SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 34 – While Combatting Satan…)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment IX – To Inspire An Insurrection (Chapter 34 – While Combatting Satan…)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

AQAP styled itself through 2010 as a paramilitary force, reinforcing the idea via their propaganda. As discussed in our previous chapter, their latest named mission, the so-called “Operation Eradicating Malice,” sought to attack vulnerable Yemeni government, military, and political targets. This chapter will discuss the way in which AQAP utilized their propaganda to produce a desired narrative, and to strive to create justified violence. Turning their ire towards the Shiite Houthi rebels AQAP threatened to devolve Yemen into irrevocable civil conflict. They did not abstain from targeting American interests of course, as Anwar al-Awlaki declared that “combatting Satan,” had no hindrances and required no special permissions. Furthermore, the rise of the organization’s influence was concerning to the Saudis to the north. The persistence of Saudi militants abroad with al-Qaida in the Khorasan region and elsewhere acted as a catalyst for the Kingdom to release yet another most wanted list aimed at brining the miscreants home and to justice.

Rewriting The Narrative

AQAP releases in early September, which dealt with accepting responsibility for the attacks of “Eradicating Malice,” also took credit for another assassination. This one was of the deputy of the investigative services in Marib province named Mohamed al-Faregh [1].  They claimed that Bassam al-Sharjabi, the former commander of Intelligence services in Marib had given the necessary information that helped them find Faregh and possibly other targets as well [1].  Sharjabi was abducted and killed by AQAP in 2009 [2].  It was around this time that Jabir Jabran al-Faifi (E-20) had contacted the Saudis with his wishes to turn himself in, while the Yemenis meanwhile insisted that they had arrested him [3,4].  Interestingly, AQAP released a statement acknowledging that Faifi was no longer with them, but that he had been forced to surrender rather than having been captured [5].  The Yemeni reports of capturing other militants were false as well, according to the communique [5].  The fact that the leadership of AQAP knew that Faifi had surrendered when the press was reporting initially that he had been captured proves that the potential double agent was familiar and close with them.  It is odd that the group seemed eager to discount a capture, but perhaps they thought it appeared more appealing to have a member surrender than be captured by what it considered an inept and corrupt government.  One thing the statement does, is take away from the idea that Faifi may have been the source of information on the cargo planes bombing attempts.  If the former Guantanamo Bay detainee had in fact known of the plot, then AQAP seemingly would have been forced to adapt or scrap their plans upon the man’s surrender.

In yet another release entitled “Martyrs Taken From Amongst You,” AQAP touched on another internal mystery and delved into the lives of its deceased soldiers and List E members Fahd Saleh al-Jutaili, Mohamed Abdulrahman al-Rashid, and Sultan Radi al-Otaibi, emphasizing Jutali’s time in Afghanistan and the others’ time in Iraq [6].  The communique tried re-enforce the idea of an accidental bombing having killed the men, as well as two other veteran jihadists [6]. AQAP seemed to be attempting to rewrite portions of their history in order to change the narrative to their own favor.

While Combatting Satan…

On September 20, AQAP claimed responsibility for the abduction of deputy director of Political Security Ali Mohamed Saleh al-Husam in northern Saada province, revealing that they had also retained their positions in the north [7].  This drew the ire of Husam’s tribe and exacerbated tensions between tribes that supported AQAP and those that did not [8].  The communique demanded a trade of Husam for two jihadists named Ali Hussein Abdullah al-Tais and Mashdur al-Ahdal [7].  Tais, was a close associate of President Ali Saleh’s half-brother General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a relationship which had provided further proof that the Yemeni government had used AQAP and jihadist fighters for political gains [9].  In fact, a group of jihadist fighters including Tais, based out of the Abu Jabarah camp in Saada, performed tasks for the government against the Houthi rebels on the orders of General Ahmar [10].  Tais was also an associate of Ammar al-Waeli (H-6), an integral figure in al-Qaida’s presence in Saada as his father had established the Abu Jabarah camp [11].  Furthermore, Tais had been in Afghanistan at al-Faruq training camp when the US bombardment of that country began [12].  Tais claimed to have gone for militant training only for the purposes of being trained in heavy weaponry, so that he could fight rival Yemeni tribes [12].  This excuse seems unlikely, as the man’s tribe could have conducted some sort of training for him.  Regardless, Tais ended up in Tora Bora where he stated he spent all of his days retreating in the snow towards the Pakistani border where he was eventually captured [12].  The militant was then transferred to Guantanamo (ISN 162) [12].  He was deemed of little importance while in detention, and as nothing more than a foot soldier, which accounted for his eventual release from the infamous prison in December 2006 [12,13].  Once in Yemen again, Tais remained imprisoned for a short while, before eventually linking with the government sponsored AQAP group in Saada [13].  Again, this unit of jihadists provided an excellent example of governmental elements using militants for political purposes.  In the summer of 2010, Tais and his accomplice were captured by the Houthis before being sent to government custody [9].  Interestingly, the Yemenis reported that Tais had surrendered to them after experiencing remorse at joining the militants [13,14].  Due to the connection between Tais and the government it was a strange move by AQAP to demand his release.  However, Tais and the other jihadist were apparently being held by factions not immediately controlled by General Ahmar, and thus while he could convince AQAP to release other hostages such as doctors, he appeared unable to free the group’s incarcerated members [9]. 

Meanwhile in the Shamran district of the capital city Sanaa, September 25 saw the graduation of several new Political Security Organization (PSO) officers trained by the Americans in counterterrorism [15].  As a bus carrying them traveled the streets, it was targeted by AQAP members [15,16].  The organization accepted blame for the high profile attack on October 9 saying that 14 intelligence officers had perished, although only one was initially reported killed [15,16].  AQAP followed this on October 11 with Samir Khan’s second issue of Inspire magazine.  The issue featured many interviews and articles, including a long discussion of religious issues and fatwas by Anwar al-Awlaki, who was fitting into his new role as an AQAP personality, as well as just an ideologue [17].  Much more disturbing was an interview that Khan conducted for his own magazine entitled, “I am proud to be a traitor to America [17].”  The article contained Khan’s reasoning for his treasonous actions.  He stated that because of America’s foreign policy and because of his religious convictions, he had no choice but to betray his country [17].  He also described how he was expecting to be arrested while still in the US, and then again when he arrived in Yemen under the cover as a teacher of the English language [17].  He was surprised by his ability to travel freely and eventually joined AQAP [17].  This he attributed to protection from Allah [17].  He even cited the recent WikiLeaks document drops as proof that the Americans were engaged in massacring Muslims across the world [17].  AQAP commander and former Guantanamo detainee Othman al-Omaira al-Ghamdi retold his story for the magazine, tracing his memories from the time of his recruitment, to his days in al-Faruq training camp, to his experiences at the battle of Tora Bora, to being imprisoned both in Guantanamo and Saudi Arabia [17].  Ghamdi even contrasted his experiences at al-Faruq as being pleasant when compared to the harsh conditions he previously experienced with the Saudi military [17].  The second issue of Inspire also included another interview with Said al-Shehri.  This time he implored Muslims and jihadists living in the West to conduct attacks and establish communication with AQAP leaders [17].  He used his time in Guantanamo to justify his enmity towards the Americans, and stated that it is every Muslim’s religious duty to stand against the Saudi government for their affiliation with the Americans, as well as to combat the Shiites [17].  Another article was written by the Egyptian militant Ibrahim al-Bannah, who reiterated the popular AQAP point that America’s “War on Terror” was actually just a war on Islam [17].  Lastly, the cover story of the magazine centered on the ever increasing violence in southern Yemen, by showing numerous pictures detailing the network’s activities therein [17].   

The month of October was one that AQAP metaphorically hijacked for the progression of its cause.  That month saw the unraveling of the cargo planes bomb plot for which the group was responsible [18].  On October 6, AQAP members fired an RPG at the armored convoy of British deputy Ambassador to Yemen Fiona Gibb [19].  The rocket missed the vehicle, just two miles from the Embassy, but did damage it, and injured bystanders [19].  Also, on October 4, AQAP released a statement describing yet another foiled scheme to kill Saudi Interior Ministry officials [20].  The release contained the details of a plot in which AQAP militants were to use SAMs to bring down a Saudi Interior Ministry plane as it attempted to land in Sanaa [20].  The plane was to be carrying Prince Naif and his son Prince Mohamed with a large contingent of security [20].  Simultaneously mortars would be fired at the building housing the Yemeni officials who would be meeting with the Saudi Princes [20].  The plot was eventually dismantled when a SAM was discovered and the flight of the Princes cancelled [20].  At least two AQAP members in the Mortar firing division of the plan were killed in the security operation:  Salim Maqsaf al-Nahdi and Badr Musharrea [20].  The latter had attempted to join al-Qaida in Afghanistan but was forced to return home to Yemen and was subsequently arrested [20].  The former had fought with Al-Qaida in Iraq and was detained in Saudi Arabia where he gained an intense hatred of Prince Naif [20].  This extensive video also profiled Mohamed al-Ghazali, the Yemeni intelligence agent turned AQAP member who coordinated Abdullah al-Assiri’s assassination attempt on Prince Mohamed bin Naif, as he recounted the details of that infamous operation [20]. 

October also saw more ambushes against soldiers and assassination attempts. Ghazi al-Samawi, the criminal investigations officer for Abyan province was shot down by motorcycle riding assassins on October 11 in Zinjibar [21].  Most important about this incident was that Samawi appeared on the list of 55 officials AQAP was targeting for death [21].  Other examples of probable October AQAP hits occurred elsewhere in the south, including Hadramout Province [2].  The fighting was also particularly intense in Abyan province where ambushes against the military were growing more common [2].  As seen, AQAP took responsibility for some of these incidents and the deaths of several soldiers in the rising violence.  It is important to note that Southern Movement leaders were quick to distance themselves and their organization from the AQAP actions and leadership, and ardently refused of Nasir al-Wuhaishi’s offer of support, insinuating that they were merely peaceful [22].  It is still very likely that the secessionists were responsible for some of the growing tension and violence, as they had been antagonized by the Saleh regime [22].

While AQAP was intent on undermining Yemeni infrastructure, they never lost focus on striking America.  In fact, Samir Khan’s third issue of Inspire, a special succinct edition released in November 2010, focused on what AQAP had called Operation Hemorrhage, or the cargo planes bombing plot, yet again boasting about the failed attempt [23].  This edition boasts about the details of the bombs, as well as the fact that the entire operation cost just $4,200 [23].  As far as additional propaganda goes, earlier on November 8, Anwar al-Awlaki released a statement in which he declared that the decision for jihadists to kill Americans should not be vetted through any other source [24].  According to Awlaki, these actions, while fighting “Satan,” also do not require any jurisprudence [24].  Awlaki was now directly threatening Americans in his propaganda, further drawing him into the crosshairs of an Obama administration already eager to neutralize him.

The trend continued through November, as AQAP and likely the separatists, continued to increasingly clash with soldiers, police, intelligence officials, and government officials in the south [2].  Importantly, AQAP was able to successfully convince locals into joining these battles against the government, as the militant organization provided services and finances for the penurious population they dwelled amongst [25,26].  In an attack outside of the US Embassy in Sanaa, a high ranking Yemeni intelligence agent was nearly stabbed to death, proving that militants were still lying in wait outside of the fortified walls [27].  In Abyan, AQAP fighters began employing mines and roadside bombs against patrols and then engaging them after the detonations [2].  AQAP later referenced some of these events in communiques such as their Sada al-Malahim magazine [2,28].  The most significant November attack however, took place not in the south but in the north.

Engaging The Houthis

With all of the guerilla tactics being implemented by the organization, AQAP had not employed a suicide bomber in quite some time.  On November 24, this changed when AQAP deployed an operative later identified as Abu Aysha al-Sanaani al-Hashimi, who rammed his vehicle into a procession of Houthi rebels in Jawf province as they traveled to a religious ceremony [29].  A top spiritual leader for the Houthis, Badruddin al-Houthi perished in the brazen attack which also killed twenty of the Shiite fighters.  The Houthis themselves maintained that Badruddin, the father of rebel leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi actually died the next day of a respiratory illness [29].  It seems likely however that Badruddin was killed in this operation, and the Shiites were attempting to rob AQAP of a portion of their glory in the attack’s aftermath.  By November 28, AQAP claimed the bombing and justified the targeting of Shiites [30].  Furthermore, the issuance warned Sunnis in Yemen to avoid the Shiites, as they would continue to be harassed and targeted [30].  A future AQAP communique also described a follow up attack in which operative Abu Abdullah al-Sanaani acted as a suicide bomber when his vehicle detonated in the funeral procession of Badruddin two days later, killing at least two more Shiite rebels [31,32].  In an exaggeration of the success of this event, AQAP later indicated that the bomber had actually killed 142 Shiites [28].  That being said, some local leaders reported a large death toll [31], leaving open the possibility that the Houthi report of two deaths [32], was a ploy to cover their losses and diminish the success of the AQAP strike.  With the Houthis in a truce with the Yemeni government [29], it could be that AQAP, in addition to striking the Houthis due to their religion, were trying to reignite their war with the government so that the Yemeni army would be stretched thin.     

AQAP continued to strike in Abyan province and elsewhere in the south, as the insurrection truly caught fire in the region, and specifically they declared that 49 militant operations over the past several months were to be credited to them [33].  The attacks ranged from the aforementioned assassination attempts, to bombings, and military raids [33].  On the night of December 15, AQAP conducted an attack in Sanaa against four US Embassy personnel [34].  The Embassy staffers were picking up a pizza from a local restaurant frequented by Westerners in their armored Toyota pickup [34].  A 28 year old Jordanian placed a package underneath the truck which blew up and damaged the vehicle, although none of the Embassy workers were harmed [34].  The sixteenth issue of Sada al-Malahim, released in February 2011 listed a long series of incidents that occurred in late 2010 in the south and that rendered several soldiers dead or injured [28].  It should be noted that the original AQAP magazine had persisted, despite the death of Naif al-Qahtani and the emergence of Samir Khan’s English language periodical.  These attacks referenced by the magazine included IED strikes, bombings, RPG firings, ambushes and shootings, mostly centered in Abyan province [28].  They also discussed, yet again, the failed cargo jet bombing plot as Ibrahim al-Bannah contributed more reasoning as to why the organization attempted the operation [28,35]. While the referenced events were increasing in number, the Saudis were observing, taking note that several of their nationals were involved in the AQAP insurrection, as well as the jihadist campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As mentioned at the end of Segment VIII, the Saudis responded with still another most wanted list.

List F

On Sunday January 9, 2011, the Saudis expanded upon their wanted list campaign even though a large majority of List E members were still at large [36].  List F, in the tradition of Lists D and E, contained Saudis who were operating in jihadists circles and militant organizations abroad [36,37].  The 47 name list contained 16 men believed to be fighting for AQAP in Yemen, 27 believed to be fighting for Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the final four were a part of Al-Qaida’s dwindling presence in Iraq [37].  The men were listed as follows: 

  • 1) Ahmed Abdulaziz al-Jasser,
  • 2) Ahmed Mohamed al-Suwaid,
  • 3) Anas Ali al-Nashwan,
  • 4) Bassam Salim al-Sabilah,
  • 5) Bassam Mohamed al-Jehani,
  • 6) Bassam Ibrahim al-Sulaimani,
  • 7) Bandar Mishal al-Otaibi,
  • 8) Turki Saad Mohamed Qalis al-Shahrani,
  • 9) Turki Hadi al-Qahtani,
  • 10) Hussein Saleh al-Bahri,
  • 11) Hamza Mohamed Arishi,
  • 12) Khalid Ali al-Qahtani,
  • 13) Khalid Hadal al-Qahtani,
  • 14) Zaam Said al-Otaibi,
  • 15) Saad Qaed al-Maqati,
  • 16) Sulaiman Ahmed al-Hamdan,
  • 17) Saleh Abdulaziz al-Luhaib,
  • 18) Adel Radi al-Harbi,
  • 19) Adel Saleh Al-Qumaishi,
  • 20) Abdulrahman Abdulaziz al-Farraj,
  • 21) Abdulrahman Fayad al-Otaibi,
  • 22) Abdulrahman Mohamed al-Jehani,
  • 23) Abdulsalam Abdulaziz al-Farraj,
  • 24) Abdulaziz Mohamed al-Assiri,
  • 25) Abdullah Humaid al-Jadani,
  • 26) Abdullah Sulaiman al-Dhabah,
  • 27) Abdullah Abdulhadi al-Jehani,
  • 28) Abdullah Ali al-Suwaid,
  • 29) Abdullah Mohamed al-Maqati,
  • 30) Abdulmajid Faris al-Otaibi,
  • 31) Abdulmajid Faisal al-Shehri,
  • 32) Amir Sulaiman al-Ali,
  • 33) Fahd Owaid al-Maabadi,
  • 34) Fawaz Ayed al-Otaibi,
  • 35) Fawaz Owaid al-Maabadi,
  • 36) Faisal Muetad al-Harbi,
  • 37) Mateb Hamad al-Jeraiwi,
  • 38) Mateb Said al-Amri,
  • 39) Mohamed Salim al-Buraikhan,
  • 40) Mohamed Farhan al-Maliki,
  • 41) Mohamed Mufreh al-Zahrani,
  • 42) Maran Farhan al-Otaibi,
  • 43) Mujab Mohamed al-Qahtani,
  • 44) Hashim Mohamed al-Hindi,
  • 45) Walid Jarbou al-Harbi,
  • 46) Walid Humaid al-Waladi, and
  • 47) Yasir Dakheel al-Harbi [37,38]. 

Seemingly, the issuance was but a list within the already well established jihadist campaigns in foreign theatres. The listed men were a variety of militant backgrounds. Abdulmajid Faisal Mohamed al-Jubeiri al-Shehri (F-31) was the nephew of Saad and Yusef al-Shehri, the son of their incarcerated brother Faisal [37].  Abdulmajid had come to Yemen to join AQAP and his uncle Yusef.  Another of Saad and Yusef’s nephews, the son of their incarcerated brother Mustafa, Abdulilah Mustafa Mohamed al-Jubeiri al-Shehri had previously been listed as E-38 [39,40].  Abdulilah had been merely 16 when he crossed into Yemen with Yusef [40]. 

The Son-In-Law

Mohamed Salim al-Buraikhan (F-39) meanwhile was married to Osama bin Laden’s daughter Fatima [41].  This daughter was born of the bin Laden wife known as Umm Abdullah, the woman who had given birth to bin Laden’s first son Abdullah [42].  Buraikhan married Fatima shortly after coming to Afghanistan in 1997, training at al-Qaida camps, becoming a bodyguard of bin Laden’s and later a personal confidant [41,43,44].  In fact, Buraikhan’s kunya Aws al-Madani was discussed in the Guantanamo assessment of bin Laden chauffer Ahmed Salim Hamdan (Abu Saqar al-Jadawi) as being one of the emir’s constant security members [44].  Most bin Laden bodyguards were ever rotating, but a few remained as constants.  Buraikhan was one of these [44].  Of note, Wuhaishi was another one of the permanent bin Laden associates and guards [44].  Also, the 9/11 Commission Report stated that Aws al-Madani was used to deliver a message from bin Laden to Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the orchestrator of the 9/11 attacks, urging him to commence the operation early [45].  Later, Aws al-Madani was reported killed in 2001 while fighting against the US invasion, in what was described as a missile strike [41,46].  Bin Laden’s security team had been split up during the efforts to hide their emir, and he had fled in 2001 with different individuals than his permanent unit [47].  In fact, the captured Ahmed Salim Hamdan reported that in November 2001, before Kandahar was overrun in the invasion, he and bin Laden’s son in law facilitated the escape of three bin Laden wives [44].  The men were transferring their duties as constant bin Laden guardians, to the tasking of protecting his family.  Hamdan refered to this son in law as “Muataz,” claiming that they accompanied the wives to the Pakistani border and handed them off to men on the other side who were to take them to Quetta, Pakistan [44].  Shortly thereafter, as Hamdan and Muataz returned, their vehicles were engaged by coalition forces at a checkpoint resulting in the death of Muataz and capture of Hamdan [44].  Thus, it is most likely that the Muataz being refered to here is Buraikhan (Aws al-Madani).  Bin Laden’s only other son in law at the time, Abdullah al-Halabi, remained alive at this point.  With this information it is hard to say exactly why the Saudis would list Buraikhan as wanted if his death was reported so many years prior.  It is possible that the Saudis did so due to the fact that they never received concrete evidence of the demise.  It seems unlikely that some new information had arose that gave the Saudis confidence that the man was actually still alive. Buraikhan was the second bin Laden son in law to be listed as wanted by the Saudis, following the aforementioned Abdullah al-Halabi, listed as Mohamed Abul Khair, and also known as Abu Abdullah al-Madani, who had joined Buraikhan in traveling to Afghanistan and becoming a permanent bin Laden bodyguard [43,44,48].  More evidence of Buraikhan’s death was obtained in early 2013 when US authorities arrested al-Qaida spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith in Jordan via Turkey [49].  The Kuwaiti mouthpiece for bin Laden in the weeks after 9/11 had fled to Iran with bin Laden’s family and several al-Qaida leaders and was held there for years after the attacks [49].  In fact, Abu Ghaith had at some point become bin Laden’s son in law [49].  The daughter he married was Fatima, further suggesting that Buraikhan had died in the invasion or before, clearing the way for his wife to marry another.  With this additional information, we will consider Buraikhan deceased, despite his listing.   

Select Others

As for others on List F, both Abdulaziz al-Jasser (F-1) and Turki al-Shahrani (F-8) were AQAP militants known to the Yemeni government, whose capture or death the Yemenis had announced a reward for in October of 2010 [50].  Walid Jarbou Eid al-Jalidi al-Harbi (F-45) had influenced the now deceased Ibrahim al-Khalifa (also known as Abu Jandal al-Qassimi) into coming to Yemen to wage jihad [51].  The two had been childhood friends growing up in al-Ras [51].  That town had been the stage of the massive battle between the AQAP precursor AQSA and Saudi security forces described in Segment IV.  In fact, Harbi (also known as Abu Zubair al-Qasimi) was arrested because of the battle and reportedly spent over a year imprisoned for his connections to the group [51].  After being released, Harbi attended college but eventually fell back into his old ways, leaving for Yemen in 2009 and taking Khalifa with him [51].  Abdulrahman Abdulaziz al-Farraj was known to be in Yemen with AQAP, and in fact he was known to write for Sada al-Malahim.  In the most recent issue, the sixteenth, Farraj plead with those jihadists who were like-minded with AQAP’s ideology to join the group in its work, stating that those who do not participate in actions are unequal to those who do [52].

Others listed were known to be operating in the Khorasan region with core Al-Qaida leadership.  Abdulrahman Mohamed Zafir al-Dubaisi al-Jehani (F-22) was known as Abu Wafa al-Saudi, a recognized logistician for the group who primarily worked from Pakistan between 2006 and 2009 [53].  This made him a target for the extensive drone campaign and as such, his death was reported in September 2008 [54].  This proved premature and Abu Wafa was in the future revealed to be actively participating in other theatres of jihad.  

Response

AQAP responded directly to the publication of the most wanted list.  Thamir Mohamed Ghiram al-Amri (E-19), writing under the simpler moniker Thamir Ghiram, railed against the efficacy of the wanted list campaign in the aforementioned sixteenth edition of Sada al-Malahim [55].  Perhaps it was Ghiram maintaining the Arabic language issuances of AQAP in Naif al-Qahtani’s absence.  Ghiram took the opportunity to declare that the lists only portrayed the Saudis as failures for preventing the spread of al-Qaida idealogy within the Kingdom [55].  He reveled in the fact that General Mansur al-Turki’s own son flirted with joining the jihad [55].  The issue of Sada al-Malahim was released on February 15, 2011, but just days after the issuance of the wanted list, Ghiram on January 18, had further called for extremists to bring their violence to their home nations, in order to vindicate the actions of their brethren in the various theatres of battle [56].  Ghiram proudly announced that he was number 19 on List E, and declared that the most exalted death is a martyrdom on the battle field [56].

In the next chapter we discuss the dichotomy of al-Qaida suffering their greatest loss to date, while near simultaneously, AQAP fulfilled the longstanding ambition of territorial dominance within the Arabian Peninsula. To do so they furthered their militant campaign, despite intensifying American countermeasures, and combined their efforts with political endeavors in an attempt to win the acceptance of the locals, all in the midst of the revolutionary Arab Spring of 2011.

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