SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 37 – Extrajudicial Execution)

Segment IX – To Inspire An Insurrection (Chapter 37 – Extrajudicial Execution)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

Embarrassments

In Yemen, the fighting since early June 2011 and the Waeli/Harithi assassinations had been vicious.  As the Yemeni government dealt with protests and armed conflict in their own capital due to the Arab Spring, the jihadists were holding their significant gains and ground in the South [1,2].  Amid suggestions that Saleh was fomenting the AQAP offensive in order to force the US into solidifying their support of his regime, the jihadists had established via Ansar al-Shariah, the entity declared as the Islamic Emirate of Abyan [1].  Also, in early June, President Ali Saleh was badly wounded in an assassination attempt which will be discussed in the next Segment [2].  Yemen was rapidly descending towards chaos and the Yemeni military elements figuratively trapped between the feuding parties in Sanaa were left in a fierce fight against the militants [1].  While AQAP was not claiming clear responsibility for all of the Zinjibar fighting, the militants within were declaring allegiance to Ansar al-Shariah, the group that would eventually become synonymous with Nasir al-Wuhaishi’s network [1,3].  As mentioned, Ansar al-Shariah was just AQAP’s effort to convince people to join them due to strict religious interpretation and public service while distancing itself from the violence which had defined them [3].  AQAP had also become increasingly active in other districts as well, such as Mudiah and Lawdar, in addition to Jaar and Zinjibar [1].  The Islamists, who had previously depended on the tribes and their allegiance in order to survive were now fighting with not just Yemeni recruits, tribal recruits, and original members but with significant back up from foreign jihadists filtering into the conflict.  Some tribes continued to harbor, protect, and support militants, but others were starting to join in the fight against them [1].  Yemen was spiraling towards disaster.  Militants continued to attack the military and police, as well as their reinforcements even as Yemeni military elements prepared an offensive to retake Zinjibar [4]. 

Meanwhile, a major incident occurred in the port city of Mukallah, Hadhramout province on June 22, 2011 [5].  A total of 62 prisoners escaped from prison by attacking guards, seizing their weapons and gaining their freedom in a well prepared operation [5].  The 62 prisoners included 57 jihadists and were assisted by extremist forces on the outside that fired upon the guards in an effort to divert their attention away from the escapees [5].  In total, at least one guard was killed in the event [5].  Later two of the escapees were arrested and three killed in quick fashion by security forces [5].  This however, still left over 50 militants free to resume their war.  Frighteningly, this total included the entire 16 man cell tried for being members of Hamza al-Quayti’s YSB Tarim cell [5,6].  Thus the two men who survived the engagement that killed Quayti, Mohamed al-Bawaydan and Ali al-Akbari, were again free [6].  The incident also unleashed Tarim cell detainee Abdullah Ali Bawazir, a Yemeni with Saudi nationality who factored into a propaganda video made about the escape [7,8].  Another was Khalid Muslim Batis, also of the Tarim cell, who had himself been sentenced to death [7].  This new influx of militants would only strengthen AQAP in the region and their fight for the south.  But nowhere was this fight more intense than Zinjibar.

As mentioned, the 25th Mechanized Brigade was the primary Yemeni military unit not to retreat from Zinjibar and was held up in the city surrounded by their enemy.  They were left to fight against the extremists until assistance arrived.  In one battle, on July 3, over 40 militants were reported killed by the 25th Mechanized Brigade, as they attacked a military position in a fierce engagement [9,10].  Yemeni military officials immediately stated that this incident resulted in the death of Walid Ali Mishafi al-Assiri (E-83), who had been one of Abdulaziz al-Jasser’s AQAP operators in northern Yemen during 2009 [9,11].  The wanted Saudi had worked for Aramco before fleeing his job and joining the jihadists in Yemen during 2006, presumably after the prison escape of Wuhaishi [10].  The Saudis immediately reached out to Yemen to confirm the death of Assiri, yet received no rapid confirmation [10].  Assiri, known as Abu Khalid al-Assiri, had a life of jihadist exploits and had been close with Naif al-Qahtani, having traveled to Yemen with him and been involved in plots against oil infrastructure together [12,13].  He even wrote Qahtani’s eulogy in the fourth issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula,” lamenting that he believed he would have been the one to die first [14].  Asiri was also close to Ibrahim al-Asiri, and had been responsible for operations in Hadhramout province before heading an assassination cell in Abyan that eventually would seed devastating results [15].  Eventually, it was Walid al-Assiri who was eulogized by his fellow extremists and his life commended [15].  In May 2013, AQAP’s media outlet announced that Assiri was killed in a US missile strike in July 2011, matching the time of his reported death [15].  Assiri’s death being confirmed in such a way shows that the US was in fact already launching strikes in order to assist the Yemeni forces trying to desperately hold out against AQAP.  Although President Barack Obama had resisted large scale military attacks, he had conceded to allowing military and vital supplies to be air-dropped to the Yemeni forces attempting to defend the city [16].  Airstrikes meanwhile were conducted in small amounts by the Saudis and Americans as AQAP and the 25th Brigade decimated the city around them [16].  The surrounding areas were continuing to fare poorly as well.  In Lawdar in early July, AQAP militants ambushed a military convoy, brutally murdering ten soldiers and retaining their influence over the area [9].   

A Yemeni Counter

Eventually, the Yemenis launched an operation to retake Zinjibar by July 17 which was followed by intense fighting and losses on each side [1,17].  The Yemenis announced that on July 20 they had managed to kill the important AQAP captain Ayedh al-Shabwani (cousin of the deceased deputy governor of Marib [18]) and his cousin Awad Mohamed Saleh al-Shabwani in the fighting [1,17].  In the eighth issue of Inspire, AQAP acknowledged the loss of Ayedh al-Shabwani and stated that he was killed when he and his men were gunned down by an attack helicopter while fighting in Zinjibar [19].  Shabwani was named as Ayedh Saleh Mohamed al-Abidi, while his exploits as a notable fighter and his role as the Yemeni government focal point of the Battle of Marib were referenced [19].  By July 30, Brigadier General Ahmed Awad Hassan al-Marmi, commander of the Yemeni forces attempting the liberation, was dead as well [1].  Tribesmen reported for fighting alongside of the Yemeni military, although at this point the jihadists had more than enough soldiers to put up a fierce resistance [1].  

On July 25 for instance, AQAP launched a major attack in Aden, where a suicide bomber drove a pickup truck into an armored military convoy departing an encampment and detonated a massive explosion [20,21,22].  The convoy was on its way to join other Yemeni military forces in the battles in and around Zinjibar, reinforcing the 25th Mechanized Brigade [21].  Disturbingly, the violence was picking up in Aden now, as the situation in the south spiraled out of control [20,21].  Most importantly perhaps was the identity of the suicide bomber.  He was Turki Saad Mohamed Qalis al-Shahrani (F-8), the man declared wanted by the Saudis in their January 2011 List F release and by the Yemenis the October before [22,23].  The young militant was described as an explosives expert, and dedicated jihadi [21,22].  As such, at least nine soldiers were killed by Shahrani’s act [21,22].  He was the first List F member confirmed killed and was later profiled in the eleventh issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula,” as Abu al-Batar al-Janubi [24].  The death of Shahrani showed that AQAP was willing to go to great lengths and sacrifice to maintain control of Zinjibar. 

Propaganda and Recruitment

Amidst the fighting in Zinjibar, Samir Khan and AQAP released the sixth issue of Inspire in July [25].  Needless to say, the issue focused on the death of Osama bin Laden.  In a “letter from the editor,” a jihadist identified as Yahya Ibrahim wrote apologetically about the delay in publication, and described both the successes of the Abyan campaign while acknowledging AQAP losses [25].  Importantly, Yahya Ibrahim reaffirmed the AQAP stance with new al-Qaida emir Ayman al-Zawahiri [25].  The senior staff of Inspire now included Yahya Ibrahim, whose real name and nationality were unknown.  He apparently worked alongside of Samir Khan as an editor of the magazine from its conception onward, with his articles appearing in the publications [26].  Analysts believed that Ibrahim was not only fluent in English, but had probably lived in the US [26]. 

The English proficient AQAP members were not restricted to just Ibrahim and Khan.  Minh Quang Pham, a British national of Vietnamese descent, joined the terror outfit in late 2010 after flying to the theatre from London [27].  Upon arrival, he participated in weapons training and swore an oath of allegiance to the group.  He became closely acquainted with both Khan and Awlaki, receiving further explosives training and instruction.  Awlaki directed the young man to detonate a bomb crafted from household materials at Heathrow International Airport, targeting Americans and Israelis.  Furthermore, Pham used his experience obtaining college degrees in graphics and animation, in order to assist Khan with Inspire [27].  Pham appears in a photograph in the magazine, proudly holding an assault rifle for the visualization of yet another article written by Awlaki [27].  Pham was also ordered to help recruit for the cause in Britain as well as perpetrate attacks, but for the moment the group was content with utilizing him for their propaganda [27]. 

That being said, Khan and Ibrahim’s efforts in the sixth issue of their magazine not only eulogized bin Laden but provided stories for several other “martyrs” as well [25].  They included the aforementioned Ammar al-Waeli, Abu Ali al-Harithi, Abu Fawaz al-Maribi and another important member killed fighting in Abyan named Ali Saleh Farhan, who perished around the same time as Harithi [25,28].  While Ali Saleh Farhan died from bullet wounds, the next eulogized militant, Sami al-Dali (Abu Hatim al-Sanaani), who was a militant trainer described as a trusted confidant of Wuhaishi, was supposedly killed committing a suicide bombing in Hudaydah [25].  Finally, Abu Hashim al-Sanaani was a close associate of Fawaz al-Maribi and died shortly after him during the Zinjibar fighting [25].   

Rampant Strikes

Meanwhile, the US kept up their drone campaign through the summer in their ever increasing fervor to kill Awlaki.  Because of the intensity of the battle, it was difficult to distinguish between explosions from heated fighting, Yemeni military strikes, and US military or drone strikes through the summer of 2011.  As mentioned, it was reported that drone strikes/missile strikes were rampant at the time, but it remains unconfirmed.  The CIA was reported though to be preparing its own drone program to be extended into Yemen [29,30].  With the CIA involved, the strikes could be commenced in a less restricted manner than the attacks thus far conducted by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with CIA support [30].  Even if the Yemeni government no longer approved of military strikes, the CIA could conduct their operations independently and “covertly [30].”  These reports, which came in June, coincided with some of the harshest fighting in Zinjibar.  In fact, by late June, the Yemenis announced over 100 of their soldiers had perished and that reinforcement units had retreated, in what was no doubt from severe militant pressure [31].  With this dire situation in mind, US military aid and strikes, coupled with the coming CIA strikes, no doubt played a vital role in allowing for the Yemenis to attempt retaking the city in mid-July.  Not every missile launched found its intended target though, as for example on June 10, a drone strike aimed at the AQAP official overseeing Jaar, Nadir al-Shadadi, decimated his residence, failing to kill him, but ending the lives of his father, mother, and sister [32,33,34].  Although multiple drone strikes were reported, the first ones of import after the Waeli/Harithi assassination were conducted on July 14, 2011 [35].  In the first attack, militants had taken over a police station in the Wadia district of Abyan province [35].  After the fighting ceased, and while the militants were resting, the airstrike occurred and killed at least eight fighters inside including the squad’s leader identified as Hadi Mohamed Ali [35].  Next, a vehicle traveling to Zinjibar was destroyed by a US drone on the very same day [36].  Just prior to the attack, senior AQAP militant Fahd al-Quso exited the vehicle [35,36].  Quso fled and remained unharmed in the Americans’ endeavor to end his life. 

By July 27, an interesting report was made by the Yemenis.  An airstrike in Zinjibar had killed men described as senior AQAP militants during very fierce fighting [37,38].  One of the militants was named as Abdullah Farraj al-Juwair (E-46), the important AQAP member that had been operating out of Hadhramout, as the commander of forces in that province [37].  Juwair was listed as one of at least seventeen militants killed in Zinjibar on July 27 amidst severe fighting and air raids [37].  As the reader may remember, Juwair had been arrested by the Yemenis exactly one year before but was never extradited to Saudi custody.  Whether or not Juwair remained in custody for long has never been confirmed, but with his participation in the battle for Zinjibar, and his description as commander of Hadhramout, he had apparently been quickly released [37].  Strangely, Juwair’s kunya was listed in the reports as Ibrahim al-Najdi, while the Saudi Interior Ministry listed his alias as Abu Awad al-Yemeni [37,39].  However, it should be noted that some militants operate under numerous names at different times.  Someone with the kunya Ibrahim al-Najdi was reported killed in the December 2009 strike on al-Majalah [40].  While this turned out to be a man named Mohamed al-Tharan, the use of Juwair’s supposed kunya coupled with the theory that Naif al-Qahtani was killed in the same strike could account for the initial belief that two List E members had perished at al-Majalah [12,41]. 

Juwair’s death in Abyan was later confirmed by AQAP itself in a unique release.  The communique read like a court document and described the proceedings against alleged local Yemeni spies who, according to AQAP, had placed tracking devices on militant vehicles in Abyan [38].  The town of Jaar had been declared a municipality in the Islamic Emirate of Waqar by AQAP and the so-called judgment of these men originated therein [38].  The document lists victims of air strikes and levels death against three named spies.  Two of the spies were convicted for placing a chip on Juwair’s car, which led to his eventual death via drone strike [38].  Confirmed killed in the vehicle with Juwair was Saleh al-Aqili, the brother of Hassan al-Aqili (Fawaz al-Maribi) [37,38].  Lastly, the well-known AQAP commander Ali Said Jamil al-Obaidi was killed in the same incident [37,38,42].  The militant known as Muwahid al-Maribi, who had survived the errant US drone strike which killed Jabir al-Shabwani, was finally dead [42,43].  AQAP eulogized him in the eighth issue of Inspire [19].  The magazine focused on Muwahid al-Maribi the warrior, one of the organization’s original members upon implanting in Yemen [19].  The eulogy was of a man who had fought in the Battle of Marib, and had eventually commanded AQAP forces in that province before going on to help lead forces in the Abyan offensive [19].  Another of the important militants the spies in Jaar were charged with helping to kill was named Ali Mubarak Firas al-Jahmi [21].  Known as Abu Osama this jihadist had fought in Afghanistan, became a commander within AQAP, and was also killed by a missile strike to his car [21,44].  Specifically, he and his men were reported to have been killed in the same engagement against the 25th Mechanized Brigade which resulted in the death of Walid al-Assiri [44]. The ongoing strikes resulted in AQAP losing some of their most capable commanders.  In addition to Yemeni men like Ali Said Jamil al-Obaidi leading the charge in Abyan, the Saudi wanted list members were shown to be finding significant roles within the offensive.  Other Saudis from the lists would find more peaceful roles to play in the overall story of the most wanted.

Saudi Surrenders

August and September 2011 saw List F be decreased in size.  First on August 3, a spokesman of the Saudi Interior Ministry announced the surrender of Abdulsalam Abdulaziz Rashid al-Farraj (F-23) [45,46].  Before notifying Saudi authorities, the militant previously contacted his family and expressed his desire to return home [46].  Through the work of his family and the Saudi Interior Ministry the man was brought home that early August day and placed into custody [45,46].  As was customary, he was allowed to meet with his family [46].  It is also important to note that the surrender occurred during the holy month of Ramadan which may have given his family some leverage in convincing him to surrender [46].  The Interior Ministry did not detail where Farraj had been fighting or what crimes he had been involved in [45,46].  His brother Abdulrahman Abdulaziz al-Farraj (F-20) remained at large, and as mentioned was a member of AQAP.  Therefore it may be safe to assume that Abdulsalam himself surrendered from Yemen. 

Next on August 24, the Saudis announced that they had received two addition militants who chose to surrender themselves peacefully [47].  The Saudis did not immediately identify the men but said they had been allowed to reunite with family members prior to being taken into custody [47].  The two men had been fighting for al-Qaida in the FATA of Pakistan, and the Pakistani security services were obviously also involved in acquiring the men for their surrender [47].  Even though the militants were not named, a cross reference of the Saudi Interior Ministry’s website revealed that the two newest Saudi most wanted who had been taken into custody via surrender were Amir Sulaiman al-Ali (F-32) and Mateb Said al-Amri (F-38) [39]. A similar press issuance by Brigadier General Mansur al-Turki on September 18, 2011, revealed the surrender of wanted militant Mujab Mohamed Jamal al-Qahtani (F-43) to Saudi authorities from abroad [48].  Qahtani decided to give up his fight in whichever foreign theatre he dwelled after having contacted his family and expressing the desire to come home [48].

Assisting The Yemeni Offensive

In Yemen, the JSOC airstrike and drone campaign continued through August.  US drones were next reported to have struck a series of jihadist positions around Zinjibar on August 1, again possibly in conjunction with Yemeni airstrikes, which led to the deaths of at least fifteen militants [49,50].  Nadir al-Shadadi, the purported AQAP governing official of Jaar was briefly considered dead in the strikes, which targeted Khamila, Abyan province amidst other locales; Shadadi survived [51,52,53].  Although several more airstrikes occurred through August, the most significant ones, and the ones to be directly attributed to the US, occurred on August 31 and September 1 [54].  In these actions, the US military was able to strike jihadist positions in order to free the besieged and struggling 25th Mechanized Brigade in Zinjibar [54].  At least 30 Islamist fighters were killed and allowed the Yemenis to prepare for a final push back through Zinjibar.  Following this, on September 10, Yemen’s 119th Brigade, alongside of  the 31st and 201st Brigades marched into Zinjibar, retaking portions of the city from AQAP and relieving the 25th Mechanized Brigade after their months long ordeal [55].  The 119th was now loyal to General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and led the charge to drive out the militants [55].  As the Yemeni military worked to consolidate control over the city, they were able to count their losses from the siege and battle.  In addition to 50 tribal fighters attached to the government, the dead included 230 Yemeni soldiers [56].  This push to free Zinjibar was successful for the Yemenis when compared to the rest of the campaign since late May.  The previous attempt mentioned, in mid-July, for Yemeni forces to retake Zinjibar had failed by July 26, as AQAP repelled the advances of the 119th and 31st Brigades [57].  As those forces fled, AQAP acquired much of their weaponry and put the 25th Mechanized Brigade back under siege [57].  Now that the city and the 25th were relieved, the successful September military takeover could not only be attributed to US and Saudi airstrikes, but also to an AQAP issuance from Qasim al-Rimi, ordering his men to retreat [16].  With that being said, others in the Yemeni military stated that AQAP still retained control over sections of the city, foreshadowing more battles to come [56].  As such, AQAP and militants continued to respond, attacking and killing soldiers through the south as well as continuing to attempt assassinations [4].  Yet for the time being, the battle for Zinjibar was over, as the military now controlled portions of the devastated city amidst scattered fighting [55].  Jaar and other areas of Abyan remained under AQAP governance [56].  While beaten back, the paramilitary force of AQAP was not thoroughly defeated by any means. 

While AQAP had been focused on fighting their guerilla war, they never ceased using the tactic of suicide bombings, as was evidenced by the Turki al-Shahrani attack.  His was not the last suicide bombing conducted by AQAP during the summer, yet the next focused again on the Houthis in the north.  According to an AQAP announcement on September 12, 2011, the suicide bomber was known as Abu Bakr Mohamed al-Najdi (suggesting he was a Saudi), and he had managed to kill over 100 Houthis [58].  The Houthi leadership was meeting in Jawf province on August 15, when the bomber drove his vehicle into the gathering and detonated [58,59].  The Yemeni press reported only two deaths, while AQAP seemed to be greatly exaggerating their successes again [58,59]. 

Car bombings continued with an attack on a military outpost near Aden on September 3, which left six soldiers dead [60].  Yemeni Defense Minister General Mohamed Nasir Ahmed survived another such attack on September 27 which targeted his convoy in Aden [61].  These instances further proved AQAP was a viable and capable adversary still, and thus the US continued to target their forces. 

The US fired upon al-Mahfad village in Abyan with a purported drone strike on September 21, as well as the village of Shuqra [62].  Said al-Shehri was the primary target of the day and was located in al-Mahfad [62].  Four AQAP fighters were killed when their vehicle was destroyed in the Mahfad strike, yet Shehri was able to escape unharmed [62].  Tribesmen later reported that Anwar al-Awlaki may have been with Shehri that day in Mahfad, but that both men escaped the attempt on their lives [63].  Awlaki fled to Jawf province next in northern Yemen [63].  The move was conducted in hopes of placing himself out of the line of fire from US and Yemeni air supremacy in the south [63].  Jawf province was in fact the location Awlaki had chosen to reside within, yet he may have already been in the northern province when the September 21 strike occurred in the south, contradicting the claims of the tribesmen [64].

Americans Executed

On the morning of September 30, 2011, the sun rose over Khashef, Jawf Province in northern Yemen to relative quiet.  Several men exited a compound containing women and children and began a long trek to their awaiting vehicles [64,65,66,67].  Among them was Samir Zafar Khan, the arrogant young North Carolinian who had turned his back on his own nation [64,66,67].  Khan had edited and released the seventh issue of his English-language terrorist magazine, Inspire just three days before [68].  In it, he acclaimed many of the successful jihadist operations worldwide from 9/11 onwards [68].  He profiled a statement by his new emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and even left a cryptic picture of Grand Central Station in New York City on one of the final pages, promising an article soon [68].  The periodical, a palimpsest of the expansive and disparate evolution of Salafist based jihadist thinking, propelled Khan to notoriety in his sphere of influence, and disrepute in the remainder of the world.  Walking with Khan was the long sought after New Mexican Anwar al-Awlaki, who had come from a life of privilege in the US to living on the run in Yemen [64,66,67].  However, with that unpredictable life, Awlaki had gained demagogue status amongst jihadists around the world and had even inspired men like Wuhaishi and Shehri to request that he be made a leader in al-Qaida’s most active franchise [69].  Awlaki could reflect upon that morning, during his long walk, the many jihadists, terrorist plots and terrorist actions that he had helped to spur along and inspire.  From the Fort Hood shooting rampage to the Christmas Day bombing attempt, Awlaki was linked to many of the most prominent recent jihadist events partaken against the US [66].  A mere two months after this day, in late November 2011, the NYPD arrested Jose Pimentel, a Dominican-American convert to Islam, who had self radicalized online [70].  Pimentel utilized Inspire magazine and sermons by Awlaki to justify constructing a bomb to kill returning US servicemembers and police in New York [70].  Fortunately, Pimentel was captured just an hour before the bomb was completed [70]. 

Furthermore he had been a danger to America’s allies in the West and in the Middle East.  Awlaki had graduated from inspiring acts to helping AQAP direct them.  For example, Rajib Karim, a British Airways employee, was convicted of working with Awlaki to get a potential bomb on board a US bound plane [268].  Karim manipulated his employment as an IT worker for the airways to make the attempt and was in direct internet contact with Awlaki, who had made the request [71].  A Yemeni security guard for an Austrian oil and gas company shot and killed Jacques Spagnolo, a contractor for the same company, after being incited to action by Awlaki and one of his relatives in October 2010 [72,73].  Hisham Mohamed Asim was sentenced to death in Yemen for the crime, while Awlaki was sentenced in absentia [72,73]. Awlaki ruminated on jihadists like Karim, Pimentel, and Asim, and how he had used the internet, tribal ties, and even the English language so effectively to recruit these well placed men to his cause.  Thoughts of a future full of further, and no doubt more extravagant, plots against America filled his mind that day.  Awlaki and Khan arrived to their vehicles after the 700 meter walk, Wuhaishi and AQAP leadership having placed two of their most valuable assets away from the southern fighting [65].  The senior militants no doubt thought they had provided them with the ability to move about freely.  Yet the US tracked Awlaki to his current location, and watched him for two weeks in the home [64,65].  With the house full of children, President Obama had to hesitate on pulling the trigger, yet finally the men provided the chance for a strike [64].  As the men opened their car doors, and drove away, their vehicle and bodies were decimated by Hellfire missiles fired from circling Reaper drones [64,65,66].  The CIA had retaken command of the drone and assassination program in Yemen [64,66].  In fact, the CIA had just completed a drone base in Saudi Arabia from which some of the aircraft were launched that day [66].  That being said, JSOC still provided heavy support for the mission [64].  The goals of Operation Troy, as the hunt for Awlaki was named, had come to fruition [64,67].  With the bodies identified, President Obama was able to announce the death of an enemy that had long plagued him [64,66,67].  With their success in Pakistan, the CIA now extended their reach and drones into Yemen and on their first attempt, ended the life of the man President Obama and his administration so yearned for. 

Two Americans were dead, along with militants identified later as Abu Muhsin al-Maribi and Salim al-Marwani [74].  The CIA had claimed that Kamal Derwish was collateral damage when they killed the American in 2002.  In this instance, they claimed Samir Khan was collateral as well [67].  Yet with Awlaki, there could be no such belief.  The CIA had sought after, tracked, and killed the radical imam knowing that he was an American [64,66].  The fallout had the potential to be intense over the extrajudicial executions of these two enemies of the state, yet the administration ordered the deed done at all costs [64,66].  With their deaths, the two American AQAP members would never again be able to plot against their home nation, nor would they be able to release any more propaganda.  Over were their days of using their command, charisma, computer savvy abilities, and ideals to inspire an insurrection. 

SEGMENT IX Appendix (For Status of Lists E, F, and H as of September 2011):

LIST E:

  1. *   = Former Guantanamo Bay Detainee
  2. (K) = Believed to be operating in the Khorasan region
  3. (Q) = Believed to be operating in Iraq (Mesopotamian region)
  4. (Y) = Believed to be operating in Yemen (Arabian region)
  5. (L) = Believed to be operating in Lebanon (Levantine region)
  6. (S) = Believed to be operating in Syria (Levantine region)
  7. (I) = Believed to be operating in Iran (Persian region)
  8. (H) = Believed to be operating in the Horn of Africa (Somalia)
  9. (?) = Unknown area of operation

LIST F:

LIST H:

VARIOUS OTHER IMPORTANT AQAP Constituents:

LEGEND:

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

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