SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Transatlantic Conspiracy

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Two factors drove al-Qaida external operations after the 2005 London bombings. First was the need and ability to outwit international security services in order to recreate and expand upon the previous operation. To do this, they needed to adjust and evolve their explosives and methodology of attack. Secondly, there was an obvious need for a new generation to absorb the knowledge of the fallen senior external operators. In the previous chapters examining the assassinations of Hamza Rabia and Musa Muhsin Matwalli Atwah, we discussed the presence of a young Austrian protege. Herein, we delve into his narrative, and how it intersected with the next developing plot, under Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Rashid Rauf, aimed at devastating another form of mass transit, this time the prized target of air travel. From there we thoroughly analyze this plot, and the overall actions of foreign elements within North Waziristan in 2006.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

An Austrian Augment

After the success of the first round of London attacks, a new recruit traveled to Pakistan to participate in jihad, one of European nationality, and immediately piqued the interest of Hamza Rabia.  Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain departed his home in Austria on August 25, 2005, intent on acquiring the skills needed to assist al-Qaida in their global ventures1.  The rarity of American and European extremists willingly joining al-Qaida is interesting.  To be sure, several did travel to become members of al-Qaida or one of their allied movements, but the number was always relatively low.  The factors explaining this phenomenon were simple.  Firstly, al-Qaida appealed directly and only to religious zealots, and not to anyone else.  Instead of reaching out to those disenfranchised with their nation or government or life, offering them a home and purpose, only then to slowly indoctrinate them into radical Islam, they approached only the already committed as viable candidates.  The al-Qaida initial usage of social media was miserable, leading them to be unable to take full advantage of various nascent services as a recruiting tool.  The harsh conditions of jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan were prominently displayed by media networks and vigorously reported upon.  This was before the 2008 financial crisis as well, and while the nation was dividing over the aftermath of the Iraq war, Americans were not fully despairing.  Europeans were dealing with anti-immigrant movements and protests, but still there was no overwhelming desire on the part of the masses to join religious fanatics in attacking their homelands.  All of that said, it would only take the latent potential of one Western volunteer to change the course of nations, and al-Qaida was cognizant of this.  Al-Qaida had success with Amir al-Azizi in the Madrid operation, and Rashid Rauf in London, now they looked to Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain for further impact. 

Born in Modling, Austria, near Vienna, his Egyptian parents were from the same neighborhood and sphere of influence as Dr. Zawahiri2.  His parents had moved to Austria just prior to his birth, and settled in the German speaking nation in order to raise their family and nurture their careers3.  The progeny of a religious scholar, when he was a teenager, Hussain was sent to Cairo to attend an Islamic school, and while his family name followed him, he earned his own identity with his professors.  Now a prodigy of Islamic study, he was sent to Pakistan for advanced education, and now the religious fervor in his soul became intertwined with sincere desire to wage jihad, initiated by the 9/11 attacks.  In 2004, he completed his religious schooling and returned to Austria.  This time as a man determined to achieve greatness in the war of his faith.  Deciding to forego the opportunities of a productive occupation, he toned his technical skills, and began screening others for joining him on his mission.  He married from within a German Islamic community he was familiar with.  By the time he departed for Pakistan in August 2005, he was a married father, well known and liked in his community and had convinced four others to travel with him for training with al-Qaida.  As a European with an impeccable record, advanced language skills, European identification and travel documents, and the appearance of a Westerner that could easily blend into the society, Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain was quickly selected by Hamza Rabia. 

After initial basic warfare training in September 2005, near Miranshah, North Waziristan, Hussain was drawn away from the rest of the students and sent for advanced training with Muhsin Musa Matwali Atwah in a camp in Datta Khel, North Waziristan4.  Suddenly, Hussain was at the whims of senior al-Qaida operatives, and receiving training in explosives from an individual long on the FBI most wanted list, who was himself attempting to impart his knowledge on someone well educated and capable.  This would be vital in al-Qaida maintaining their proficiency.

Atwah trained Hussain in detonators and explosives, along with two Pakistani-British individuals who were placed under Hussain’s command by Hamza Rabia.  Referring to Hussain as Imran as of October 2005, Hamza Rabia spoke infrequently to the cell, but ensured that they were consistently training and preparing for whatever possible mission theirs could be5.  Hussain’s subordinates were Rangzieb Ahmed and Mohamed Zillur Rahman.  From Manchester, England Rangzieb was already known to authorities, given that an unwise border crossing from Pakistan to Indian in 1994 resulted in his incarceration sans trial or conviction until 2001, when he was released on time served6. Rangzieb traveled to the region for the sake of jihad in Kashmir, and was unsurprisingly associated with the Pakistani militant outfit Harakat ul Mujahidin (HuM)7. His time home in Britain ended in 2004 when he likely returned to Pakistan, this time associating instead with al-Qaida before appearing again at home8. In May 2005 he traveled with certainty to Pakistan9, and in the autumn was assigned to the incoming Austrian.

Glidepath

Atwah’s training digressed from the normally utilized explosives, already sought after by various security agencies, and detectable in screening operations.  Atwah lingered on the possibility of using hydrogen peroxide based bombs again, much like the successful London operation.  But this time would different, in order to prevent a failure as was seen in the second London iteration.  By November 2005, Atwah was referring to Hussain as Waqas as opposed to Imran and displaying fondness for him.  Despite this, their training regimen, which focused on the technical and physical aspects of a mission, also included periods of dead time, perhaps indicative of a security mechanism or a lack of required logistics. However, soon details of impending operations were to be revealed to Hussain10.  

This time period of course, coincided with the CIA attacks on Hamza Rabia, including the first in November, in which he escaped wounded. This meant that Hamza Rabia was compelled into mobilizing the Austrian and two British operatives under his command.  He dispatched Abu Ubaidah al-Masri to oversee the preparations. As mentioned, the Egyptian was fluent in German, and communicated thusly with Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain, gaining his instant respect.  Hussain also was multilingual, counting himself fluent in not just his native German, but the Arabic of his ancestors, and English for his upcoming mission. The choice of Abu Ubaidah, the grim oversight of the London bombings, meant that the new plot was advanced and expected to succeed. 

The question immediately arises as to why Hamza Rabia was willing to sacrifice his most promising operatives in what was likely to be a suicide mission. It makes sense that Hamza Rabia meant to act decisively in response to the drone strike that killed his family, and it makes sense that Hamza Rabia now understood just how close his pursuers were, and how compromised his ambitions may have been. Therefore, deploying his absolute best prospects, even prematurely, under the supervision of his most efficient subcommander was a necessary and meaningful reaction. But it was a reaction nonetheless.

In December Abu Ubaidah deployed Hussain and his men on a circuitous flight path in order to confuse and mask their intentions, eventually having them regroup in Dubai. Their flights took them from Pakistan, through China, and then eventually to the Emirates11. All arrived by December 11, interestingly 10 days after Hamza Rabia’s demise.

Unbeknownst to the conspirators, investigators from Manchester in the UK were on the trail of Rangzieb Ahmed, and through international cooperation were listening to them in Dubai, after Emirati authorities placed listening devices in their luxury hotel accommodations12. CIA and US government officials referred to this developing plot as Operation Glidepath13. Reaffirming the connection between Hamza Rabia and South African operatives, the cell was apparently venturing through that particular nation on the way to America for their final tasking. Intending to fly in a pattern of spread departures to South Africa, Zillur Rahman launched on December 14, but the official confirmation of the Hamza Rabia assassination thwarted the remainder of the plot and intended travels. Instead they decided to scatter for their homes, a method undertaken by Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain instantly14. Rangzieb, now viewing himself as “more than a manager,” called upon the assistance of a fellow Mancunian and al-Qaida recruit named Habib Ahmed, originally intended to assist in sanitization from their plot15. Habib, a former taxi driver, traveled in May 2005 alongside Rangzieb from Manchester to Pakistan16. As part of the cell, he was assigned to limit any trail of evidence from the participants’ travels, for later investigators to obtain. Habib now conducted a rushed version of his tasking before departing, taking with him and separating from the others any incriminating documents17. After some delay, Ahmed then followed Habib in return to Manchester18.

Liquid Innovation

In March 2006, Abu Ubaidah al-Masri began to call for his wayward sons, and as such, Abdulrahman Hussain Hilal returned to Pakistan.  Through his own impatience, the Austrian abandoned his wife and son at the airport and ventured onward without them. In Miranshah, North Waziristan, “Waqas” again conferred with Abu Ubaidah al-Masri. Of the Austrian’s conspirators, Zillur Rahman returned as well, and was apparently content with fighting in Afghanistan with al-Qaida and Taliban forces19. Meanwhile, Rangzieb Ahmed brooded since his return to Pakistan (in January20), most assuredly over his own established network in Britain and was not a component of what was to come next.  Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain meanwhile, was restless, therefore Abu Ubaidah, in order to assuage the Austrian’s qualms and to utilize his intellect, invited him to his inner circle of staff in plotting external operations, in order to prevent him from wasting his life in Afghan combat.  Abu Ubaidah was not willing to sacrifice Waqas haphazardly as Hamza Rabia had been, thus approaching external operations with some caution and determination. Waqas again traveled to the specialized camp and joined with Atwah. Therein he enmeshed with Rashid Rauf in the terroristic enterprise.  

This time to fill the role of ground commander for the plot, Rauf enlisted Abdullah Ahmed Ali (sometimes referred to as Ahmed Ali Khan), and often abbreviated as AAA. A student of computer engineering and politically motivated21, AAA was an asset for Rauf to be utilized in an analogous role to that of Mohamed Saddique Khan of the 2005 London bombings. Assisting him was Assad Sarwar, who dropped out of college and fell under the sway of AAA22, providing al-Qaida with two intelligent and willing operatives.

Sarwar and AAA ventured to an Afghan refugee camp, close to the border in Chaman, Pakistan during January 2003, for charitable purposes23. The experience catapulted AAA to a newfound discontent with British and American foreign policies and into an emotional instability due to the horrid conditions of the refugees 24. AAA was already susceptible to manipulation from these images of suffering, having been profoundly affected by the plight of Muslims in Bosnia during the Balkan wars of the 1990s25. Just two months later, the American invasion of Iraq incited further emotional turmoil in AAA, and solidified his determination in offering a response26. His quiet, smoldering desire for martyrdom now raged.

Interestingly, AAA was a fixture in Pakistan from the autumn of 2004 into early 2005, and may have crossed paths and communicated with the London bombing conspirators while in training27. Specifically he was believed to be in contact with the failed London bombings commander Muktar Said Ibrahim28. Set on a single-minded trajectory, AAA intended on remaining in the region and fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan, before senior al-Qaida intervened to diverge him to a differing path29. During this 2004 spell in Pakistan, AAA coordinated with Rashid Rauf, who in turn linked him with Abu Ubaidah al-Masri for advanced instruction30. Later in June 2005, AAA again journeyed to Pakistan, but this time he was accompanied by a troubled youth, a protege of sorts named Adam Khatib31. Educators noted the religious extremism of Khatib, making him an easy target for indoctrination by AAA, to whom he displayed an obvious fealty32. While in Pakistan the two coordinated with Sarwar, and Khatib’s young life was set onto a new radical trajectory. As 2005 drew to a close, Rashid Rauf deployed AAA home to Britain, readied to recruit a cell and execute another devastating plot. Rauf was eager to dispatch this cell as he correctly assumed that the London bombings success would compromise his agents with frequent travel records to Pakistan33

A fourth and final journey to Pakistan was commenced in spring 2006, and once there AAA was under the auspices of Rauf and conducting advanced training with the explosives34. Senior officials requested AAA risk another journey in order to acquire the necessary education pertaining to the liquid explosive devices35. During this time, Sarwar was also the recipient of chemical instruction from Rauf36. AAA was the oversight of the plot once in Britain, focused on logistics and ensuring the mechanics of the devices37. Sarwar was the operative to purchase chemicals and components, then to assemble the many devices38. Al-Qaida leadership did not expect for Sarwar to perish in the operation, thus maintaining a sizeable reservoir of knowledge in the innovative explosives39.

To ensure that failure did not encompass the new mission as it had the July 21, 2005 London assailants, Atwah reexamined the hydrogen peroxide explosives of the London assaults and adjusted, intending to utilize a liquid as opposed to powdered form of the chemical40. This would be easily smuggled in various containers onto an airliner. First the correct concentrations of chemicals and methods to make the explosives viable in a home laboratory had to be discovered and rendered able to recreate. The team was already content with detonators, power supplies, and other components of the potential devices41.

As previously discussed, Waqas was dismayed on the morning of April 13 at the unexpected assassination of Atwah. Abu Ubaidah, the ranking external operations commander remaining, cautiously ceased operations and plotting, in order to allow adversarial focus to pass and subside. Upon resumption of the efforts, the team consisting of Rashid Rauf, Waqas, and their subordinates determined the correct concentrations and methods after which they had so ardently sought42. With the second of his mentors slain, Abdulrahman Hilal Hussain decided to rebrand and discard Imran and Waqas; this time he chose the alias Abu Zubair al-Masri, under which he was to operate43.

Transatlantic Plot

Once the conspiracy was certain of the liquid explosives efficacy, Rauf deployed AAA to London with explicit orders to conduct the attacks44. Unfortunately for the plot, the spring sojourn of AAA aroused interest and suspicions among British authorities. His previous contact with Muktar Said Ibrahim had placed him under suspicion and authorities were observing his movements with interest45. Upon landing in London, his luggage was surreptitiously confiscated and searched46. AAA departed the airport none the wiser but was now under perpetual surveillance and scrutiny47. British, American, and Pakistani authorities labored in conjunction to surveil and monitor the conspirators, in an effort to prevent the intended carnage48.

In Pakistan, Rashid Rauf waited with agitation. Rauf ordered his men on the ground to conduct a dry run of the operation, to ensure that all components could be easily brought aboard an airliner, which resulted in success49. However, throughout July there were apparent obstacles. For example, AAA and his crew complained about the costs of chemicals, and in late July developed nervousness about potential observation from authorities50.

Supposedly, Rauf deployed his childhood friend and associate Mohamed Gulzar to ensure his plotters’ efficiency and the effective and punctual completion of the bombings51. Gulzar had departed Britain for Pakistan in 2002 around the same time as Rauf, but had spent much of the time since in South Africa52. It was from this nation that Gulzar arrived in Britain during July 200653. From then, he allegedly met with both AAA and Sarwar to provide oversight on behalf of Rauf54.

In reality, it was up to AAA and Sarwar to conduct the operation with precision. The intention was to smuggle the explosives onboard a multitude of planes via half-liter sports drink plastic bottles. Within each another substance was to be injected, this composed of the concentrated hydrogen peroxide mixed with Tang, an orange drink powder. The penetration of the bottles via syringe was done so as to avoid opening the seals atop each, with the intention being that the miniscule punctures could be resealed to airtight capacity. Reliable detonators within AA batteries were to be used, with initiation provided by the flash of disposable cameras55. Thus once the cameras were used, the bottles would detonate.

Acknowledging his desire for self-sacrifice since his adolescence, AAA recorded a martyrdom statement, declaring himself as the operation’s commander56. Within the recording, AAA heralded a flood of such operations against unbelievers57. His fellowship of recruited suicide bombers included Brian Young of London, a married father of two and bus driver, who upon converting to Islam, was known to his compatriots as Umar Islam58. Young visited the Chaman refugee camp alongside AAA and Sarwar in 200359. Three additional young men from east London in their 20s, joined Umar Islam in recording video martyrdom testimonials in anticipation of their deaths in the operation. They were Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan, and Waheed Zaman60. Tanvir Hussain, another east London native, a close confidant of Ali, rounded out the final of six wills61. In it, Tanvir maintained that civilian casualties were acceptable for their cause62. An athlete that experimented with various vices, he had just the year prior converted to a radical following of Islam63. At a safehouse located on Forest Road, Walthamstow, east London, Tanvir and AAA physically adjusted and experimented with their explosives and the bottle vessels intended to carry the lethal mixtures64. On August 3, even while being monitored by British intelligence service MI5, the two conspirators had an epiphany in their efforts, and determined that they had successfully achieved the proper device design65. AAA informed Rauf via email the same day of the achievement, noting that what remained was selecting times66. By August 6, AAA was communicating confidence to Rauf in the prospects of the mission succeeding, despite any qualms about surveillance67.

AAA selected seven flights launching across a three hour window, two each from Air Canada and American Airlines, plus three from United Airlines. All departing London Heathrow Airport, the seven intended destinations were American and Canadian: two to Chicago, and one each to New York, Washington, San Francisco, Toronto, and Montreal68.

Adam Khatib meanwhile, conducted meticulous research on the required chemicals, and gave written warnings to the others on its inherent volatility69. Khatib himself was somewhat volatile, and received coded reprimands from Rauf in Pakistan, after he was cited in Britain for driving without a license. Rauf questioned the young man’s commitment and scolded him for endangering the mission70. Khatib was apparently not one of the intended suicide operatives, but rather a loyalist and assistant to AAA throughout the plot71. He perhaps did not even know the intended target of the hydrogen peroxide explosives.

Another young man, Nabeel Hussain, was coordinating with AAA, conferring with him twice in July, apparently in order for AAA to convince him to act as the seventh suicide operative. Nabeel prepared his own version of a martyrdom statement and will, and expressed the consideration of sacrificing himself72. This was not as damning as the six recorded wills, but is indicative that Nabeel was a candidate for one of the flights.

In hopes of easier travel, the conspirators labored to obtain new passports, in order to clear any immediate evidence of their travels to Pakistan73. Authorities watched with dread as the plot progressed. On August 9, 2006, one of the six suicide wills was recorded at the Forest Road residence under surveillance, with authorities listening from afar74. AAA alluded to the others that the impending operation was fast approaching in a matter of days75. The Americans and Pakistanis remained focused on Rauf and worried that he may dissolve into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), surviving to conduct further operations. With so much reconnaissance on the cell, Rashid Rauf inevitably and unwittingly stumbled into a precarious situation of his own.

Rauf made the untimely decision to telephone his contacts in Britain from a cellular device, and the communication was ultimately interrupted by an interceptor, inquiring as to the identity of the caller76. Despite this obvious breach in security, Rauf apparently maintained possession of the phone, allowing for the conclusion in this particular chapter of his narrative. The phone traced and verified as in Rauf’s possession, it was obvious based on cell tower data that the terrorist was now transiting towards the FATA77. A decision was made between the Pakistanis and Americans to remove Rauf and gather what information could be obtained from this experienced operative, even if it compromised the British surveillance undertaking in London. At a railroad crossing of the road near Bahawalpur, Punjab province, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) posted men at an impromptu checkpoint, with the assistance of at least one CIA agent78. As the bus approached, Rauf slept through his journey, only to be awakened by the disconcerting sight of non-uniformed gunmen boarding his transport79. Confusion gave way to reality, and in a display of futility Rauf attempted to shutdown his cellular phones, including the one being traced, the one he should have remembered to discard80. Initially believing that he was experiencing an abduction, Rauf requested assistance from his fellow passengers, but then understood that it was Pakistani authorities that held him81. The CIA authorized the apprehending of Rauf along with Pakistan of course, but neither received permission or approval from the British, who were enmeshed within their own investigative efforts82.

Conclusion of Operation Overt

Thus, the British were forced to prematurely end their reconnaissance mission, ironically dubbed Operation Overt, far before they intended to do so. In fact, the Americans were wary of British tactics, which at one point included a plan to allow the terrorists to board their intended planes, before “mechanical” problems would force passenger egress and thus the expected suicide bombers would be ferried out to waiting law enforcement. The British rightfully viewed these terrorist scenarios and situations as law enforcement matters, while the Americans, perhaps drastically viewed them militarily and existentially, leading to the potential to rush for results83. Accordingly, the British desired sufficient evidence to end the threats properly and before a judge, while the Americans feared scenarios where the bombers could detonate within the airports if cornered and wanted the threat quashed well before that possibility.

Over the course of the night on August 9, the British descended upon their prey, capturing two senior plotters at a town hall parking lot84. Overall, 24 suspects were apprehended for questioning, with a list of 19 published after their financial assets were frozen85.

Britain utilized their nascent anti-terrorism laws in order to detain the suspects for longer than a fortnight sans charges86. This was done for nine suspects in particular, while the authorities attempted to determine their culpability if any within the plot87. Many of the initially detained were released and never charged. For example, Tayib Rauf, the brother of Rashid, was released within the fortnight, having no connections to the insidious plot of his kin88. Two brothers were released due to insufficient evidence against them in early November, after being apprehended on the basis of failure to provide information on their other younger brother and suspect, Nabeel Hussain89.

Eventually 12 adults among those arrested faced serious charges. AAA, the five confirmed intended suicide bombers, Sarwar, and their aide Adam Khatib were all charged with conspiracy to commit murder90. Cossar Ali, wife of AAA and mother to his infant was charged with failure to disclose information91. Two more AAA associates, Nabeel Hussain and Mohamed Shamin Uddin joined Mohamed Yasar Gulzar in being charged with preparations to commit terrorism92.

The trials were precarious and required multiple iterations. AAA, Sarwar, and Tanvir Hussain were the first defendants to be dealt with, convicted of the conspiracy and intention of bombing airliners, and sentenced to life in September 200993. Umar Islam (Brian Young) received the same sentence on the conspiracy charge, although his conviction oddly lacked the specific airliner element94. Rashid Rauf’s old companion, Mohamed Gulzar vehemently denied his supposed role in the operation, and was acquitted of all charges that September95. Later in the year, in December, Khatib joined AAA a final time, when he too was convicted of the conspiracy96. The same month saw Nabeel Hussain convicted of preparing for terrorism and possessing items for usage in the same act97. Mohamed Shamin Uddin, avoided serious charges, but was convicted of possessing items useful in preparing an act of terrorism98. A retrial was required for Savant, Arafat Khan, and Zaman, but they too were convicted on the conspiracy charge and finally sentenced to life in July 2010, their martyrdom testimonials securing their damnation99.

Even those not directly associated with the Transatlantic plot were detained amid the fracas of international counterterror activity. Those involved with Operation Glidepath fared no better than their compatriots abroad. Choosing to engage in combat within Abu Ubaidah al-Masri’s previous unit (in Kunar, Afghanistan) instead of committing to external operations, Mohamed Zillur Rahman was slain on the front during the course of 2006 or 2007100. Rangzieb Ahmed was captured by Pakistani authorities on August 20, 2006, and held in torturous circumstances for 13 months within facilities in Rawalpindi and another infamous prison called Adiala101. Rangzieb was extradited in September 2007 to the UK, and in December 2008 was convicted and sentenced to life on a charge of directing terrorist activities102. Interestingly, US officials assessed and assumed that the man they only knew as Imran from the plot, fell in battle with Zillur Rahman in Afghanistan103. To the contrary, Abu Zubair al-Masri remained viable. He labored under Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, now the director of external operations. They were now among the most sought after and dangerous men on the planet. Elsewhere in their North Waziristan base, the foreign fighters of al-Qaida focused on the complex relationships established with their Pashtun hosts, and the politics of their sister theatre in Iraq.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  2. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  3. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  4. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  5. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  6. Loner That Became a Terrorist, Manchester Evening News, January 12, 2013, https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/loner-that-became-a-terrorist-976668 ↩︎
  7. Loner That Became a Terrorist, Manchester Evening News, January 12, 2013, https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/loner-that-became-a-terrorist-976668 ↩︎
  8. Loner That Became a Terrorist, Manchester Evening News, January 12, 2013, https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/loner-that-became-a-terrorist-976668 ↩︎
  9. Loner That Became a Terrorist, Manchester Evening News, January 12, 2013, https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/loner-that-became-a-terrorist-976668 ↩︎
  10. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  11. British Muslim aborted terror plot after al-Qaida chief’s death, court hears, by Sadie Gray, The Guardian, September 25, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/sep/25/1 ↩︎
  12. Man convicted of directing terror activities sentenced to life, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, December 19, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/dec/19/uksecurity-terrorism ↩︎
  13. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  14. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  15. British Muslim aborted terror plot after al-Qaida chief’s death, court hears, by Sadie Gray, The Guardian, September 25, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/sep/25/1 ↩︎
  16. Loner That Became a Terrorist, Manchester Evening News, January 12, 2013, https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/loner-that-became-a-terrorist-976668 ↩︎
  17. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  18. British Muslim aborted terror plot after al-Qaida chief’s death, court hears, by Sadie Gray, The Guardian, September 25, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/sep/25/1 ↩︎
  19. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  20. Loner That Became a Terrorist, Manchester Evening News, January 12, 2013, https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/local-news/loner-that-became-a-terrorist-976668 ↩︎
  21. Airliner bomb plot: profiles of the defendants, by Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/07/airliner-bomb-plot-profiles-defendants ↩︎
  22. Airliner bomb plot: profiles of the defendants, by Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/07/airliner-bomb-plot-profiles-defendants ↩︎
  23. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 // Airliner bomb plot: profiles of the defendants, by Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/07/airliner-bomb-plot-profiles-defendants ↩︎
  24. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 // Airliner bomb plot: profiles of the defendants, by Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/07/airliner-bomb-plot-profiles-defendants ↩︎
  25. Airliner bomb plot: profiles of the defendants, by Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/07/airliner-bomb-plot-profiles-defendants ↩︎
  26. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 ↩︎
  27. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 ↩︎
  28. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 ↩︎
  29. Document shows origins of 2006 plot for liquid bombs on planes, by Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, CNN, April 30, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents ↩︎
  30. Document shows origins of 2006 plot for liquid bombs on planes, by Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, CNN, April 30, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents ↩︎
  31. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm ↩︎
  32. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm ↩︎
  33. Document shows origins of 2006 plot for liquid bombs on planes, by Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, CNN, April 30, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/30/world/al-qaeda-documents ↩︎
  34. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 ↩︎
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  37. Inside the terror plot that ‘rivaled 9/11’, by  Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, NBC News, September 15, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26726987 ↩︎
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  55. ‘Plotters made suicide videos’, BBC News, April 3, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080407073007/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7329221.stm ↩︎
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  57. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm ↩︎
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  60. Would-be suicide bombers jailed for life, BBC News, July 12, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/10600084 ↩︎
  61. Airliner bomb plot: profiles of the defendants, by Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/07/airliner-bomb-plot-profiles-defendants ↩︎
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  68. Plotters made suicide videos’, BBC News, April 3, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080407073007/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7329221.stm ↩︎
  69. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm ↩︎
  70. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm ↩︎
  71. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm ↩︎
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  76. Rashid Rauf: the al-Qaida suspect caught, tortured and lost, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, September 8, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/08/rashid-rauf-terrorism-torture-pakistan ↩︎
  77. How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  78. Rashid Rauf: the al-Qaida suspect caught, tortured and lost, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, September 8, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/08/rashid-rauf-terrorism-torture-pakistan // How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  79. How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  80. How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  81. Rashid Rauf: the al-Qaida suspect caught, tortured and lost, by Ian Cobain and Richard Norton Taylor, The Guardian, September 8, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/08/rashid-rauf-terrorism-torture-pakistan ↩︎
  82. How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  83. How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  84. How the U.S., U.K. and Pakistan Teamed Up To Stop Another 9/11, by Aki Peritz, Politico, January 2, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/02/liquid-bomber-plot-counterterrorism-international-cooperation-526246 ↩︎
  85. A plan ‘to commit unimaginable mass murder’, by Philip Webster, Sean O’Neill and Stewart Tendler, The Times, August 11, 2006, https://archive.ph/20110222012903/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article606341.ece#selection-259.31-273.52 ↩︎
  86. Judge extends custody of 9 U.K. terror suspects, NBC News via The Associated Press, August 21, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna14462164 ↩︎
  87. Judge extends custody of 9 U.K. terror suspects, NBC News via The Associated Press, August 21, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna14462164 ↩︎
  88. Brits Release 2 Terror Plot Suspects, CBS News, August 21, 2006, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brits-release-2-terror-plot-suspects/ ↩︎
  89. Discharge for two transatlantic bomb ‘plot’ accused, The Guardian, November 1, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/nov/01/terrorism.world ↩︎
  90. Air plot suspects appear in court, CNN, August 22, 2006, https://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/22/uk.terror/index.html ↩︎
  91. Judge extends custody of 9 U.K. terror suspects, NBC News via The Associated Press, August 21, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna14462164 ↩︎
  92. 3 more charged in British terror plot, NBC News via The Associated Press, August 29, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna14574664 ↩︎
  93. Three terrorists convicted of plotting to blow up jets over Atlantic, by Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/07/terrorists-plot-atlantic-liquid-bombs // Airline bomb plotters jailed for life, by Haroon Siddique and Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, September 14, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/14/airline-bomb-plotters-jailed-life ↩︎
  94. Three terrorists convicted of plotting to blow up jets over Atlantic, by Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, September 7, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/07/terrorists-plot-atlantic-liquid-bombs // Airline bomb plotters jailed for life, by Haroon Siddique and Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, September 14, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/sep/14/airline-bomb-plotters-jailed-life ↩︎
  95. Defendant ‘planned global jihad’, BBC News, June 19, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7463999.stm // 3 men convicted in British bomb plot, NBC News via The Associated Press, September 8, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna26608742 ↩︎
  96. Briton guilty of plotting ‘deadly terror attack’, BBC News, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8404551.stm // Fifth man found guilty in plane bomb plot trial, The Guardian via The Associated Press, December 9, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/09/man-guilty-terrorism-bomb-plot ↩︎
  97. Fifth man found guilty in plane bomb plot trial, The Guardian via The Associated Press, December 9, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/09/man-guilty-terrorism-bomb-plot ↩︎
  98. Fifth man found guilty in plane bomb plot trial, The Guardian via The Associated Press, December 9, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/09/man-guilty-terrorism-bomb-plot ↩︎
  99. Would-be suicide bombers jailed for life, BBC News, July 12, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/10600084 ↩︎
  100. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎
  101. BHATT MURPHY SOLICITORS STATEMENT: RANGZIEB AHMED v MI5, MI6, FOREIGN OFFICE, HOME OFFICE & OTHERS, October 26, 2020, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://bhattmurphy.co.uk/files/Ahmed/Statement%20re%20Rangzieb%20Ahmed.pdf ↩︎
  102. Man convicted of directing terror activities sentenced to life, by Ian Cobain, The Guardian, December 19, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/dec/19/uksecurity-terrorism ↩︎
  103. Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security, by Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, St Martin’s Publishing Group, 2012 ↩︎

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