SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 35 – An Emirate In Abyan)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment IX – To Inspire An Insurrection (Chapter 35 – An Emirate In Abyan)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

In the following chapter, we discuss how both the propaganda and paramilitary campaign of AQAP further evolved. Most importantly, we examine the repercussions in Yemen of a far away assassination, and the opportunity thus presented to the jihadists.

The Fourth Issue

As the winter months progressed, so did Nasir al-Wuhaishi’s campaign through both the media and on the ground through attacks and assassinations.  Said al-Shehri released a statement in January yet again railing against the Houthis and claiming that the Yemeni government had ceased their assault on the rebels only due to American intervention, and thus leaving the Sunni tribes to suffer at the hands of these Shiites [1].  Also in January, Samir Khan released the fourth issue of Inspire [2].  Khan’s magazine was increasingly well done, and one could easily see the effort being put into it.  While the publication was not perfect in a journalistic sense, it must be remembered that journalism is never the goal of propaganda.  For Wuhaishi, Khan’s magazine was serving its purpose in garnering the attention of English speaking and Western Muslims who either sat on the verge of extremism or had already crossed the line.  Also it was perpetuating fear among analysts and lawmakers [2].  So while portions of the magazine were undeniably juvenile, the overarching dangerous theme and goal of the articles within shone through in their violent nature. 

While the magazine is augmented by recycled documents and statements from the likes of bin Laden, Adam Gadahn, and Abu Musab al-Suri, there are quite a few articles written by actual AQAP members [2].  For instance, Khan wrote a piece on what he called the “central issue” of jihad, and provided the argument that theologically speaking, jihad was obligatory to all Muslims up until such a time as all occupied lands are freed from those he describes as apostates [2].  Khan’s contributions are far from erudite, and he is not an Islamic scholar, but perhaps due to his experiences as an American and his ability to reach other youth, he takes on such a role in the magazine.  He is of course backed up by the actual scholars of AQAP.  Disturbingly, this issue included a “Question and Answer” segment with idealogue Adel al-Abab on the targeting of non-Muslim civilians as well as Yemeni soldiers [2].  Abab condoned both of these actions in a heartless manner, using abstruse interpretations of his religion to state that civilians are fair prey when they are disbelievers and their governments war against Islamic nations [2].  Soldiers in Yemen meanwhile, are targeted due to their association with Western government interests [2].  Anwar al-Awlaki penned an article in this issue which illustrates how Muslims are allowed to steal property and money from Western countries despite any allegiance or covenant they might have due to citizenship [2].  This is because Western nations are viewed by Awlaki as at war with Islam, and the Islamic nations that have alliances with the West are disregarded and said agreements void due to the fact that the offending leaders are in his eyes, heretics [2]. 

This was followed in March by an interesting event involving Said al-Shehri, in which Fahd al-Quso placed a call to his brother in Bahrain and informed him of Shehri’s death while handling explosives [3].  As the February call was monitored, it was believed to be a technique Quso was employing to relieve the pressure from his superior [3].  The media ran with the story and reported that Wuhaishi’s deputy was dead, but intelligence officials and diplomats quickly quashed the idea [3].  It should be noted that while this tactic was used, AQAP never officially released anything on Shehri’s supposed demise.  Thus their record of reporting actual deaths remained pristine.

Anwar al-Awlaki released yet another statement, this time expressing anger at the recent arrest of Abdulilah Haider Shayi, the Yemeni journalist who had traveled, lived with and become well acquainted with AQAP militants [4,5].  Shayi had been the prominent Yemeni journalist to originally claim what was eventually revealed as truth:  that over 40 civilians died in the December 17, 2009 strike on al-Majalah [5].  Supposedly, due to his unusually close ties and access to AQAP militants he was arrested in August 2010 by Yemeni authorities and eventually convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment in January 2011 [5].  Although, the government was going to release him in the same manner they had other militants and their supporters, President Obama requested that President Ali Saleh continue the detention of the man [5].  Awlaki lambasted this decision, and several journalists claimed that instead of Shayi’s links to the militants being the main factor for his detention, his arrest was mainly due to his early revelation of civilian deaths in the American airstrike [4,5]. 

Motorcycle Assassins

As for the military aspect of the winter for AQAP, they continued with their usual spate of various attacks in the south.  In fact, an operative known as Abu Zakariya al-Eritri described in the fourth issue of Inspire how Wuhaishi sent him to Abyan province to assist in the fight [2].  While there the Eritrean described how the AQAP soldiers split into assassination teams and attack teams in order to wreak havoc on Yemeni forces [2].  He claims responsibility for actions in Mudiah, Abyan that had previously gone unaccounted for.  These included the assassination of security chief Abdullah al-Baham in mid-October as he attempted to quell a group of angry demonstrators [6].  Eritri explains how four men approached and shot him in the head, then easily escaped amidst the throng [2].  Also, Eritri describes how right before this event an AQAP attack team launched an ambush on the military convoy carrying Abyan Governor Ahmed Mohamed al-Maisari [2,6].  In fact, Yemeni forces described themselves enthralled in a guerilla war with AQAP starting around this time period in Abyan [7].  Southern Movement leaders meanwhile, argued again that they were not a part of this violence [6]. 

These actions, and the formation of assassination teams, leave open the door for AQAP being directly responsible for a long series of hits previously unmentioned in this Segment.  They include:  The shooting of Sayun’s deputy intelligence chief Brigadier Gen. Riyadh al-Khatabi on October 13 in Hadhramout [8], the murder of deputy investigations director of Hajjah province, Ali Abdullah Wahan on October 25 [9], and the killing of Lt. Col. Abdulaziz Abu Abed of the intelligence services in Hadhramout on October 25 [10].  AQAP then was also probably responsible for the assassinations of Col. Atiq al-Amri of Shabwa’s intelligence and investigation services (Jan 17), Lt. Col. Nabil Aklan of the security forces in Marib (Jan 22), Col. Mohamed al-Ezzi deputy director of the Polictical Security Organization (PSO) in Hadhramout (Feb 17), senior PSO Mohamed Hassan al-Qerzi in Hadhramout (Feb 28) and Colonels Abdulhamid al-Sharabi and Shaif al-Shuaibi in Abyan and Hadhramout respectively (Mar 6) [11-15].  Interspersed through these events were many more ambushes on security and military positions resulting in the deaths of more soldiers [16].  Several other officials survived assassination attempts [16].  The assassination tactic of choice for these militants and others seemed to be the usage of motorcycles to conduct quick drive-by shootings, such as the one which resulted in the death of Col. Hussain Gharma in the ever violent Lawdar district of Abyan [13].  Through April, direct attacks against Yemeni soldiers instead of just criminal investigators and intelligence officers greatly increased [16].  President Obama’s deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan even called President Saleh during this time to express his condolences on the murders of so many Yemeni soldiers and to reiterate America’s support for the Yemeni regime [17].  The US response to these actions and the continual threat of AQAP to America was inevitable.  By late 2010 for instance, the US had decided to significantly expand its presence in the region, with personnel, drones, and supplies, in order to combat the ever strengthening militant organization [18,19]. 

The offensive in Abyan was being led by a very capable AQAP commander named Khalid Said Batarfi (Abu Miqdad al-Kindi).  Batarfi was a Saudi of Yemeni origin, who had trained in Al-Qaida’s al-Faruq camp in Afghanistan in 1999, fought against US forces after the invasion in 2001, and transplanted his jihadist goals into Yemen [20,21].  Initially, his services were utilized by Hamza al-Quayti during his 2008 string of attacks [20].  By 2010, he took control of the AQAP aggression in Abyan [20,21].  However, in March 2011 he was arrested by the Yemenis in Taiz and was eventually placed into prison in Mukalla, Hadhramout [20,21,22].

The Fifth Issue 

While the US played this dangerous chess game with AQAP, Wuhaishi’s two infamous English speakers Awlaki and Khan never ceased trying to inspire the insurrection they so desired.  March 2011 saw the fifth issue of Inspire be published [23].  This edition includes a central interview with Qasim al-Rimi, who clearly identifies himself as AQAP’s military commander and references the operations in Yemen’s south as freeing the people from government oppression [23].  He also answers a inquiry about why so many Muslims have been killed by the group in comparison to their real Western enemies.  Rimi answers by explaining that the soldiers of countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia have betrayed their religion and thus do not count amongst the truly faithful [23].  Interestingly, Rimi references his brother Faris as having been killed by the state, perhaps in an effort to cover up his own role in the death [23].  Much of the issue is dedicated to Khan, Awlaki, and Ibrahim al-Rubaish striving to interject violent religious radicalism into the Arab Spring of 2011, and advocating for radicals to take charge in their revolutions as the governments fall across the Arab world [23]. Awlaki disputes that the revolutions and government overthrows are negative for al-Qaida and claims that the outcomes are positive because the repressed radicals of these countries will have the chance to prosper unhindered again [23].  To Awlaki these instances of protestors, demonstrators, and rebels removing their governments were revealing new oppurtunites for jihadists worldwide [23].  Khan penned an article concerning this subject imploring the people of the affected nations to not allow US backed governments to take over, but rather to ensure jihadists take control in the power vacuums [23].  These articles continue to illuminate the same ultimate goals of AQAP [23].  As an interesting side note, the fifth issue also includes an article by Hashim al-Hindi (F-44), on his experiences in fighting US forces during the battle of Fallujah, Iraq in 2004 [23].  This puts a location to Hindi, making him one of the 16 List F members believed to be working with AQAP, and more dangerously puts another veteran fighter in Wuhaishi’s ranks.  We must not forget that while many List E and F members resemble Hindi in belonging to AQAP, many others were entrenched in Pakistan and Afghanistan waging jihad for al-Qaida in those theatres.  Instead, unlisted Yemenis comprised the majority of middle ranking officers.

One such was Abdullah Hadi al-Tais, known as Abu Atta al-Waeli [24,25].  In early March, Tais was shot and killed by security forces in Marib as he participated in a raid on a security center [24,25].  Tais, who had fought in Iraq in 2003 before returning to Yemen and helping to facilitate the movement of fighters from Saudi Arabia, was eulogized in the 8th issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula [25,26].”  One might remember from Segment VIII, that Abdullah and his brother Saleh al-Tais were incorrectly reported as killed with Qasim al-Rimi in a January 2010 missile strike which they survived [25,27]. 

Aftermath of Abottabad

In the immediate aftermath of the vaunted May 2 Abottabad raid and Osama bin Laden’s demise, al-Qaida was inexplicably portrayed in some media as reeling and in a rush to regain composure [28].  Elements of al-Qaida abroad were more than capable of conducting their operations independently but since bin Laden had been in direct communication with the leaders of some of his franchises, his loss would be a devastating morale blow.  With the organization being portrayed in such a way, some media coverage focused on the breaking news of a List F member who chose to turn himself in around the same time as the bin Laden raid [28,29].  It is not known if Khalid Hathal Abdullah al-Atifi al-Qahtani (F-13) chose this option as a result of bin Laden’s death or not.  In fact, Qahtani’s surrender was announced on May 4, 2011, but neither the date that he turned himself in, nor the country from which he fled was revealed with exactitude [28,29].  The man was taken into custody and allowed to meet with his family [28,29].  The Kingdom took the news of his surrender favorably [29], and while some Western media jumped to the assertion that his surrender was a major sign of al-Qaida’s dismantling in response to their emir’s death, it was certainly not the case [28].  As to where Qahtani might have been fighting, some sources estimated that he may have been part of a group of AQAP fighters that had recently decided to flee from Yemen [28,29]. 

The successful assassination of bin Laden seemingly opened the doors for the Americans to continue with their stalled airstrike campaign in Yemen.  Just prior to the famous assassination, US Joint Special Operations Command had conducted a raid on April 19, 2011 that captured a Somali militant named Ahmed Abdulqadir Warsame [30].  The extremist was a major catch, and was held on the naval vessel USS BOXER for two months prior to being transferred into law enforcement custody in New York City [151-30].  Bringing Warsame directly to New York and bypassing a detention facility such as Guantanamo allowed the Obama Administration a chance to experiment with trying these enemies in civilian court circumstances, although it did cause controversy [30].  According to Daniel Klaidman’s Kill or Capture, Warsame was traced via his cell phone until it was clear that he would be traveling in a manner where his capture could be conducted with ease [31].  In fact, Navy SEALs boarded his small boat and arrested the militant without any resistance [31].  According to his indictment, Warsame had participated in jihad from 2007 until his capture [32].  For the majority of his career he fought for and supported al-Shabaab [32].  From 2009 onward he provided monetary assistance, supplies, and fighters to AQAP, while also helping to train their forces [32].  Warsame in return received some weaponry training from the organization [32].  Perhaps his main contribution was to instigate a weapons deal between the two al-Qaida franchises, and he also clarified for US authorities, the position of Anwar al-Awlaki as a rising leadership figure in the organization [30,32].  The two men had met just before Warsame’s arrest [30].  Warsame was traveling with a computer given to him by Samir Khan, and and as such eventually helped to build the case against Khan and Awlaki [33].  In addition, he linked Awlaki with an up and coming Kenyan extremist named Abdulqadir Mohamed Abdulqadir, known in jihadist circles as Ikrima [33,34].  This relationship was beneficial to both parties and allowed for an ever increasing cooperation between al-Shabaab and AQAP.  Ikrima was known to have been in Yemen as well as to have worked with AQAP [34].  Ikrima and Awlaki maintained an email correspondence and set up a pathway for the two al-Qaida franchises to train each others members and trade supplies [34].  The Warsame arrest helped to unravel the intricate connections between the two and due to his fear of being sent to Guantanamo, Warsame became an incredibly cooperative witness [33,34]. 

Despite this success, and also because of it, JSOC and the US government’s primary target remained as Anwar al-Awlaki.  With Yemeni tribes refusing to turn over al-Qaida leaders under their protection, and with the US having moved to use drones against AQAP, the stage was set for direct American intervention yet again [19,35].  On May 5, with patriotic feelings running high in America, the Obama Administration once again attempted to kill an American citizen [36]. 

On this day, the Americans were said to have sent a veritable armada in the sky of fighter jets and drones to end the rogue cleric’s life [36,37].  Awlaki and a person described as a wanted Saudi militant were riding through Shabwa province in Yemen when they were discovered and tracked by US forces [36,37,38].  Despite firing at least three missile strikes, the jets and drones were unable to destroy their targeted truck and kill the wanted ideologue [36,37].  Under cover of dust and debris coupled with a lull in the chase due to the fighter jets breaking away, Awlaki and his associate switched vehicles with two of his men who had arrived at the scene to offer aid [36,37].  Awlaki had called for help and two brothers Mosaed and Abullah Mubarak al-Daghari arrived [37].  After pulling off into a forested area, the two AQAP brothers took Awlaki’s truck, and led the remaining US aircraft on a distraction run, while the cleric escaped [37].  In the end, Mosaed and Abdullah Mubarak al-Daghari, who were known for sheltering militants, were killed when a missile destroyed Awlaki’s truck [37,39].  The missile was fired by an unmanned Predator drone, marking not only the resumption of JSOC strikes, but also the clearest example of the addition of drones to the Special Forces’ arsenal [37,38]. 

Yemeni officials and others claimed that through May and June, JSOC conducted a multitude of unreported and reported drone strikes leaving many militants and others dead [40].  This series of attacks was in response to increasing AQAP violence and insurrection within the south, and assuredly in part to the discovery of the bin Laden letters which revealed Wuhaishi’s intention of waging war against the Saleh regime [40].  Officially, the idea was to dismantle AQAP’s efforts to strike foreign targets and Western interests, yet it seemed more and more that the strikes were aiding in one side of a civil conflict.  As a portion of this resurgence of JSOC strikes in the Peninsula and Somalia, and in the aftermath of the Awlaki attempt, the US military put forward a plan to the President which aimed to bring about the demise of eleven AQAP and jihadist militants fighting in southern Yemen [41].  The Arab Spring violence was threatening the Saleh regime at this point in 2011, and the volatile south was becoming a potential battleground, more and more each day [41].  However, Obama and some of his advisors fought back against the initiative, wishing not to target individuals merely focused on tackling the Yemeni government, but rather to aim for wanted terrorists, and significant AQAP leadership [41].  The killings of other prominent jihadists who may not have been linked to AQAP could bring many of these men’s followers into the folds of the terror organization.  As such, the list was changed to only four names.  That being said, the coming months saw military and drone strikes in Yemen increase dramatically anyway.  There were certainly enough AQAP and jihadist targets in Yemen for the US to continually strike.  But for the administration the question was:  who posed the most direct threat?  Some were obvious targets, as was the case with bomb maker Ibrahim al-Assiri (E-1), whom the US State Department had recently designated as a terrorist in March [42].  Needless to say, the likes of Wuhaishi, Rimi, Awlaki, Quso, Shehri and numerous members of Lists E, F and G were legitimate focal points.  The Yemenis however often left these men’s names off of their “wanted lists.”  For instance, on October 15, 2010, the Yemenis had announced rewards for the capture of eight wanted AQAP militants:  Amin Abdullah Abdulrahman al-Othmani, Bashir Mohamed Ahmed al-Hulaisi, Shawqi Ali Ahmed al-Badani, Abdulilah Ali Qasim al-Mesbahi, Abdulhamid Ahmed Mohamed al-Habishi, Mohamed Ali Abdullah al-Nashiri, Musleh Abdullah Ahmed al-Hulaisi, and Yusef Ahmed Muthana Zayed [43].  None of these men were previously well-known and the list comprised of mid-level AQAP commanders at best.  Of them, only Badani would become a prominent AQAP leader.  Would the US also risk alienation and backlash from strikes just to take out these men as well?  Would preventing AQAP from benefiting from the Yemeni civil unrest and launching military-like offensives warrant a large increase in American intervention?   

Zinjibar Falls

As this line of questioning was occurring, violence was reaching a crescendo in May in southern Yemen, the peak of which saw the jihadists taking over portions of Abyan province [16].  To list just a few examples, May saw five Yemeni soldiers killed by an RPG in Marib [44], just days after at least seven soldiers were killed in ambushes in Zinjibar and Hadhramout province [45,46].  Baydah province was not able to escape the violence either where an ambush left six additional soldiers dead [47].  Unfortunately for President Saleh, these events were occurring simultaneously with massive demonstrations and protests within Yemen, brought about by the Arab Spring and with the intention of removing Saleh from power [47].  Saleh responded to the movement with violence as his own government fell apart around him [47,48].  Saleh’s own brother in law, the very influential General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar had earlier in the spring defected to the demonstrators and those opposed to Saleh’s rule [48].  Furthermore, Saleh lost numerous military and government officials either from his firing them or from their resignations [48].  While the hit-and-run guerilla tactics of AQAP were mentioned above to continue to showcase their means of attack, the methodology of the group transformed in this new environment of government instability.  AQAP now went on the full offensive in the south. 

By May 27, an estimated three hundred jihadists and rebels raided into Zinjibar, Abyan, taking and claiming the city for their cause [49].  The Yemeni military did not rush to respond to this event in the south, amidst the backdrop of ever intensifying fighting in and around the capital that had been spurred on by the Arab Spring, protestors, rebellious tribes, and breakaway military units.  More specifically, the people accused President Saleh of refusing to provide reinforcements to the city’s defenders, allowing it to fall in order to create a distraction from the above problems [49].  The militants had quickly dealt with a detachment of Central Security Forces, the counterterrorism unit in Yemen, acquiring their weapons cache as the spoils of war [50].  Afterwards, militants took the battle to the primary defenders of Zinjibar, the 25th Mechanized Brigade, defeating their attempts to stem the flow of militants, while surrounding and besieging its soldiers [50].  The 25th Mechanized Brigade’s senior officer was refused help from General Ahmar due to the fact the he would not enter into the growing feud between the General and the President [50].  With no help coming from the President’s forces or even the opposition forces, AQAP held onto their new prize.  Thus the city of Zinjibar became an important battle ground for AQAP militants, and any Yemeni soldiers coming to its supposed aid were prime targets.  It should be noted that this takeover occurred after bin Laden’s death, with Wuhaishi keeping his men relatively in check per his emir’s wishes prior to the assassination.  However, before this, jihadist fighters had in fact also secured control of Jaar, a town in Abyan province, in March [51,52].  The city had been raided, and its munitions factory looted [52].  Once the weapons were seized, the remaining ordinance was left to explode, killing dozens of the town’s population [52].  The takeover was ruthless, and as if there was any doubt as to who was to blame, ideologue Adel al-Abab referenced the Jaar takeover in an April message [53].  Abab made a more cryptic reference when referring to the jihadist movement as “Ansar al-Shariah” during the same recording.  The political front of AQAP was seemingly born.  According to Abab, Ansar al-Shariah was the name the militants were using to introduce themselves to new populations while offering them succor, and providing assistance with basic needs and services [53].  This political rebirth of AQAP was providing for people in ways that the government had neglected.  Despite the munitions accident, the jihadists were going to work to make the lives of their subjects better and in the process win their approval.  From this point onward, AQAP envisioned itself as an entity ruling over territories. Here was born an emirate in Abyan. In fact, as they slowly expanded their control, AQAP identified their gains and governance as the Emirate of Waqar [54].

The month of June saw intense battle as the jihadists held the city of Zinjibar against the government forces that eventually came to its aid [16,50].  The 25th Mechanized Brigade meanwhile held on in its besieged state, standing as a last line between AQAP and the city of Aden, despite the fact that reinforcements could not make it through to them [50].  Some examples of the vast violence include instances where four soldiers were killed in route to Zinjibar via ambush on May 30 [55], followed by a June 6 series of ambushes which left nine soldiers killed and others wounded [56].  Military positions were attacked on June 7 leaving at least seven more soldiers dead on the city’s outskirts [57].  AQAP forces were also taking their own casualties in the fighting although the reporting of how heavy or light those losses were may have been skewed. 

Pertinent to the issue of the battle in Zinjibar and Abyan, the jihadists utilized their new Inspire magazine as an outlet for their eulogies.  The extremists reported in their sixth issue of Inspire on the loss of Hassan al-Aqili, the militant known as Fawaz al-Maribi [58].  The man was in Abyan province assisting with AQAP fighting around Zinjibar [58].  In early June the Yemenis reported that Aqili had been killed fighting against military forces, and that a further 30 militants were killed in total during the battles [59].  AQAP confirmed the death of the jihadist captain and stated that Aqili perished while attacking a checkpoint near Aden [58].  The magazine claimed that he and his men had killed all of the soldiers manning the outpost except for one, who eventually shot and killed Aqili via a sniper’s shot to the neck [58].  Aqili was also profiled in the ninth issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula [60].”  Between this profile and that found in Inspire, Aqili was described as a devoutly pious fighter, who was well-liked and an essential part of the jihad due to his driving and transportation abilities [58,60].  He was known for moving weapons, men, and supplies around the region [58,60].  There were stories of him praying while driving, telling jokes and laughing as he died [58,60].  He was described as a good friend and a family man, while still maintaining his role as a ‘backbone’ to the jihadists, fiercely fighting in the Battle of Marib, the Battle of Zinjibar, and others [58].  This romanticized version of a hard life and gruesome death was nothing more than pure propaganda aimed at recruiting more men to take his place, and was of course penned by Samir Khan [58]. 

Insidiously spreading throughout this region of Yemen, AQAP made further gains even while embroiled in combat. By June 2, it was announced that Azzan in Shabwa province fell to the jihadists, as they ousted token government forces [61]. Adequate Yemeni security detachments were diverted to Sanaa and vital urban centers to respond to the protests, riots, and unrest precipitated by the Arab Spring [61]. Soon Azzan, was the acknowledged strategic staging point of AQAP operations and advances [62]. Such advancement was completed with relative ease, as militant vehicles entered and conquered the coastal town of Shuqra in Shabwa as announced in August [63]. This solidified jihadist control and security of roads to Mudiah and Lawdar districts in Abyan which traversed through the port of Shuqra [62]. Through the summer, AQAP were comfortable in movements and maneuvering, so much so that senior commanders were repositioned to Jaar and others to include Wuhaishi frequently transited between Azzan and Jaar [54].

The next chapter diverts and revisits a long disregarded list of Yemeni militants, with the impetus being the appearance of one of their number amidst the conflict in Abyan.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

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