SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Internal Structure Post-2001

Written by Nolan R Beasley

In order to chronicle the initial CIA drone strikes in Pakistan during the early aughts in a separate series, Predators of the Khorasan, it is imperative that we examine and understand the actual hierarchy and structure of al-Qaida in its post 9/11 manifestation. Therefore, this Series reverts back to 2002 and the development of the internal structure of al-Qaida, after the conclusion of the initial US invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the Taliban. Dark Years of al-Qaida will explore the personalities of interest and their actions during the years between the fall of the Taliban and the full commencement of the drone war in 2008. This was a period where the militants of Afghanistan and Pakistan were not persistently observed in the media cycle, and overall focus was primarily on their counterparts in Iraq. During this time, the militants in the Khorasan, both al-Qaida and the Taliban, were viewed as defeated, only to resurface with a vengeance in the middle-aughts. In fact, al-Qaida was quite active in this period, politically, paramilitarily, and operationally. Only with this examination can we understand exactly whom the CIA was hunting during the later drone campaign and why they were sought.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Majlis ash-Shura

The Internal structure of al-Qaida evolved drastically after the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the failed culminating engagement at Tora Bora. The objectives and misfortunes of Tora Bora will be discussed elsewhere, but its ramifications will be examined herein. During the invasion, elements of al-Qaida and other foreign fighters were ferried out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, with several returning to their home countries. Among these were many of whom successfully escaped from Tora Bora1. Others fled from other rendezvous points within Afghanistan2. Among those escapees were almost all of the senior al-Qaida hierarchy. Certain dedicated militant elements remained in Afghanistan and were themselves engaged in March 2002 during the Battle of Shah I Kot, or Operation Anaconda, which resulted in heavy casualties for both the Americans, Taliban, al-Qaida and associated militants (particularly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) 3. After this, most of the foreign militant presence was driven to the havens across the border in tribal Pashtun Pakistan; autonomous regions, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies, or FATA. From here the foreign elements plotted and conducted cross border raids, reestablished their echelons, maintained interoperability with the Taliban, and reinstated their training regimens. All of this with minimal interference from Pakistani authorities. It proved a perspicacious displacement decision, as American authorities were initially reticent to conduct, and were prevented from, direct military action across the border in Pakistan. First though as they coalesced in other Pakistani territories, al-Qaida forces of early 2002 were in desperate need of competent leadership and direction.

This was precipitated by significant upheaval within the Majlis ash-Shura of al-Qaida, which was an executive council overseeing multiple committees that held responsibilities for specific facets of the militant and terror network. According to former FBI special agent Ali Soufan, prior to 9/11 and after the 1998 Embassy Bombings, the Majlis ash-Shura of al-Qaida was comprised of bin Laden and nine select lieutenants 4.  Bin Laden was of course the primary participant and executive, but as was astutely observed by Soufan and other investigators, the council was otherwise dominated by Africans 5. This was a direct result of the extensive working relationship between al-Qaida and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad contingent, as demonstrated by their infamous co-signed Fatwa in February 1998, issued against Americans and American interests6. This relationship culminated in the June 2001 merging of the two entities7. Also based in Afghanistan, and having previously dwelled with al-Qaida in the Sudan, the Egyptians displayed the tendency to remain in jihadist theatres and havens due to a government in their native land which was hostile to their cause8.

Of the ten councilors, only bin Laden and senior ideologue Abu Hafs al-Mauritani were not Egyptian 9.  Some of the Egyptians had been with bin Laden since the early days in Afghanistan, traveled with him to Sudan, and back to Afghanistan10 . Their names were prominently listed on a recovered document declaring 170 al-Qaida members, which seems to have been dated in late 1998 or early 1999 as it references the Embassy bombings11.  Mohamed Atef (Abu Hafs al-Masri) is listed third, behind bin Laden and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri (the original paramilitary commander, who perished in 1996, drowning in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria 12).  Sheikh Said al-Masri was fourth13.  Abu Mohamed al-Masri and Saif al-Adel were listed as seventh and eighth respectively14.  With the interrelation and merging with Zawahiri’s EIJ, Zawahiri himself was added to this council alongside of some of his men: Abu Khayr al-Masri (Abdullah Abdulrahman Mohamed Rajab Abdulrahman) and Mohamed Salah (Nasir Fahmi Nasir Hussanain)15 [A].  In fact, al-Qaida insiders described Abu Khayr as one of the most venerated men in the operation, and that he acted as the direct liaison between EIJ and al-Qaida interests16.  Additionally, Abu Khayr was said to be the liaison to the Taliban17.  Salah meanwhile was postulated by the FBI as the Shura liaison to other jihadists and militants in the region of varying backgrounds18.  The final member of the Shura may have been Ali Said Mohamed Mustafa al-Bakri, (Abdulaziz al-Masri), as per his description in his US State Department terrorist designation published in October 200519.  Number 148 on the aforementioned recovered roster is declared to be an Abdulaziz al-Masri, demonstrating his possible candidacy20.  Bakri was a specialist in chemicals and participated in the elevated training of advanced militant students21.  On September 23, 2001 the Bush Administration unveiled Executive Order 13224 which designated specific foreign nationals as terrorists as determined by the Departments of State, the Treasury, and Justice. It is worth noting that the initial list of these designated nationals focused on al-Qaida and included seven of the Shura councilors 22 [B]. Five had already been indicted for the 1998 Embassy bombings23 [C].

There were additional characters affiliated with the council. Abu Asim al-Maghrebi (Abdullah Tabarak) sat in on the meetings also, as at the time he was one of the primary protectors of bin Laden, even though he was not officially a councilor24.  Most important was Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, who was described by the US government as a member of al-Qaida’s “senior advisory” council, having ascended to this role in 200025. Captured al-Qaida operatives reiterated the importance of the Iraqi and the belief that he may have been a councilor26. This seems to be related to his elevated role in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance, with bin Laden providing the Iraqi’s services to their hosts.  He directly liaised with the Taliban on behalf of bin Laden, in order to enshrine the place of the Arabs and foreigners within Afghanistan27. Lastly, al-Qaida spokesperson, the Kuwaiti Sulaiman Abu Ghaith was described by the CIA as a member of the Shura Majlis, but the FBI differed in this opinion28.  While Abu Ghaith was undeniably a member of al-Qaida’s Media sub-Committee at this point, he does not seem to have actually been a Shura councilor.

The Roles and Fates of the Councilors

With the interoperability of al-Qaida and EIJ, came a delineation of responsibilities.  Bin Laden was assisted by these aforementioned Majlis al-Shura councilors and others in advisory roles, and several of these individuals ran specifically focused sub-Committees29. Firstly, a Military Committee was helmed by Mohamed Atef, with Saif al-Adel as a second30.  Training and instruction at the al-Qaida established militant camps was the purview of Abu Mohamed al-Masri (Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah)31.  He was assisted in this by the Palestinian-Egyptian Hamza al-Zubair32.  Combat operations and command of Brigade 55, (their actual fighting force; an all foreign contingent of the Taliban military provided by bin Laden to his hosts33), fell to Abdulhadi al-Iraqi34.  Abdulhadi swore allegiance to bin Laden in 1999, ensuring his increased military responsibility35.  He was familiar with and also preferred by the Taliban to manage foreign elements along their front lines36. Bin Laden even later discussed the Taliban’s appointment of the Iraqi within the Taliban military structure, and how this responsibility necessitated the Iraqi’s close proximity and advisory position to the Majlis ash-Shura37.

As such, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, known as Nashwan Abdulrazaq Abdulbaqi al-Tamir38, was bin Laden’s military commander for the Bagram, Kunduz, and Kabul front lines, commanding the all Arab Brigade 55 for the Taliban39.  As mentioned, this was bin Laden’s contribution to the Taliban military, with the Abdulhadi in charge of all Arab foreign fighters, and with bin Laden himself involved in the command and control40.  Thus, Abdulhadi was bin Laden’s direct military representative for Taliban purposes41.  Abdulhadi had also been known as Abdulmuhaiman al-Iraqi, corresponding with number 46 on the aforementioned roster of al-Qaida members from the late 1990s42. 

Atef was ordered by bin Laden to vacate his desired position along the front lines and lead from a commander’s perspective, while Abdulhadi helmed the fight on the front lines43. This protected Atef and made him a general of Arab and foreign forces, while Abdulhadi held control of ground operations.  Beyond the local scale of Afghanistan, a global operations portion of the Military sub-Committee, which concerned terrorist maneuvers, also existed, and was technically overseen by both Atef and Adel44.

Second, Adel was the all-important leader of a Security Committee, ensuring leadership was safe, while preventing espionage, assassination, and maintaining a reliable infrastructure and logistical apparatus for the safe conduct of their operations45.  The Saudi Hamza al-Ghamdi and the Egyptian Khalid Habib joined Adel at this table46.  Third, a Political Committee was specifically given to Zawahiri47.  This makes sense as two of his prominent men and Shura councilors, Abu Khayr al-Masri and Mohammed Salah were vital in cultivating and maintaining relationships with both the Taliban and other jihadist networks dwelling in Afghanistan48.  Fourth, a Media Committee was the eventual project of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohamed49.  He was notably absent from the proposed list of Shura members. This was likely due to his late arrival to the organization and initial hesitance to swear fealty to bin Laden50. Nonetheless, he gained enough trust to chair the sub-Committee. Initially, all media matters were also the purview of Mohamed Atef51.  Fifth, the Financial Committee was the duty of Sheikh Said al-Masri, who continued in this role from throughout the 1990s52.  Another Egyptian, Sheikh Fateh was seen by American authorities as the manager of Salaries53. While within Afghanistan, Sheikh Said was assisted in funding matters by a militant known as Hamza al-Qatari54.  Sixth, a Religious, Legal, or Sharia committee was helmed by Abu Hafs al-Mauritani (Mahfouz Ould al-Walid)55.  Sheikh Said assisted the Mauritanian with the legal committee56, although it was noted that Abu Hafs was the only officially trained scholar within the Shura57.

After Tora Bora, the Shura Councilors were scattered, with some fleeing to Pakistan and others to Iran. While initially afforded some free movement, those in Iran were and placed under increasingly restricted detention beginning in late 2002, through the middle of 200358. Those of the Majlis al-Shura apprehended were Saif al-Adel, Abu Khayr al-Masri, Abu Mohamed al-Masri, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, and Abu Abdulaziz al-Masri59. Meanwhile, bin Laden and Zawahiri disappeared, blending into their havens within Pakistan. Prior to Tora Bora, Mohamed Atef was killed in a US bombing raid on his residence in Kabul on the night of November 12-13, 2001, having remained behind due to an injury60. The capital was abandoned by the Taliban and al-Qaida the next day61. The subsequent retreat led some in a column to Khost62. Bombings there in mid-November claimed the life of Mohamed Salah (Nasir Fahmi Nasir Hussanain)63. Thus, the only freely mobile and potentially operational Shura member was Sheikh Said al-Masri. The surviving paramilitary commander was Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, although his organized forces and those of his Taliban hosts had been devastated during the US bombing campaigns. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM) remained operational in Karachi, attempting to conduct further plots and attacks against Western and American interests.

Sheikh Said al-Masri

KSM and his fellows oversaw an infrastructure in Karachi poised to be a base for al-Qaida operations and governance.  The remaining Majlis ash-Shura member resided there as well.  Sheikh Said al-Masri, while in Karachi, continued to maintain responsibility for al-Qaida finances64.  As such, in March 2002, he received the capable Saudi Mustafa al-Hawsawi from KSM, assigned to assist with managing financial affairs65. This was due to the death of his immediate subordinate Hamza al-Qatari, whose demise in Afghanistan was reported by the press and militants alike in March 200266. The Qatari was actually killed fighting in the “defense” of Kandahar during the invasion in latter 2001, as reported directly by Saif al-Adel67. The Egyptian Shura councilor was dedicated to his cause, and needed the replacement to continue conspiring on behalf of al-Qaida.

Sheikh Said al-Masri was the Egyptian Mustafa Ahmed Mohamed Othman Abu al-Yazid68.  He was born in 1955 in Sharqia, Egypt (with various specific dates given)69.  After becoming radicalized, Yazid was arrested in the aftermath of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981, and was incarcerated for three years70.  Upon release, he became intimately involved with Zawahiri and his EIJ establishment, before migrating to Afghanistan in 1988 for jihad71.  Therein he became a fervent adherent of bin Laden, and followed him to Sudan, where he managed finances for bin Laden’s front companies72.  The Egyptian evolved into a vital bin Laden colleague, and replaced the Saudi Madani al-Tayib as the financial executive of al-Qaida73.  Subsequently, he assumed his role on the all important Majlis ash-Shura74. He was responsible for doling out the salaries of al-Qaida members and employees, and helping them with various other expenses75.  When it came time to depart Sudan, he followed bin Laden back again to Afghanistan76. 

Sheikh Said benefited from a collective confusion over his identity, and his conflation with various other militant figures.  Very rapidly after the 9/11 attacks, the press began to report on Mustafa al-Hawsawi’s role in forwarding funds to the hijackers77.  However, as he used the identity Mustafa Mohamed Ahmed, reporters and others associated him with Sheikh Said al-Masri78.  This was assuredly due to their similar given names, and the known role of Sheikh Said as the financial master of al-Qaida (information gleaned from the testimony of former al-Qaida member and cooperating witness Jamal al-Fadl in the 1990s79).  The aforementioned Executive Order 13224 incorrectly presents Sheikh Said’s alias as Mustafa Mohamed Ahmed80. Furthering the confusion, Sheikh Said was twisted in the report with the Pakistani militant and Harakat ul-Mujahidin official, Ahmed Omar Said Sheikh, freed during the December 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking to Afghanistan, and intimately involved in the 2002 abduction of American Daniel Pearl81.  This is especially interesting, considering that this report came out prior to Pearl’s abduction, and that Sheikh Said al-Masri eventually sided with KSM in Karachi, supporting the execution of the Wall Street journalist82.  Additionally, frequent lists published by the Associated Press displaying the status of al-Qaida officials during the early stages of the war, also often meshed Sheikh Said al-Masri with bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Saad al-Sharif, to form a false moniker of Sheikh Said al-Sharif83.

ABU FARAJ AL-LIBI

Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and his network in the cities of Pakistan will be discussed at length later, along with his plots and operations from 2001 to 2003. Many in al-Qaida found the situations in Pakistan’s cities to be untenable and sought an alternative haven. For example, al-Qaida members and families located in Peshawar eventually realized the pressure they were under from Pakistani authorities and searched for a proper escape route.  The majority began relocating to the aforementioned Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan along the eastern border of Afghanistan. 

Particularly, al-Qaida migrated to the agencies of Bajaur, as well as North and South Waziristan84.  In Bajaur, they dwelled in territory overseen by the local militant organization, Tehreek e Nafaz e Shariat e Mohammedi, or TNSM85.  TNSM official Maulvi Faqir Mohamed assisted in facilitating the al-Qaida assets and families into the FATA86.  After escaping the disaster in Afghanistan, Zawahiri eventually migrated from North Waziristan to Bajaur and enmeshed himself with the likes of the TNSM with Faqir Mohamed and his men87.  Marrying again into the local Mohmand tribe, Zawahiri ensured that he would remain protected by the locals, and further fostered his bonds with Faqir Mohamed and the TNSM88. With the exception of Zawahiri, the most important militant who also eventually conspired from and rooted in Bajaur was Abu Faraj al-Libi89. 

Abu Faraj had attempted to join the jihad in Afghanistan as early as 1989, but a series of failures and arrests in Egypt and Tunisia prevented his arrival to Pakistan until 199090.  Once there he transited to Afghanistan and trained at the early iteration of the al-Faruq camp in Khost before being selected for advancement due to his rigorous dedication and work ethic.  In 1990 he was offered membership in the fledging al-Qaida organization, an offer which he readily accepted91.  Once, when bin Laden pontificated at Jihad Wahl in 1991, Abu Faraj listened intently to the cause of al-Qaida92.  The Libyan fought in Afghanistan, but mostly found his calling in logistics.  As such, he was employed at the Jihad Wahl and Khallad camps initially and eventually as an administrator for al-Qaida at al-Faruq.  Despite al-Qaida resettling in Sudan, Abu Faraj remained in the Pakistan-Afghanistan arena and continued to teach classes at al-Faruq, to include topography, and was vital in providing the necessary administrative and logistic services required for the camp to function.  Eventually, his time as a weapons instructor ceased due to medical concerns with his vision, and he focused solely on administration93.  At one point in the early 1990s, al-Qaida sent Abu Faraj to Peshawar, Pakistan for classes on Islamic Law94.  Strangely, despite being employed by al-Qaida, Abu Faraj did not meet bin Laden personally until his return to Afghanistan from Sudan95.  It was at this point that Abu Faraj was included in summits of the upper echelon96.  This may explain a lack of detail on Abu Faraj from early al-Qaida conspirators.  He simply was yet to be in the trusted inner circle of bin Laden.   

This changed though, and Abu Faraj was considered primary contact for the training camps.  When the Americans launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in response to the Embassy bombings in August 1998, both Jihad Wahl and the original al-Faruq were destroyed, leading Abu Faraj to the unpleasant conclusion that the camps in their previous forms no longer existed and must cease operations97.  That being said, Abu Faraj received direct orders from Mohamed Atef to reopen the camps98.  They were integrated into one larger, more efficient al-Faruq camp, originally opened in Kabul but quickly moved to its new home outside of Kandahar by the end of 199999.  Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (Abu Mohamed al-Masri) was in turn placed in charge of all al-Qaida training and camps, perhaps due to Abu Faraj preparing for a wedding at this time, and most likely as a reward for the Egyptian’s successful operations in East Africa against American Embassies100.  Instead of camps, Abu Faraj was placed in charge of a duo of guesthouses in Kabul, a position he maintained until the 9/11 attacks and beyond101.  The al-Qaida roster listed him at 108102, while a further militant source described Abu Faraj as belonging to the second tier of vital al-Qaida leadership103.

On the day the World Trade Center fell, Abu Faraj was watching television with Mohamed Atef, who correctly predicted a massive American response to the attacks104.  Abu Faraj was able to maintain his location in Kabul until the city was taken in November.  While there he received last minute orders from bin Laden and eventually assisted other fighters and their families in fleeing.  The Libyan did not however join the exodus that made their last stand at Tora Bora.  Abu Faraj fled first to Kandahar, where he collected his wife, then on to Gardez, where he organized nearly 200 militants’ retreat to back to Kandahar105.  Eventually the Libyan made his way to Pakistan with his family, where he went underground into obscurity for months106.  Despite his hiding, he still participated in the creation and publication of the 9/11 attacks anniversary commemoration media effort, via coordinating with KSM and his nephew Ammar al-Baluchi of the media committee during the months of June and July 2002107. 

Apparently, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi needed specific assistance in his paramilitary efforts, and brought Abu Faraj from hiding in order to make him his deputy in Peshawar during October 2002108.  From this Pakistani city, Abu Faraj again fell into working administrative duties and providing logistics, this time to the insurgents fighting across the border in Afghanistan109.  By November 2002, al-Qaida communications referred to Abdulhadi as the commander of internal paramilitary efforts, with Abu Faraj acknowledged as his deputy110.

Evidenced by his close relationship with Mohamed Atef, the Libyan was also deeply trusted by senior al-Qaida leadership, specifically both bin Laden and Zawahiri.  When significant al-Qaida figures were captured in spring 2003, Zawahiri fled his safehouse and linked with a trusted Afghan courier known as Firad al-Afghani111.  The Afghan escorted him to Abu Faraj, who then ensured that Zawahiri was safely transplanted to the Shakai Valley of South Waziristan and into another protected living situation112. 

Internal Operations and the FATA

Now in a state of war and disarray, bin Laden concocted a new approach in delineating areas of responsibility for al-Qaida.  As such, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed took the appointment of External Operations commander, focused on the obvious: attacks outside of the immediate war theater.  For al-Qaida Internal Operations, relating to Afghanistan, Pakistan, the war at hand, and managerial duties, Abu Faraj al-Libi was selected113.  It was not until December 2002 that bin Laden was able to put it in writing that KSM was the commander of External Operations, even after KSM was conducting a variety of actions and potential operations114. It was even later that Abu Faraj received his official calling.

Bin Laden dispatched the enigmatic courier “Abdulkhaliq Jan” to Peshawar, arriving in July 2003, with a message of importance for Abu Faraj al-Libi115.  The Libyan was tasked with receiving and distribution of funds for families of militants in Pakistan, raising those funds, and facilitating movements116.  Thus, Abu Faraj relocated to Abbottabad, Pakistan, in order to accomplish these tasks.  Most importantly however, Abu Faraj was delegated by bin Laden to be his sole point of contact, distributing orders and messages from bin Laden to subordinates and associates in Pakistan and the rest of the theatre117.  Thus, Abu Faraj became the gateway to bin Laden.  This inherently complicated the status of Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, who viewed himself as the primary actor on bin Laden’s behalf in the region.  Thus, from August 2003 forward, Abu Faraj carried the direction of al-Qaida and spoke with the voice of bin Laden118.  This can be seen as the point where Abu Faraj essentially assumed the role of managing al-Qaida and maintaining Internal Operations.  This was a natural progression of his previous logistics tasking, which had seen him supply and maintain the war theatre in a satisfactory manner since 2002119.  In this manner, while Abdulhadi al-Iraqi held focus on military and political matters, Abu Faraj had already slowly taken on the necessary qualities and responsibilities for Internal Operations.  Some analysts thus see his unofficial ascension occurring in 2002120.  It was in this expanded occupation that Abu Faraj eventually settled into Bajaur agency in 2004121. 

But we must also take a moment to observe the hostile al-Qaida presence elsewhere in the FATA. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi convened his forces, lived, and fought, while established in the Shakai Valley of South Waziristan122.  According to a young jihadist interviewed by Newsweek, the al-Qaida associated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group commander Abu Laith al-Libi lived at a hidden camp in remote South Waziristan, presumably the same in Shakai Valley, with senior militants, related to al-Qaida and EIJ 123.   These included EIJ and al-Qaida loyalist and security protocol operator Hamza Rabia, and explosives and chemical expert Abu Khabab al-Masri (Midhat Mursi)124.  

Although his paramilitary campaign inflicted casualties against American forces125, all was not entirely smooth for Abdulhadi al-Iraqi.  Yes, he became the chieftain of al-Qaida’s military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the primary al-Qaida representative on the ground126.  Yet he inserted himself on the Majlis ash-Shura, without apparently, the proper authority to do so, and his personality grated on his colleagues127.  Thus, tensions grew.  Nonetheless a community of the jihadists was created around his base in the Shakai Valley.  Pakistani militant operative Hassan Ghul, the subject of intense Pakistani manhunts in 2002, moved to the Shakai Valley and linked with Abdulhadi at this base of operations128.  Having departed Karachi, Ghul was wary of some local contacts in the cities and was eager to avoid more raids which had already plagued al-Qaida safehouses 129.  Abu Faraj al-Libi acted as a mediator between Ghul and Hamza Rabia, and also assisted Ghul in funneling Gulf funds to Abdulhadi for the benefit of the jihadist enclave within Shakai in the summer of 2003130.  Ghul represented the transition of al-Qaida operatives and facilitators migrating from the volatile urban centers to the rural security of the FATA. Thus, Abu Faraj was tasked with managing the coalescing of these disparate personalities. Via a network of couriers, of which bin Laden bodyguard and host Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti was key, the al-Qaida emir continued to give orders and written messages to his primary functionaries, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi in Shakai and Abu Faraj elsewhere131. Abu Faraj even traveled to South Waziristan in order to directly communicate with subordinates and peers such as Hamza Rabia, and pass along specific orders from the al-Qaida hierarchy132

The Shakai base persisted and was continuously utilized by al-Qaida despite infrequent Pakistani interference.  Abdulhadi’s exploits in the paramilitary realm will be discussed later, but suffice to say now, that al-Qaida senior leadership, particularly the Egyptians of South Waziristan staunchly maintained their influence on these operations. Among these Egyptians were al-Qaida stalwarts, including Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah (Abu Abdulrahman al-Muhajir – an explosives expert wanted by the FBI for the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa133), Hamza Rabia (the Zawahiri loyalist responsible for security and technical concerns134), Midhat Mursi (Abu Khabab al-Masri – another explosives and chemical expert135), Khalid Habib (the bin Laden protector, Security council member, and paramilitary official136); Ahmed Said al-Khadr (an Egyptian-Canadian placed in charge of relations with the tribal Pashtun militias137), Abu al-Hasan al-Masri (another paramilitary officer known to have been deployed with the jihadists to Somalia in the early 1990s, and of whom bin Laden referenced regarding a dream just after 9/11138); Hamza al-Jawfi (the fractious procurer of weaponry139); Sheikh Issa al-Masri (the ideologue that was to have a dramatic impact on the beliefs of the local Pashtun militants140); and Sami Tufankashi (known as Abu Abdulrahman BM, another weapons expert and instructor141). By November 2003, Sheikh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Othman Abu al-Yazid) made his permanent residence within South Waziristan at Shakai, while his son Abdullah was used as a liaison to the rest of his family in Dera Ismail Khan142.  They had migrated to the North West Frontier Province and FATA from Karachi, where safety concerns increasingly mounted. As if his authority was not endangered enough by the Egyptians, Abdulhadi was also rivaled by compatriot LIFG paramilitary commander Abu Laith al-Libi, whom dwelled and based among them, and whose services al-Qaida coveted143.

Thus, there was no dearth of capable militants of importance in South Waziristan, as they coalesced and plotted in this haven far away from the dangerous Pakistani cities where Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and his acolytes fared much less well in 2002-2003.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] The 1999 Egyptian mass trial of EIJ members, known by the moniker “The Returnees from Albania” case, clarified the EIJ primary echelon to include Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Khayr al-Masri, and Mohamed Salah. As their names do not appear on the late 1990s al-Qaida roster, while seven of the Shura in fact do, their inclusion in this trial proves them as the individuals joining the al-Qaida Shura as a part of the merging of al-Qaida and EIJ. Of note, another famous member of the EIJ council, Said Imam al-Sharif, who later renounced all jihadist violence, claimed that Zawahiri merged al-Qaida with the idea of the EIJ only, and that only a mere eight members actually traveled and joined with him. Obviously, these included both Abu Khayr and Mohamed Salah.
  • [B] These seven designated by EO 13224 on September 23, 2001 were bin Laden, Mohamed Atef, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Saif al-Adel, Sheikh Said al-Masri, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, and Mohamed Salah
  • [C] These five indicted for the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Africa were bin Laden, Mohamed Atef, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Saif al-Adel, and Abu Mohammed al-Masri
  1. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdu Ali al-Haji al-Sharqawi (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN 1457, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1457.html ↩︎
  2. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim al-Nashiri, ISN 10015, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10015.html ↩︎
  3. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf // Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002, by Adam Geibel, Military Review March-April 2002, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Operation-Anaconda-Shah-i-Khot-Valley-Afghanistan/ ↩︎
  4. Next in Line to Lead al-Qa`ida: A Profile of Abu Muhammad al-Masri, by Ali Soufan, CTC Sentinel, Vol 12, Issue 10, November 2019, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/next-line-lead-al-qaida-profile-abu-muhammad-al-masri/ ↩︎
  5. Next in Line to Lead al-Qa`ida: A Profile of Abu Muhammad al-Masri, by Ali Soufan, CTC Sentinel, Vol 12, Issue 10, November 2019, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/next-line-lead-al-qaida-profile-abu-muhammad-al-masri/ ↩︎
  6. Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement, signed by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al, 23 February 1998, https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm ↩︎
  7. United Nations Security Council Sanctions, Resolution 1267, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, listed on October 6, 2001, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/egyptian-islamic-jihad ↩︎
  8. The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrell, Oxford University Press, 2015 // Next in Line to Lead al-Qa`ida: A Profile of Abu Muhammad al-Masri, by Ali Soufan, CTC Sentinel, Vol 12, Issue 10, November 2019, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/next-line-lead-al-qaida-profile-abu-muhammad-al-masri/ ↩︎
  9. Next in Line to Lead al-Qa`ida: A Profile of Abu Muhammad al-Masri, by Ali Soufan, CTC Sentinel, Vol 12, Issue 10, November 2019, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/next-line-lead-al-qaida-profile-abu-muhammad-al-masri/ ↩︎
  10. Trial Transcript of Jamal al-Fadl Testimony, USA vs. Osama bin Laden Day 2, February 6, 2001, https://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm // al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, The War against Islam: the Story of Harun Fazul, Autobiography of Harun Fazul, February 2009 ↩︎
  11. Evidence Collection, List of 170 Al-Qaida Members, recovered 2001 from home of Mohamed Atef ↩︎
  12. Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri profile, CTC at West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Abu_Ubayda_al-Banshiri.pdf ↩︎
  13. Evidence Collection, List of 170 Al-Qaida Members, recovered 2001 from home of Mohamed Atef, Ref Number: AFGP-2002-600046, Combatting Terrorism Center – West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/List-of-Names-of-Al-Qaida-Members-Translation.pdf ↩︎
  14. Evidence Collection, List of 170 Al-Qaida Members, recovered 2001 from home of Mohamed Atef, Ref Number: AFGP-2002-600046, Combatting Terrorism Center – West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/List-of-Names-of-Al-Qaida-Members-Translation.pdf ↩︎
  15. Next in Line to Lead al-Qa`ida: A Profile of Abu Muhammad al-Masri, by Ali Soufan, CTC Sentinel, Vol 12, Issue 10, November 2019, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/next-line-lead-al-qaida-profile-abu-muhammad-al-masri/ // Evidence Collection, Statements of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Saqar al-Jadawi) to the FBI, May 18, 2002 // A NATION CHALLENGED: THE TERROR NETWORK; Bombs Have Killed 3 Qaeda Leaders, U.S. Now Believes, by James Risen, The New York Times, December 13, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/world/nation-challenged-terror-network-bombs-have-killed-3-qaeda-leaders-us-now.html // Executive Order 13224, US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of the Treasury Specially Designated Nationals List, September 23, 2001, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/// Treasury Designates Seven Al-Qaida Associates, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, October 3, 2005, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js2960 // UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Deletes Eight Individuals from Its Sanctions List, July 3, 2012, Mohamed Salah (Nasir Fahmi Nasir Hussanain), Listed Oct 6, 2001, https://press.un.org/en/2012/sc10697.doc.htm // Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List, Abu Khayr al-Masri (Abdullah Mohamed Rajab Abdulrahman), Listed Sept 29, 2005, https://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/consolidated.htm ↩︎
  16. al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, The War against Islam: the Story of Harun Fazul, Autobiography of Harun Fazul, February 2009 ↩︎
  17. Rare Photo Surfaces of Top al-Qaeda Leaders Inside Iran, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 2, 2022, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/09/rare-photo-surfaces-of-top-al-qaeda-leaders-inside-iran.php ↩︎
  18. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  19. Wanted, Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa al-Bakri, aka Abd al-Aziz al-Masri, Up to $5 Million Reward, US Department of State Rewards for Justice Profile, https://web.archive.org/web/20070323183417/http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=ali_sayyid_al-bakri ↩︎
  20. Evidence Collection, List of 170 Al-Qaida Members, recovered 2001 from home of Mohamed Atef, Ref Number: AFGP-2002-600046, Combatting Terrorism Center – West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/List-of-Names-of-Al-Qaida-Members-Translation.pdf ↩︎
  21. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 // Nine Lives: My Time as MI6’s Top Spy Inside al-Qaeda, Aimen Dean, Paul Cruickshank, and Tim Lister, Oneworld Publications Simon & Schuster, 2018 ↩︎
  22. Executive Order 13224, US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of the Treasury Specially Designated Nationals List, September 23, 2001, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224 ↩︎
  23. US Embassy Bombings Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of New York, USA v Osama bin Laden, et al ↩︎
  24. The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 911 and the War Against Al-Qaeda, Ali Soufan, W.W. Norton and Company, 2011 ↩︎
  25. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  26. Evidence Collection, Statements of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Saqar al-Jadawi) to the FBI, May 18, 2002 ↩︎
  27. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  28. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  29. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  30. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  31. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  32. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 // Evidence Collection, Statements of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Saqar al-Jadawi) to the FBI, May 18, 2002 ↩︎
  33. Guantanamo Assessment File, Said Ibrahim Ramzi al-Zahrani, ISN 204, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/204.html ↩︎
  34. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  35. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  36. Letter on Shura, Letter from bin Laden to Abu Faraj al-Libi regarding Majlis ash-Shura, dated approx 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter%20on%20Shura.pdf ↩︎
  37. Letter on Shura, Letter from bin Laden to Abu Faraj al-Libi regarding Majlis ash-Shura, dated approx 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter%20on%20Shura.pdf ↩︎
  38. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf // Alleged al-Qaida commander reveals new name in Guantánamo court, by Carol Rosenberg, Miami Herald, July 12, 2016, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article78112562.html ↩︎
  39. Guantanamo Assessment File, Fahd Sultan Obaid al-Osaimi al-Otaibi, ISN 130, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/130.html ↩︎
  40. Guantanamo Assessment File, Said Ibrahim Ramzi al-Zahrani, ISN 204, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/204.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali, ISN 840, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/840.html ↩︎
  41. Guantanamo Assessment File, Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali, ISN 840, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/840.html ↩︎
  42. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdullah Ali Saleh al-Dubaikhi, ISN 340, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/340.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Sharif Ahmed Mohamed Masud, ISN 170, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/170.html ↩︎
  43. Evidence Collection, Statements of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Saqar al-Jadawi) to the FBI, May 18, 2002 ↩︎
  44. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  45. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  46. Evidence Collection, Statements of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Saqar al-Jadawi) to the FBI, May 18, 2002 ↩︎
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  49. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 ↩︎
  50. 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims At The American Homeland, 2004 ↩︎
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  58. Letter from Abu Anas al-Subayi to Bin Laden, dated October 13, 2010, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl/english/Letter%20dtd%2013%20Oct%202010.pdf ↩︎
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  60. What Really Killed Terrorist Mastermind Mohamed Atef?, by William M. Arkin, August 3, 2015, Jalopnik – Excerpt from Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare, William M Arkin, https://jalopnik.com/what-really-killed-terrorist-mastermind-mohamed-atef-1721123878 ↩︎
  61. What Really Killed Terrorist Mastermind Mohamed Atef?, by William M. Arkin, August 3, 2015, Jalopnik – Excerpt from Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare, William M Arkin, https://jalopnik.com/what-really-killed-terrorist-mastermind-mohamed-atef-1721123878 ↩︎
  62. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  63. FBI Memo on history of al-Qaida, Special Agent Ali Soufan, November 12, 2002 // A NATION CHALLENGED: THE TERROR NETWORK; Bombs Have Killed 3 Qaeda Leaders, U.S. Now Believes, by James Risen, The New York Times, December 13, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/world/nation-challenged-terror-network-bombs-have-killed-3-qaeda-leaders-us-now.html ↩︎
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  67. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad, Compilation and Commentar by David Aaron, (Chapter 2: Life in Jihad – Al Qaeda and the Battle of Kandahar, by Saif al-Adel), RAND Corporation, 2008 ↩︎
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  77. Suspected hijack bankroller freed by India in ’99, by Kelli Arena and Mike Boettcher, CNN News, October 6, 2001, https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/10/05/inv.terror.investigation/ ↩︎
  78. Suspected hijack bankroller freed by India in ’99, by Kelli Arena and Mike Boettcher, CNN News, October 6, 2001, https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/10/05/inv.terror.investigation/ ↩︎
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  86. Guantanaamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  87. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
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  90. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  93. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  95. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  97. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  98. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  99. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  101. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  102. Evidence Collection, List of 170 Al-Qaida Members, recovered 2001 from home of Mohamed Atef ↩︎
  103. al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, The War against Islam: the Story of Harun Fazul, Autobiography of Harun Fazul, February 2009 ↩︎
  104. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  105. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  106. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  107. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ali Abdulaziz Ali, (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISN 10018, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10018.html ↩︎
  108. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  110. Letter to Abu al-Faraj and Abd al-Hadi from Abu Saad, dated November 19, 2002 ↩︎
  111. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  114. Guantanamo Assessment File, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, ISN 10024, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10024.html ↩︎
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  116. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  117. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
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  120. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  121. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  122. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  123. The Taliban’s Oral History of the Afghanistan War, by Sami Yosafzai, Newsweek, September 25, 2009, https://www.newsweek.com/talibans-oral-history-afghanistan-war-79553 ↩︎
  124. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  125. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
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  143. The Taliban’s Oral History of the Afghanistan War, by Sami Yosafzai, Newsweek, September 25, 2009, https://www.newsweek.com/talibans-oral-history-afghanistan-war-79553 // Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎

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