SERIES: Predators Of The Khorasan – The Chenagai Madrassa

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Less than a year from the inglorious drone strike on Damadola, Bajaur, the CIA conducted a much more devastating attack, this time on a madrassa in Bajaur, ostensibly utilized by militants as a training and logistics complex. To understand the action, we must first turn to the south and the agency of North Waziristan, wherein the Pakistani civil infighting evolved in 2006 to a ferocity that eventually birthed a peace accord with Taliban jihadists, an outcome the US desired to avoid in Bajaur. American military and intelligence were desperate to control an eastern flank in Afghanistan that was less conducive to cross border raids from Pakistan, yet the ongoing struggle was only worsening the situation.

Raid At Danda Saidgai

The compound of local Noor Payo Khan rested amidst various residences in the village of Danda Saidgai, North Waziristan, merely 15km or 9 miles west1 from nearby Miranshah2. Within he was accused of housing a militant compound, a suspected training complex, an arsenal of weaponry, and jihadists of various importance3. On March 1, 2006, combatants were alleged by authorities to have participated in paramilitary activities across the border in Afghanistan before returning to the North Waziristan abode4. Local sources claimed that the militants utilized tent encampments in the mountains for their foray5.

A counter raid commencing at 0700 was said to consist of forces of the elite Pakistani Special Services Group ferried by a dozen helicopters, half of which were attack variants6. Domiciles and compounds within Danda Saidgai were targeted by the aircraft, before forces spilled forth to engage the militants upon the ground7. At least one of the Pakistani soldiers was slain8.

The apparent officer of the militant compound, a Chechen, departed with two (or three9) fellow jihadists in a large red pickup truck, attempting to escape, but instead becoming an obvious target of the preying helicopters above. His vehicle disabled and guards killed by the helicopters’ munitions, the Chechen chieftain perished just hours later, succumbing to his wounds10. He was initially identified only as Imam, the title used by religious prayer leaders within mosques11. Army officials noted that Imam was responsible for a slew of recent assaults on Pakistani forces along the Afghan border, and that the Chechen was intrinsically linked to al-Qaida12.

Other American media sources made extravagant claims about the Chechen militant, his presence in Danda Saidgai, and the circumstances of the raid. Among them, he was identified as Imam Asad [A] and stated to be the senior al-Qaida officer for all of Pakistan, while those killed with him actually comprised an elite guardian unit for Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the upper echelons of the network13. Furthermore, in this version, upwards of eight compounds consisting of barracks for these guards were assaulted, not by Pakistani military, but rather an American counterterror Task Force with the ability to operate in Pakistan to eliminate al-Qaida commanders14.

Despite all of these assertions, a Chechen commander meeting this description, or bearing his alias, failed to appear in the eulogies of prominent al-Qaida panegyrist Abu Ubaidah al-Filistini15. This does not preclude his death or importance, but leaves open the possibility that he was a captain of lesser importance, simply one of a plethora of Central Asian militants now inhabiting the region, operating for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Taliban, Haqqani Network, or independently.

Meanwhile, authorities insisted that those slain were Central Asian militants16. Pakistani military sources declared 45 militants killed, some also of Arab descent. There were also collateral casualties as civilians were caught in the fire from the attack helicopters17. In fact, regional authorities claimed some of the explosions were the result of militant munition caches detonating in the fire18. Student and other local protestors took to the streets, damaging property, attacking and even capturing a dozen Pakistani soldiers at checkpoints19.

A cynical take on the event describes the motivation of the Pakistanis as determined by impressing US President Bush as he made his first official visit to neighboring Afghanistan to observe the status of the war and meet with President Hamid Karzai20. He was then to depart for Pakistan for a brief Islamabad meeting, which he maintained despite the previously discussed Karachi Consulate bombing21. President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan would therefore have results to boast to his distinguished visitor, and to alleviate criticisms of his nation’s counter terror efforts. This is especially significant given that President Bush placed sincere emphasis on the issue of cross-border militant raids from Pakistani territory against coalition forces in Afghanistan22. When meeting with Musharraf, the subject was heavily discussed as the two world leaders attempted to rejuvenate their alliance against the jihadists. Musharraf acknowledged previous inconsistencies from his forces in the campaign23. There was focus on intelligence sharing, the discovery of militant locales, and most intriguingly, the efforts to neutralize them once found24. Observers agreed on this hypothesis, noting that the timing was entirely too coincidental25. Locals resented what they perceived as President Musharraf besieging their homes for the sake of politics26.

Another option, perhaps even more cynical, was that the US forces did actually organize and coordinate the assault in order to demonstrate a persistent pressure against al-Qaida militants, bringing the operation to focus as Bush visited Kabul and Islamabad, in order to display American prioritization of the insurgents. If the raid resulted in ranking figures captured or killed, then President Bush could leverage this against President Musharraf for additional cooperation, or claim credit with an exasperated American public for a significant victory in an otherwise disregarded and disheveled war.

Local anger remained palpable. On March 4, even as President Bush conducted his state visit to Pakistan, up to 100 Pashtun tribal militants27 ambushed convoys of Pakistani forces in Mir Ali, before the violence expanded to engulf Miranshah, wherein dissidents launched mortars towards and fired upon soldiers while raiding and holding strategic governmental compounds28. Hundreds of combatants under Maulvi Abdulkhaliq Haqqani engaged in the actions, prompting the Pakistanis to respond with severity and helicopters, killing approximately 46 militants and losing five soldiers combined in the two locations29. The ferocity was necessitated by the militant attempts to overrun the headquarters of Pakistani paramilitary Frontier troops in the town30. Abdulkhaliq (not a constituent of the Haqqani Network or family, despite his name), goaded the populace into open revolt, claiming authorities were killing civilians31. Locals evacuated Miranshah, leaving the central bazaar barren, while the military concentrated its ire on a madrassa overseen by militant Maulana Sadiq Noor [B] 32.

Coinciding with a curfew implemented on March 6, Pakistani forces attempted to liberate the telephone exchange in Miranshah, a structure occupied by militants, and in the resulting engagement a total of 19 belligerents, including some foreign elements, were slain33. As the tensions subsided, the Pakistanis established patrols through the afflicted areas, and on March 7, reengaged in order to destroy another madrassa utilized as a staging location by the militants in Miranshah34. The Darul Uloom Faredia Gulshan-i-Ilum madrassa, overseen by Abdulkhaliq, was decimated by four rockets launched from a Pakistani Cobra helicopter, however, the compound was evacuated beforehand, sparing hundreds of students, Abdulkhaliq himself, and any militants sheltering within35. Authorities blamed pernicious Indian interference, equating the militants with Pakistan’s traditional enemy, in an attempt to justify, and as an excuse to the Pashtuns for the fighting that eventually claimed around 140 lives36. By March 10, the Pakistanis made a final attempt on Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulvi Abdulkhaliq Haqqani, striking via helicopter a domicile believed to double as a weapons cache and staging ground for the senior militants. Military spokesperson General Shawkat Sultan declared the weaponry destroyed and 25-30 combatants, again suspected to include foreigners, as deceased in the strike37. The ranking agitators though, remained unharmed.

As another response, Pakistani authorities moved to make Afghan refugees in North Waziristan as a convenient collective scapegoat, declaring them responsible for the violence and protests since the raid38. After nearly two weeks, the situation calmed, but authorities issued a proclamation that the refugees were to depart North Waziristan with expediency39. This of course, did not address the issue of the Central Asian and Arab militants.

A North Waziristan Accord

Significant fighting flared in North Waziristan sporadically throughout 2006. As an example, before sunlight on June 10 saw Pakistani helicopters bombard another compound reportedly infested with militants in the agency, a mere 5 km from the Afghan border, resulting in as many as 20 fighters slain, to include not just Pashtuns, but Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens as well40.

On June 26, a militant suicide bomber drove his vehicle borne IED into a military checkpoint, some four miles east of Miranshah and killed at least six soldiers, demonstrating the intense disdain for the government forces manning such outposts within the agency41. Coupled with another suicide bombing on June 2, in which two assailants utilized their vehicle to intercept a military convoy between North Waziristan and Bannu district, and killed four soldiers, the government was consumed with dread and fearful concern over the proliferation of this tactic within their nation42. Incidentally, around the same time as the June 26 incident, militants offered a reprieve if only the Pakistanis withdrew from the controversial checkpoints43. By this point the Pakistanis claimed as many as 3oo militants, with 75 foreign elements perished in the campaign of the past year44. Within the months of July and August, senior tribal militants Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulana Sadiq Noor approved a ceasefire resulting in negotiations for a lasting cessation of hostilities45.

A grand tribal jirga, composing of various elders helped to negotiate an end to the fighting, and on September 5, 2006, representatives of the North Waziristan government and Pakistani military signed a peace accord with various Taliban militants within the agency46. The Pakistani government was desperately attempting to prevent American ambitions and intentions to eventually overtly pursue and attack militants on Islamabad’s side of the border. Attempts to construct a physical border along the Durand Line separating the countries was futile, and radical Pashtun elements were gaining significant influence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)47. Tribal seniors in the Waziristan agencies who were sympathetic to the government, were already under siege with at least 25 murdered in the previous year, rendering sufficient local assistance and information sharing severely restricted48. For President Musharraf the potential of peace was also self serving, as it could restrain the foreign elements responsible for pursuing his assassination. Further, the Pakistani government had no appetite to engage with the Pashtuns and preferred the Taliban controlling Afghanistan and the FATA as opposed to instability and revolt along that particular border. At that moment, Pakistan already had to fret over Baloch rebels within the nation as well as their ever present enemies India49. Therefore the fighting the FATA needed to lessen or cease, and the foreign elements needed to be rendered obsolete so as to avoid American incursions as well as internal national conflict. Simultaneously, Pakistani political opposition party JUI-F, laboring in solidarity with the militants, desired for the jihadists to maintain a Taliban style government over the FATA, in order to prevent their arrival and influence in major urban areas50. From the various Pakistani perspectives, the peace accord was a necessity.

The accord contained the obvious conditions. Cross border raids and attacks on Pakistani authorities were to cease, and the Pakistani military would withdraw from checkpoints in the agency to consolidate in concentrated fortified positions51. Foreign elements were to be expelled, unless they conceded to dwelling legally within North Waziristan52. All captured equipment prisoners would be exchanged, and Pashtun traditional means were to be utilized in resolving conflicts53. Reparations would be paid in consideration for the collateral losses among the local populace54. Despite the obvious victory for the militants, it was said that no shadow Taliban government was to exist.

Unsurprisingly and behind the scenes, representatives of the Haqqani Network and Taliban commander Mullah Mohamed Omar advocated for the accord55. Signatories for the local militants of what was referred to as the Pakistani Taliban included Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulana Sadiq Noor, although they did not directly appear for the ceremonial commencement, but rather deployed representatives instead56. Pakistani press correctly called out that no tribal elders signed, despite government assertions otherwise, leaving Bahadur and and Sadiq Noor as the primary beneficiaries of the agreements, with the six others considered second tier militants. All eight received government pardons57.

The Signatories

Of the two seniors, Bahadur emerged of the most importance. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was born in approximately 1961, a Pashtun hailing from the Wazir tribe, specifically of the Mada Khel clan in North Waziristan58. Bahadur was incensed when in 2001, the UN considered sending monitors to the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to sever a weapons artery to the Taliban59. Due to ethnic and religious linkages, Bahadur felt a responsibility to support the Taliban, and fought for them accordingly60. He fell in line with their beliefs, owing to a Deobandi Islam education obtained in Multan61, Punjab province, which he attended after his upbringing in Mada Khel territory62. Particularly, he is assessed as having fought in the Afghan civil war after the Soviet collapse63, and later assisted the Taliban in the fight against the Northern Alliance64. As a leader and activist in the Islamist political party Jamiaat Ulema Islam pre-9/11, he gained influence and evolved into a political and paramilitary official for North Waziristan post 9/1165. When al-Qaida their allied foreign forces absconded from Pakistani military maneuvers in South Waziristan during 2004 and entered the north, a resulting conflict between host and government was inevitable. First, Bahadur helmed the tribal militant counter operations throughout 200566. He eventually helped negotiate the peace settlement with the Pakistani government in September 2006, allowing for him to thrive and actually hold North Waziristan under a Taliban mirrored rule of law67. 

His ally in Miranshah, North Waziristan, Maulana Sadiq Noor ran a madrassa that acted as a central headquarters for the Haqqanis68. He eventually disavowed the Uzbeks and some Arabs in North Waziristan, resulting in infrequent times that the tribal Taliban adherents nearly came to violence with these foreign elements69. This clashed with his previous stance concerning outsiders, wherein he surreptitiously approved and assisted in their presence but publicly refuted their existence to the government. He was particularly annoyed with the al-Qaida aligned Abu Okasha al-Iraqi, whom Sadiq Noor observed was openly inserting himself onto local jirgas and tribal matters, hindering efforts to plausibly discredit assertions of Arab and foreign element residence70.

Concerning Central Asians, he certainly once sheltered or associated with IMU combatants at his madrassa near Miranshah, as evidenced by the fact that an Uzbek named Chemaq, purportedly an officer for Tahir Yuldashev, was among 70 militants (including 35 foreign elements) killed during an October 2005 Pakistani operation to neutralize Sadiq Noor71. Beginning in August of that year, Pakistani authorities focused on Sadiq Noor, accusing him of a campaign against their forces, which included the usage of IEDs and assaults on Pakistani facilities72. Government authorities placed great value on him and his oversight of Taliban belligerents, and noted his and Abdulkhaliq Haqqani’s refusals to surrender when declared wanted, while most others did so when required. Furthermore, he received funding and logistical support from the now notorious Abdullah Mahsud out of South Waziristan73.

Sadiq Noor was of the Dawar tribe and represented Bahadur’s ability to appeal outside of the Wazir tribe74.  Born and raised impoverished on the outskirts of Miranshah, he was educated at a Deobandi institution in Karachi prior to returning as a member of the political party JUI-F75. He garnered paramilitary experience against the Soviets during the 1980s and at Bagram against the Northern Alliance on behalf of the Taliban prior to the American invasion76. The severe Islamist was openly hostile to technology and enforced strict observance of Shariah law in North Waziristan77.

The North Waziristan peace accord was lauded by President Musharraf to President Bush in his own visit to America in September 2006, in which the former again claimed that the deal was specifically reached with tribal elders and not with Taliban militants78. This fact was already disproven by Bahadur and Sadiq Noor constituting the primary signing parties. Furthermore, the deal was rapidly exposed as a veil for further militant actions. While Pakistan held to their side of the bargain and removed their spread forces from checkpoints to their fort and encampments, basal criminal aspects of society subsequently ran rampant79. A shadow Taliban government was established in Miranshah, foreign militants were neither harassed nor expelled, and assaults across the border into Afghanistan only increased significantly80. Within a month after the signing, a local combatant Maulvi Mir Kalam was killed on such a mission and ten of his subordinates apprehended, in a telling representation of the accord’s failure81.

Foreign fighters persisted as an asset to the likes of the Haqqanis, and as a hindrance to Bahadur and those willing to tolerate the Pakistani government. It appears Bahadur presented a choice to the Uzbeks and Chechens under his purview: join the fight and obey orders, or assimilate into the tribal society82. Nonetheless, despite any deals or ultimatums, the foreign elements were remaining, and constituted a sincere destabilizing presence in the region.

Pakistani media saw abounding American military conflict in the FATA as inevitable now83, while US media and analysts reacted with indignation at the signing of the accord. A similar agreement was rapidly developed and proposed to the Tehreek e Nafaz e Shariat e Mohammadi (TNSM) to the north in Bajaur agency. By October 13, as a show of good faith, the Pakistanis even liberated prisoners in order to advocate with the leadership for the impending accord84. American political and military goals were contrarian in this sense to the Pakistanis, with dire consequences.

Chenagai Strike

Predator drones swept over Damadola, Bajaur for the second time in the year 2006, taking aim at a madrassa in nearby small Chenagai community, not far from the agency capital of Khaar85. Recently in Khaar, anti-US militants and protestors had gathered in force, as proponents of the Taliban and al-Qaida86. Assuredly, none in Bajaur were anticipating another devastating drone strike. However, this morning, on Monday October 30, the Chenagai locals were startled into consciousness by the explosions and brutality87. Supposedly, Pakistani military kept the madrassa under surveillance and had determined it housed a hive of armed militants88. In fact, Pakistan expressed confidence that it was a training camp for terrorists and so-called miscreants89. President Musharraf cited a week long reconnaissance that revealed all within as enemies90. As the building, known as the Ziaul Uloom Taleemul Quran madrassa91, was the recognized former headquarters of the TNSM, it is unlikely that Pakistan was suddenly surprised by its existence92. American intelligence was reported to have identified 22 such locations in the FATA alone93.

Around 0500 the first drone fired twice, with one direct hit and one miss, while a second drone followed up with a third successful strike on the compound94. In the coming days, it was clarified that the structure stood no chance against the firepower, and 82 of its inhabitants perished, including the madrassa’s master Maulvi Liaquat Hussain95. In terms of militant linkages, Maulvi Liaquat was a known associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri96, a relationship of necessity built by the al-Qaida deputy commander once he fled to Bajaur97. Liaquat was also the brother of Mullah Fazalullah, the current commander of the TNSM and son-in-law of its founder, the imprisoned Sufi Mohamed98. It appears that as opposed to a sudden discovery of the madrassa’s militant tendencies, the Pakistani military instead first went directly to Maulvi Liaquat and implored him to cease illegal activities99. Maulvi Liaquat ardently refuted the idea of restricting or shuttering the compound100. While the madrassa was an acknowledged staging location for local militants on their forays into Afghanistan101, for this lethal night, it housed mostly young male students aged between those under 10 years old, those in their teens, and some in their twenties102.

Zawahiri’s other confidant in the agency, Maulvi Faqir Mohamed reportedly departed the madrassa just prior to the strike, with some Pakistani sources claiming it was merely a half-hour difference103. Ironically, Maulvi Faqir and Mohamed and Maulvi Liaquat Hussain were to be recipients of pardons that same day as their militant forces entered into the peace accord with the government, in an effort to mirror the happenings to the south in North Waziristan104. Obviously, this agreement remained unsigned for several months, although as mentioned, Pakistan prematurely released incarcerated militants in anticipation105.

Pakistani military officials voiced by General Shawkat Sultan immediately credited the attack to their own forces, perpetuating the idea that the scores of dead within were all militants, or the aforementioned miscreants106. Locals however, attributed the strike appropriately to Predator drones and later observed Pakistani helicopters emptying missiles and rockets into wilderness terrain in an attempt to conceal the US involvement107. These same locals labored in futility to retrieve the fallen victims and provide proper internments, but the trauma and destruction was intensive, with remains which were shredded and scattered108. While incoming reporters were barred from the region, those there on the night of the strike witnessed the carnage and advised that children were among the slain109. Political opposition leaders in Islamabad went further, describing at least 30 children deceased110. This despite General Sultan’s declarations that no collateral deaths occurred111. The populace of Bajaur was not placated, and took to the streets in mass protests112. For his part, Maulvi Faqir Mohamed swore to persist in jihadist efforts113, in an incendiary speech given to a crown of at least 10,000114. In interviews, Faqir galvanized his people and laid the groundwork for justification of a response, declaring that innocents were slaughtered by a complicit Pakistan government at the behest of the Americans115. Protests spread through Pakistan, including the city of Karachi116. Prince Charles of the UK, on a formal visit to Pakistan, was forced to cancel a journey to and event within a Peshawar madrassa, due to the outrage117.

Pakistani officials reluctantly revealed US intelligence was utilized for the attack, but that was the extent of the admission. Perhaps both sides were so eager to strike these targets in Bajaur due to a misguided belief that Osama bin Laden was hiding alongside Zawahiri within these borders118. In fact, American press at the time ran with the story that Zawahiri was believed to have actually been residing in the madrassa, thus justifying the attacks119. There was an apparent belief that Zawahiri was pinned within a 40 square mile zone with US assets closing in on his position120. As for the children, other American pundits attributed their presence at the madrassa to merely a Taliban tactic utilizing human shields, or proof of indoctrinated child combatants121. Later a distraught aide to President Musharraf implied that the plan was for Pakistan to take responsibility as it would be less inflammatory than announcing another American airstrike, but that they did not anticipate the casualties and aftermath122. Most plausibly, the Pakistanis were willing to allow for the assassinations of recalcitrant militants like Liaquat Hussain and Faqir Mohamed, unlikely to abide by the coming accord; or simply the Pakistanis were compelled to attempt to cover for an impulsive American strike aimed at derailing the very same peace agreement. Subsequently, the Pakistanis requested the Americans abstain from this type of strike in the future123. After compiling lists of the deceased, the local press eventually revealed that indeed, 69 children between ages 7 and 17 were killed, with the remainder mostly being in their late teens and twenties124.

Dargai Response

Taliban militants, having embraced the tactic of suicide bombings, responded with what was described as the most significant assault on the Pakistani military to date in Dargai of the Malakand District, North West Frontier Province125. Screaming Allah Akbar, an assailant concealing their explosives under a large shawl garment called a chador, rushed into the training grounds of the Punjab Regimental Center and detonated, spreading carnage through the facility. Readying for drill, upwards of 130 military recruits were targeted, with at least 42 perishing in the November 8, 2006 atrocity126. A second militant reportedly carried a faulty device and escaped via motorcycle127. This associate was pursued by citizens through the adjacent settlement until he fended them off by revealing a grenade, and subsequently escaped into sugarcane fields, undetected despite a sizeable search effort128. The TNSM was of course suspected129, but a claim of responsibility was received from the “Pakistani Taliban” as an umbrella organization of the local militants, and specifically stated the bombing was a reaction to the Chenagai strike130. The individual making this call to authorities, frantically gave the moniker of “Abu Kalim Mohamed Ansari” as the commander of the relevant Pakistani Taliban131. It must be noted that Malakand was a traditional stronghold of the TNSM.

Another vital observation was that as the American drone strikes increased in frequency in Pakistan, the phenomenon of suicide bombings proportionally expanded as well, adopted by a variety of groups now linked together in common cause. Inherently, the Chenagai drone strike was another reversal for the CIA drone program in terms of public acceptance. Yet it seemed the benefits of this methodology still outweighed the current consequences, resulting in its impending disproportionate usage in the future.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] At the time of the raid, another proposed identity for “Imam” was that of “Daniar,” a Chechen militant officer first reported to have participated in and escaped from the Battle of Wana in March 2004132
  • [B] A madrassa is an educational institute focused on Islamic religious studies
  1. Pakistan: 45 Tied To Al-Qaida Killed, NBC News via The Associated Press, February 28, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11613271 ↩︎
  2. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  3. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation // Pakistan hits militant hideout, al-Jazeera, March 1, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/3/1/pakistan-hits-militant-hideout ↩︎
  4. Pakistan: 45 Tied To Al-Qaida Killed, NBC News via The Associated Press, February 28, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11613271 ↩︎
  5. Pakistan hits militant hideout, al-Jazeera, March 1, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/3/1/pakistan-hits-militant-hideout ↩︎
  6. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  7. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  8. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  9. Pakistan: 45 Tied To Al-Qaida Killed, NBC News via The Associated Press, February 28, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11613271 ↩︎
  10. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  11. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  12. Pakistan: 45 Tied To Al-Qaida Killed, NBC News via The Associated Press, February 28, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11613271 ↩︎
  13. The Black Guard, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 12, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/the_black_guards.php ↩︎
  14. The Black Guard, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 12, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/the_black_guards.php ↩︎
  15. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  16. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  17. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  18. Pakistan hits militant hideout, al-Jazeera, March 1, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/3/1/pakistan-hits-militant-hideout ↩︎
  19. Foreign Militants Among 40 Killed in N. Waziristan: Helicopters Mount Massive Operation, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 2, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/181184/foreign-militants-among-40-killed-in-n-waziristan-helicopters-mount-massive-operation ↩︎
  20. Bush Makes First Visit To Afghanistan, by Mark Oliver, The Guardian, March 1, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/01/usa.india1 ↩︎
  21. Bush Still Plans to Go to Dangerous Pakistan, ABC News, March 3, 2006, https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1682765&page=1 ↩︎
  22. Bush Makes First Visit To Afghanistan, by Mark Oliver, The Guardian, March 1, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/01/usa.india1 ↩︎
  23. Bush Hails U.S.-Pakistan Partnership, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 4, 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1066350.html ↩︎
  24. Bush Hails U.S.-Pakistan Partnership, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 4, 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1066350.html ↩︎
  25. Pakistani soldiers battle with tribal rebels as Bush visits, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, March 6, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/06/pakistan.usa ↩︎
  26. Eyewitness: Battle for Waziristan, by Haroon Rashid, BBC News, March 9, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4787548.stm ↩︎
  27. Pakistani Troops Battle Militants, killing dozens, CBC News, March 4, 2006, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pakistani-troops-battle-militants-killing-dozens-1.628246 ↩︎
  28. Pakistani forces clash with pro-Taliban rebels, NBC News via The Associated Press, March 4, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11671317 ↩︎
  29. Pakistani forces clash with pro-Taliban rebels, NBC News via The Associated Press, March 4, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11671317 // Pakistani soldiers battle with tribal rebels as Bush visits, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, March 6, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/06/pakistan.usa ↩︎
  30. Pakistani Troops Battle Militants, killing dozens, CBC News, March 4, 2006, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/pakistani-troops-battle-militants-killing-dozens-1.628246 ↩︎
  31. Pakistani forces clash with pro-Taliban rebels, NBC News via The Associated Press, March 4, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11671317 ↩︎
  32. Pakistani soldiers battle with tribal rebels as Bush visits, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, March 6, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/06/pakistan.usa ↩︎
  33. Curfew Imposed on Miranshah as Toll Mounts to 120, by Azhar Masood, Arab News, March 7, 2006, https://www.arabnews.com/node/281422 ↩︎
  34. Militant Cleric’s School Destroyed in Miramshah, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 8, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/182145/militant-cleric-s-school-destroyed-in-miramshah ↩︎
  35. Militant Cleric’s School Destroyed in Miramshah, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, March 8, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/182145/militant-cleric-s-school-destroyed-in-miramshah ↩︎
  36. Eyewitness: Battle for Waziristan, by Haroon Rashid, BBC News, March 9, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4787548.stm ↩︎
  37. Pakistani clash ‘leaves 25 dead’, BBC News, March 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4795746.stm ↩︎
  38. Afghans Ordered Out Of Waziristan, al-Jazeera via Reuters, March 13, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/3/13/afghans-ordered-out-of-waziristan ↩︎
  39. Afghans Ordered Out Of Waziristan, al-Jazeera via Reuters, March 13, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/3/13/afghans-ordered-out-of-waziristan ↩︎
  40. Pakistan attacks Waziristan compound, Al-Jazeera, June 10, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/6/10/pakistan-attacks-waziristan-compound ↩︎
  41. Pakistan suicide bomber kills 6 soldiers, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 26, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna13552831 ↩︎
  42. Pakistan suicide bomber kills 6 soldiers, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 26, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna13552831 ↩︎
  43. Pakistan suicide bomber kills 6 soldiers, NBC News via The Associated Press, June 26, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna13552831 ↩︎
  44. Pakistan attacks Waziristan compound, Al-Jazeera, June 10, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/6/10/pakistan-attacks-waziristan-compound ↩︎
  45. Abu Okash al-Iraqi: AQ’s Arab Broker in North Waziristan, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 10, October 29, 2010, https://jamestown.org/abu-okash-al-iraqi-aqs-arab-broker-in-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  46. Waziristan Accord Signed, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, September 6, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed ↩︎
  47. The Knife at Pakistan’s Throat, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, September 2, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070112155825/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI02Df02.html ↩︎
  48. The Taliban Breaks the “Waziristan Accord,” by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 11, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/the_taliban_breaks_t.php ↩︎
  49. After Bajaur Strike, Peace Deal with Agency Militants Still Ahead, by Tarique Niazi, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus, November 8, 2006, https://jamestown.org/after-bajaur-strike-peace-deal-with-agency-militants-still-ahead/ ↩︎
  50. The Knife at Pakistan’s Throat, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, September 2, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070112155825/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI02Df02.html ↩︎
  51. Waziristan Accord Signed, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, September 6, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed ↩︎
  52. Waziristan Accord Signed, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, September 6, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed ↩︎
  53. Waziristan Accord Signed, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, September 6, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed ↩︎
  54. Waziristan Accord Signed, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, September 6, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed ↩︎
  55. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  56. Waziristan Accord Signed, by Pazeer Gul, Dawn, September 6, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed ↩︎
  57. Why The Waziristan Deal is a Hard Sell, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, October 14, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/214890/why-the-waziristan-deal-is-a-hard-sell ↩︎
  58. Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 9, April 10, 2009, https://jamestown.org/hafiz-gul-bahadur-a-profile-of-the-leader-of-the-north-waziristan-taliban-2/ ↩︎
  59. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  60. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  61. Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 9, April 10, 2009, https://jamestown.org/hafiz-gul-bahadur-a-profile-of-the-leader-of-the-north-waziristan-taliban-2/ ↩︎
  62. Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/23/inside-pakistans-tribal-frontier-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  63. Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/23/inside-pakistans-tribal-frontier-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  64. Why Has Hafiz Gul Bahadur Turned Against Pakistan?, by Zalmay Azad, The Friday Times, December 13, 2023, https://thefridaytimes.com/13-Dec-2023/why-has-hafiz-gul-bahadur-turned-against-pakistan ↩︎
  65. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis // Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/23/inside-pakistans-tribal-frontier-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  66. Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 9, April 10, 2009, https://jamestown.org/hafiz-gul-bahadur-a-profile-of-the-leader-of-the-north-waziristan-taliban-2/ ↩︎
  67. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  68. Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/23/inside-pakistans-tribal-frontier-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  69. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  70. Abu Okash al-Iraqi: AQ’s Arab Broker in North Waziristan, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, The Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 10, October 29, 2010, https://jamestown.org/abu-okash-al-iraqi-aqs-arab-broker-in-north-waziristan/ ↩︎
  71. A Profile of Maulana Sadiq Noor: A Central Player in the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 1, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, January 31, 2011, https://jamestown.org/a-profile-of-maulana-sadiq-noor-a-central-player-in-the-north-waziristan-taliban/ ↩︎
  72. A Profile of Maulana Sadiq Noor: A Central Player in the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 1, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, January 31, 2011, https://jamestown.org/a-profile-of-maulana-sadiq-noor-a-central-player-in-the-north-waziristan-taliban/ ↩︎
  73. A Profile of Maulana Sadiq Noor: A Central Player in the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 1, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, January 31, 2011, https://jamestown.org/a-profile-of-maulana-sadiq-noor-a-central-player-in-the-north-waziristan-taliban/ ↩︎
  74. Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan, by Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/23/inside-pakistans-tribal-frontier-north-waziristan/ // Why Has Hafiz Gul Bahadur Turned Against Pakistan?, by Zalmay Azad, The Friday Times, December 13, 2023, https://thefridaytimes.com/13-Dec-2023/why-has-hafiz-gul-bahadur-turned-against-pakistan ↩︎
  75. A Profile of Maulana Sadiq Noor: A Central Player in the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 1, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, January 31, 2011, https://jamestown.org/a-profile-of-maulana-sadiq-noor-a-central-player-in-the-north-waziristan-taliban/ ↩︎
  76. A Profile of Maulana Sadiq Noor: A Central Player in the North Waziristan Taliban, Jamestown Foundation Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 1, by Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, January 31, 2011, https://jamestown.org/a-profile-of-maulana-sadiq-noor-a-central-player-in-the-north-waziristan-taliban/ ↩︎
  77. The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis, by Charlie Szrom, Critical Threats, August 6, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis ↩︎
  78. President Bush and President Musharraf of Pakistan Participate in Press Availability, Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 22, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060922.html ↩︎
  79. Why The Waziristan Deal is a Hard Sell, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, October 14, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/214890/why-the-waziristan-deal-is-a-hard-sell ↩︎
  80. Why The Waziristan Deal is a Hard Sell, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, October 14, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/214890/why-the-waziristan-deal-is-a-hard-sell ↩︎
  81. Why The Waziristan Deal is a Hard Sell, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, October 14, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/214890/why-the-waziristan-deal-is-a-hard-sell ↩︎
  82. The Knife at Pakistan’s Throat, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, September 2, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070112155825/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI02Df02.html ↩︎
  83. The Knife at Pakistan’s Throat, by Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, September 2, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20070112155825/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI02Df02.html ↩︎
  84. After Bajaur Strike, Peace Deal with Agency Militants Still Ahead, by Tarique Niazi, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus, November 8, 2006, https://jamestown.org/after-bajaur-strike-peace-deal-with-agency-militants-still-ahead/ ↩︎
  85. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones // After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  86. 80 Dead In Pakistan Madrassa Raid, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, October 30, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/30/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  87. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones // After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  88. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  89. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones // After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  90. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  91. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  92. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  93. Airstrike on Bajaur Training Camps, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, October 30, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/airstrikes_in_bajaur.php ↩︎
  94. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  95. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  96. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  97. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  98. Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero, Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, Reaktion Books Ltd, 2011 // South Asian Terrorism Portal, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws), https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/TNSM.htm ↩︎
  99. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  100. 80 Dead In Pakistan Madrassa Raid, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, October 30, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/30/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  101. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  102. The Day 69 Children Died, by Chris Woods, The Tribune, August 12, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/229844/the-day-69-children-died ↩︎
  103. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike // TARGET: TERROR LORD – PAKISTAN ATTACK AIMED AT QAEDA NO. 2, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, October 31, 2006, https://nypost.com/2006/10/31/target-terror-lord-pakistan-attack-aimed-at-qaeda-no-2/ ↩︎
  104. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  105. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  106. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones // Scores Killed in Pakistan Air Assault, Al-Jazeera, October 30, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/10/30/scores-killed-in-pakistan-air-assault ↩︎
  107. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  108. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones // Scores Killed in Pakistan Air Assault, Al-Jazeera, October 30, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/10/30/scores-killed-in-pakistan-air-assault ↩︎
  109. 80 Dead In Pakistan Madrassa Raid, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, October 30, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/30/alqaida.pakistan ↩︎
  110. Scores Killed in Pakistan Air Assault, Al-Jazeera, October 30, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/10/30/scores-killed-in-pakistan-air-assault ↩︎
  111. Scores Killed in Pakistan Air Assault, Al-Jazeera, October 30, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/10/30/scores-killed-in-pakistan-air-assault ↩︎
  112. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  113. 82 Die As Missiles Rain On Bajaur: Pakistan Owns Up To Strike, by Anwarullah Khan, Dawn, October 31, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/216918/82-die-as-missiles-rain-on-bajaur-pakistan-owns-up-to-strike-locals-blame-us-drones ↩︎
  114. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike ↩︎
  115. A Closer Look at the Chingai Airstrike in Bajaur, Pakistan, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, October 30, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/a_closer_look_at_the-2.php ↩︎
  116. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike // TARGET: TERROR LORD – PAKISTAN ATTACK AIMED AT QAEDA NO. 2, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, October 31, 2006, https://nypost.com/2006/10/31/target-terror-lord-pakistan-attack-aimed-at-qaeda-no-2/ ↩︎
  117. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike // TARGET: TERROR LORD – PAKISTAN ATTACK AIMED AT QAEDA NO. 2, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, October 31, 2006, https://nypost.com/2006/10/31/target-terror-lord-pakistan-attack-aimed-at-qaeda-no-2/ ↩︎
  118. After The Madrassa Strike, The Economist, October 31, 2006, https://www.economist.com/asia/2006/10/31/after-the-madrassa-strike // TARGET: TERROR LORD – PAKISTAN ATTACK AIMED AT QAEDA NO. 2, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, October 31, 2006, https://nypost.com/2006/10/31/target-terror-lord-pakistan-attack-aimed-at-qaeda-no-2/ ↩︎
  119. TARGET: TERROR LORD – PAKISTAN ATTACK AIMED AT QAEDA NO. 2, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, October 31, 2006, https://nypost.com/2006/10/31/target-terror-lord-pakistan-attack-aimed-at-qaeda-no-2/ ↩︎
  120. TARGET: TERROR LORD – PAKISTAN ATTACK AIMED AT QAEDA NO. 2, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, October 31, 2006, https://nypost.com/2006/10/31/target-terror-lord-pakistan-attack-aimed-at-qaeda-no-2/ ↩︎
  121. Airstrike on Bajaur Training Camps, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, October 30, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/airstrikes_in_bajaur.php ↩︎
  122. The Day 69 Children Died, by Chris Woods, The Tribune, August 12, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/229844/the-day-69-children-died ↩︎
  123. The Day 69 Children Died, by Chris Woods, The Tribune, August 12, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/229844/the-day-69-children-died ↩︎
  124. The Day 69 Children Died, by Chris Woods, The Tribune, August 12, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/229844/the-day-69-children-died ↩︎
  125. Suicide blast kills 42 Pakistani soldiers, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 8, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/08/pakistan.declanwalsh ↩︎
  126. Suicide Attack on Army Base: 40 soldiers dead; search on for bomber’s aide, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, November 9, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/218195/suicide-attack-on-army-base-40-troops-dead-search-on-for-bomber-s-aide ↩︎
  127. Suicide blast kills 42 Pakistani soldiers, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 8, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/08/pakistan.declanwalsh ↩︎
  128. Suicide Attack on Army Base: 40 soldiers dead; search on for bomber’s aide, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, November 9, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/218195/suicide-attack-on-army-base-40-troops-dead-search-on-for-bomber-s-aide ↩︎
  129. Suicide blast kills 42 Pakistani soldiers, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 8, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/08/pakistan.declanwalsh ↩︎
  130. Suicide Attack on Army Base: 40 soldiers dead; search on for bomber’s aide, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, November 9, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/218195/suicide-attack-on-army-base-40-troops-dead-search-on-for-bomber-s-aide ↩︎
  131. Suicide Attack on Army Base: 40 soldiers dead; search on for bomber’s aide, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, November 9, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/218195/suicide-attack-on-army-base-40-troops-dead-search-on-for-bomber-s-aide ↩︎
  132. Trapped al-Qa’eda Leader Is Uzbek Mullah, The Telegraph, March 21, 2004, https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1102154/posts ↩︎

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a comment