SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 38 – Ansar Al-Shariah)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment X – Chaos Sans Conclusion (Chapter 38 – Ansar Al-Shariah)

AQAP was wounded in the aftermath of arguably the most consequential drone strike of the conflict thus far, but the organization was far from reeling. In fact, their political entity Ansar al-Shariah maintained control over their territories, and gained more through an influential family, despite a persistent press to oust the militants. American efforts meanwhile, were derailed by yet another miscue in the field of covert assassinations.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

Remaining Entrenched

In Yemen, the jihadist communities were reeling from the loss of two developing icons having just been incinerated in a Predator drone strike.  With the deaths of Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, AQAP had lost their ability to use the two men to reach out to the English speaking world effectively.   They had lost a charismatic speaker to easily influenced and volatile youth.  They were now devoid of the editor to their Inspire magazine, which while it was ineptly published, still had the potential to reach unstable minds and render violent results.  AQAP had to recover from this loss while also coming to terms with the realization that after nine years, the CIA had rejoined the hunt for al-Qaida in Yemen [1].  Where before they were tracking the militants, now they were free to kill them.  The Predator drones were flying with deadly intentions and with the potential that the Yemeni government would have no warning as to when or where they would strike.  As such, neither would AQAP.

Yemen itself was still in turmoil.  On the same day as Awlaki and Khan’s deaths, AQAP had released a statement claiming to have killed at least 130 Yemeni soldiers in additional Zinjibar violence on September 14 [2].  This number is most likely an exaggeration and it is not known how many casualties can be attributed to AQAP during this time period.  The Yemenis did admit to losing two men to an IED attack in Zinjibar on September 11 [3], and at least six soldiers had perished during fighting in the city at the end of the month [2].  Despite the discrepancy in numbers, the important takeaway from this information was that AQAP was still contesting the city of Zinjibar after its supposed liberation recounted in Segment IX.  This fact was not lost on analysts, who noted that the city still contained AQAP resistance, and that special US-trained Yemeni counter terrorism forces (the Central Security Forces) had never engaged the militants, but were rather being employed in Sanaa against protestors [4,5].  In fact, months after the victory in Zinjibar, Gen. Mohamed al-Sumali and his men of the 25th Mechanized Brigade were still entrenched in fighting AQAP [5]. 

As for the militant organization’s propaganda loss, on October 10, 2011, AQAP acknowledged the strike that killed their men, Awlaki and Khan [6].  While the US originally asserted that master bomb-maker Ibrahim al-Assiri (E-1) also died in the explosion [7], it quickly become apparent that the man had either survived or had never been at the scene that day [8].  The AQAP communique went on to reference the US sense of judicial value and questioned why US citizens like Khan and Awlaki never received a trial [26].  That they instead were just assassinated was portrayed in AQAP propaganda as a contradiction of American values.  Perhaps not strangely, this discussion was actually being held in the US by various personalities with differing ideas on the subject [9].  Regardless of what was thought on the matter, Awlaki and Khan were dead, and had been eliminated because the Obama Administration felt they were large enough threats to warrant a strike.  Much the same as with the death of Kamal Derwish, a citizen with the capability to influence violence against his home country had been removed from the overall picture of jihadist action by the CIA. 

The Intelligence Official

This did not mean that the CIA was the sole party conducting airstrikes in Yemen at this point.  Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) continued to participate in airstrikes, raids, and attacks against AQAP and jihadist positions in the south [10].  On October 14, 2011, JSOC targeted an influential Egyptian Islamic Jihad member who they believed played a major intelligence role in AQAP [11-13].  Ibrahim Mohamed Saleh al-Bannahfled Egypt as so many other EIJ operatives had in the early 1990s and eventually settled in Yemen [11,12].  Shortly after his arrival he fell under the guidance of Mohamed al-Zawahiri and while there used the country of Yemen as a base of operations and junction for which to transport weapons and supplies to other jihadists [11,12].  While in a capacity that equaled an intelligence chief for his organization, Bannah was also responsible for training and turning loose into the world, a militant named Abdulmunim Izzaldin al-Badawi, who later became Abu Ayub al-Masri, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq from 2006 – 2010 [11,12].  Bannah, who himself was known as Abu Ayman al-Masri, remained in Yemen even after most of his compatriots, including the Zawahiri brothers and Badawi, had long since departed [11,12]. 

Bannah, it was believed, developed into an intelligence and media/propaganda role for Nasir al-Wuhaishi and his network [11-14].  His death of course was reported by the Yemenis in the January 15, 2010 US airstrike [15], but this was disproven shortly thereafter [12].  In fact, by August 10, 2010 it was reported that he was arrested in Hadhramout province and would eventually be tried alongside of Abdullah Farraj al-Juwair (E-46) [16,17].   In this instance it appeared as if Bannah truly was in Yemeni custody due to the release of details from his interrogation [12].  His revelations while detained seem to be either coerced or completely fabricated by the Yemenis.  Bannah’s supposed interrogation “revealed” that AQAP was closely associated with the Houthi rebels in the north and the secessionists in the south in terms of arms dealing and other forms of logistical assistance [12].  He also claimed that weaponry being funneled to jihadists in other nations were not originating in Yemen but from African locales [12].  His assertion that AQAP was assisting the Houthi rebellion and southern insurgents can be seen as absurd, and was probably put forth by the Yemenis in yet another attempt to demonize these anti-government movements by linking them to al-Qaida.  While Bannah was in custody as of late 2010, he was sometime thereafter released and yet again became a person of interest for the Yemenis’ circuitous search for AQAP suspects.  His parole may have come in return for his incorrect remarks implicating the secessionists and Houthis as the primary cohorts of AQAP and its violence.  As Bannah was a part of the Hadramout cell of militants arrested in 2010 [16], and was then released, more evidence is therefore amounted for the assertion that Juwair was also freed from prison around the same time. 

As for Bannah, he continued to declare ignorance on AQAP activities and stated that he had no real role in them despite his history [12].  This assumption can be easily disproven by the fact that he authored articles in Samir Khan’s Inspire, including the second issue [18].  With his interrogation and subsequent freedom, Bannah was again given the opportunity to operate for AQAP unhindered.

Collateral Casualties

In spite of this apparent prerogative for formerly detained militants, JSOC took aim at Bannah on October 14 [13,14].  On that morning, a house believed to be sheltering Bannah was struck by US missile fire and destroyed in Azzan, Shabwa province [14].  Although the house was demolished, Bannah and his men were said to have departed just before the attack [14].  A follow up series of strikes occurred with the intention of killing the Egyptian and further wounding AQAP [14].  One airstrike descended upon an area in Azzan where a group of Awlaki tribe members, including teenage boys had gathered to eat outdoors by a fire [19,20].  Immediately, the US claimed that Bannah had been killed and reveled in their success [13,14,19].  However, further analysis revealed that Bannah had not been killed.  AQAP proclaimed in the coming days that the Egyptian was alive and well [21].  The dead were Awlaki tribe members, but more importantly included teenage boys, one of which was another American citizen [19,22].  Abdulrahman Anwar Nasir al-Awlaki was the 16 year old son of Anwar Nasir al-Awlaki [19,20].  The adolescent had just lost his father two weeks prior to his own demise and probably never suspected that he would be the next prominent name to die in such a fashion.

The younger Awlaki was born in Denver during his father’s time as an imam there, and eventually moved to Yemen to be with him [19,20,23].  Of the other young Awlaki tribesmen who died in that strike, Awlaki’s 17 year old cousin Ahmed Abdulrahman al-Awlaki and Sarhan al-Quso, the brother of AQAP captain Fahd al-Quso constituted two of them [19,24].  While the men were obviously linked to AQAP, it still stands to question as to whether or not they were actual members, sympathizers, or bystanders to AQAP and its actions.  The obvious answer was that the younger Awlaki was just in the wrong place at the wrong time, with only the intentions of coming home to be with his family [19].  In fact, some sources claimed that at the time of the strike some of the men were going to renounce their affiliations with the militant and terror organization, although it is not clear who this is referring to exactly [25].  Disturbingly, the media reported the younger Awlaki to be 21 years old instead of 16, furthering the misconception that he was a militant fighter [19,20].  However, a Yemeni journalist who traveled with AQAP members would later say that the younger Awlaki had averred that he hoped to “attain martyrdom as my father attained it [26].”  It is not known if that sentiment is true, or merely a story fabricated to help justify the unfortunate collateral damage caused by the attempt on Ibrahim al-Bannah.  The much darker assumption in the circumstance at hand is that the US preemptively assassinated the youth in order to prevent any sort of revenge he might seek throughout his lifetime. 

AQAP, as mentioned, later categorically denied that Bannah was killed in this strike and distributed literature condemning the claim [27].  Of the other strikes reported that night, yet another one resulted in a teenage boy killed [28].  Saleh Qaed Tuayman, the boy’s father, had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s and it is currently unknown as to what role he might have played in the growing threat of AQAP, if he had one at all [28].  However, he was still targeted that same night in Shabwa and killed along with his 14 year old son [28].  Of the aforementioned strikes that were reported this night, the death of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a teenage American, garnered and still garners the most attention [19,23,29].  In the aftermath of October 14, the question became why JSOC would conduct such a series of raids and acquire such an amount of collateral damage, when the CIA could possibly have perpetrated the strike in a much more controlled manner [10].  It was later revealed that the CIA did not have Bannah on a specific kill list [10].  JSOC on the other hand, had the man listed and he was thus a viable target [10].  This admission revealed a serious flaw in the way that the US military and intelligence communities were conducting their Yemen campaign.  Incompatible goals and lack of communication seemed to be an issue with the strategy of an assassination program conducted simultaneously by the two entities.  As for an explanation, it was theorized that since the CIA had only just taken over drone operations in the country, their target list had yet to reach the length of the one developed by JSOC [10].

The American public in the meantime, still trying to answer a tough question about the legitimacy of the assassinations of Awlaki and Khan were now faced with a third American killed in a US airstrike in less than a month.  In the end, there was and still is some backlash over the killings, but overall the public sentiment seemed relatively favorable due to the threat posed by the elder Awlaki, and the general overall fear of terrorism in the country.  The Abdulrahman al-Awlaki death seemed to be explained away as a situation in which the young man was associated with the wrong people and found himself in the crosshairs thusly.  The killings of Awlaki’s son and Quso’s brother would not be the last familial deaths for AQAP members in the US campaign.

Exploiting Disarray

The drone strikes seemingly came to a pause following the younger Awlaki’s death, at least as far as those heavily reported in the media were concerned.  They resumed with a strike that reportedly killed Abdulrahman al-Wuhaishi, the younger brother of the AQAP emir [30,31].  Zinjibar, which still had a large contingent of AQAP and insurgent fighters despite fierce fighting with the Yemeni military, was the location of this purported drone operation on December 22, 2011 [30,31].  AQAP has yet to confirm the death of Abdulrahman al-Wuhaishi, yet this relatively unknown persona in the insurgency seems like an unusual claim for the Yemenis unless it was true.  Yet another family member of the senior leadership had been eliminated, but questions remained as to what degree of effectiveness this was achieving in the war.  More importantly, this story shed light on the fact that fighting was continuing to rage in Zinjibar, and Abyan province as a whole.  AQAP retained possession of strategic and important population centers Jaar, Shuqra, and Azzan as well [32].  They had previously taken the town of Rawda in Shabwa province before marching on the port of Balhaf amidst fierce firefights [33].  Finally, it was reported that by late December, the violence around Zinjibar had increased [31].  Zinjibar had previously been hit by a US drone strike on October 5, during the time period between the two Awlaki strikes, and had killed five militants [32].  The US also hinted that they were done fighting Yemen’s rebels, and were only going to focus on core AQAP members who posed a direct threat the Americans at home and abroad [34].  This was a direct result of the Saleh regime losing all semblances of control and power within the country [34].  AQAP rushed to exploit the disarray, aiming to fracture the military establishment. For example, previous to the Awlaki airstrike, and indicative of how volatile the south remained, on September 27, AQAP launched an assassination attempt on the Yemeni Defense Minister, Gen. Mohamed Nasir Ahmed in Aden [35].  A suicide car bomber detonated next to the Defense Minister’s convoy, and fighting followed between his entourage and AQAP militants [35].  While the Defense Minister survived, AQAP was continuing to display why its leaders, such as Wuhaishi, remained as such valuable targets.   

Meanwhile, Wuhaishi himself had been reported killed in either an airstrike or in a gun battle with Yemeni forces in late August in the Dawfas region outside of Zinjibar during some of the most contentious fighting of the the battle for the southern city [36].  These reports were met with enthusiasm, when it was stated that his body had been delivered to a military hospital in Aden [36].  Perhaps, the body would be easily recognizable due to the fact that Wuhaishi was short in stature [37].  However, this news never panned out.  In fact, by late October, AQAP had released a statement denying Wuhayshi’s death and declaring him to be alive and well [38].  In addition to this the Yemeni journalist Abdulrazaq al-Jamal, who had also reported on Abdulrahman al-Awlaki’s martyrdom intentions, published an interview with Fahd al-Quso in which the militant denied his leader’s demise [38].  Quso sarcastically quipped that, “We are used to such kind of false news by many of the media outlets…I myself was killed more than once and then Allah resurrected me. Emir Nasir al-Wuhaishi is well and there is no truth to any of this news [38].”

The statement from Quso made no mention of the reportedly deceased brother, but it did show that AQAP was remaining viable in the media.  Although, it was not just through embedded journalists that the group continued to get its messages published.  As mentioned, AQAP released its seventh issue of Inspire magazine in September of 2011, just days before the deaths of the organization’s primary propagandists and in the midst of the continued fighting in the south [39].  This issue was a special edition, which highlighted what it called the “greatest special operation of all-time,” a reference to the 9/11 attacks [39].  While this article was penned by the editor known as Yahya Ibrahim, another lengthy article entitled “The Media Conflict” was attributed to Samir Khan [39].  Khan discusses the role in that media and propaganda play in jihad and explains that AQAP retains the upper hand in this arena [39].  The rest of the issue is littered with articles formed from the previous writings of bin Laden and other major jihadist figures [39].  It should be noted that at this point, Yayha Ibrahim referred to himself as the ‘editor in chief’ of the magazine [39]. 

The Family al-Dhahab

While it is unknown if someone like Wuhaishi’s brother played a role in AQAP, and more than reasonably suspect that Awlaki’s son fought for the group, other familial and tribal connections to AQAP leadership were notably militant.  Perhaps the best shown example is the family of characters into which Anwar al-Awlaki had married.  Tariq Ahmed Nasir al-Dhahab was the brother in law of Awlaki, having married off his sister to the American sometime before [40,41].  Dhahab and his brothers were influential amongst the tribesmen of southern Yemen and some like Tariq were deeply affiliated with AQAP and their philosophy [40,41].  Tariq al-Dhahab was preferred by AQAP to help lead within its political front, Ansar al-Shariah, due to his rapport with the people and because of his tribal connections [41].  His father, Ahmed Nasir al-Dhahab, had sired eighteen sons before his assassination in the 1980s, leaving son Ali in charge of the family [40].  Ali was a member of the Yemeni parliament, and his full brother Hizam also supported Yemen’s central government [40].  Tariq however, along with his full brothers Qaed and Nabil, had taken a more militant path in the time since their father’s death [40].  By the time Ali passed away from complications related to diabetes in 2010, Hizam was left to manage the family, and much to his chagrin, his half-brothers were linking the family name to extremists [40].  Tariq al-Dhahab was one of many parties taking full advantage of the chaos which had embraced Yemen in the previous year.  He was admittedly an associate of AQAP and not a full member [41], and thus his reasons for affiliating with the extremists did not center on religion, but rather on gaining dominance and power within his family, tribe, and Yemen [40].  As mentioned, the people saw him as someone who could bring improvement to their lives as opposed to destruction, and thus Tariq helped to champion the AQAP political wing of Ansar al-Shariah [40,41].  By January 16, 2012, Dhahab had led his forces, loyal to Ansar al-Shariah, into the city of Radaa in Baydah province [42].  Hundreds of tribal fighters entered along with him and they freed political prisoners from the local prison [42].  Once this was done, they raised the banner of Ansar al-Shariah and purportedly offered a vow of fealty to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri of al-Qaida [42].

It would be up to other tribesmen and locals to attempt to protect Baydah province especially amidst the accusations that the Yemeni military had just allowed the takeover to occur [43].  Furthermore, it seemed the Yemenis were only willing to help by capitulating to the imperious demands of Tariq al-Dhahab [44].  Yemen, as mentioned, was in a state of chaos.  Going back to the summer of 2011, the situation within the nation had greatly deteriorated and provided sufficient haven for jihadists.  With the government primarily focused on the Arab Spring inspired protests, unrest, and revolt in Sanaa and other areas of the country, AQAP had stepped into the void and taken hold of power in certain regions of the south [45].  Towns and villages like al-Koud, Shuqra, Radaa, Zinjibar, Jaar, and Azzan had thus fallen into their hands and the hands of their allies [45,32].  The military was finally making a response as seen in the previous Segment, but much of that response came with the assistance of US airstrikes, Special Forces trainers, and US logistical support [46]. 

Political Upheaval

With the continual protests, President Ali Saleh had offered to and then balked at ceding power and removing himself from office [47].  Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was slated to take power in his absence, throughout a tumultuous spring and summer [48].  However, Saleh’s initial words in the spring were empty and thus he remained in control [47].  The metaphorical tides changed with an assassination attempt on June 3, 2011, in which a planted explosive (originally claimed to be an RPG) detonated in a mosque within the Presidential Compound of Sanaa, leaving Saleh badly injured and burned [49].  Several of the President’s entourage were killed and he himself was rushed to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment [49].  Vice President Hadi took over in the interim and it would be months before Saleh returned to his home country [48,50]. 

Upon his arrival in September 2011, Saleh held on to power tentatively, and by November 23, he had flown to Saudi Arabia to sign the power transfer deal that he originally had rebuked [50,51].  In the end, Saleh was forced to resign and cede power officially to Hadi [52].  He had departed for the US for more medical treatment, but reentered his homeland on February 24, 2012 just as Hadi was preparing to take the oath of office [53].  He appeared at the inauguration, ceremoniously gifting the Presidency, after an election with just Hadi as a candidate [52].  As such, Hadi was now seen as the legit leader of the devastated nation. 

Tears Along The Road

On January 31 meanwhile, the southern insurgency was continuing and JSOC was prepared to conduct yet another airstrike.  Press reports stated that the US had removed all of its Special Forces personnel and counterterrorism training team from Yemen during 2011 due to the increased political fracturing of the nation [54,55].  It became obvious however, that US forces remained engaged against the AQAP paramilitary in Abyan, JSOC strikes continued, and the CIA was operating against AQAP core leadership [54,55].  In fact, by the spring USCENTCOM was deciding to revive the counterterrorism training as a partnership with the new Hadi Administration [54].  The ongoing military operations were aiming at lower ranking jihadists, and those influential in the territorial gains being made by rebels in the south [54,55].  As such, the US was more and more being seen as participating and choosing sides in a Yemeni civil war, and initially as protecting the Saleh regime [54].  The strikes were consistently assisting the Yemeni forces such as the 25th Mechanized Brigade who were locked in a deadly struggle against the Abyan AQAP insurgency [55].  In Lawdar, Abyan province, a relative hotbed of rebellious activity, the next US airstrike took place killing Abdulmunim Salim Amqidah al-Fathani [56].  Statements issued by the militants acknowledged Fathani’s death, saying that two vehicles belonging to Ansar al-Shariah were destroyed by the missile fire and that Fathani was severely wounded by shrapnel to his neck.  He later died in a hospital in Azzan [56].  The news was carried to Wuhaishi who reportedly broke down in tears along the side of the road [56].  Fathani had apparently been instrumental to the jihadist movement in the country and news reports stated that he was yet another individual who had been involved in the COLE bombing [56].  This does not appear to be the case, although Fathani may certainly have had connections with the Nashiri network.  Around a dozen other militants were killed in this particular strike which also aimed at a nearby school in which militants were hiding, in addition to their cars [57].  Press reports confirmed the strike was carried out by JSOC [57].  Ansar al-Shariah responded to the incident by killing three supposed spies for the Yemeni, Saudi, and American intelligence services [58].  One man was actually crucified for his role in the espionage, which according to the militant group, led directly to Fathani’s death [58]. 

The Segment continues in the next chapter with a discussion into the next phase of the travails of the Dhahab family. Further examined is the campaign to dislodge AQAP from their emirate, the jihadist determination to maintain their holds under Ansar al-Shariah, and the US commitment to resuming airstrikes.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a comment