SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Faltering Along The Way To Jihad

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Even as 2006 commenced, Iraq remained the most viable and strategically vital theatre for al-Qaida. The organization’s combined efforts with the Taliban and allied movements would eventually thrust Afghanistan into focus and chaos again, but the global conscious centered on happenings in Mesopotamia. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, troublesome and contentious, was incorporating and consolidating other Sunni jihadists under his command. However, displeasure in the upper echelons of al-Qaida stemmed from the exclusion of one particular group, resulting in renewed efforts to transplant oversight into the theatre. Meanwhile, al-Qaida was coalescing factions of its own, and furthering their propaganda machine in the process.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Ansar al-Sunnah

On January 15, 2006, Zarqawi attempted to comply with at least two of the al-Qaida requests from their 2004 merging process, and to assuage the anger and wariness from his parent organization. As such, his spokesman declared a conglomeration of jihadist units coalescing as a network, with a figurehead Iraqi commander. Al-Qaida in Iraq was initially joined by six other Salafist militant entities under the umbrella of the Mujahidin Shura Council1. While Zarqawi handled paramilitary operations, the political command was delegated to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a fictional personality created to ensure that the Iraqi insurgency was helmed by local as opposed to foreign elements2. This ruse was not disclosed for some time, but was inherently an egregious affront to the Iraqi resistance. As was the conspicuous absence of the Kurdish based militant organization Ansar al-Sunnah. Al-Qaida fretted over the omission, as the network of Kurdish and Arab jihadists who composed Ansar al-Sunnah were the only other major faction of Salafist insurgents loyal to central al-Qaida (and willing to utilize their tactics of suicide bombings) within the conflict3.

Thus, al-Qaida desired a combination of forces, as the excluded Ansar al-Sunnah was a formidable insurgent component, with a propensity for high profile operations. In late 2003, the faction coalesced from the remnants of the Ansar al-Islam, another iteration of Kurdish militants in northern Iraq4. Exemplifying their tactics, on February 1, 2004, they deployed suicide bombers against Kurdish political parties in Irbil, murdering approximately 109 during revelries5. They were notable for perpetrating a brutal suicide bombing against US forces in Mosul in December 2004, an incident in which one of their operatives infiltrated a dining hall at Forward Operating Base Marez and detonated, killing 22 (of which 18 were Americans – 14 soldiers and 4 contractors)6. During a flurry of US Marine engagements in early August 2005, Ansar al-Sunnah ambushed and killed six Marine snipers in Haditha7.

As touched upon in a previous chapter, Ansar al-Sunnah dispatched two envoys, named as Abu Mohamed and Abu Dardaa, to negotiate with and confer to al-Qaida, in regards to the situation in Iraq8. Having communicated their concerns to Zarqawi, al-Qaida anticipated bringing him under full control after the October 2004 merger, alleviating the worry of his erratic and nihilistic actions. However, the grievances as presented by the Kurdish militants and Zarqawi’s persistent disobedience in 2005 gave rise to continued fears. The envoys’ words were conveyed to both bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri9, as they met directly with Sheikh Said al-Masri, Khalid Habib, and others10.

Zawahiri wrote directly to the Ansar al-Sunnah emir Abu Abdullah al-Shafi’i on January 26, requesting clarification as to the Kurdish outfit’s intentions concerning unity, and as to their preferred methods for a formal merger11. Interestingly, Zawahiri remarked that he desired to avoid the “suffering” endured during the campaign in Afghanistan thus far, a startling acknowledgement of their relative ineffectiveness despite years of operations12. Undoubtedly, the extended chance of victories was within Iraq. A new al-Qaida council, specifically handling matters pertaining to Iraq conveyed an understanding of the Ansar al-Sunnah desire for unity in principle, if only circumstances were properly met13. This “Special Committee of al-Jihad Qaida of the Mujahidin Affairs in Iraq” was formed in order to address the Iraqi theatre from abroad, and in a January 29 response of their own to Ansar al-Sunnah, they stressed their admiration for the organization, aspiration for unity, and the belief that each their causes and organizations were actually one in the same14. They revealed that Zarqawi was also sending representatives to explain his own reasonings and positions. Al-Qaida acknowledged the necessity of change and adjustment to their most valuable franchise. The communications of the council were a clear insinuation that Zarqawi would have to be more closely monitored, contained, or possibly removed from power15.

In order to adequately reach a resolution to the political conflict, al-Qaida was deploying an “honorable” and “virtuous” lieutenant, well known to the organization in northern Iraq16. According to correspondence from Sheikh Said, the appointee was the mediator Libyan, Atiyah Abdulrahman, to be accompanied by at least two other officials17. Abu Jihad al-Masri was eventually selected for the mission as one18, and although discussed, it remained unsure if Abdulhadi al-Iraqi was to finally join the movement in Iraq.

An exact composition of this Iraq oriented Committee cannot be confirmed, but an educated estimate can be made. Based upon the pattern of attempted future travel to Iraq of al-Qaida officials, interest in the theatre, ethnic linkages, and internal communications, one can assume that Ayman al-Zawarhiri, Sheikh Said al-Masri, Khalid Habib, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, Abu Faruq al-Iraqi, Atiyah Abdulrahman (Sheikh Mahmud al-Libi), and Abu Jihad al-Masri were constituents. Many of these were undoubtedly al-Qaida Majlis ash-Shura councilors as well, with the overlap of personnel stressing the weight of importance that global jihadists placed upon the beleaguered and embattled nation.

Apocalyptic Change

Prior to the arrival of any central al-Qaida oversight in Iraq, the political reality of the insurgents drastically shifted. American intelligence was adroitly closing in upon Zarqawi. An informant from within the Jordanian’s organizational infrastructure turned and revealed one Abu Abdulrahman al-Iraqi as the religious advisor to the Jordanian militant commadner19. Thus, he was followed until he traveled to liase with Zarqawi, bringing a devastating destiny to both20. Two patrolling F-16 fighter aircraft converged on the scene and deployed two 500 lb munitions upon the Zarqawi safe haven21. It was an isolate residence, hidden among surrounding orchards in in vicinity of Baquba22, and was the first locale where American authorities could verify Zarqawi’s presence in real time during the war23. Local police arrived on scene and discovered a surprisingly alive but critically injured Zarqawi24. Five others, including his advisor and the remainder of his household were already dead. As American forces arrived to positively identify the jihadist, he too perished from his wounds25. The identification was achieved without any doubts, due to Zarqawi’s distinguishing marks and eventually a DNA test26. The next day, al-Qaida in Iraq acknowledged the loss of their leader27.

Interestingly, on June 9, Abu Abdullah al-Shafi’i (writing under the moniker Abu Abdullah al-Hassan bin Mahmud), the emir of Ansar al-Sunnah, penned a letter of mourning and condolences to al-Qaida over the loss of Zarqawi, declaring him as a martyr28. The insurgent outfit did not extend the same cordial correspondence nor any allegiance to his successor29.

The Mujahideen Shura Council, did not wait for permission prior to naming Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, a former Egyptian Islamic Jihad adherent, to the post of overall command30.  Born as Abdulmunim Izzaldin al-Badawi, he was reportedly known as Abu Ayub al-Masri, an identity that US officials rapidly utilized in referring to the jihadist31. Perhaps replacing Zarqawi with a Zawahiri loyalist was the most acceptable outcome for which al-Qaida could hope.  In fact, on June 13, Abu Hamza released his first statement, promising to continue the conflict and engage in harsh war against the American presence in Iraq, while also reaffirming his oath to bin Laden and al-Qaida32. Despite this vow, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir furthered the discontent with senior leadership. 

Without getting too far into the details of the tenure and style of command of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, he desired to declare an Islamic caliphate, or kingdom, under Shariah Law with proper Iraqi leadership in the Mesopotamian region, not just to battle coalition forces, but to claim a legitimate theocracy. This need to implement a caliphate rapidly was due to a deeply ingrained apocalyptic belief within, and severe zealotry exhibited, by Zarqawi’s successor33.  Thus, the Mujahideen Shura Council morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq on October 13, 200634, with the nebulous Abu Omar al-Baghdadi remaining as the named leader, and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir as the actual oversight, declaring himself the Minister of War35. 

Egyptian Merger

Beyond Iraq, there was of course, discontent with various movements throughout the jihadist world community. For Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular, his obsession with Egypt never faded. Al-Qaida media outlet as-Sahab created a stir on August 6, 2006 with a video featuring Zawahiri on the matter.  With great delight he announced that a portion of the Egyptian militant group from which he sprang, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, was merging with al-Qaida36.  For Zawahiri this was a tremendous accomplishment, in that as his original militant group, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, had agreed to cease operations against the Egyptian government back in 199637.  This was most likely one of the factors that drove Zawahiri to merge his own EIJ faction with al-Qaida.  However, it was unclear just how many members were in fact joining Zawahiri, returning to a true path of jihad, as Zawahiri worded the news38.  The implication from Zawahiri was that a large portion of the membership had joined al-Qaida39.  With him on the video, speaking for this rebel faction of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, was the Egyptian Mohamed Hassan Khalil al-Hakimi, known better as Abu Jihad al-Masri40. 

Mohamed Hassan Khalil al-Hakimi, was born and raised in the Aswan governate of Egypt, before joining al-Gama’a al-Islamiya in 197941.  His journey took a predictable turn in that he was detained in 1981 in the aftermath of the Anwar Sadat assassination42.  He was subjected to stints in and out of Egyptian custody, being arrested on four occasions, once even with the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdulrahman43.  Having formed a faction of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya in Aswan, he sat on the Shura Council of the group, and warranted attention from the authorities44.  According to one hyperbolic source, one warning was particularly fierce, and resulted in members of the Egyptian security apparatus tossing Hakimi from a fourth floor window, a fall from which he survived45.  At some point among the rounds of social disruption, he received a Master’s degree in social sciences46.  He was allowed to leave the country finally, in 1988, but under the provision that he never return47.  Instead, he made his way to the Khorasan to fight against the Soviets by way of Saudi Arabia48.  Becoming active in the media responsibilities of the jihad enhanced his speaking and writing skills49.  By 1999 he was living in Britain, but under intensive scrutiny due to his associations50.  Sometime shortly after the 9/11 attacks, he was able to avoid arrest and flee from Britain, returning to the Khorasan to join the militants within51.  His migration to the theatre nearly resulted in his detention by the Iranians, but he was fortunate to escape52.  Hakimi brought his family with him to the region, but facing the American invasion was compelled to abscond again into Iran53. 

Abu Jihad conducted this sojourn with Zarqawi, with his intent being to facilitate the Jordanian and his men into Iraq54.  The Egyptian had initially attempted to flee to the border areas of Pakistan, but with fear that the Pakistanis were to conduct sweeping arrests, he migrated across the less desirable border in order to escape55.  While in Iran, he began to facilitate the movements of other Arabs and their families56.  With Zarqawi onto the next portion of his journey, Abu Jihad and his associates were arrested by Iranian authorities57.  Held at a hotel prior to processing, Abu Jihad managed to avert his captors and flee58.  His son Jihad however, was eventually taken by the Iranians59. 

Having persevered with the remainder of his family through the ordeal, Abu Jihad arrived in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, forming an important public relations alliance for al-Qaida and for Zawahiri specifically60.  He often acted as an intermediary between al-Qaida and likeminded groups, such as his utilization in obtaining an alliance with Abu Laith al-Libi, and now with dissatisfied al-Gama’a al-Islamiya adherents.

In the August 2006 video release, Zawahiri revealed that the joining Egyptian faction was led by Abu Jihad and Mohamed al-Islambouli, known as Abu Jafar al-Masri, the brother of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s 1981 assassin Khalid61.  This was a politically savvy manuever on the part of Zawahiri, displaying that the brother of a lionized Egyptian martyr would deem it acceptable to join al-Qaida due to lack of action from al-Gama’a al-Islamiya.  Islambouli however, was unable to speak on the video, due to his imprisonment in Iran after fleeing the American invasion62.  Whereas Abu Jihad had escaped custody and was given the opportunity to make his way to the central al-Qaida cadre, Islambouli remained behind.  However, his status with al-Qaida and his stature overall among the jihadist community made his name powerful in this public rebuking of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya. 

Zawahiri previously railed against the pacifist methods of his former group after 1996, and now he and Abu Jihad were rectifying this mistake63.  To further gain justification and acceptance of the merger, Abu Jihad and Zawahiri even claimed to be speaking for the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdulrahman, incarcerated in the US, who had himself previously supported the pacifist stance, but retracted this from his prison in June 200064.  Abu Jihad was invoking the name of this famous jihadist in order to legitimize his claim that al-Gama’a al-Islamiya was now a part of al-Qaida and that the Egyptian militants should set aside their uneasy truce with the Egyptian government65.  Zawahiri also invoked Rifai’i Ahmed Taha, the Egyptian military commander of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, languishing in Egyptian prison, as being a part of the new alliance66.  Whether or not a specific or significant portion of the group actually joined al-Qaida beyond Abu Jihad and Islambouli, Zawahiri hoped that the announcement would inspire the rest to actually do so67.  Especially given that from 2003 to 2006 the Egyptians had released hundreds of the militants from prisons for upholding the truce, leaving Zawahiri to attempt to take advantage of the liberated members68. 

Abu Jihad meanwhile, officially joined al-Qaida by swearing allegiance on the video69.  Egyptian militants accepting of the pacifist stance of their group refuted that Abu Jihad spoke for all of them, and the renegade was forced into a role where he used writing and speaking in order to attempt to sway opinions and justify the resumption of violence70.  Abu Jihad took to internet forums to broadcast his message to his fellow Egyptians71.  As for his duties within al-Qaida, he was appointed to chair the al-Qaida security committee, and as such handled intelligence, counterintelligence, and security for the organization72.  Abu Jihad was adept in his security role, and was not responsible for their external operations, despite claims to the contrary.

However, Zawahiri brought attention to previous confusion in the responsibilities of Abu Jihad, noting that although the Egyptian, whom he referred to as Hajji Harun, was overseeing security during the drone strike which claimed Hamza Rabia, the latter’s insistence on providing for his own operational security rendered any efforts from the former ineffective73.

Abu Jihad continued to flood the internet with his diatribes, endorsements, and opinions, in a full effort to both support al-Qaida and convince his erstwhile Egyptian allies of the worth of resuming jihad74. Hakimi’s undeniable influence on former al-Gama’a al-Islamiya militants in Egypt linked him to Islamist attacks within his native nation75.  Specifically, he was linked to the perpetrators of bombings and shootings in the Taba Red Sea resort town on October 9, 2004, Cairo in April 2005, and the more notable July 23, 2005 incidents in another Red Sea resort town, Sharm al-Sheikh76.  His efforts again, are explained by his deep links to Egyptian militants, but they were also restricted to Egypt.   

All the while, his son languished in Iranian custody. Yet Abu Jihad was not lacking for symbolic sons. In fact, two senior militants eventually married into his family. One was Abu Hassan al-Rimi. Hailing from Yemen, Rimi was the current commander of the al-Faruq Battalion, coordinating and leading cross border militant efforts in Kunar province77. He provided Abu Jihad with three grandchildren while in theatre78.

Persistent Propaganda

The nuances and internal jihadist politics of the August video perhaps ensured that it was not the most notable among the American public, but there were three others that summer that garnered much more attention, especially because they concerned American Adam Gadahn. As previously discussed, Gadahn appeared in July for the as-Sahab video celebrating the anniversary of the London underground bombings, in which he callously denounced and placed blame upon the victims of the attack79.

Within a September 2 as-Sahab video release known as “An Invitation to Islam,” Zawahiri acted as an opener for a Gadahn statement80. Zawahiri implored the American audience to heed the warnings and advice of Azzam al-Amriki81. For his part, the crux of Gadahn’s message was for Americans and the US military to “escape from the unbelieving Army and join the winning side82.”

At the age of 28, Gadahn received the distinction through the unsealing of his indictment, of being the first American charged with treason since WW2. The same day, October 11, his name was added to the FBI Most Wanted Terrorist list, and the Department of State announced a $1 million bounty via the Rewards for Justice program83. Terrorism analysts acknowledged his role in correctly translating as-Sahab material for an English audience, his role in video production, and his ability to potentially recruit others like him84.

It was the third summer video that received the most scrutiny and coverage. The September 2006 anniversary video from as-Sahab commemorated the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, reliving the preparation in 90 minutes85.  Gadahn declared America as the enemy, and commended the hijacker operatives86.

Bin Laden, Mohamed Atef, Ramzi Binalshibh all made appearances or were referenced, as did Abu Turab al-Urduni, a militant who trained the hijackers87.  That training was detailed and even some of the hijackers, specifically Hamza al-Ghamdi and Wail al-Shehri were interviewed88.  Despite assertions by the press that Abu Turab was never revealed prior to March 2006 testimony89, he was in fact detailed in the 2004 9/11 commission report90. The extensive report however, named him as Abu Turab al-Jordani, essentially synonymous with al-Urduni, but also confirms that he was a son in law to Ayman al-Zawahiri91.

A plausible identity for Abu Turab was forwarded by Saudi and Israeli press in April 2006, when it was announced that Zawahiri’s son-in-law, a 32 year old West Bank Palestinian named Hussam Abdullatif Abu Bakr was killed in a recent airstrike in Afghanistan92. The publications noted that Abu Bakr, a former guard for bin Laden, fathered four children with Fatima al-Zawahiri, including one that he had informed his family of just the week prior. His family remained in Jenin, West Bank, but had dwelled in Saudi Arabia when Abu Bakr departed for Afghanistan a decade before93. Fatima is noted to have married Abu Turab al-Urduni, thus providing some indication that the two identities are the same individual94. Especially given that many Palestinians dwelled within Jordan as refugees.

It seems that the assassination of such an important figure in the 9/11 plot would be announced and heralded by the US government as a spectacular victory, given that arrests and assassinations were difficult to achieve at this time. Further, al-Qaida does not seem to have eulogized this figure in depth, rather only referencing him as a “martyr” within the anniversary video95. US intelligence assessed that Abu Turab al-Urduni likely perished in December 2001 during combat and bombings within Afghanistan96. A possibility remains that the assessment was incorrect and that the Jordanian survived until 2006, or it is possible that Fatima Zawahiri married another jihadist after his death, with whom she rapidly birthed four children. With all of the fallen al-Qaida operatives, it must not be forgotten that many during this time were incarcerated instead of slain, often subjected to the interrogations of the CIA.

High Value Detainees

By 2006, the CIA had taken possession of a remarkable 119 individuals detained for suspected militant or terrorists activities or connections97. In a surprise speech made on September 6, 2006, US President George W Bush announced the transfer of only fourteen “High Value Detainees,” from the very controversial CIA custody sites to the equally disparaged Guantanamo Bay military prison facility98. President Bush acknowledged the existence of the CIA detention program, although he was careful not to divulge any specific details99. It was announced that the there were no additional detainees in CIA custody. The remainder of the suspects seemingly disappeared. Most were transferred to other nations for detention, or alternately they were freed. Abu Yahya al-Libi and three of his compatriots of course escaped their captivity in 2005. President Bush offered a tendentious defense of the incarceration and interrogation policies of the CIA as approved by his administration, while detailing the necessity of the programs. He outlined the stories of several detainees and how the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques had ostensibly prevented major terrorist attacks both within the US and abroad against allies100. Furthermore, he emphasized that there was legal and political oversight preventing the programs from being characterized as illegal torture101. Thus, the CIA programs remained open to future detainees despite the dearth of current prisoners. President Bush also announced impending military commissions to charge and try the fourteen remaining militants, once authorized by Congress102. With the militants’ transfer to Guantanamo, there was a need for the President to offer an equally adamant justification for this facility’s existence as well, and reasoning as to why so many uncharged foreign detainees lingered103. The Administration pushed for Congress to clarify and adjust legislation to ensure that detainees could not bring litigation against American interpreters and captors accused of any violation of the Geneva Conventions104. The overall intention was to prosecute the fourteen (and future ranking militants) for their various crimes under the military commissions and not in a civilian court of law.

Composed of a perplexing mix of senior and minor militants, terror suspects, and former FBI fugitives, the fourteen transfers were involved or directly responsible in at least four major terrorist strikes and multitudinous failed ambitions105. Chief among them was Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and his lieutenants Ammar al-Baluchi, Ramzi Binalshibh, and Mustafa al-Hawsawi, all accused of participation in the 9/11 plot. Abdulrahim al-Nashiri was of course the senior militant responsible for the USS COLE attack. Walid bin Attash (Khallad) was implicated in both incidents. Abu Faraj al-Libi was the internal manager of al-Qaida in its post invasion form. Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali) and his mid-level operatives Mohamed Farik bin Amin and Mohamed Nazir bin Lap were linked to the 2002 Bali bombing. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was the former external operations subordinate and lesser ranked operative wanted for his role in the US East Africa Embassy bombings. Guled Hassan Durad and Majid Khan were minor actors in the East Africa and KSM networks respectively. Abu Zubaydah al-Filistini was affiliated with but not sworn to al-Qaida, initially one of the most sought after militants in the early months of the war.

With all high value detainees now transferred from CIA detainment, there were a series of names conspicuously unaccounted for and absent.  One was Hassan Ghul, the Pakistani born as Mustafa Hajji Mohamed Khan106.  In actuality, Ghul was rendered from the CIA back to Pakistan in August 2006107.  The Pakistanis, despite invested immense amounts of time and effort to locate the man back in 2002, eventually released him in May 2007108.  Ostensibly, al-Qaida should have viewed the Pakistani operative with suspicion given that he was released so easily after being declared such an important figure for capture.  However, he was reintegrated into the fold of the militants109.  He was said to immediately commence his old activities and set up a logistics network for al-Qaida yet again in 2007110.  In this role, he facilitated the smuggling of funds and personnel from the Arabian Peninsula to the Khorasan, and arranged meetings and travel for senior al-Qaida in the region111.  Of note, Hassan Ghul worked closely with Khalid Habib112.  As for his suspicious release, journalists were confounded as to why the Pakistanis would free someone considered so valuable and who was known to have been a recidivist113.  Later reporting postulated that Ghul’s close association with the Pakistani militant outfit Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and thus Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI), must have played a part in his emancipation114. 

Several detainees faced such renditions. Senior al-Qaida operative Abu Yasir al-Jaziri was apparently released to another nation as well115. Palestinian facilitator Marwan al-Jabour joined in eventually obtaining freedom, as he was released to Jordanian custody in July 2006 after over two years of captivity in CIA detention facilities. From there he was delivered to Israeli custody before being freed in Gaza during the autumn116. The sons of infamous Egyptians, both Mohamed Omar Abdulrahman and Hamza Midhat Mursi were delivered to Egypt for further imprisonment117. Several of the CIA detained were obscure figures from the happenings of the war. For example, Saud Memon, the Karachi owner of a textile enterprise who owned the property where the American Daniel Pearl was slain, was himself disappeared while on a business venture in South Africa during March 2003118. Memon was confirmed to be in CIA detainment for some 740 days before transfer, presumably to Pakistani authorities119. Upon his release and reappearance in Karachi in April 2007, he was revealed to be in an horrific and advanced deteriorated health condition. He died in a Pakistani hospital in May120.

Others from among the 119 CIA detainees had already been quietly transferred to Guantanamo without the same level of fanfare as those delivered in September 2006. These included the Yemenis of the “Karachi Six,” Hassan bin Attash (brother to Walid), and the notable KSM facilitators the Rabbani brothers, all captured in KSM safehouses during the raids of September 2002. Riyadh the Facilitator, captured in Karachi in February 2002, and Binyam Mohamed of the s0-called “dirty-bomb” plot, were already in Guantanamo. Another example was Sanad Ali Yislam al-Kazimi, one of Nashiri’s operatives in the Gulf region121. Of course the most colorful fates, belonged to the very few who managed to escape. Although eventually recaptured in November 2006, Abu Nasir al-Qahtani remarkably did not rejoin the ranks of the imprisoned high value detainees now in Guantanamo, but was rather extradited to Saudi Arabia on April 29, 2007122. Another departed the theatre of his own volition.

Fate of an Escapee

There were other militants in or setting out for Iraq, destined for leadership responsibilities in the wake of the Zarqawi assassination.  One was Omar al-Faruq, of the now infamous Bagram escapees from July 2005.  Although not explicitly stated by Sheikh Said as a deployed asset, the Kuwait born Iraqi was an obvious candidate, and indeed ventured to his ancestral homeland for jihad. It is quite possible that he was one of the mentioned officials that Sheikh Said intended to dispatch, as he referenced earlier in March122. Omar al-Faruq remained within the Khorasan and linked to al-Qaida at least through the spring of 2006, as evidenced by a recorded interview published by as-Sahab in March wherein he again regaled the audience with the exploits of his escape and elicited sympathy with tails of abusive incarceration123.

Born to Iraqi parents in Kuwait, the once incarcerated Faruq returned in order to establish another aggressive front in the Iraqi insurgency, this one in the relatively calm southern city of Basra, at the time under British military jurisdiction124.  With expertise in explosives125, it is presumed that he was intended to commence attacks alongside of Zarqawi’s network or directly for it, while in Basra.  He did not just arrive in Basra as an entry point, but rather specifically traveled through Iraq in order to reach this destination displaying a purpose in the city126.  Faruq arrived in June, coinciding with a period of potential upheaval in insurgency leadership due to Zarqawi’s demise.  As an assigned manufacturer of explosives, Faruq traveled and operated under the identity of Mahmud Ahmed127, a variant of his birth name Mahmud Ahmed Mohamed128. Yet his movements were not surreptitious and the British were able to clandestinely follow him into Basra129.  Once established in the port city, some 200 soldiers surrounded his abode.  Alone inside on September 25, 2006, Faruq chose to die in a gunfight rather that be sent to another prison or interrogation130. 

Faruq was not featured in a series of militant eulogies released in 2008, however he was profiled and honored by his fellow escapee Abu Yahya al-Libi in November 2006131. His significance to the jihadist global movement was undisputed, but Faruq was not to be the next pivotal al-Qaida champion in Iraq.  Perhaps Abdulhadi al-Iraqi would inherit the mantle.

A Refugee In Gaziantep 

Assuredly as a consequence of Zarqawi’s death, al-Qaida leadership finally broke and deployed Abdulhadi al-Iraqi in June to “take control of”advise and assist” the Iraqi al-Qaida branch and reassert command and control132.  For the controversial Abdulhadi, his departure from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region was undoubtedly welcome and assumably safe, as so many militants crossed these well worn paths. Hindered in the past by the Jordanian’s past objections, during this current journey he would not have to worry about being impeded by Zarqawi.  Afghanistan was in the capable hands of al-Qaida paramilitary commander Khalid Habib and the acclaimed Abu Laith, thus Abdulhadi had little to fret about in that regard.  Zarqawi had exhausted Abdulhadi and his superiors long enough, and now the Iraqi was free of the burden.  Abdulhadi had long been away from home, but was now on his triumphant return mission in order to claim and corral the Iraqi jihad for al-Qaida.

Despite the internal tensions of the Afghan insurgency, Abdulhadi was a long serving al-Qaida loyalist. Often portrayed as Kurdish, these assertions were later disputed, with one Turkish author of an article reportedly admitting to fabricating the insurgent’s ethnicity for sensationalism133. The native of Mosul, born 1961134 as Nashwan Abdulrazzaq Abdulbaqi al-Tamir, gained military experience in the armed forces of Saddam Hussein, achieving the rank of major135 while a participant in the brutal 1980s Iraq-Iran war136. After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, Abdulhadi fled to the Khorasan to engage in a different type of battle therein137. By 1996 he was overseeing the original al-Faruq camp for al-Qaida, indoctrinating and propagandizing to new recruits on behalf of the organization. From then until 1998 he also held control of vital Kabul guesthouses for the militants, known as the Ashara and Ghulam Bacha locales138. As mentioned, by 1997 he was helming the al-Qaida paramilitary enterprise, and in 1999 he was sworn to bin Laden139. A series of letters from 1997-98, that the Iraqi penned to Mohamed Atef and Saif al-Adel, demonstrated his military prowess and devotion to the al-Qaida cause, as they dealt with a variety of personnel, logistical, and equipment issues, as well as interoperability with the Taliban140. He was instrumental in solidifying the military and political union of al-Qaida and the Taliban while liaising with the Afghan theocracy141. Abdulhadi reported in return to al-Qaida on a series of suggestions to ensure a steady relationship with the Afghans as well as favorable conditions for the Arab combatants utilized in the Taliban’s ongoing war142.

After 15 years in the region, Abdulhadi egressed from the Khorasan theatre via Iran and traveled intently towards Turkey.  By the time he did so, he was burdened with his own $1 Million bounty from the US Department of State143. It was two Turkish al-Qaida members named Mehmet Yilmaz and Mehmed Resit-Isik that crossed the border into Iran and facilitated Abdulhadi’s movements into their own country144.  From there the plan was to transport him to Iraq via Syria.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the CIA was tracing Abdulhadi by electronic means.  They could not convince the Turkish the arrest him with this evidence and thus cleverly placed an anonymous tip to local police that Abdulhadi was utilizing a fraudulent passport before he could depart by vehicle for Syria through the border town of Gaziantep145. 

The Gaziantep police conducted a search of the vehicle in question on October 16, 2006 near the local University, and found two men, four children and a woman146.  The men were Mehmet Polat, an al-Qaida member assigned to take Abdulhadi into Syria, and Abdulhadi himself147.  The others were presumably his family.  Abdulhadi presented an Iranian passport naming himself as Muhammet Rezaei.  This initial effort at falsifying his identity failed when it became apparent that the passport was indeed fake, and Abdulhadi was forced to adjust148.  While in custody Abdulhadi shifted to the identity of an Afghan named Abdulrahman Yar Mohamed.  In this story, Abdulhadi was an asylum seeker from Takhar, traveling to better days potentially in Europe.  He inefficiently attempted to clarify that his Syria detour was for Ramadan vacationing purposes, which seemed at odds with a man desperate to escape this region of the world for Europe149.  Abdulhadi and his comrades stuck to this story and he applied for asylum in Turkey utilizing a lawyer sympathetic to jihadists.  Yet this was to no avail, and Abdulhadi’s worst fears were realized, and on a Halloween no less150. 

Asylum was not granted and he was flown back to Kabul, and into the waiting arms of the CIA.  There is an assertion that Abdulhadi could somehow have prevented Iraq’s descent into further chaos151, but one must remember that he was to be there as the ambassador from bin Laden, and most assuredly to take over operations in the country aimed at harming American and coalition forces.  That is if he even was successful.  It is also likely that Abu Ayub or other Zarqawi disciples would have just simply murdered the Iraqi for threatening their stranglehold on the war.  Regardless, the outcome was the same in that Abdulhadi failed and in Arpil 2007 he was shipped to Guantanamo to join the other high value detainees152 [A]. 

As a side note, Abdulhadi’s compatriots on his failed journey fared no better in the end.  Mehmet Yilmaz and Mehmed Resit-Isik were known as Abu Khalid al-Turki and Abu Khalil al-Turki respectively153.  Yilmaz helmed a contingent of some 20 Turks into Afghanistan in October 2001 in an attempt to fight against the initial US invasion154. Apprehended upon return to the Turkish capital Ankara in February 2002, he was liberated via amnesty by November the same year155. He returned to the war theatre before eventually being wounded in 2004 and apprehended in Pakistan while healing.  His extradition to Turkey only resulted with his parole by the end of 2005156.  It was then that he immediately set up his cell involved in the movement and relocation of al-Qaida leaders and fighters, assisting in migrations between Afghanistan and Iraq.  This logistical service was of great importance for the overall network.  As Abdulhadi was such a vital figure, it was to Yilmaz that his security was entrusted.  Both Yilmaz and Resit-Isik were entrenched in Iraqi al-Qaida affairs at this point and on June 23, 2007, less than a year after they smuggled Abdulhadi into Turkey, they were killed in an American military operation in Hawija, Iraq, near the northern city of Kirkuk157.  It fell to Mehmet Polat, Abdulhadi’s companion on the day of his arrest, to take over the remains of the Yilmaz crew and operation.  In January 2008 though, Polat and his son were among four al-Qaida that were shot down and killed in raids across Gaziantep and other southern Turkish locations in an attempt to disrupt all militant operations158.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] It must be noted that Abdulhadi’s Guantanamo assessment was never revealed by Wikileaks, but that a history of his activities can be assembled from other testimonials and the specific charges against him. 
  1. Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq: Fact or Fiction?, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, March 28, 2006, https://jamestown.org/mujahideen-shura-council-in-iraq-fact-or-fiction/ ↩︎
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  5. Mysterious Iraqi terror group gains clout, NBC News, December 25, 2004, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6754534 ↩︎
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  92. Slain al-Qaida aide was Palestinian, by Khaled Abu Toameh, The Jerusalem Post, April 21, 2006, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/slain-al-qaida-aide-was-palestinian/article-19534 // Report: Al Zawahri’s Son-in-Law Killed in U.S. Strike, ABC News, April 21, 2006, https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1871494&page=1 ↩︎
  93. Slain al-Qaida aide was Palestinian, by Khaled Abu Toameh, The Jerusalem Post, April 21, 2006, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/slain-al-qaida-aide-was-palestinian/article-19534 // Report: Al Zawahri’s Son-in-Law Killed in U.S. Strike, ABC News, April 21, 2006, https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=1871494&page=1 ↩︎
  94. Infatuated With Martyrdom: Female Jihadism From Al-Qaeda to the ‘Islamic State,’ Mohammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, Translated by Banan Malkawi, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Jordan & Iraq, 2017 ↩︎
  95. as-Sahab release The Manhattan Raid: And Knowledge Is For Acting Upon, Part 2, September 2006 ↩︎
  96. A New Name in 9/11 Plot Surfaces, by Josh Meyer, The Los Angeles Times, March 29, 2006, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-mar-29-na-ksm29-story.html ↩︎
  97. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  98. 14 Terror Suspects Profiled, CNN, September 7 2006, https://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/06/terrorr.detainees/ ↩︎
  99. President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Office of the Press Secretary Release, September 6, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ↩︎
  100. President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Office of the Press Secretary Release, September 6, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ↩︎
  101. President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Office of the Press Secretary Release, September 6, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ↩︎
  102. President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Office of the Press Secretary Release, September 6, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ↩︎
  103. President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Office of the Press Secretary Release, September 6, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ↩︎
  104. President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Office of the Press Secretary Release, September 6, 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ↩︎
  105. 14 Terror Suspects Profiled, CNN, September 7 2006, https://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/06/terrorr.detainees/ ↩︎
  106. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289 ↩︎
  107. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  108. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  109. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289 ↩︎
  110. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289 ↩︎
  111. Treasury Targets Three Senior Al-Qa’ida Leaders, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, September 7, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1289 ↩︎
  112. Scent of Helps Trace Hassan Ghul, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, October 19, 2014 ↩︎
  113. Why Was Key Source on Bin Laden’s Courier Freed?, by Thomas Joscelyn, The Threat Matrix by The Long War Journal, May 14, 2011, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/why_was_key_source_on_bin_lade.php ↩︎
  114. Linchpin in hunt for bin laden back with Al-Qaeda, by Adam Goldman, The Associated Press, June 15, 2011, https://www.arabnews.com/node/380800 ↩︎
  115. Guantanamo Assessment File, Adel bin Hamlili, ISN 1452, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1452.html ↩︎
  116. The Case of Marwan Jabour, Human Rights Watch, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0207/2.htm ↩︎
  117. Jihadist believes bin Laden inspired Arab Spring confidence, by David Wroe, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 10, 2011, https://www.smh.com.au/world/jihadist-believes-bin-laden-inspired-arab-spring-confidence-20110909-1k1z9.html // He’s the son of Osama bin Laden’s bombmaker. Then ISIS wanted him as one of their own., by Souad Mekhennet and Greg Miller, The Washington Post, August 5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/08/05/bombmaker/ ↩︎
  118. KARACHI: Key Suspect in Daniel Pearl Case Dies, by S Raza Hassan, Dawn, May 19, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/247665/karachi-key-suspect-in-daniel-pearl-case-dies ↩︎
  119. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  120. KARACHI: Key Suspect in Daniel Pearl Case Dies, by S Raza Hassan, Dawn, May 19, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/247665/karachi-key-suspect-in-daniel-pearl-case-dies ↩︎
  121. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 // Guantanamo Assessment File, Sanad Ali Yislam al-Kazemi, ISN 1453, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1453.html ↩︎
  122. US Extradites Al Qaeda Militant to S. Arabia, Dawn, May 8, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/245883/newspaper/newspaper/column ↩︎
  123. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Othman Abu Yazid) to bin Laden, dated March 1, 2006 ↩︎
  124. A Video from al-Sahab Production of an Interview with Mujahid Farouq al-Iraqi, an Escapee from Bagram Prison in Afghanistan, Translated by Site Institute, March 9, 2006 ↩︎
  125. Senior Militant ‘Killed in Iraq,’ BBC News, September 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5378410.stm ↩︎
  126. Al-Qaeda ‘lieutenant’ killed in Iraq, Al-Jazeera, September 26, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/9/26/al-qaeda-lieutenant-killed-in-iraq ↩︎
  127. Senior Militant ‘Killed in Iraq,’ BBC News, September 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5378410.stm ↩︎
  128. UK troops kill fugitive al-Qaida leader, The Guardian, September 26, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/26/alqaida.iraq ↩︎
  129. US Extradites Al Qaeda Militant to S. Arabia, Dawn, May 8, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/245883/newspaper/newspaper/column // Details Emerge on a Brazen Escape in Afghanistan, by Eric Schmitt and Tim Golden, The New York Times, December 4, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/04/world/asia/details-emerge-on-a-brazen-escape-in-afghanistan.html ↩︎
  130. Senior Militant ‘Killed in Iraq,’ BBC News, September 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5378410.stm // International al Qaeda Operative Omar Farouq Killed in Iraq, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 25, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/international_alqaed.php ↩︎
  131. Senior Militant ‘Killed in Iraq,’ BBC News, September 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5378410.stm // International al Qaeda Operative Omar Farouq Killed in Iraq, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 25, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/international_alqaed.php ↩︎
  132. as-Sahab production, Abu Yahya al-Libi Video Eulogy for Abu Faruq al-Iraqi, November 2, 2006 ↩︎
  133. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  134. Guantanamo’s alleged Kurdish prisoner says he isn’t a Kurd, by Roj Eli Zalla, Rudaw, May 10, 2018, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/05102018 ↩︎
  135. Defense Department Takes Custody of al Qaeda Leader, American Forces Press Service, April 26, 2007, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/530808/defense-department-takes-custody-al-qaeda-leader ↩︎
  136. Wanted: Abdulhadi al-Iraqi – Up to $1 Million Reward, Department of State Rewards for Justice program, https://web.archive.org/web/20070429013653/http:/www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=abd_al_hadi ↩︎
  137. Alleged al-Qaida commander reveals new name in Guantánamo court, by Carol Rosenberg, Miami Herald, July 12, 2016, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article78112562.html ↩︎
  138. Alleged al-Qaida commander reveals new name in Guantánamo court, by Carol Rosenberg, Miami Herald, July 12, 2016, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article78112562.html ↩︎
  139. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  140. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  141. USA v Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Government Motion to Consider Evidence During Preliminary Matters and to Admit Evidence for Trial on the Merits, April 22, 2015 ↩︎
  142. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  143. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Notes on the Taliban, Harmony document AFGH-2002-000091 ↩︎
  144. Wanted: Abdulhadi al-Iraqi – Up to $1 Million Reward, Department of State Rewards for Justice program, https://web.archive.org/web/20070429013653/http:/www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=abd_al_hadi ↩︎
  145. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  146. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  147. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  148. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  149. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  150. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  151. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  152. The Man Who Could Have Stopped The Islamic State, by Brian Fishman, Foreign Policy, November 23, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/ ↩︎
  153. Defense Department Takes Custody of al Qaeda Leader, American Forces Press Service DVIDS, April 26, 2007, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/530808/defense-department-takes-custody-al-qaeda-leader ↩︎
  154. Insurgents killed while rigging truck with explosives, CNN News, June 27, 2007, https://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/06/27/iraq.main/index.html?eref=rss_latest // US says two Turkish Qaeda operatives killed in Iraq, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/us-says-two-turkish-qaeda-operatives-killed-in-iraq-idUSYAT759824/ ↩︎
  155. Al-Qaeda and ISIL outfits operate in Turkey under charity cover, Nordic Monitor, December 31, 2018, https://nordicmonitor.com/2018/11/al-qaeda-and-isil-outfits-operate-in-turkey-under-charity-cover/ ↩︎
  156. Al-Qaeda and ISIL outfits operate in Turkey under charity cover, Nordic Monitor, December 31, 2018, https://nordicmonitor.com/2018/11/al-qaeda-and-isil-outfits-operate-in-turkey-under-charity-cover/ ↩︎
  157. US says two Turkish Qaeda operatives killed in Iraq, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/us-says-two-turkish-qaeda-operatives-killed-in-iraq-idUSYAT759824/ ↩︎
  158. Insurgents Killed While Rigging Truck with Explosives, by Mohammed Tawfeeq, CNN News, June 27, 2007, https://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/06/27/iraq.main/index.html?eref=rss_latest // US says two Turkish Qaeda operatives killed in Iraq, Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/us-says-two-turkish-qaeda-operatives-killed-in-iraq-idUSYAT759824/ ↩︎
  159. More suspects detained in Turkey’s Al Qaeda crackdown, Emirates 24/7 via AFP, January 27 2008, https://www.emirates247.com/eb247/news/more-suspects-detained-in-turkey-s-al-qaeda-crackdown-2008-01-27-1.218066?ot=ot.AMPPageLayout ↩︎

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