SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Martyrs and Miscues

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Several years into the insurgency, al-Qaida propaganda resolved to celebrate their fallen “martyrs” in releases designed to glorify jihad and entice replacement followers. Consequently, the recruitment efforts of the jihadist network were producing solid results, with Westerners, Arabs, and others alike coming in a slow but steady rate to the Khorasan, either newly initiated or thoroughly tested in alternate theatres. This even though most of those who perished actually did so in obscurity. In Afghanistan, attacks and counters increased in complexity as the war progressed. Among the many mistakes of war, American authorities and al-Qaida commanders traded violent attempts against the other’s primary leadership, often resulting in missed opportunities, disappointing results, and collateral carnage.

The Bagram Breach

An Afghan National Directorate of Security operation on February 4, 2007 targeted the Hezb I Islam – Gulbuddin (HiG) in Nangarhar province, resulting in what was a major intelligence haul for American investigators and analysts. The facilitator and affiliate Harun Shirzad al-Afghani was apprehended with six other HiG operatives1. Despite his allegiance to a separate network, the Afghan had extensive ties to and knowledge of al-Qaida, proving his capture to be beneficial to American intelligence analysts. As part of his expansive interrogation, Harun reported on Sheikh Said al-Masri as helming the al-Qaida Majlis ash-Shura, and those he believed joined him on the council2. Unsurprisingly, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi was mentioned. Of note, the militant in charge of training since 2005, Sheikh Ihsanullah al-Masri, was also suspected of having a chair on the council3. But it was Abu Laith al-Libi whom the Afghan also named as a suspected councilor that drew the most attention at the time. The Libyan’s exploits and operations remained in the forefront, and his legend only continued to expand.

As previously discussed, Abu Laith was brought into the fold of al-Qaida officially under a partial and personal oath as early as 2004 and given command in Jalalabad4. What al-Qaida desired though, was the full absorption of the Libyan faction in the region to their cause, thus reaping the benefits of an apparently united jihadist movement.

Nonetheless, Abu Laith acted in accordance with al-Qaida through this time period. One of the most stunning examples, was an incident on February 27, 2007, in which a suicide bomber, named as an Afghan national, Mullah Abdulrahim, attempted to target US Vice President Dick Cheney on the latter’s surprise visit to Afghanistan5. The operation was planned and executed by Abu Laith al-Libi, according to American authorities6. After arriving in country from Islamabad, and intending to travel to Kabul, Cheney was forced to remain overnight at Bagram airbase instead, due to disagreeable weather7. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mullah Abdulrahim was able to avoid local police on the perimeter of the base, and penetrated further in towards the primary entrance8. At this point, at another station manned with coalition personnel, he waited. Despite the best operational security efforts, knowledge of Cheney’s presence in the compound was leaked, allowing for the insurgents to place an operative within striking distance9.

As a convoy of vehicles departed the gate, the Mullah Abdulrahim assumed Cheney was within, and detonated his vest. Cheney however, was assigned to a convoy poised to depart in another half an hour, thus escaping the militant operation10. Cheney was still in his room on the base when he heard the explosion around 1000 that morning, and was thereafter rushed to a safe shelter11. Among the deceased though were twenty Afghan day laborers, applying for work at the base, plus one American civilian, Lockheed Martin employee Geraldine Marquez12. Two military were slain as well, including American PFC Daniel Zizumbo and South Korean SGT Yook Jang-ho13. Cheney continued onward with his journey to Kabul, refusing to allow the incident to curtail his plans14.

The Taliban rapidly took advantage of the surprising incident and claimed responsibility, while proudly naming the bomber15. Alarmed by the severity of the situation, and the near avoidance of disaster, US military officials rushed to cover the incident, and leaned into a false narrative that the Taliban were lying16. They relied on Cheney’s unexpected overnight stay as reason to declare the Taliban claims as ludicrous, and stated that it was impossible for the militants to verify the Vice President’s movements17. The fabricated reasoning discounted the egregious security breach, and allowed for a renewed Taliban and al-Qaida propaganda campaign. The interoperability between the insurgents in conducting the attack was displayed in Abu Laith’s involvement, the local nature of the assailant, the Taliban spokesman Qari Yusef Ahmadi announcing the assault18, and a later claim by Taliban paramilitary commander Mullah Dadullah Lang that it was conducted on the orders of Osama bin Laden himself19. While authorities deflected blame to the lesser known Abu Laith, he was rapidly becoming one of the most concerning militants in theatre.

International Recruiting

As al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their Allied Movements ramped up the scale of the insurgency’s intensity in 2007, there was a glaring need for additional jihadist recruits from abroad, in addition to those they could draw from within Afghanistan and Pakistan. Europeans, Americans, and further Arabs were desired by al-Qaida and external operations commander Abu Ubaidah al-Masri. These potentials began arriving in theatre offering logistical and operational enhancements.

German facilitator Aleem Nasir arrived in Pakistan for a third journey in January 2007, this time with a trove of logistics and support equipment to be gifted to al-Qaida20.  Sheikh Said al-Masri previously and specifically requested these items21.  Among the accessories were night vision goggles, sights for rifles, listening devices, computers, and actual funds22.  He hand-delivered them to Khalid Habib in Jani Khel, Bannu, while again meeting with senior al-Qaida facilitator and logistician Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi23.  Equipment and recruits to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) came through this Saudi lieutenant of Sheikh Said, whose actual name was Mujab Atiyah al-Zahrani (thus also known as Abdullah Azzam al-Zahrani)24.  Nasir began bouncing from safehouse to safehouse conducting parlays with various important al-Qaida figures.  Khalid Habib escorted him to meet the Austrian Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain (Abu Zubair al-Masri), and from there to Mir Ali, North Waziristan to meet with, among others Abu Yahya al-Libi25.  While there he was introduced also to Nehad Cosic, a Bosnian al-Qaida trainer purportedly responsible for the instruction of European recruits26. Cosic was later arrested in 2007 during a Pakistani police operation in an unknown location, only to be deported to Sarajevo sans appropriate charges27. The incident robbed al-Qaida of a European asset, yet by 2007 there was an increase in new vital arrivals.

Abu Ubaidah gained another such Western student in March 2007, when a German citizen of Moroccan descent, Bekkay Harrach, arrived in the FATA28.  His family migrated to Germany in 1981 and in 1997 Harrach gained his citizenship.  He expressed jihadist leanings early on, and in 2003 during the midst of the Second Intifada he traveled to and fought within the West Bank against Israeli soldiers29.  Wounded in action, he returned to Germany before attempting twice to join AQI by traveling to Iraq30.  He averted German authorities by claiming that his trips were innocuous, but suspicions remained31.  Harrach next studied mathematics and laser technology32.  After dropping out of college in February 2004, Harrach focused next on successfully joining the jihadists in the Khorasan.  To accomplish this, he approached the aforementioned German Aleem Nasir and received a vouching letter to present to his handlers and smugglers on the way to the FATA33.  

Aleem Nasir had established a method to dispatch German recruits to al-Qaida via this vouching letter, via a decision made with the facilitator Abdullah Azzam al-Zahrani34.  The recruits would enter the FATA from Iran via the assistance of al-Qaida operative Yasin al-Suri, who conducted the movements of funds and militants through Iran for al-Qaida, being essentially their ambassador within the Shiite theocracy35.  Nasir utilized a phone number and email address provided by Zahrani to establish contact with Yasin al-Suri in order to move the approved recruits36.  Nasir deployed three Germans through this method.  For Renee Marc Sepac, Yasin al-Suri never collected him in Tehran, so he returned home to Germany37.  Omer Ozdemir, known as Abu Jabir al-Turki, and Bekkay Harrach, were successfully transported through Iran to the FATA38. Harrach was linked with Abu Ubaidah in 2007 where he received explosives training and became an intriguing asset to al-Qaida’s core leadership assuming the alias Abu Talha al-Almani39.

In fact, during May, Aleem Nasir conducted a fourth and final excursion to Pakistan40. Maintaining his previous routine he convened with Zahrani in order to transfer funds in Jani Khel, Bannu41.  From there he went to the Austrian Abu Zubair al-Masri in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, where he was prepared for an explosives training course42.  The Austrian gave instructions to Nasir, including an order to break contact with Iranian based facilitator and human trafficker Yasin al-Suri43.  This is presumably because the Syrian was taken into Iranian custody around this time44.  Abu Zubair also confirmed to Nasir that his charge Ozdemir had previously arrived in the FATA for training located in Bajaur agency near Damadola45.  Nasir reconnected with Bekkay Harrach who was in the same compound as Abu Zubair, under the supervision of Abu Ubaidah al-Masri46.  Tasked by Abu Ubaidah to make notes of the course in his native German, Nasir prepared to learn and recreate.  However, while attempting manufacture of his second explosive device, there was an inadvertent blast, causing Nasir a wounded hand47.  It is assessed that the Bosnian Cosic was one of Nasir’s instructors on the course48.  After the incident, Nasir was delivered by Abu Ubaidah to a medical provider in Miran Shah, North Waziristan in order to treat his hand49.  His time at the camp truncated, Nasir departed the FATA, and attempted to leave the country via Lahore on June 18, 200750.  He was arrested by diligent Pakistani authorities who believed that Nasir was part of a conspiracy to strike against the government51. 

Additional Westerners arrived during the same time period.  Moaz Garsallaoui, a Tunisian extremist, dwelled in Brussels, Belgium, with his new wife, Malika al-Aroud52. She was a widow, once married to Abdulsattar Dahamane, one of the suicide bombers assigned to assassinate Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Masud two days prior to the 9/11 attacks53.  Now having returned home to Belgium, she ran a jihadist propaganda website, which she and her new spouse utilized to glamorize the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan54.  They also used the site for recruitment, ensnaring at least two online followers to become willing participants55.  Meanwhile, Garsallaoui prowled immigrant communities in Brussels, preying on disenfranchised youth and indoctrinating them56.  In total, the couple acquired six young men for the mission57. They were Belgians Hicham Bouhali Zrioul, Hicham Beyayo, Ali El Ghanouti, and Said Harrizi, as well as the two Frenchmen acquired from the online efforts, Hamza al-Alami and Walid Othmani58.  In December 2007, they were assembled with Garsallaoui in Istanbul, Turkey, and acquired the services of human smugglers to lead them to Zahedan, Iran and into Pakistan59.  Garsallaoui took the route first, arriving late in the year in 200760.  His pupils followed, and eventually they arrived in South Waziristan via Bannu district with relative ease in January 200861.  While they were greeted warily, Garsallaoui collected them on January 13, 2008 and brought them into the fold62.  Perhaps due to his marriage to al-Aroud, Garsallaoui was rapidly incorporated into the network.  He befriended a senior external al-Qaida operative, involved in the 7/7 attacks63.  The new recruits observed 3-400 Arabs in the FATA, preparing and training64.  Their training was conducted indoors though, and they lived and moved frequently in squads of ten or less individuals65. In their observation, the paramilitary commander for al-Qaida combatants was Abu Laith al-Libi, now a legend in the region66.  This represents Abu Laith’s notoriety more than a specific appointment.  However, with bin Laden’s initial reservations about Khalid Habib, it may also have represented his best option for ground commander among the foreign elements.  Al-Qaida leadership just needed to persuade Abu Laith and the vestiges of his LIFG to officially join the group and swear full allegiance. 

While al-Qaida coveted Westerners for their operational ambitions, there were those in the organization who were wary of potential espionage.  For example, as the sun set on 2007, an American Bryant Neal Vinas sat in an al-Qaida safehouse in South Waziristan awaiting judgement from several Arabs as to whether or not he should be allowed to officially join with the militants and participate in jihad against American forces67.  Among the Arabs was one Abu Issa al-Yemeni, a transplant from Iraq, in addition to a primary instructor who questioned the intentions of Vinas68.  The fighters indeed feared espionage and stalled Vinas.  But for the network, Vinas was exactly what they needed.  A willing Westerner for their plots. 

For Arab examples, there were two malleable and radicalized recruits represented a new social media oriented generation of jihadists bound for the Khorsan theatre. They were Abdulmuhsin al-Sharikh (known as Sanafi al-Nasir) and Mohamed al-Mutlaq (known as Qahir al-Salib), and they commenced their sojourn on April 8, 2007, progressing to the FATA via Bahrain, Iran, and finally Pakistan69. Accordingly, they were taken in and befriended by Abdullah Azzam al-Zahrani, the Saudi lieutenant assigned to process incoming militants. Drawn into a Saudi jihadist orbit, they frequently interacted with a mid level paramilitary officer, Abu Bashir al-Najdi. Yet it was his proclivity for the ideological, theological, and media aspects of the insurgency that placed Sharikh under the auspices of Abu Laith, Abu Yahya al-Libi, and Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti amongst others70. The latter, Khalid Abdulrahman al-Hussainan, a Kuwaiti imam formerly of the Kuwaiti Endowments Ministry71, had himself just entered the fray of the Khorasan circa 200772.

The Iraqi Exchange

There were also Arabs drawn from other theatres, most commonly from Iraq. The aforementioned Abu Issa al-Yemeni was but one of many. There were also leadership figures transferring into the Khorasan as well. A prominent example was that of Abu Sulaiman al-Otaibi, the primary judge of the Islamic State of Iraq, under Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. Due to ideological differences a rift developed in the Iraqi faction’s leadership73. Thus, Abu Sulaiman departed Iraq alongside Abu Dujanah al-Qahtani (the brother of Abu Nasir al-Qahtani74) in August 2007, assisted to Pakistan by Ansar al-Sunnah, and arriving sometime in late November, offering their services to core al-Qaida commanders75.

Another Zarqawi loyalist, the Saudi Saleh al-Qarawi, arrived in the Khorasan via Iran in September 2006, after the death of his superior. In fact, Qarawi, a veteran of the brutal battle in Fallujah, was dispatched abroad by Zarqawi, working in Syria and elsewhere to ensure the steady influx of foreign recruits into the ravaged nation76. After his arrest and extradition to the Saudi kingdom, Qarawi was able to flee again into a new theatre77. To his new allies and al-Qaida leadership in the FATA, he was known as Najm al-Khair.

Sheikh Said al-Masri reported to bin Laden on May 30, 2007 that Najm al-Khayr was in direct contact with a wealthy donor in Saudi Arabia, who was willing to contribute significant funds, but only directly to bin Laden78. He did not desire the funds to be allocated only to the other leadership figures or be misused. Therefore, he was only willing to donate upon receiving a direct message from bin Laden himself, naming the cleric by his kunya, and referencing Najm al-Khayr79. Upon receiving the funds, Najm would be responsible for ensuring bin Laden’s receipt. Sheikh Said described Najm to bin Laden as a trustworthy former AQI lieutenant, having departed that theatre out of concern of capture80. Jihadist credentials were further improved for Qarawi as he was married to the daughter of Abu Jihad al-Masri81.

Of course, as some militants migrated from Iraq to the Khorasan, others took the reciprocal path. Libyan Atiyah Abdulrahman was now the primary militant enroute to Iraq after the arrest of Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, and in early 2007 found himself in the company of militants in the Iranian Kurdish community. In a letter forwarded by Sheikh Said to bin Laden in May 2007, Atiyah reported on his stay with the Kurds, their plight under the Iranian regime, and their hospitality to the al-Qaida entourage82. He requested advice from bin Laden, especially regarding the issue of the Iranians pitting the jihadist Kurds against the overall secular Kurdish leadership in an effort to fracture the community83. As Atiyah dealt with internal Kurdish politics, he made no further advancement in his sojourn to Iraq. There was obvious concern over the smuggling of personnel to Iraq, and in a late May statement in which Sheikh Said al-Masri was publicly announced as the commander of al-Qaida in the Khorasan, he accused Turkey of culpability in Abdulhadi’s capture, due to their desire for European inclusion84. Interestingly, US intelligence were aware of the movements of al-Qaida senior lieutenants and acknowledged the presence of Atiyah and Abu Jihad al-Masri in Iran, hypothesizing a functional relationship between the Shiite theocracy and al-Qaida85. This as opposed to the actual efforts of the al-Qaida operatives to reach the insurgency in Iraq.

Lost In Obscurity

The reliance on Abu Laith as a desired and necessary official component of al-Qaida operations, was also owed to the attrition of the original Egyptian ground leadership. Hamza Rabia, Atwah, Abu Umamah, and several others were dead in strikes or raids. Hamza al-Jawfi was problematic and insubordinate. Abu Hassan al-Masri had apparently lost interest in command, and was focused on ground level tactics. Others simply faded away from mundane or accidental causes, far from the glory these individuals so often sought.

For example, Abu Yahya al-Hawn al-Masri, the alias for the Cairo native known as Zakariya, was a venerated senior jihadist and instructor in projectile weaponry86. He was a respected veteran of the conflict against the Soviets, a trusted confidant of the mujahidin leadership, and remained in Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout, eventually becoming an instructor at Khaldan camp87. After the invasion, he gained prominence during the battle at Tora Bora commanding a unit, wherein it was believed by US intelligence he perished88. However, he continued onward in training militants in the FATA, but was diagnosed with apparent lung cancer, which according to his jihadist comrades, he had obtained from the gasses associated with his mortar and rocket launchers89. He succumbed to his illness nearly 20 years since his arrival in the Khorasan in 198690, placing his demise around 2005-6.

Similarly, Sami Tufankashi, the respected Egyptian militant known as Abu Abdulrahman BM, was dealt with an unseemly demise. After being assigned to command the defense of Kandahar during the American invasion, and later assisting in the organized retreat via Zormat, he fled through Karachi before being imprisoned in a third nation91. After release, he joined the jihadists in the FATA and became a primary instructor in weaponry for the militants, particularly concerning his namesake projectile launcher. Despite the wealth of knowledge he posessed, it was his preferred device that malfunctioned, causing a premature detonation, killing both Tufankashi and one of his apprentices, Barud al-Pakistani during a training session92. The date of the mishap is not given in jihadist eulogies, but it was said that his journey lasted 20 years from his arrival in theatre during 1985, giving an approximate time of 200593.

Tufankashi also brought his son into the fold, an Egyptian that had never truly lived in Egypt.  Born in Alexandria, Abdullah Tufankashi was raised in the Arabian Peninsula and in Peshawar during the war against the Soviets in which his father fought94.  Once al-Qaida relocated to Sudan, Abdullah was sent along with them for schooling there, and also to Yemen for the same.  Once the militants were reestablished in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Abdullah was brought back and based out of Kandahar, going through a rigorous training regimen95.  He supposedly impressed those he met despite his youth and inexperience96.  Bin Laden appointed him to work as a staffer for the Military Committee, most assuredly due to his name, a position he held through the 9/11 attacks97.  After partaking in the failed defense of Kandahar he fled with his father through the Karachi safehouses and on to a third country where he too was incarcerated98.  Upon returning to the Khorasan and setting up in Shakai, he became an instructor along with his father99.  In addition, he was a fighter and participated in cross border raids and excursions100.  He was killed in such activity, apparently by airstrikes on a stronghold position he held, although it is unclear when this occurred, it was at some point prior to 2007101. From their safehouse in Abbottabad, Osama bin Laden’s wife Siham Sabar, the mother of Khalid, wrote her and her son’s condolences to her friend, the wife of Sami and mother of Abdullah Tufankashi, in a letter dated December 16, 2007102. Most of the strikes and engagements like the one in which Abdullah Tufankashi perished went unnoticed in the public and sometimes remained unrecognized by the militants themselves. Occasionally there were incidents deserving greater scrutiny, and individuals praised by the jihadists in their propagandas.

Winds of Paradise

Mentioned throughout this series are the histories and remembrances of 120 slain al-Qaida affiliated and allied jihadists penned by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (al-Filistini), entitled Martyrs in a Time of Alienation. Several of the still thriving militant community in the FATA contributed vignettes to the work, including paramilitary stalwarts Abu Laith al-Libi, Qari Sufyan al-Maghrebi, Abu Luqman al-Makki, Abu Mansur al-Harbi, Osama al-Kini (Fahd Ali Musalam), Abu Othman al-Shehri (Saad Mohamed Mubarak al-Jubeiri al-Shehri), and Khalid Habib103. The Palestinian’s book covered the stories of the 120 lost jihadists through a time period of 2002-2006, and provides detail on several of the fallen though they be infamous or obscure, or whether they fell in a notorious engagement or mundane circumstances104. In addition to those who fell in the various battles discussed in previous chapters or in drone strikes, Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi also gave the stories of Sami Tufankashi and Abu Yahya al-Hawn, dying from accidental or natural causes as discussed above. Even lesser jihadists received the same treatment in the book. Ahmed Yahya al-Mansur (known as Nibras al-Sanaani) was a fighter assigned to Khost, responsible for participation in IED ambushes against coalition convoys105. Having arrived in theatre for training at al-Faruq prior to 9/11, the Yemeni survived multiple battles including the defense of Kandahar. Despite his experience, he was also susceptible to mishaps. Fearing a coalition raid one day, he rushed to load a vehicle with his explosives and depart, but inadvertently detonated them instead106. While Martyrs in a Time of Alienation gave pages to the deceased such as these, al-Qaida specifically chose to focus on those whose deaths occurred in action.

Thus, mirroring the eulogist efforts, and as an official al-Qaida media outlet, as-Sahab endeavored to also memorialize their lost compatriots, although in a much more sporadic manner. On July 19, 2007 as-Sahab released the first of a eulogy series called Winds of Paradise, with the initial installment subtitled “Martyrdom Seekers”. The issuance contained narration from Sheikh Said al-Masri, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abdullah al-Shami (the Bagram escapee), and others as they spoke in length about their fallen comrades107. These included Abdullah al-Afghani (alias of one Mohamed Anwar from Jalalabad), who acted as a translator and administrator for al-Qaida militants raiding in Zabul. Eventually, he was promoted to a combatant and was killed in an attack on Afghan forces three months later. Another was the Moroccan Abu Omar al-Maghrebi, who resided in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until the 9/11 attacks inspired his migration to Afghanistan108. From there he participated in training, rapidly followed by combat in Kabul and eventually Shah I Kot. Once in the FATA, he continued in paramilitary efforts, until he was shot down prematurely by coalition forces as he and a companion attempted to detonate an IED against a military convoy in Birmal, Paktika province109. The remaining five jihadists eulogized in the release have been previous discussed in this series [A].

A second Winds of Paradise issue was released on January 27, 2008 and focused solely on foreign element fighters killed during operations in Zabul110. The exploits of the squad are explained as the commencement of a summer campaign in the restive province. They were dispatched from camps training suicidal zealots, including the one visited by Mullah Dadullah Lang in 2007. Upon arrival in Zabul, the squadron was placed under the command of Abu Omar al-Kuwaiti, an officer in the province, and dispatched upon their missions111. According to the release they were involved in a series of undated attacks against local Afghan police and forces, including against one against a convoy which killed ten, and another morning escapade in which three outposts were assaulted simultaneously. Sometime later in the year, as they conducted preparations for future raids, the foreign element fighters were themselves raided in their safehouse. Coalition forces called in air support and decimated the militants112. Al-Qaida named those slain as: Abu Musa al-Turki, Abu Zuha al-Kuwaiti (Mufzi Khalif al-Azizi), Aslam al-Pakistani, Abu Musab at-Tamimi (Fahd Saad at-Tamimi), Khalid al-Peshawari, Abu Abdullah al-Qasimi (Sultan Mubarak), Jafar at-Tajiki, Abu Anas al-Taifi (Said Mohamed al-Shamrani), Abu Bakr al-Muhajir (Munawar Saleh al-Shammari), and the Saudi Shuaib al-Harrani (Abdullah Muhammad al-Ayed [B])113. As always the purpose of these jihadist eulogies was to glorify and romanticize horrific combat deaths in order to both normalize the occurrance and to inspire others to action. Usually those caught in the fervor were young unknown militants. Occassionaly, such delusions even swept away senior extremists.

During this phase of the war, nearly 7 years since the invasion, a sense of boredom and need for action had apparently set in for some.  For Abu al-Hassan al-Masri, who had been acting as a senior military leader for al-Qaida for the duration of the war, his religious fervor far outweighed his judgement.  This was a disconcerting intention from a jihadist that previously held a variety of battlefield positions of importance, since arriving in the Khorasan during the late 1980s with his compatriot Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah114. Upon return from Sudan he established himself within the paramilitary structure of the al-Qaida foreign fighting force provided to the Taliban, Brigade 55, under the command of Abdulhadi al-Iraqi. The Iraqi labeled the Egyptian stalwart in an organizational chart in November 1998 as his Frontline administrative commander, and also the individual responsible for transporting the elite emergency force into conflict via armored personnel carrier115. His participation in the Afghan insurgency post 9/11 evolved from his command over the Jalalabad region, to being named deputy of paramilitary forces116, to taking control of operations in Zabul and Kandahar by late 2004117.

Also known as Abu al-Hassan al-Saidi, the southern Egyptian was preoccupied with the tactical as opposed to the strategic matters when approaching the war, and became ever more obsessed with martyrdom operations. Therefore, instead of remaining as a battlefield commander, he was striving to become a suicide bomber.  His compatriots noted with dismay that he was determined to take this path118.  Of the leaders, they took note that he was seemingly possessed with his religious fervor and desire for martyrdom.  One even noted that he did not want to broach the subject and embarrass him because he assumed that Abu al-Hassan did not have bin Laden’s permission to undertake such a mission.  They also knew that if they forbade him from the act, he would still do it anyway.  Evidently, Abu al-Hassan informed his leadership and obtained the necessary blessing to act119. It is quite possible that the 2006 assassination of Abu al-Hassan’s travel companion and close associate Muhsin Musa Matwali Atwah attributed to his fervor for martyrdom. The two Egyptians were together throughout their time in theatre, and the loss of Atwah may have created a void in Abu al-Hassan’s desire and willingness for continued command.

The operation reportedly targeted an American convoy in Paktia, alleged to be transporting vital documents. Again, coordination, intelligence aspects, and some of the plotting were conducted by Sheikh Said’s son Abdullah120. A later intricate martyrdom video was produced and released on July 8, 2008, leading to the misleading conclusion that the operation occurred around a similar date. However, a closer examination of the video reveals that the incident occurred on June 28, 2007121 [C]. While one al-Qaida official actively sought death, the remainder required arduous searches, strikes, and raids in order to eliminate.

Miscalculations

In response to the proliferation of al-Qaida and Taliban commanders in the theatre, the Americans and their coalition could not solely rely on conventional warfare means to neutralize these threats, and thus turned to untraditional means. These of course included the adoption of CIA Predator drone strikes, but also utilized Special Forces, such as a secretive elite unit known as Task Force 373, deployed to covertly assassinate enemy officers and senior terrorists122. Yet the ground components too suffered embarrassments and mistakes and the middle portion of 2007 saw TF 373 embroiled in such controversies. The Task Force was fresh off of a June 11 night raid debacle in which they mistakenly engaged an Afghan police unit in vicinity of Jalalabad, going as far as to bring in an AC-130 gunship to destroy the unit, resulting in seven police killed and four wounded123. Following this, they were employed just days later on June 17 to strike and kill Abu Laith al-Libi, assessed to be stationed within a madrassa in Nangar Khel village of Paktika124. This was undoubtedly in direct response to the Libyan’s meteoric rise in the militant circles and his involvement in the Vice President Cheney operation of February. While surveillance in June proved that children were occupying the selected compound, TF 373 was still ordered to conduct the strike and eliminate Abu Laith at all costs125. To do so, they utilized the High Mobility Artillery Rockets (HIMARS) system, which comprised a launcher on a vehicle firing projectiles high into the air with the capability of being remotely guided to their targets126. From a complement of six such rockets in the weapon, five were deployed against the madrassa127. The operation called for the Task Force to send in a ground unit after the rockets in order to ensure the demise of Abu Laith128.

However, despite reportedly neutralizing six Taliban in the approach, TF 373 soldiers only found six dead children, and one other desperately clinging to life. Despite efforts from the unit’s medics, the seventh child rapidly succumbed to their wounds129. The Americans acknowledged the deaths publicly, but deflected blame to the Taliban, claiming that the militants were utilizing children as human shields, and that their own reconnaissance had failed to produce evidence of the presence of children130. This was of course, an untruth, yet the Americans needed to control the narrative and limit public damage, thus they claimed knowledge of “nefarious activity” within the compound which necessitated the strike131. Abu Laith avoided the attempt and lived to continue operating against coalition forces.

While not an egregious miscue, another dispiriting episode occurred later in the summer during August, when coalition forces turned their ire upon gathering militants within the Tora Bora complex in Nangarhar province. Startlingly, the available intelligence suggested that Osama bin Laden could be in attendance in order to inspire and deploy suicidal operatives abroad, the first such time that American authorities felt any sort of confidence of his presence again in Afghanistan132. An array of aircraft including long range B-2 bombers were deployed alongside of ground forces and artillery with the ambition of laying waste to Tora Bora and the insurgents within. More importantly for the Bush Administration, the instance offered the hope of finality in regards to eliminating bin Laden; an ambition they wanted to occur during their time in office. Unfortunately, the intelligence proved faulty, and officials erred on the side of caution, diverting the B-2 aircraft to an Indian Ocean base in avoidance of possible collateral casualties from the intended bombing raid133. However, helicopter gunships and Special Forces were utilized in an alternate attack on the complex, devastating the militant congregants, yet failing to obtain the fall of bin Laden134. The mission was a portion of a larger coalition offensive against militants in Tora Bora commencing on August 14, 2007135. At least 50 insurgents were reportedly slain by August 24136. Many of those reported killed and captured in the offensive were said to be Uzbeks, Chechens, and Uyghurs, associated with the IMU or ETIM137.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] These were Abu Turab al-Pakistani (killed in the raid against Muhsin Musa Matwali Atwah), Osama al-Hamawi (killed in the 2005 Battle of Lwara), and the suicide bombers Abdulrahman al-Najdi, Abdulmunim al-Tajiki, and al-Zubair al-Turkistani. In parallel, all were eulogized also by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi in Martyrs in a Time of Alienation.
  • [B] Despite being killed in Zabul, Abdullah Mohamed Abdullah al-Ayed (Shuaib al-Harrani) was listed by the government of Saudi Arabia as number 47 on an 85 person most wanted list in February 2009. For more on Ayed, please see the Chronicles in Zealotry special SERIES: Fugitives of the Peninsula – (Chapter 24 – The Recidivists And The Wanted) https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/2025/04/30/series-fugitives-of-the-peninsula-chapter-24-the-recidivists-and-the-wanted/
  • [C] Most reporting gives a date around June or July 2008 for Abu al-Hassan’s demise. However, this seems to be given due to the release of his martyrdom video on July 8, 2008. Traditionally, al-Qaida has not immediately produced complex videos in such short notice after an attack. We have chosen to describe the attempted attack as having occurred in 2007 and to discuss the video eulogy itself in another chapter. It must be noted that at least one separate al-Qaida references lists this instance as occurring in 2008.
  1. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  2. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  3. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  4. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  5. Cheney unhurt after deadly blast at Afghan base, NBC News, February 26, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17355517 ↩︎
  6. ‘Al-Qaida leader likely behind Afghanistan bomb,’ The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2007, https://www.jpost.com/international/al-qaida-leader-likely-behind-afghanistan-bomb/article-60127 ↩︎
  7. Cheney unhurt after deadly blast at Afghan base, NBC News, February 26, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17355517 // Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  8. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  9. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  10. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  11. Cheney unhurt after deadly blast at Afghan base, NBC News, February 26, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17355517 ↩︎
  12. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  13. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  14. Cheney unhurt after deadly blast at Afghan base, NBC News, February 26, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17355517 ↩︎
  15. Cheney unhurt after deadly blast at Afghan base, NBC News, February 26, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17355517 ↩︎
  16. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  17. Deceptions and lies: What really happened in Afghanistan, by Craig Whitlock, The Washington Post, August 10, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210913020237/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2021/08/10/afghanistan-papers-book-dick-cheney-attack/ ↩︎
  18. Cheney unhurt after deadly blast at Afghan base, NBC News, February 26, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17355517 ↩︎
  19. ‘Al-Qaida leader likely behind Afghanistan bomb,’ The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2007, https://www.jpost.com/international/al-qaida-leader-likely-behind-afghanistan-bomb/article-60127 ↩︎
  20. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  21. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  22. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  23. Mujab al-Zahrani:  Dead and Wanted, a jihadist internet release, by Sanafi al-Nasr, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/50-march09 // Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  24. Mujab al-Zahrani:  Dead and Wanted, a jihadist internet release, by Sanafi al-Nasr, translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/50-march09 // Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  25. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  26. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  27. Bosnia’s Islamic Revival, by Vivienne Walt, Time Magazine, June 15, 2009, https://time.com/archive/6688616/bosnias-islamic-revival/ ↩︎
  28. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html ↩︎
  29. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html ↩︎
  30. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html ↩︎
  31. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html ↩︎
  32. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html // Al-Qaida Threatens Terror Attacks in Germany after Election, by Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, Der Spiegel, September 18, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-video-message-al-qaida-threatens-terror-attacks-in-germany-after-election-a-649987.html ↩︎
  33. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html ↩︎
  34. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  35. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf // Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, July 28, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1261 ↩︎
  36. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  37. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  38. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  39. A German Islamist Rises up al-Qaida’s Ranks, by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash, Marcel Rosenbach, Holger Stark, and translated to English by Paul Cohen, Der Spiegel, January 27, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-threat-from-within-a-german-islamist-rises-up-al-qaida-s-ranks-a-603752.html ↩︎
  40. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  41. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  42. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  43. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  44. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, dated December 28, 2009 ↩︎
  45. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  46. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  47. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  48. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  49. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  50. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  51. Al-Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German-Pakistani Aleem Nasir, by Ronald Sandee, NEFA Foundation, June 2009, https://www.fondazionecdf.it/var/upload/file/992-01.pdf ↩︎
  52. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  53. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  54. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  55. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  56. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  57. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  58. Recruits reveal al Qaeda’s sprawling web, by Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN News, July 30, 2009, https://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/07/30/robertson.al.qaeda.full/index.html ↩︎
  59. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  60. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ // Jund al Khalifah Emir Killed During ‘Treacherous Raid,’ by Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, The Long War Journal, October 17, 2012, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/jund_al_khilafah_emi.php ↩︎
  61. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  62. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  63. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  64. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  65. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  66. The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline, by Paul Cruickshank, CTC Sentinel, Volume 2, Issue 4, April 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-2008-belgium-cell-and-fatas-terrorist-pipeline/ ↩︎
  67. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  68. United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, USA v Saddiq al-Abbadi and Ali Alvi, January 20, 2015 ↩︎
  69. From the Khorasan to the Levant: A Profile of Sanafi al-Nasr, by Kevin Jackson, Volume 8, Issue 9, September 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-khorasan-to-the-levant-a-profile-of-sanafi-al-nasr/ ↩︎
  70. From the Khorasan to the Levant: A Profile of Sanafi al-Nasr, by Kevin Jackson, Volume 8, Issue 9, September 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/from-khorasan-to-the-levant-a-profile-of-sanafi-al-nasr/ ↩︎
  71. Al Qaeda Religious Leader Thought Killed in US Drone Strike, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, December 7, 2012, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/12/al_qaeda_religious_l.php ↩︎
  72. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  73. The First Defector: Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, The Islamic State, and al-Qa’ida, by Brian Fishman, CTC Sentinel, Volume 8, Issue 10, October 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-first-defector-abu-sulayman-al-utaybi-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida/ ↩︎
  74.  A statement from the Al-Fajr Media Center regarding the martyrdom of the two jihad leaders Shaykh Abu-Sulayman al-Utaybi and Shaykh Abu-Dujanah al-Qahtani, may God accept them among the martyrs, Al-Fajr Media Center, May 11, 2008 ↩︎
  75. The First Defector: Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, The Islamic State, and al-Qa’ida, by Brian Fishman, CTC Sentinel, Volume 8, Issue 10, October 2015, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-first-defector-abu-sulayman-al-utaybi-the-islamic-state-and-al-qaida/ ↩︎
  76. In the Shadow of al-Zarqawi: A Profile of the Saudi Militant Saleh al-Qarawi, by Murad Batal al-Shishani, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 4, April 29, 2010, http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36334&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=568&no_cache=1 ↩︎
  77. In the Shadow of al-Zarqawi: A Profile of the Saudi Militant Saleh al-Qarawi, by Murad Batal al-Shishani, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 4, April 29, 2010, http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36334&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=568&no_cache=1 ↩︎
  78. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  79. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  80. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  81. In the Shadow of al-Zarqawi: A Profile of the Saudi Militant Saleh al-Qarawi, by Murad Batal al-Shishani, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 4, April 29, 2010, http://mlm.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36334&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=568&no_cache=1 ↩︎
  82. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  83. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, “Respected Brother, kind Shaykh, Zamrai, Sahib,” dated May 15, 2007 ↩︎
  84. Al-Qaeda’s Afghan head ‘named,’ al-Jazeera, May 24, 2007, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/5/24/al-qaedas-afghan-head-named-2 ↩︎
  85. Qaeda Is Seen As Restoring Leadership, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, April 2, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/world/middleeast/02qaeda.html ↩︎
  86. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  87. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  88. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mohamed Abdulrahman Awn al-Shamrani, ISN 195, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/195.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Saleh Abdulrasul Ali Abdulrahman al-Balushi, ISN 227, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/227.html ↩︎
  89. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  90. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  91. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  92. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  93. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  94. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  95. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  96. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  97. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  98. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  99. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  100. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  101. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  102. Letter from Umm Khalid to Umm Abdulrahman, dated December 16, 2007 ↩︎
  103. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  104. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  105. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
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  109. Winds of Paradise 1 Martyrdom Seekers, as-Sahab Media Production, July 19, 2007 ↩︎
  110. Winds of Paradise II The Martyrs of Zabul, as-Sahab Media Production, January 27, 2008 ↩︎
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  117. New Al Sahab Video In Honor of Slain Al Qaeda Commander, CBS News, July 8, 2008, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-al-sahab-video-in-honor-of-slain-al-qaeda-commander/ // Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  118. Letter regarding Abu al-Hassan al-Saidi, date unknown ↩︎
  119. Letter regarding Abu al-Hassan al-Saidi, date unknown ↩︎
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  125. Attack that killed kids targeted al-Qaida leader, by Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube and Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 19, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19318805 ↩︎
  126. Attack that killed kids targeted al-Qaida leader, by Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube and Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 19, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19318805 ↩︎
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  131. Attack that killed kids targeted al-Qaida leader, by Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube and Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 19, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19318805 ↩︎
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  135. Tora Bora Offensive Continues Against Taliban, Al-Qaeda, by Duad Wafa and Mustafa Sarwar, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, August 17, 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1078201.html ↩︎
  136. The Eastern Afghanistan Offensive, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/08/the_eastern_afghanis.php ↩︎
  137. The Eastern Afghanistan Offensive, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 24, 2007, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/08/the_eastern_afghanis.php ↩︎

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