Dissipating Pressure – A Withdrawal From Opposing Hatred

Written by Nolan R Beasley

The US announced in June that it would be dramatically reducing military presence in Syria, manifested in the abandonment of seven of its eight bases within the nation1. Despite the rapid depletion in resources and forces, the US still faced a lingering ISIS threat. This was also persistent in the form of the remnants of al-Qaida franchise Hurras al-Din, now seemingly at odds with Ahmed al-Sharaa and his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham directing the Syrian nation.

ISIS was at this point limited in its ability to respond to the new Syrian regime and the current US presence, which raised the legitimate fear that upon full withdrawal, the terror network will be allowed to again flourish without the persistent pressure from American forces. The stability of the nascent Syrian government must be questioned, as well as their capabilities in managing the undeniable and continual threat posed by the jihadists. On May 22, an IED planted by ISIS operatives in the al-Safa desert of Syria’s Suwaida province, detonated against a government vehicle resulting in seven Syrian soldier casualties2. The Free Syrian Army was also attacked via an ISIS bombing approximately a week later, with one fighter having perished in the incident3. Overall ISIS remained operational and given sufficient time could very well regroup and revitalize.

Clarifications

Despite the certainty in which the results of specific raids were presented during the slow withdrawal, there was of course room for error. In order to examine some of these nuances and inaccuracies, a study of UN reports must be conducted as they relate to militant and jihadist organizations. In the first article of this series, we discussed the demise of not one but apparently two ISIS shadow governors of Iraq: Ahmed Hamid al-Ithawi and Jasim al-Mazroui. The UN reports provided estimates to ISIS strengths across Iraq and the Levant as well as revelations on the two senior operatives.

The 36th UN Monitoring report on ISIS and al-Qaida referenced the belief that ISIS maintained at least 3,000 combatants spread across Syria, mostly in a structure of numerous small operational cells. The organization was also assessed to be particularly active against the Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast via approximately 400 deployed belligerents.

In Iraq, the report acknowledged with no fanfare that the former ISIS governor (or Wali) of Iraq, Jasim Khalaf Dawud al-Mazroui, known as Abu Abdulqadir, was alive and likely functioning as the replacement to the assassinated senior official Abdullah Makki Musleh al-Rufayi4. This is significant, as Mazroui was targeted in a combined assault by American and Iraqi forces in October 2024 amid redoubts in the Hamrin Mountains, resulting in the Iraqi Joint Operations Command hailing his death as one of the successful outcomes of the operation5. Yet it seems he survived, allowing for his ascension to fill Rufayi’s former position. As for Mazroui’s governorship in Iraq, the UN revealed that one Ahmed Zaidan Khalaf Abed al-Ithawi was ruling in his stead, albeit over a significantly weakened state6. The operatives within Iraq were also constricted to guerilla style assaults against government forces and operating in reduced cells7. A 35th report previously released in January 2025 also quietly acknowledged that at the time Mazroui remained active as the ISIS governor of Iraq, despite the losses of 9 of 17 provincial commanders8. One of those lost was Ahmed Hamid Hussein al-Ithawi (not to be confused with the above mentioned Ahmed Zaidan al-Ithawi), killed in a US raid in Anbar on August 29, 2024, and clarified in the 35th report to have been ISIS deputy governor of Iraq under Mazroui as opposed to the actual senior position9, a status insinuated when US CENTCOM described him as commanding all operations within Iraq. Of note, Ahmed Hamid al-Ithawi prior to his assassination, was a candidate for the identity of overall ISIS commander Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, as per the UN10. Ahmed Hamid al-Ithawi also was a conduit of communication between Rufayi and his Somali province indicating that his position was vital for global operations as well.

Herein it is essential to note that US CENTCOM did not issue a revision to their previous announcement of Mazroui’s supposed death, and thus the continued belief in the former ISIS governor’s fall was misleading to a public wary of a full withdrawal from the region. As for Ithawi, he was in fact assassinated, but it is also important to acknowledge his actual role in the network and the functions for which he was responsible. Neither was appropriately reported or widely disseminated.

Further Targeted Officials

In the days following the significant drawdown acknowledgement, American intelligence and air superiority persisted in attempts to destabilize ISIS critical infrastructure. Notably, US CENTCOM did not announce the next strike via official means, but rather through their X account, demonstrating a recent shift away from formal communications. Nonetheless, the social media post on June 12 revealed that ISIS operative Rakhim Boev was targeted and eliminated in an airstrike against his position in northwest Syria, probably Idlib province11. Boev, whose name indicates a possible Slavic or Central Asian ethnicity, was reportedly responsible for external operations against American and allied interests while he was based within Syria12. A photograph was also shared, displaying what was apparently a ruined Kia vehicle, most likely attacked via a precision drone strike in order to reduce the possibility of collateral damage13. According to local sources, the attack happened just prior on June 1014. Much the same as many recently deceased ISIS operatives, there appears to have been nothing in popular media outlets or academic research regarding his existence prior to his targeting, thus it remains unknown exactly how vital he was to terroristic plotting and advanced operations.

Next, an official press release was issued by USCENTCOM for a raid launched against a senior ISIS official in al-Bab, located within Aleppo province, Syria15. The July 25 assault targeted and killed Dhiya Zawba Musleh al-Hardani, who was accused of establishing a direct danger against the fledgling Syrian government as well as American interests16. The issuance was quick to point out that three women and three children survived the raid, and that the only other fatalities were adults. These were two additional ISIS operatives, and the sons of Hardani, both Abdullah and Abdulrahman Dhiya Zawba al-Hardani17.

A Familial Affair

On August 20, press reports began emerging alerting the world to another operation against ISIS in Syria, along with ambiguity as to the target’s demise or survival. Helicopters dispatched American forces in Atimah, in vicinity of the Turkish border, during the early morning darkness18. Initial reports varied, with some Syrian sources stating that the targeted ISIS official was killed before he could abscond, and others stating that he was apprehended successfully19. Compounded the intrigue was a report from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights proposing that the militant was an Iraqi who carried the moniker Abu Hafs al-Qurashi20. This of course is a suspiciously similar alias to the proclaimed commander of ISIS, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.

An official USCENTCOM press release notified the public that the August 19 raid had successfully killed an ISIS financier and commander responsible for terrorist operations across Iraq and Syria, and maintaining a notable network of ISIS contacts21. The release did not name the target, nor did it give him any additional significance.

Syrian press meanwhile, provided further information, naming the Iraqi as Saleh Numan22. More specifically he was named as Saleh Numan Abdulnaif al-Jabouri23. He sported a host of known aliases to include Ali, Muhannad, Abu Saleh, and Abu Saleh24. His apartment, in which he lived with a French speaking wife, their son, and his mother, was the subject of the raid. It seemed that Saleh Numan failed to survive the operation25. It was the reference to his networking that remains of the most interest. Syrian authorities concluded that Numan was one of the most threatening operatives in the nation, as he directly commanded ISIS cells upon their activation, deploying them against locations within their borders, and trafficked them elsewhere in the region26. Further sources pinpoint him as the fifth highest ranking official within Syria, naming him as the liaison from Iraq to Syria27. In Iraq he was the treasurer of their efforts, and utilized their funds for the procurement of drones, and other military supplies28. As such he was the recipient of a warrant for his arrest from Iraqi authorities, prior to his death29.

His connections appear to have also been familial. Through Speculation by name alone, he may have been the brother of senior ISIS official Muataz Numan Abdulnaif al-Jabouri, who was killed in Deir al-Zawr, Syria in a coalition airstrike on May 26, 202030. Known as Haji Taysir, the militant Muataz Numan had the distinction of appearing within the US Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program with a $5 million bounty, which was announced on August 21, 201931. Haji Taysir was said to be the deputy commander in Syria for manufacturing and research, a role that allowed him to labor to produce chemical and biological weaponry, and thus by 2017 be one of the vital leaders of the ISIS campaign32. His profile seems to have extended to family, allowing Saleh Numan the contacts and means to develop into a connected and efficient militant commander, especially given that Haji Taysir was reportedly a member of the organization through all of its iterations, from al-Qaida in Iraq through ISIS33. By the time of his assassination, Kurdish authorities were referring to Haji Taysir as the ISIS governor of Iraq34. Another potential family member may be Abu Fatima al-Juhaishi, the erstwhile ISIS governor of Kirkuk, whose given name was Nimah Abdulnaif al-Jabouri35.

Revocation and the Envoy

While Syria was rife with armed militant networks, the one that now controlled the government was shown favoritism, mercy, and forgiveness. This was exemplified by the July 7 revocation of the terrorist designation of Jabhat al-Nusrah, under the moniker Hayat Tahrir al-Sham36. Per the State Department announcement, this was due to the new cooperation with Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa aimed at cessation of ongoing conflict, the apparent progress of Sharaa’s newly established Syrian government, the “dissolution” of his militant organization HTS37. The relationship gave the Americans a valid partner against ISIS and al-Qaida militants, and a reasonable excuse for carrying through with the withdrawal.

Cooperation persisted, notably in the form of a USCENTCOM raid undertaken in Syria on September 19, which neutralized Omar Abdulqadir, a known ISIS external operations plotter and militant, poised to specifically attack American interests38. The killing was touted as hampering prospective militant threats and assaults. Per a new usual, the details of the operation were sparse, as provided by USCENTCOM. Iraqi counterterror forces however, also claimed credit for the raid, which they acknowledged was conducted in conjunction with the Americans. They named the targeted operative was significant, and named him as Omar Abdulqadir Bassam, alternately known as Abdulrahman al-Halabi, and declared his intentions and plots expanded beyond American focus, also centering on Lebanon and Europe39. In fact, after the successful sunrise raid, the Iraqis confirmed that the deceased Omar Abdulqadir Bassam was a responsible party in the November 19, 2013 dual suicide bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut40. Interestingly, at the time of the attack, the incident was claimed by a separate extremist network, known as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, indicating that upon that organization’s decline, its senior operatives shifted to and provided services for other militant outfits including ISIS. The AAB was affiliated with, but not subservient to al-Qaida during its operational era. For ISIS, Omar Abdulqadir Bassam labored in security41 in addition to external planning, before his September demise in Hama42.

The strategy of targeting al-Qaida affiliated militants has been discussed in a previous article, and the practice itself continued as a benefit to Sharaa and as a preventative measure for the Americans. On October 7, USCENTCOM announced an airstrike which killed a militant of the Kurdish Iraqi militant organization Ansar al-Islam43. He was named as Mohamed Abdulwahab al-Ahmed in a brief press release, and labeled simply as an “attack planner44.” Interestingly, USCENTCOM chose to name the militant by his actual identity and not an alias. His alias revealed his expansive militant career in the region. He was Abu Dardaa al-Kurdi45, a senior official in Ansar al-Islam, with some sources declaring him as the deputy commander of the network46. Of note, he once traveled from Iraq to Pakistan as an envoy from the group to senior al-Qaida leadership, aiming to ease tensions and encourage a merger. Said to be aged in his 40s, Abu Dardaa was operational in Idlib and Aleppo, Syria from 2012 forward, responsible for planning assaults and facilitating necessities and logistical supplies to fellow militants47. His death was revealed to have occurred as the result of a precision drone strike against his vehicle in Idlib on October 248. The pressure on these individuals and organizations was suffocating with US involvement ostensibly preempting attacks, but also conveniently facilitating Sharaa in his power consolidation.

The stories of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Omar Abdulqadir Bassam, and Abu Dardaa, demonstrate three vastly contrasting fates of long serving al-Qaida affiliated officials. It is a remarkable distinction. One fell as a servant of a vicious network, one was targeted via drone for probable political reasons, while the other was celebrated as a politician. As for ISIS operatives, the Syrian government would need to earn trust and offer pressure against the organization’s remnants as the American presence dissolves and their own pressure dissipates. Perhaps it is not inevitable that ISIS will enter a resurgence, but it is certainly possible, with a clear plan for observation and interference needed to prevent an already unstable region from yet another descent into absurdity, brutality, and chaos. We have seen too many circumstances where the threat was misunderstood and recovered to a previous increased level of probable threats, political prowess, foreign influence, and available resources.

CITATIONS:

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