targets included the Library Tower of Los Angeles, the Empire State Building of New York, the Sears Tower of Chicago, and the Plaza Bank, of Washington state201.
  1. The American War in Afghanistan: A History, Carter Malkasian, Oxford University Press, 2021 ↩︎
  2. Guantanamo Assessment File, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, ISN 10024, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10024.html ↩︎
  3. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ali Abdulaziz Ali, (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISN 10018, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10018.html ↩︎
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  12. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ramzi Binalshibh, ISN 10013, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10013.html ↩︎
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  18. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1460, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1460.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1461, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1461.html ↩︎
  19. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1460, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1460.html ↩︎
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  21. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1460, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1460.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1461, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1461.html ↩︎
  22. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1460, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1460.html ↩︎
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  24. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdu Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, ISN 1457, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1457.html ↩︎
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  134. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  135. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 // Malaysian linked to 2002 Calif. terror plot, NBC News via The Associated Press, February 9, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11266564 ↩︎
  136. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  137. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  138. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  139. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  140. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  141. Polish-Born Muslim Convert Sentenced for Leading Role in Tunisian Synagogue Bombing, by Raffaello Pantucci, Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol 6, Issue 6, February 25, 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/polish-born-muslim-convert-sentenced-for-leading-role-in-tunisian-synagogue-bombing/ // al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, The War against Islam: the Story of Harun Fazul, Autobiography of Harun Fazul, February 2009 ↩︎
  142. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  143. al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, The War against Islam: the Story of Harun Fazul, Autobiography of Harun Fazul, February 2009 ↩︎
  144. Polish-Born Muslim Convert Sentenced for Leading Role in Tunisian Synagogue Bombing, by Raffaello Pantucci, Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol 6, Issue 6, February 25, 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/polish-born-muslim-convert-sentenced-for-leading-role-in-tunisian-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  145. Polish-Born Muslim Convert Sentenced for Leading Role in Tunisian Synagogue Bombing, by Raffaello Pantucci, Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol 6, Issue 6, February 25, 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/polish-born-muslim-convert-sentenced-for-leading-role-in-tunisian-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  146. United States District Court Southern District of New York, USA v. Christian Ganczarski, Superseding Indictment ↩︎
  147. United States District Court Southern District of New York, USA v. Christian Ganczarski, Superseding Indictment ↩︎
  148. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  149. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ // al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, The War against Islam: the Story of Harun Fazul, Autobiography of Harun Fazul, February 2009 ↩︎
  150. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  151. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  152. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  153. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  154. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  155. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  156. 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ ↩︎
  157. 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ // Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  158. 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ // Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  159. 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ ↩︎
  160. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  161. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  162. Spanish Judge Jails Al-Qaida Suspects, The Intelligencer, March 11, 2003, https://www.theintelligencer.com/news/article/Spanish-Judge-Jails-Al-Qaida-Suspects-10579573.php // 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ // Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  163. 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ ↩︎
  164. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  165. Polish-Born Muslim Convert Sentenced for Leading Role in Tunisian Synagogue Bombing, by Raffaello Pantucci, Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol 6, Issue 6, February 25, 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/polish-born-muslim-convert-sentenced-for-leading-role-in-tunisian-synagogue-bombing/ // Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  166. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  167. Polish-Born Muslim Convert Sentenced for Leading Role in Tunisian Synagogue Bombing, by Raffaello Pantucci, Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol 6, Issue 6, February 25, 2009, https://jamestown.org/program/polish-born-muslim-convert-sentenced-for-leading-role-in-tunisian-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  168. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  169. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  170. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  171. Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing, by Aaron Y Zelin, CTC Sentinel, Vol 10, Issue 4, April 2017, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fifteen-years-after-the-djerba-synagogue-bombing/ ↩︎
  172. Al-Qaeda claims Tunisia attack, BBC News, June 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2061071.stm ↩︎
  173. Al-Qaeda claims Tunisia attack, BBC News, June 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2061071.stm ↩︎
  174. Al-Qaeda claims Tunisia attack, BBC News, June 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2061071.stm ↩︎
  175. Synagogue Attack Linked to Al-Qaida: “There is not decline in action, and there are indications of new plans,” Says a Top German Police Official, by Douglas Frantz and Desmond Butler, The New York Times, August 23, 2002, https://greensboro.com/synagogue-attack-linked-to-al-qaida-there-is-no-decline-in-action-and-there-are/article_ff504133-b2af-5228-a76a-a6f4afb2bd54.html ↩︎
  176. Spanish Judge Jails Al-Qaida Suspects, The Intelligencer, March 11, 2003, https://www.theintelligencer.com/news/article/Spanish-Judge-Jails-Al-Qaida-Suspects-10579573.php ↩︎
  177. 2 men convicted in Tunisia bombing, by Al Goodman CNN, May 10, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/10/spain.tunisia.bombing/ ↩︎
  178. French Judge Questions Tunisian Synagogue Bombing Suspects, VOA News, November 12, 2002, https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2002-11-12-8-french-67252847/266948.html ↩︎
  179. Bin Laden son ‘takes leading role’, BBC News, July 30, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2161232.stm // Al-Qaida finds safe haven in Iran, by Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 24, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8330976 ↩︎
  180. Bin Laden son ‘takes leading role’, BBC News, July 30, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2161232.stm // Al-Qaida finds safe haven in Iran, by Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 24, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8330976 ↩︎
  181. Osama bin Laden’s family on the run: ‘I never stopped praying our lives might return to normal’, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Guardian, May 6, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/osama-bin-laden-family-on-the-run-after-9-11 ↩︎
  182. Osama bin Laden’s family on the run: ‘I never stopped praying our lives might return to normal’, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Guardian, May 6, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/osama-bin-laden-family-on-the-run-after-9-11 ↩︎
  183. Saif al-Adel letter to Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, dated June 13, 2002 // Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim al-Nashiri, ISN 10015, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10015.html ↩︎
  184. Al-Qaeda claims Tunisia attack, BBC News, June 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2061071.stm ↩︎
  185. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  186. Guantanamo Assessment File, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, ISN 10024, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10024.html ↩︎
  187. Guantanamo Assessment File, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, ISN 10024, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10024.html ↩︎
  188. US Department of Justice Press Release, Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda, October 28, 2003, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/October/03_crm_589.htm ↩︎
  189. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ali Abdulaziz Ali, (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISN 10018, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10018.html ↩︎
  190. Guantanamo Assessment File, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, ISN 10024, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10024.html ↩︎
  191. 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims At The American Homeland, 2004 // How a barbershop arrest led to heart of al-Qaeda’s web, by Jamie Doward, The Guardian, November 11, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/nov/12/alqaida.terrorism // Al-Qaida’s New York surveillance video released, by Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 15, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19254592 ↩︎
  192. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1460, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1460.html ↩︎
  193. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  194. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdu Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, ISN 1457, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1457.html ↩︎
  195. Path of Blood:  The Story of Al-Qaeda’s War on the House of Saud, Thomas Small and Jonathan Hacker, Simon & Schuster UK, 2015 ↩︎
  196. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdu Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi, ISN 1457, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1457.html ↩︎
  197. Guantanamo Assessment File, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, ISN 10024, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10024.html ↩︎
  198. Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing of ISN 10024, March 10, 2007, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Detainne_Related/15-L-1645_CSRT%20Transcript%20ISN%2010024_10-mar-07.pdf ↩︎
  199. British National Indicted for Conspiring with “Shoe Bomber” Richard Reid, US Department of Justice Press Release, October 4, 2004, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/October/04_crm_673.htm ↩︎
  200. Shoe-bomber supergrass Saajid Badat testifies in US, by Laura Trevelyan, BBC News, April 24, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-17820810 ↩︎
  201. Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, March 10, 2007, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Detainne_Related/15-L-1645_CSRT%20Transcript%20ISN%2010024_10-mar-07.pdf ↩︎

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