SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 19 – Assailing Abqaiq)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment V – A Kingdom Bleeds Black (Chapter 19 – Assailing Abqaiq)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

Amidst the death throes of AQSA, the network was able to attempt one more grandiose and ambitious attack. At the apparent behest of al-Qaida central command, this ill-timed endeavor was launched. This chapter explores this effort and the rapid defeat of the failed extremist insurrection within Saudi Arabia. The depletion of List C within the Kingdom was imminent due to these operational miscues. We begin though with the juncture of the story in which AQSA was reeling from their defeat at Dammam, with militants mourning both family and wasted opportunities.

Obstacles And Oil

When considering the brutal battle at Dammam, it is worth noting the facilities within the militant unit’s vicinity. Although it is speculated that the men were preparing for an attack within Dammam [1], the Saudi oil center of Dhahran was just a mere ten km away from the cell and their large explosives collection [2].  There were reports that the militants had fled Medina after the fall of their leader Awfi and it seems they immediately fell in line for a new plot [3].  For Juwair to have a cell prepared to attack Dhahran would make perfect sense and made increasing sense in the months to come.  In fact, many of the documents and forged documents recovered from the rubble of the villa indicated that the extremists were consumed with thoughts of oil and gas facilities [4].  They had plans for many major facilities in an attempt to derail the Saudi economy [4].  Juwair developed an interest and eventual obsession with attacking Saudi oil assets [5,6].  This cell may have been his first play towards that goal.  With capable men like Sammari, Harbi, and Hasri gone from his ranks, Juwair eventually felt as if he would have to take the battle to the Saudi oil interests himself [5,6].

Mohamed al-Suwailmi subsequently posted a voice recording online addressing his brother Ahmed’s death in Dammam and proving that he himself was alive [7].  His recordings were used as propaganda and recruiting tools by AQSA [8].  In the release, Suwailmi suggests that the Saudis were congratulating themselves too early for dismantling Sammari and his men [7].  Suwailmi seems to be suggesting that AQSA can replace their lost fighters and continue their fight effortlessly [7].  He also addresses and expresses gratitude to Zarqawi in Iraq for his continued support, further proving the linkages and coordination between the two Al-Qaida franchises [7].  This replenishment of the ranks was crucial for Juwair if he was to manage an attempt to strike an oil facility with success.  Suwailmi may have left out an important point however, in that the loss of experienced men and their replacement with greener, younger fighters, does not always equal a fair trade.  AQSA and other groups containing wanted Saudi fighters were to continue to lose these experienced men. 

By November 8, 2005 it was announced the Adnan Abdullah Faris al-Amri al-Sharif (D-8) had surrendered to the Saudis from an undisclosed country [9,10].  He was extradited back to the Kingdom and joined Fayez Ayub (D-14), who had surrendered in Beirut, and Zaid Humaid (D-6), who had been extradited by the Yemenis, in being another List D member to land in Saudi custody alive [9,10].  It is not known in which country and for whom Sharif had been fighting although it can be assumed that he was in Iraq.  This was the height of the Iraqi insurgency being led by the puissant Zarqawi and young Saudi men flocked to fight there [11].  No doubt Sharif was scared by seeing his name on the list and realizing the fates that many of his wanted mates had suffered.  With at least 15 names left on List D and 8 more left on List C, the Saudis had made decent progress in the few months since their publications.  Suwailmi had to hope that he was right and that AQSA could recuperate these loses despite the persistent obstacles.  To that point, Suwailmi soon found himself in a situation in which his position as recruiter and internet logistician was compromised. 

A Lethal Pursuit

Mohamed al-Suwailmi

Suwailmi was previously considered wanted for attacks on Saudi checkpoints [1].  Abdulrahman Saleh Abdulrahman al-Mateb (C-4), a close associate of Khalid al-Farraj was also connected with assaulting Saudi forces in more remote locations [12].  In fact, Mateb was an apparent survivor of the Thuwarait raid on January 9, 2005, in which four militants were killed, including Mohamed al-Farraj [12].  Mateb’s relationship with both Khalid and Mohamed al-Farraj shows that he must have had one with Fahd al-Juwair as well.  Plus, Mateb’s association with Suwailmi, and Suwailmi’s link to the Dammam cell via his brother Ahmed, also demonstrate that the members of List C were not just a random list of militants who had survived the campaign thus far, but rather a much more interconnected and organized group of jihadists, as had been the case with Lists A and B.  Suwailmi’s ability to recruit via the internet and release propaganda further displayed that the group’s technical capabilities were not fully diminished [7].  With Suwailmi and Mateb’s penchant for targeting security forces, their modus operandi of attack seemed apparent and perhaps constituted part of the reasoning for their inclusion on List C.  These soft target attacks which Suwailmi participated in and encouraged others to engage in were not the same grandiose mass casualty attacks that AQSA normally desired to perpetrate, but they were effective in instilling fear in the Saudis.  Particularly, the men wanted this fear put into Saudi security.  As such, on December 27, 2005 they engaged in a killing spree [13,14]. 

In Qassim province, just outside of Buraidah, Cpl. Atallah Ali Shuja al-Mutairi and Cpl. Abdulrahman Mohamed Saleh al-Kudaibi were murdered in a drive-by shooting on their patrol [14].  The incident, which occurred around 9 am was perpetrated by Suwailmi and Mateb [13,14].  The duo then traveled 12 miles to Midhnab where they fired heavily upon a checkpoint there [13].  Sgt. Obeid Abdullah al-Mutairi was killed in the exchange along with two of his soldiers:  Cpl. Sarur Mohamed al-Rashidi and Saad Damuk al-Mutairi [14].  Suwailmi and Mateb sped away but this time Saudi security forces were awaiting them.  A chase ensued and the Saudis were able to fire upon and disable the fleeing vehicle [13,14].  After having his vehicle forced to a stop, Suwailmi fought back but was wounded and captured [13,14].  Mateb meanwhile, fled the scene on foot and was able to hijack a civilian vehicle and escape [13,14].  The Saudi security forces followed in pursuit after Mateb left the driver and female occupant of the vehicle on the side of the road [13].  Suwailmi meanwhile, was revealed to be in possession of communication equipment, computers, a large sum of money, machine guns, grenades, explosives, etc [14].  The man who worked hard to bring others into the fold of AQSA had gone too much out on a limb to conduct operations for the network.  Now he lay dying in the hands of the Saudi government.  His computers were no doubt a great asset to the Saudi authorities and were used against the network in the future.  Ironically, the man had used his computers to help strengthen the organization and replenish its ranks, yet now his technology was to be used to potentially disable AQSA for good.  Suwailmi would never know the outcome of his murderous joyride and captured intelligence, as he died of his wounds the very next day, while police continued to chase after Mateb [13,14,15]. 

Abdulrahman Saleh al-Mateb

Mateb meanwhile led the Saudis on an impressive chase for the next day and a half before finally being surrounded on the night of December 28, 2005 [15,16].  The location of his final stand was to the north of Riyadh in a desert region called Nefoud Umm Khashaba [15].  This location is in eastern Al-Midhnab province where Mateb had earlier participated in the murders of security forces [15].  Mateb did not choose to surrender and was subsequently killed by Saudi forces in the resulting exchange of gunfire [15,16].  The weapons, grenades, and ammo in his possession were not enough to allow him to stretch out his run from the authorities [15,16].  Yet another List C member had fallen.  With six members of List C remaining, and his men and supplies dwindling, Fahd al-Juwair was soon forced to make his move against Saudi oil interests. 

Bleeding Black at Abqaiq

Juwair had set up a cell near Dhahran in Dammam province, purportedly to attack those oil interests [2,4].  With the cell neutralized, Juwair turned his attention to the Abqaiq oil processing facility, also in Dammam province.  With a capacity of up to 13 million barrels a day, the processing plant accounted for 2/3s of the Saudi output and if shut down could cut world supply by 10% [17,18].  The facility is not only huge, but incredibly well guarded by both Aramco independent guards and the Saudi military and security forces [18].  It would be nearly impossible to shut down the facility with conventional attack means [18].  However, Juwair and his allies knew that even just a slight penetrating attack would send shockwaves through the world economy, through oil prices, and through the confidence of the Saudi royal family and government [17,18].  Anything else achieved by the ostentatious operation would be just an added bonus.  The terrorists knew that targeting infrastructure of this nature was new to their agenda, although it had been called for [18,19].  For instance, Dr. Ayman Zawahiri had in September of 2005, publicly called for attacks on oil output [19].  Juwair moved to oblige him and hoped that he could reach a maximum amount of destruction and affect. 

On Friday February 24, 2006 two Aramco marked vehicles pulled up to a side gate of the Abqaiq facility [17].  They were manned by a pair of suicide bombers working for Juwair [17,20].  Supporting gunmen in another vehicle assisted in allowing them to penetrate the first barrier of security by firing upon the guards [21,22].  The vehicles entered and were stopped at the next security level perimeter [17].  There they engaged in a vicious gun fight with Saudi security forces and were forced to detonate prematurely [17].  As mentioned, the two white pickups had been marked to look like Aramco official vehicles and were fitted with over a ton of explosives on each [17].  However, the men inside, though well prepared for a suicide mission were inadequate in the language skills required to get past the guards [17].  They seemed unfamiliar with Aramco and the Abqaiq facility, which hastened their eventual demise [17].  They were forced to drive into the facility and enter into a gun battle.  They detonated earlier than anticipated when they came under such heavy fire.  The resulting dual explosions killed both of the bombers and two Saudi security men, Hamad Saleh Mubarak al-Marri and Badi Saud Haqbani al-Dosari [17].  Other security men and Aramco employees were wounded in the blasts [17].  A fire occurred in part of the complex but the oil processing facility survived with extraordinarily minor damage due to the excessive security layers, fire protection capabilities of the plant, and quick actions of the guards [17,18].  AQSA quickly claimed responsibility for the foiled attack [17,20].  As terrorism is a mental strategy, Juwair saw some success in the outcome as fears of more oil facility attacks climbed, and oil prices themselves went up in reaction [17].  AQSA announced that the two suicide bombers were far from no-name foot soldiers but rather two men from List C.  They were Mohamed Saleh Mohamed Al-Ghaith (C-8) and Abdullah Abdulaziz Ibrahim al-Tuwaijri (C-9) [17,20].  This fact speaks volumes about the state of affairs of AQSA under Juwair at the time, and the paucity of experience.  Instead of being able to use suicide bombers from a supposed plethora of recruits, Juwair chose to use two young and wanted veterans of his cause. Ghaith was closely associated with Juwair, and had been trained alongside of his new leader to be a suicide bomber, under Muqrin’s direction a couple of years prior [23].  It could be that he needed experienced men behind the wheels, but it removed more trusted allies from his roster as well.  It also is another piece of evidence which shows the connected relationships of the List C militants.  In the end, with minimal damage done, one wonders if Juwair could have used other lesser experienced militants for this operation.

Mohamed Saleh al-Ghaith
Abdullah Abdulaziz al-Tuwaijri

Also telling is the fact that Juwair and others of his senior militants were at Abqaiq engaging security forces in order to allow Tuwaijri and Ghaith entrance into the facility [22].  Juwair was determined to carry out the attack and with a lack of other suitable candidates participated directly.  Juwair was in a Land Cruiser at the scene of the effort, and fired upon guards with two of his men: Abdullah Muhaya Shalash al-Silaiti al-Shammari (C-15) and Jaffal Rafie al-Shammari [22].  A later al-Qaida release (Sawt al-Jihad’s thirtieth issue) interviewed a man named Badr Abdullah al-Humaidi who also claimed to have been a gunman with Juwair during the Abqaiq attack [21].  His name suggests that he may possibly be the brother of captured ideologue Hamad Abdullah al-Humaidi.  After the gun battle and explosions, the gunmen exited Abqaiq in their vehicle and fled to a safe house where they could replenish supplies, regroup, and plan for the next phase in their war on the Saudi government [6,22].  However, with the security measures being enforced at the Abqaiq facility and the massive subsequent investigation, Juwair and his men were traced and tracked down rapidly [22].  The Abqaiq attack made Juwair infamous and as such he wanted to continue his role in AQSA of leading attacks on the infrastructure of his country.  The Saudis had a different plan for the man. 

The Battle of Yarmuk

Fahd Farraj al-Juwair

Fahd Farraj al-Juwair was a relative unknown to the public although intelligence communities studying and tracking AQSA and other Al-Qaida militants knew him from his writings in Sawt al-Jihad [24,25].  Juwair is said to have fought in Afghanistan as well.  Once in the Kingdom, he initially just helped to hide the wanted men from the earlier lists, prior to joining them in their nefarious deeds [22].  In fact, despite his training with Muqrin and his writings in Sawt al-Jihad, it was not until March 16, 2006 that the public took notice of militants online fully profiling the 36 year old Juwair [26,27].  The video was a high quality biography and interview with Juwair entitled “Blood That Will Not Be Lost [27].” In addition to his statements within the video itself, the group released three papers by the militant commander where he describes the making of a good jihadist and leader (including one of his earlier writings in Sawt al-Jihad) [25,27].  Juwair rambles through a defense of jihadist actions in the video, as well as critiquing the Saudi government [26,27].  He also references the important point that his group respects all Muslims [26,27].  This is obviously a contentious claim due to the sheer number of Muslims killed by the organization in their war.  He continues to harass the Saudi government verbally by saying: “we have come to slaughter you and your rule is fleeting, and the mujahidin will vanquish you…If you knew what the boys have prepared for you, you would not be preparing for war in this Peninsula [27].” The threats also extend to foreigners in the nation when he states they need to:  “…leave Mohamed’s Peninsula and all Muslim lands [27].”  Juwair also emphasized the fact that every Saudi military or security force recruit was participating in evil against their religion [27].  This was yet another attempt to gain allies within the forces that were actually fighting against them.  In addition to Juwair, a young unknown fighter had recently begun to sprout up on jihadist forums, named Suleiman al-Taq, who was an up and coming associate of the AQSA leader [22].

When Juwair and the his men fled the scene of the Abqaiq attack, they drove their Land Cruiser to the eastern Riyadh neighborhood of al-Yarmuk to a safe house where they had constructed the bombs used in the refinery operation [22].  At the safe house, Ibrahim Abdullah Ibrahim al-Mutair (C-11) and Suleiman al-Taq were awaiting them [22].  By the end of the weekend though, Saudi security forces were awaiting them all [22].

Abdullah Muhaya al-Shammari
Ibrahim Abdullah al-Mutair

By early Monday February 27, 2006, Saudi forces had traced the Land Cruiser used in the Abqaiq attack back to the Yarmuk safe house [22].  They cordoned off the area, removed civilians, and engaged in an attempt to take the house [22].  Juwair and his men resisted with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and whatever else they could muster [22].  The men used the Land Cruiser and another vehicle inside the garage of the house as cover [22].  Two hours after it began, the gun battle ceased with Ibrahim al-Mutair, Jaffal Rafie al- Shammari, Abdullah Muhaya al-Shammari, and Sulaiman al-Taq all dead [6,22].  Most importantly however, the mastermind of the Abqaiq attack, Fahd Farraj al-Juwair would never be able to plot against another oil facility, as he also perished at the scene [22].  His men were described thusly:  Ibrahim Abdullah al-Mutair was yet another internet savvy computer technician for the group, while Abdullah Muhaya al-Shammari had actually been captured and held by the Saudis but had made a promise along with his family to forego being included in any more militancy [22].  This oath he had obviously broken which earned him a spot on the wanted list; a spot he had further earned by assisting Juwair in firing upon the Abqaiq facility guards [22].  Jaffal Rafie Mazhur al-Shammari had also been arrested and subsequently released by the Saudis [22].  He had since gained skills needed in bomb manufacturing and had also fired upon the guards of Abqaiq with Juwair [22].  Suleiman al-Taq, the youngest of the group, was active in jihadist internet websites and, as mentioned, was beginning to make a name for himself on them [22]. Later, an additional young militant named Adel Mohamed Salim al-Yamani was arrested for his role in Juwair’s attack on Abqaiq.  He appears to have been a new green recruit with no previous battle experience until the operation [28,29]. 

The authorities were able to seize a large amount of weapons and explosives, computers, communication equipment, large sums of cash, documents related to the oil facilities, and plans for Abqaiq from the al-Yarmuk safehouse [22].  Later analysis revealed that the chemical composition of the bomb making materials found at the al-Yarmuk site matched those used in the Abqaiq bombing [22].  The militants also left behind the video making equipment they had used to do Juwair’s yet to be released interview [22].  They had also videoed themselves in masks mixing chemicals and fertilizers to produce the bombs used in the incident at the refinery [30].  The video also showed the men, who were identified as Juwair, Tuwaijri, Ghaith, Jaffal al-Shammari, Abdullah al-Shammari, and Taq, planning for the event in a desert location with their vehicles [30].  With the death of the Zulfi born Juwair, the Saudis had decimated List C [22].  By mid-April the Saudis had arrested five additional men linked to the attack (including Adel al-Yamani [A]) and confiscated huge amounts of weaponry and explosives [30]. 

At this point, the Saudis had, in their opinion, fully decimated AQSA and its leadership, and had surmounted its capability to further conduct meaningful operations.  By late spring of 2006, King Abdullah declared al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia defeated, and thus the Saudi insurgency at an official end [31].  This was despite the counsel of Prince Naif who cautioned the media, public, and his royal brother that new al-Qaida leaders could very well emerge [32].  The Saudis would remain vigilant, but for the time being, AQSA in its early 2000s mode of existence was merely no more.  The group struggled to find another leader, to find more fighters, recruiters, ideologues, collaborators, etc.  It would need an infusion of veteran militants into the Arabian Peninsula.  In an ironic twist, that infusion had actually already occurred.  Just weeks before Juwair’s defining attack and eventual death, AQSA, now the evolving AQAP, had seen its future and longest lasting leader introduced on to the battlefield as he emerged from captivity.  In fact, multiple AQAP leaders had elaborately entered the scene and would forever change the organization’s conflict against the Saudis and Americans. 

SEGMENT V Appendix (For Status of Lists B, C, and D as of February 2006):

LIST B REMNANTS:

5) SALEH MOHAMED AWADALLAH AL-ALAWI AL-AWFI

16) TALIB SAUD ABDULLAH AL-TALIB

LIST C:

  1. YUNIS MOHAMED IBRAHIM AL-HAYARI
  2. FAHD FARRAJ AL-JUWAIR (AL-FARRAJ)
  3. ZAID SAAD ZAID AL-SAMMARI
  4. ABDULRAHMAN SALEH ABDULRAHMAN AL-MATEB
  5. SALEH MANSUR MUHSIN AL-FARIDI AL-HARBI
  6. SULTAN SALEH HASSAN AL-HASRI
  7. MOHAMED ABDULRAHMAN MOHAMED AL-SUWAILMI
  8. MOHAMED SALEH MOHAMED AL-GHAITH
  9. ABDULLAH ABDULAZIZ IBRAHIM AL-TUWAIJRI
  10. MOHAMED SAID MOHAMED AL-SIYAM AL-AMRI
  11. IBRAHIM ABDULLAH IBRAHIM AL-MUTAIR
  12. WALID MUTLAQ SALIM AL-RADADI
  13. NAIF FARHAN JALAL AL-JIHAISHI AL-SHAMMARI
  14. MAJID HAMID ABDULLAH AL-HASRI
  15. ABDULLAH MUHAYA SHALASH AL-SILAITI AL-SHAMMARI

LIST D:

  1. NOOR MOHAMED MUSA (CHAD)
  2. MANOOR MOHAMED YUSEF (CHAD)
  3. OTHMAN MOHAMED KOURANI (CHAD)
  4. MUHSIN AYED FADHIL AL-FADHLI (KUWAIT)
  5. ABDULLAH WALAD MOHAMED SAYYED (M)
  6. ZAID HASSAN HUMAID (YEM)
  7. FAHD SALEH AL-MAHYANI
  8. ADNAN ABDULLAH AL-OMARI AL-SHARIF
  9. MARZOUQ FAISAL AL-OTAIBI
  10. ADEL ABDULATEEF AL-SANIE
  11. MOHAMED ABDULRAHMAN AL-DHAIT
  12. SULTAN SUNAITAN AL-DHAIT
  13. SALEH SAEED AL-GHAMDI
  14. FAYEZ ABDULLAH AYUB
  15. KHALID MOHAMED ABBAS AL-HARBI
  16. MOHAMED OTHMAN AL-ZAHRANI
  17. ABDULLAH MOHAMED AL-RAMYAN
  18. MOHAMED SALEH AL-RASHOUDI
  19. SAAD MOHAMED MUBARAK AL-JUBEIRI AL-SHEHRI
  20. ALI MATER AL-OSAIMI
  21. FARIS ABDULLAH AL-DHAHIRI AL-HARBI

LEGEND:

  • KILLED IN EXCHANGE OR RAID
  • PERISHED IN SUICIDE ATTACK
  • CAPTURED
  • FREE AT LARGE
  • SUSPECTED DECEASED (WITHOUT DECISIVE EVIDENCE)

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] – Of those apprehended in the aftermath of the Battle of Yarmuk, Adel Mohamed Salim al-Yamani was executed on January 1, 2016 by the Saudi government for terrorism convictions [29]. This occurred as a component of a Saudi mass execution that day of 47 combined Sunni terrorists and Shia dissidents.

© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

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