SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 36 – A Forgotten Warning)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment IX – To Inspire An Insurrection (Chapter 36 – A Forgotten Warning)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

Amidst the conflict in Abyan and throughout Yemen, we return to a brief discussion of the pre-9/11 Yemeni Nexus of jihadists and al-Qaida affiliates. Specifically those that adorned a frantic February 2002 FBI alert. We also examine how even in an era of romanticized extremist propaganda, the reality and futility of the jihadist life is overwhelmingly apparent.

Reducing Targets

Following the Obama Administration’s order to reduce the US military’s hit list of AQAP operatives to be exterminated in an effort to dismantle their southern takeover, US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) had drones flying to kill the remaining available targets [1].  As mentioned, multiple raids, bombings, and drone strikes were reported to have been conducted by JSOC, according to Yemeni and other sources, yet this cannot be entirely verified.  Only some strikes were heavily reported upon due to the prominence of their targets or their effectiveness in the southern battles.  One such strike occurred on June 3 and removed two important AQAP members from the battlefield.  One was Ali Abdullah Naji al-Harithi, also known as Abu Ali al-Harithi [2,3].  His name should not be confused with Qaed Sinan Salim al-Harithi, who also went by the same kunya.  It should be noted that it is not entirely uncommon for fighters to have the same kunya, although it is a fact that is rarely reported or focused upon. 

Harithi had been a deputy fighter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi with AQI, and had returned to Yemen with orders from his commander [2,4].  However, upon his return in 2004, he was imprisoned and eventually charged along with the sixteen other members of the cell he established once home [2,5].  The proceedings against them commenced on February 22, 2006, the same month as the infamous Sanaa prison escape [5].  Harithi was in charge of the cell, made the decisions as to everyone’s individual role, and plotted against the Yemenis and Americans as a way to avenge the deceased Qaed Sinan Salim al-Harithi [5].  However, the militants denied all charges and their lawyers argued that it was not against Islamic law to wage jihad against a foreign occupier, as the men had against the US forces in Iraq [5,6].  The Yemeni judges agreed and on July 8, 2006, Harithi and his men were acquitted [6].  Harithi, when he was eventually released from prison, became a fighter and captain for AQAP and was a member of the jihadist Aden-Abyan Army [3,4].  He was said to be respected by Qasim al-Rimi and kept from the frontlines in order to protect a rising leader in the organization [4].  Despite this protection, Harithi was killed in his vehicle during that June 3 strike, while participating in the fighting around Zinjibar [2,4]. 

Killed with Harithi that day in a drone strike was another important AQAP commander, Ammar al-Waeli (H-6) [7,8].  He had fought in Afghanistan and was a lifelong jihadi [4].  His father was also a man who participated in jihad and had been appointed to help establish a training camp and base in the Saada province of Yemen, the Abu Jabarah camp [7,9].  This camp was used by the militants in their future fights against the Houthis [9].  Waeli was thus associated with AQAP elements which were supported by the government, particularly by General Ali Mushin al-Ahmar [9].  This linkage shows that AQAP was receiving significant support at least in Saada province in order to assist in quelling the Houthi rebellions.  Waeli was also a known arms dealer and had used his tribal connections to help shelter and protect AQAP militants including Naif al-Qahtani [10].  It is assumed that he and his men facilitated and assisted the AQAP fighters comprised by Qahtani, Abdulaziz al-Jasser, Fahd al-Jutaili and others in late 2009.  Furthermore, he participated in recruiting, training, and deploying the Queen of Shiba suicide bomber who killed eight Spaniards in Marib [11,12].

AQAP reported in the sixth issue of Inspire that Waeli had been assigned to attack the city of Zinjibar and the Yemeni troops within to prepare it for the takeover [7].  During this, he was supposedly wounded in the neck, yet continued to fight despite the severity of such a wound [7].  On June 3 however, he was killed along with a man named Jafar al-Adani in the aforementioned drone strike [7,8].  AQAP stated that Waeli and Adani were struck at an artillery position, while Harithi was in a vehicle when he was killed, therefore suggesting separate strikes killed the men [4,7].  Other sources however, stated that the two were killed in the same strike [13].  Regardless, the fighters, including Waeli, the List H member first declared wanted by the FBI in 2002, were dead and off of AQAP’s southern Yemen frontline. 

Bait Habra

With the death of Waeli, we should look back upon List H, and its components, first announced by the FBI in February of 2002 [14].  Upon news of the release of the FBI alert that listed the men, there were little accompanying details about the militants.  In looking back on the release, former FBI agent Ali Soufan (heavily involved in the FBI’s counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaida) stated in his book, The Black Banners, that the men were participants in a Yemeni car theft ring based out of a guesthouse called the Bait Habra [15,16].  This Bait Habra home in Sanaa, was the house of Bashir Ali Nasir al-Shadadi (H-14), and the epicenter of the car theft operation, in which vehicles were stolen and sold, while the profits were then used to obtain weapons and explosives [15,17].  The congregation of al-Qaida linked militants within was acting outside of the orders of their emir [15].  In fact they were operating in order to free the leader of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army from prison as he was about to be executed for his role in the abduction and subsequent deaths of foreign nationals [15].  However, the Yemenis struck first and in May 1999 arrested the members of the car theft ring [15].  The group was also implicated in the COLE bombing, supposedly having roles in handling the explosives and conducting surveillance [17].  It is unknown if these allegations are true, but they are reported in leaked Guantanamo assessments [17]. While these men were implicated, the truth of the matter, as shown in Segment I, was that Abdulrahim al-Nashiri conducted the operation with a small number of men with actual knowledge of the plot.  He did however have a large support structure, as can be seen by his henchmen being involved with plots in Yemen after the bombing of the destroyer.  Thus, the men who comprised List H were part of a broader jihadist community within Yemen directly connected to Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden, and his lieutenants [A].  In addition to this, another glaring implication that may have easily linked the men to the COLE bombing was the fact that Hassan al-Khamri (one of the eventual suicide bombers of the COLE) had been arrested along with them [15].  Most of the men, including Khamri were released from custody fairly quickly [15].  Some however, remained in prison for an extended time [15].

As mentioned, Shadadi’s home was the base for the group, and Shadadi himself was an important facilitator and recruiter for militants in Yemen [18].  He helped arrange the recruitment and travel of young Yemeni radicals from their home country to the training camps and battle grounds of Afghanistan [17,18].  He was assisted in this endeavor by his brother-in-law, Abdulrazaq Mohamed Saleh al-Najjar, known as Abu Saleh al-Yemeni, who often operated within Afghanistan for Al-Qaida, facilitating the Yemenis upon their arrival [18,19,20].  As discussed in Segment I of this series, Najjar was an important component for al-Qaida in its pre-9/11 form as he was responsible for so many of the arriving Arabs who filled the ranks of Al-Qaida’s Brigade 55 or who later became operators for the group [19,20].  Later a Guantanamo detainee assessment described Najjar as involved with the bombing of the destroyer and as one of al-Qaida’s most active operators [19].  In the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, Abu Saleh al-Yemeni was reported as one of the first major al-Qaida operatives killed [21].  At the time of the reporting, no evidence was available in any media sources as to the actual identity of this man.  It was not until the aforementioned leaked documents did it become clear that the man had actually been Najjar. 

Najjar’s brother-in-law Shadadi was revealed to already be in Yemeni custody at the time of the publication of the FBI alert [22].  The US believed that the facilitator was somehow involved in the COLE bombing as well as other militant activities [17].  The US Embassy, as revealed in a future cable leak, suggested that because of Shadadi’s close ties with Yemeni intelligence services, he would probably not remain in custody nor would he ever be extradited [23].  In fact, shortly after the release of List H, six members were revealed to already be in custody [24].  They were Issam Ahmed Dibwan al-Makhlafi, known as Akrama, Ahmed al-Akhadr Nasir al-Bidani, Bashir Ali Nasir al-Shadadi, Abdulaziz Mohamed Saleh bin Attash, Mashur Abdullah Muqbil al-Sabri and Abdu Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (H-12 through H-17) [15,17,22,25].  As mentioned in Segment I, Abdah Ali al-Hajj al-Sharqawi (H-17, ISN 1457) was captured in a Karachi raid in 2002 and transferred to Guantanamo [25].  He was known as Riyadh the Facilitator and had been working out of the same Karachi home that Nashiri used during his time there [25].

Shuhour Abdullah Muqbil Ahmed al-Sabri (H-16, ISN 324) was revealed to be in Guantanamo as well under the name Mashur Abdullah Muqbil Ahmed al-Sabri [17].  Sabri, a Yemeni, had been deported out of Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s prior to ending up at the home of his friend, Shadadi [17].  While there he participated in the Bait Habra car theft ring until the group was arrested in May 1999 [17].  By January 2000, he was released from prison and ended up being a part of a group of jihadists associated with the Nashiri network [17].  Later in the year, Sabri was convinced to travel to Afghanistan to receive training and participate in battle against the Northern Alliance [17].  He was stationed with Brigade 55 at the front lines of Kabul, and remained there until the lines fell during the US invasion [17].  Sabri was assessed to have been an important fighter, having gone through training at al-Faruq camp followed by more advanced training [17].  He was identified by many other detainees and major jihadists as a fighter on the front lines [17]. He fled to Pakistan after the lines fell and was captured and transferred to US custody [17].  He was eventually transferred to Saudi Arabia in April 2016 in order to be put through their rehabilitation program [26].  Sharqawi remained in custody at Guantanamo until January 2025, when it was announced that he and ten other Yemeni prisoners were transferred to the care of Oman [27].

Bashir al-Shadadi meanwhile remained in prison from the time of his arrest in May of 1999 until he was released in September of 2002 [22].  Makhlafi was known as Akrama and was another close associate of Shadadi’s [14,28].  Abdulaziz bin Attash, the brother of Walid bin Attash, was known also as Abdulbarah or Abu al-Bara, and had been retained in custody due to his familial links to bin Laden [15].  He became a bargaining chip in case it was ever needed [15].  However, he was eventually released and made his way to Somalia where he joined with al-Shabaab militants there in order to wage jihad [29].  It is unknown if Bidani or Makhlafi remained for long in Yemeni custody but it is very unlikely. 

Fawaz al-Rubayi (H-1 and G-5), Mustafa al-Ansari (H-4) the perpetrator of the Yanbu massacre, and Waeli (H-6) were the List H members who had thus far been confirmed killed [7,30,31].  Two of the List H members, Abu Nasir al-Tunisi (H-9) and Abu Moaz al-Jadawi (H-10), were known only by kunyas making the job of finding them that much more difficult [14].  Leaked Guantanamo Assessments revealed that Abu Moaz al-Jadawi was a primary al-Qaida facilitator, instrumental in arranging the travel of numerous combatants to Afghanistan for their training and jihad [32].  He was also known to provide logistical support and funding to al-Qaida operatives in Yemen and Somalia, and to have coordinated with the above mentioned Sharqawi [32].  Abu Moaz al-Jadawi was revealed by a Human Rights Watch document to be a Saudi named Ahmed Ibrahim Abu al-Hasana, who was well known while in Afghanistan [33].  Hasana was said to have been arrested, most likely in Yemen, just shortly after his wedding and transferred to CIA custody, probably during 2002 [33].  Eventually he was rendered to Jordan where he was held for over a year before being incarcerated in Saudi Arabia [33].  Hasana remained imprisoned as of 2008 when the document was published and it is assumed he remains there still [33].  As for the Tunisian on List H, it is worth noting that on September 25, 2007, US forces conducted an airstrike in Nasayib, Iraq which killed a ranking Al-Qaida in Iraq leader known by his kunya, Abu Nasir al-Tunisi [34].  While it is possible that the man is the same individual from List H, it is unlikely.  Lastly, Omar Ahmed al-Habishi (H-5) was known as Abu Osayed al-Madani and was a respected member of AQAP within their media and propaganda efforts [35].  He was lauded as a ‘munshid’ as he sang Islamic hymns for propaganda videos, and his experience waging jihad in Bosnia, Yemen, and elsewhere helped him to easily recruit others.  By February 2014 Habishi had departed from Yemen to bring his expertise in jihad to the battlegrounds of Syria [35].  The other members of the car theft ring/terror cell have thus far been unaccounted for, although as mentioned, at least one continued his saga in Somalia.

Horn of Africa

A miniscule distance across dangerous waters from Yemen, the Horn of Africa had transformed into a thriving breeding ground for jihadists, as well as a training ground for veteran and newly recruited radical fighters.  As such, the Horn of Africa had also converted into a dying ground for jihadists.  Somalia was where Abdulaziz Mohamed Saleh bin Attash (H-15), found himself engaged in militancy [29,36].  For years the radical organization al-Shabaab had been fighting against a new Somali government, struggling to maintain its delicate hold over power [37].  This extremist group had also been fighting against foreign forces attempting to assist the new Somali government [37].  As such, they were able to draw upon militants from abroad to come and join their resistance.  Bin Attash was one such young man, who in 2011, found himself and his group embroiled ever more so in a battle for continued existence [29].  The organization had attempted to swear fealty to Al-Qaida emir Osama bin Laden and failed, yet after his death they eventually pledged allegiance to his successor [38,39].  There was also a close working relationship between al-Qaida affiliates such as al-Shabaab and AQAP, present in Yemen [40].

Bin Attash was a prime example of this relationship, as his circumstances had ingrained him in the jihadist movement of Yemen, only to see him join the battle in Somalia.  This young man was essentially al-Qaida royalty, at least in his mind and in the eyes of certain others [29].  He and several of his brothers had been indoctrinated into the radical ideology of bin Laden from a very early age [29,36,41].  The fault of this may well have lain with their father.  Mohamed Saleh bin Attash had been detained by the Saudis for his close relationship to bin Laden and no doubt for the actions of his sons [36,41].  It is not known whether or not he remains in custody to this day, but out of ten sons, Mohamed was known to have raised five al-Qaida fighters [29].  The most famous was Walid, known as Khallad, who was discussed extensively in Segment I.  Walid was captured in Karachi, Pakistan on April 29, 2003, and had spent subsequent years in CIA detention prior to finding himself in Guantanamo Bay [36].  His explicit involvement with Nashiri and the COLE bombing, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and the 9/11 attacks, as well as his close personal relationship with bin Laden made him a senior al-Qaida lieutenant and a top tier target of the US [36].  While in the world’s viewpoint the man was terrorist, to the jihadist community he was a legend.  Abdulaziz lived in that shadow, but with his name, came recognition, privilege, and rank. 

His eldest brother Husam, known as Mohanad, had brought Walid and the other brothers to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance amongst other jihadist ventures [36,41].  They eventually became a part of what was to be bin Laden’s Brigade 55 of Arab soldiers, battling for the Taliban [36,41].  As mentioned in Segment I, Mohanad was killed in battle in 1997, leaving Walid as the elder of the family [36,42].  Ali Soufan, in his book The Black Banners stated that Walid, while being so well respected was known also for being negligent of his brothers’ needs [42].  In 1997, Abdulaziz and his brother Hassan (known as Omayr) came to Afghanistan to train [41,42].  Once they realized where they were, the two became very frightened, cowardly, and recalcitrant [42].  Hassan and Abdulaziz eventually acquiesced to their new reality and became loyal subjects of bin Laden, and at times integral parts of his network [41,42]. 

Abdulaziz and Hassan were facilitated into Afghanistan by the militant facilitator and logistician Abu Zubaydah [41].  The man ran the logistics of the infamous Khaldan training camp [43].  Due to his assistance they were introduced to Ali Mohamed Abdulaziz al-Fakhiri (Ibn Sheikh al-Libi) who was the commander of Khaldan, and who was later considered as a father by the two brothers [41,43].  They conducted their training at the camp, graduated, and went on to fight on the front lines [41].  Abdulaziz participated in the battle in which Walid was wounded and lost a leg, and in which Mohanad was killed [41,42].  Hassan meanwhile stayed behind the lines, recovering from malaria [41].  Abdulaziz did not exactly obtain an exemplary record of service with the mujahidin, as he became lost behind enemy lines during the battle and subsequently had to be rescued by a Taliban helicopter [42].  He went on to attend more advanced training classes under the guidance of al-Qaida instructors [41].  Eventually, he returned home prior to ending up in Yemen.  It should be noted that while the bin Attash brothers had Yemeni citizenship they were raised in Saudi Arabia [36,41].  Once repatriated to Yemen, Abdulaziz was linked up with Bashir al-Shadadi, the al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator, and operated out of his extremist abode, the Bait Habra [17].  Thus, when the car theft ring was arrested in May 1999, the young bin Attash was also apprehended, and later found his name in the warning comprised by the FBI for their alert in 2002, (List H) [14,15,16,17]. 

Abdulaziz was detained in Yemen still when that FBI alert was issued.  Soon thereafter his name was removed from the list, due to the realization that he was already incarcerated [15,16,44].  In fact, Abdulaziz could reflect that while his brothers fought in Afghanistan against the American invasion, he remained stagnant in a Yemeni prison.  While another brother, Hussain, fought and died in late 2001 in Afghanistan, Abdulaziz was countries away participating in no sort of jihad [36,41].  According to Ali Soufan, this youngest bin Attash brother was also known as Moaz and was killed in the same strike that eliminated Mohamed Atef in Kabul [45].  Hassan meanwhile had gone on to escape the fighting and contribute to Nashiri’s Strait of Hormuz plot, and also assisted in preparing for an insurgency against occupying US forces in Afghanistan [41].  Hassan was later captured along with Ramzi Binalshibh in a gun battle in Karachi, Pakistan exactly one year after the 9/11 attacks [41].  He was sent to Guantanamo where Walid bin Attash joined him in 2006 [41,46,47].  Meanwhile, the Yemenis kept Abdulaziz because of his surname, and his fellow militants left him and some of the other Bait Habra members in custody without petitioning for their freedom [15].  A compatriot militant arrested with him in 1999 was Hassan al-Khamri, one of the future COLE bombers, who once released, continued to visit his young friend [15].  Soon the pleasantries ceased, as Khamri was under orders from Saif al-Adel and the al-Qaida emir to not flaunt his allegiance or draw attention to himself due to the pending operation [15].  While these events occurred, Abdulaziz bided his time awaiting his eventual release. 

Emancipation finally came and Abdulaziz prudently chose to avoid the inevitable spotlight he would be under while in Yemen.  The young man could no doubt have attained status as an operative for Wuhaishi’s network, but instead elected to take his family name, his notoriety, and whatever services he could proffer elsewhere.  He traversed the jihadist landscape, to east Africa, where al-Qaida arguably had first made a name for itself [29].  First through bin Laden’s infrastructure and network in Sudan, and secondly for its operations against the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam.  Al-Shabaab militants not only viewed foreigners such as Abdulaziz as additional fighters, but also sought guidance and leadership from them. 

By late 2011, Abdulaziz could reflect upon his decision to come to this land in order to fight for his cause.  He had traveled there with Mansur al-Baihani, the Sanaa prison escapee [29].  The two figured to play predominant roles in the ever growing al-Qaida presence in Somalia.  For a lawless region such as this was fertile for their ambitions, and they could recreate the infrastructure of Afghanistan with training grounds and operational bases.  These travails were ill-spent.  Baihani was long since dead, killed at the hands of US forces in 2007 [48], although other jihadists no doubt relished that idea with pride:  to be martyred fighting against their greatest enemy. 

However, not everyone received such an extravagant type of death.  Abdulaziz bin Attash was one of these.  Abdulaziz and the other foreign fighters were without proper mujahidin leadership, in the midst of the al-Shabaab militants, warring Somali tribes, and encroaching African forces.  The Ethiopians, Kenyans and other African forces had invaded the anarchy of Somalia in late 2011, and although the desired results were not yet coming to fruition, the militants had been forced to temporarily retreat with desperation [49,50].  As such, Abdulaziz bin Attash would not meet as prestigious an end as his brothers.  He would not be captured and sent to Guantanamo to potentially face a US military tribunal.  He would not be killed fighting Americans, or their Western allies.  Abdulaziz bin Attash was gunned down fighting against Ethiopian forces near the Kenyan border, attempting to hold back the tide of encroaching enemies upon their supposed militant havens [29].  The young man died the same death as innumerable unnamed jihadists.  He would not perish in glory or in a manner where it could be claimed he had inflicted harm to America or the West.  Abdulaziz merely died in foreign land, fighting in a pointless conflict.  By December 30, 2011, his death was announced on the Al-Fida forum known for releasing information on deceased extremists [29].  So many other radicals met a similar fate, although never had the name recognition which warranted a martyrdom announcement.  With him died his ability to exploit others with his family name and the ability of others to exploit him.  While men like Abdulaziz fell in the name of jihad around the world in such a bleak manner, others were being actively targeted by the US.  Some died in their sought after blazes of glory, and others such as Anwar al-Awlaki learned that death is not always a matter of fighting to the last breath, but rather being incinerated unexpectedly without any warning, after being followed and tracked.

After this detour into the fates or whereabouts of the various inhabitants of the 2002 FBI Alert, we must now commit to a return to Abyan and an overall Yemen in disarray. With the CIA in control of the drones in the skies, with a voracious appetite for their targets, the debate was raging as to the ethics of their implementation. Despite the controversy, AQAP commanders and ideologues remained unprotected from this wrath.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] Refer to Segment I, Chapter 2 of this series, Foundations in a Franchise of Fear – Chapter 2 – The Yemeni Nexus for further analysis and discussion of this pre-9/11 network of Yemeni jihadists providing recruitment, logistics, and support to the broader al-Qaida and extremist movement.

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

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