SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 33 – Eradicating Malice)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment IX – To Inspire An Insurrection (Chapter 33 – Eradicating Malice)

Commencing herein, we delve into the expansion of AQAP into a regional paramilitary force, focused on an intensive and localized campaign with the aim of controlling a population and managing territory. Methods to achieve these ambitions were based in various forms of intimidation, violence, and harrassment. Observations must be made as to how this AQAP paramilitary apparatus aligned against and with existing rebellious personalities and organizations within Yemen. Furthermore we examine the escalating transformation of the network from a criminal terrorist entity into a enhanced movement entrenched in the broader jihadist community, thus resulting in opportunities for increased recruitment, operations, and relevance.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

An Obscure Martyr

The oil fields of Yemen were a prime target for AQAP fighters.  The soldiers stationed at these installations, as well as elsewhere in southern Yemen, were seen as occupiers, and AQAP was attempting to take advantage of these sentiments to recruit followers and perpetrate attacks in order to make territorial gains [1].  Osama Ahmed Ali Hafizullah al-Imrani, known as Talut al-Sanaani, was proud to be on the vanguard of this AQAP effort [2].  On that late July day in 2010, as his utility vehicle raced towards an Austrian petroleum company’s oil fields, Imrani prepared his weapons and himself for the coming raid and his coming martyrdom [3].  As he did so, he reflected on his life as a jihadi.  He held a deep hatred for the soldiers he was about to engage, as the Yemeni military had once detained him while merely attempting to board a ship for Somalia; a journey which would have initiated his course towards violent religious radicalism [2].  His failed attempt at traveling abroad for jihad resulted in imprisonment for a month and radicalization regardless [2].  Up until that month, Imrani’s jihadist resume had only included reprisals against local businesses deemed unethical under Sharia law [2].  Yet Imrani graduated to violent attacks.  Just two days prior he and the men around him had ambushed a military patrol in Shabwa’s provincial capital of Ataq, murdering five soldiers and an officer in their rage [2,4,5].  Imrani killed three on his own, a feat which his comrades cheered [2].  Yet Imrani had dreamed of his coming martyrdom, and like all religious fanatics, had rushed to prepare by cleansing himself of his sins and unrighteousness [2].  Imrani was part of a contingent which named themselves for the deceased AQAP ideologue Mohamed Ahmed Saleh Omayr al-Kalawi al-Awlaki, and was in fact led by a tribesman of the dead militant [5,6].  This exemplified again the Yemenis problems with the tribesmen who were allying themselves with al-Qaida based on feudal standards.  Much more urgent though was the fact that the secessionist southern provinces of Yemen were on the verge of serious unrest, and AQAP members knew this, acting and reacting in ways that would give them the upper hand in the region against the Yemeni military and government.  When the vehicle approached its target, the AQAP fighters spilled out, firing their automatic weapons as well as RPGs at the soldiers guarding the compound [2,3,7].  The battle was considered a success that day as it left six Yemeni soldiers dead [3,7,8].  On the field of war AQAP left its servant Talut al-Sanaani, shot in the head and left to linger in his dying for over an hour [2]. 

This man did not occupy space on a Most Wanted List, nor had he truly been known to security forces prior to the attack.  This type of individual heralded a coming era in which Nasir al-Wuhaishi and his men would not have to use their most trusted and well-known associates to carry out attacks, but could rely on well-trained new and obscure recruits.  For his sacrifice, Imrani was rewarded by his organization.  Soon this unknown man became the extremist profiled in the 7th issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula [2].”  The release of profiles had thus far told the stories of men who were of important leadership and symbolic roles.  Imrani’s profile shifted the series’ focus to the common AQAP foot soldier and field officer.  As a review, the first issue profiled Abu Jandal al-Qassimi (Ibrahim al-Khalifa) the Saudi fundraiser [9], the second profiled Abu Salman al-Sanaani (Hani Abdah Muslih Shaalan) the Guantanamo returnee [10], while the third profiled Nasir Awad Nasir al-Kindi one of the M/V Limburg suicide bombers [11].  The fourth issue revealed details about Abu Hammam al-Qahtani (Naif Mohamed al-Qahtani) the editor of Sada al-Malahim [12], while the fifth told more on Jamil Nasir Abdullah al-Anbari, an important Wuhaishi lieutenant and emir of Abyan province [13].  The sixth gave additional insight to Abu Yaqin al-Qassimi (Fahd al-Jutaili), the wanted Saudi and former Guantanamo detainee, referencing the debate around how he was killed and refuting the claims that he fought alongside the Houthis [14].  Meanwhile, Imrani and his final attack were but one incident of the many to come, orchestrated, inspired or incited by AQAP and their stirring of anti-government sentiment in the south. 

Southern Movement

At this point, it would be beneficial to speak of the problems in Yemen’s south.  For a period spanning from 1967 to 1990, the southern provinces constituted their own socialist nation, supported by the Soviets [15].  By 1990 however, President Ali Saleh had unified the country, both north and south [15].  The leaders in the south however were continually opposed to Saleh’s rule [15].  Saleh did not easily hold down this minority in the first years of the unified Yemen.  In 1994, civil war broke out and Saleh began manipulating the strong jihadist community within the nation to fight for his forces against the socialists [15,16,17].  The religious radicals and the liberal socialists were at odds in every possible ideological manner and Saleh was eager to use the Islamists to regain control over his fledgling nation [17].  The northern forces overran the south leaving an embittered population of defeated Socialists [17].  In the time since, the southerners were mostly peaceful, even though they were reproachful of what they viewed as an occupying army [1,17].

One excellent example of this is the influencial Tariq al-Fadhli.  A brief history of Fadhli shows that he was raised in Saudi Arabia after his wealthy Sultan father had lost their familial lands in Abyan province to the Socialist leadership of South Yemen [17-19].  During the late 1980s, Fadhli joined so many others in flocking to Afghanistan in order to fight the Russians [17-19].  While there he became acquainted with Osama bin Laden and many other jihadist leaders [17-19].  While Fadhli claimed that his relationship with bin Laden was nominal at best, extremist thinker Mustafa Setmariam Nasir of Syria wrote that bin Laden had appointed Fadhli to lead a jihad in South Yemen in order to take back the ancestral bin Laden homeland [17].  Fadhli most likely returned to his native country due to the fact that he had been wounded by a bomb in Jalalabad [18,19].  Whether this is true or not became irrelevant to the story as Fadhli was arrested shortly after his return [17,19].  The socialists, as well as President Saleh, saw him as an enemy and thus he was imprisoned for supposed jihadist activities and an alleged attempted assassination of a politician [17,19]. 

Despite this, he was freed from prison when Saleh realized he needed the religious radicals to help him quell the southern rebellion [17,19].  As such, Fadhli aligned with Saleh, assisting him in the matter and leading the extremists for this cause [17,19].  Fadhli took advantage of the parallels between the socialists of southern Yemen, and the Russians that the Mujahidin had fought against in Afghanistan.  Fadhli received some assistance from his connection and apparent friendship with bin Laden [19].  Afterwards, Fadhli received a portion of his father’s lands in return and became a prominent member of the Saleh government [17,19].  He went as far as to go to Sudan to express gratitude to bin Laden, the man who had once chosen him for battle in Afghanistan after he broke into tears from being initially passed over [19].  Back in Yemen, Fadhli enjoyed a special freedom, fame, and position given to him by Saleh [17-19]. 

The remnants of the defeated south formed the Southern Movement led in part by the former socialist leaders, amongst several other factions [17].  Fast forward to 2009, and Fadhli broke ranks with Saleh’s government and formally joined his men with the Southern Movement [17-19].  The rhetoric that followed showed Fadhli’s motivations were more about freedom for the south than about any radical religious beliefs [17-19].  In 2010, he raised the American flag in his compound in a display of requesting international support for the southern cause [19].  That being said, Fadhli still represented strong jihadist communities [17].  The oppression of those in the south, with whom Fadhli sympathized because of his own ancestry, appeared to drive him to their cause.  This scenario offered to men such as Wuhaishi and his comrades a way into the deep seeded southern hatred of the Saleh regime.  As such, jihadists were now beginning to link themselves with once peaceful elements of the Southern Movement in order to turn them to violence and use them in their fight against the government [17,20]. 

While it is certain that religious radical elements such as Fadhli’s groups and AQAP had been utilized by the Yemeni government to fight against the secessionists and the Shiite Houthi rebels of the north, the strong tribal and ancestral linkages several of these militants had for the south were driving them into a war with the northern “occupiers.” For example, Wuhaishi himself hailed from Abyan Province in the south [17].  As mentioned, this gave the militants a great influx of recruits, supplies, and weaponry.  On the same day as Fadhli broke with the government in 2009, Wuhaishi released a statement expressing solidarity with the Southern Movement [17,20].  He proclaimed that his group could not stand by and watch the sufferings of the south [17].  AQAP had thrown in its lot with the southerners and essentially declared war against the Saleh regime in the north.  Elements of Saleh’s government, security, and intelligence apparatus however still sympathized with Wuhaishi and his men, offering them assistance and protection at times, while the population accused Saleh of not being serious in dealing with the AQAP threat to their nation [21].  At other times, AQAP members depended on the hospitality of some of the southern tribes, whose support they had worked to acquire, and would continue to strive to win over [22].

Fadhli meanwhile, distanced himself from AQAP and al-Qaida in general.  He downplayed his relationship with bin Laden and stated that jihadists were not all al-Qaida despite the assertions of the West [17,19].  This is an important point.  Just the same as al-Qaida does not represent every jihadist group in Pakistan or the FATA of Pakistan, AQAP was not an all-encompassing umbrella group of violent jihadist or secessionist groups in southern Yemen.  However, the distinctions can often times be thin, as Fadhli’s group, AQAP, and other factions seemed to all have the same goals:  to attack government interests in the south in order to remove government influence.  It happened that AQAP envisioned an Islamic State in the aftermath where they could create a haven for their peers as well as have a base of operations to engage the West and America in the days to come [23].  The ancestral bin Laden homeland would become the scene of an insurrection, inspired by AQAP and fueled by years of civil unrest and government oppression.

With that being said, it should be noted that the Yemeni government then subjected all enemy groups in the south with the label of of al-Qaida [19].  This was done to give a face to their enemies, one that was recognized worldwide, and that would draw the most sympathy and support from foreign nations, particularly from the Americans.  Whether or not all of the jihadist/secessionist groups were linked with AQAP mattered not, because any time an attack took place, it was likely to be attributed to the network [24].  AQAP in the meantime, did grow and take advantage of the situation [22,25].  They perpetrated attacks and gained territory acting in conjunction with elements of the Southern Movement, while not converging with them [25].  The tribes had taken in the AQAP fighters and it would seem as if the former Socialists were going to at least tolerate their existence if not readily accept their assistance.  The government was forced to negotiate with the tribes in order to combat the threats, but even these measures did not guarantee victory, as AQAP had entrenched themselves into the hearts of the disenfranchised local Yemenis [22,26].  As mentioned, AQAP was blamed for the series of attacks leading up to the insurrection.  While it is certainly possible, it is also very unlikely that they perpetrated all of these acts.  Included in this Segment (IX), are the events for which AQAP is believed to actually be responsible, due to intelligence gathering or statements of acceptance by the group itself.  The deteriorating situation in the south was allowing AQAP to expand in its ambitions, its operations, and in its propaganda literature.  Wuhaishi now had the manpower to wage effective jihad throughout the south.

Commencing A Paramilitary Campaign

Throughout the summer of 2010, Wuhaishi’s AQAP continued its evolution from a jihadist, criminal, and terrorist organization into a paramilitary outfit as well.  The group was apparently recruiting enough local fighters and inspiring others to join from abroad, that it could form larger units of men to conduct raids and attacks on internal targets.  AQAP had been mainly concerned with operations targeting Westerners and Western interests at large, however, while they still continued that trend, they were also now focusing on destabilizing the Yemeni government.  While Mohamed Saleh Omayr al-Kalawi al-Awlaki previously stated that the AQAP war was not aimed against the soldiers of Yemen, the arising insurrection disproved this claim [27].  Several examples of AQAP’s activities in this campaign for an Islamic state can be listed.

On June 5, 2010, less than two weeks after the disastrous US airstrike that killed Marib deputy governor Jabir Ali al-Shabwani, AQAP militants attacked senior army officials on their way to inspect oil field positions in the province [28,29].  Local AQAP commander Hassan Abdullah Saleh al-Aqili led the operation which resulted in the assassination of Colonel Mohamed Saleh al-Shayef [28,29,30,31,32].  The colonel was killed along with two of his soldiers [28,29].  Aqili survived and escaped a subsequent military raid on June 9, which left several soldiers wounded when the tribesman sheltering him fought to protect him, thus illustrating the government’s continual problems with acquiring AQAP suspects from their tribal caretakers [30,31,32].  The Yemeni security force presence in Marib was hunting for Aqili and later Ali Said Jamil (Muwahid al-Maribi [33]), although both escaped [31].  The tribes eventually showed disgust for both al-Qaida and the government over the fighting and the death of Jabir al-Shabwani (which they partially blamed on Jamil [34]), although they threatened to align entirely with AQAP against the government despite the violence [31].  A following June 12 attack on Marib’s main oil pipeline was blamed on the local tribes, but the government named the culprits as Said al-Shehri, Othman al-Ghamdi, Qasim al-Rimi, and the aforementioned Jamil [31,35].  Local tribesman in fact, denied the attack [31].    

In Abyan province meanwhile, AQAP members gunned down Political Security Organization (PSO) official Jalal al-Othmani in front of his house [36].  Othmani was an intelligence official and an instructor of counterterrorism efforts at an institute in Aden [36,37].  AQAP later released a statement claiming the assassination [37].  Continuing in Aden, on June 19, AQAP gunmen raided the intelligence headquarters in that port city [38-40].  The operation resulted in the deaths of eleven people, to include seven military members and four civilians [38].  AQAP also claimed responsibility for this instance in an issuance citing revenge [38].  Yemen had arrested Gudol Mohamed Ali Naji as the leader of the squad who carried out the attack, but the same AQAP release described Naji as having no involvement [38].  With the attack, AQAP was displaying more of a militaristic readiness in its actions.  Next, Colonel Saleh Amthaib, a ranking intelligence officer who had worked on AQAP and southern secessionist issues in the past, was assassinated in Abyan province [41].  On July 1, two gunmen on motorcycles shot Amthaib in front of his home in the provincial capital of Zinjibar [41]. AQAP reported this murder in the same release as claimed the Othmani assassination [37].   

The city of Zinjibar became a strategic battleground for the network in the coming months.  On July 14, numerous AQAP assailants launched a raid against the security and intelligence headquarters in that city to complement the one launched in Aden [42,43].  AQAP declared that members of their Jamil al-Anbari Brigade carried out the attack and that 24 people were killed, all of them related to Yemeni intelligence or military [37].  Interestingly, the organization was building up its operations and claiming composition of brigade elements.  Although it should also be noted that naming squadrons of attackers after a deceased militant had been a common practice for militants for some time.  It is probable that members of the Anbari brigade were responsible for the Othmani and Amthaib assassinations as well since their deaths were announced in the same communique which referenced the intelligence HQ attack [37].  The attackers advanced in vehicles including motorcycles and used machine gun fire, mortars, and grenades to strike their target [42,43].  At least two of the security forces were left dead and several wounded [42,43].  AQAP renounced the Yemeni claim that nine of the perpetrators were arrested [37].  The group did concede the death of one Jamil al-Anbari Brigade member named Mohamed Hilal (Abu Muhajir al-Sanaani) during the battle [37].  Interestingly, this engagement occurred just after the wanted Abdullah al-Juwair (E-46) was reported arrested in Hadhramout province [44].  The same AQAP announcement denied that particular arrest as well, while claiming success in the initial raid on Juwair’s cell that left two Yemeni soldiers dead [37].  It is worth noting that the Saudis never received Juwair via extradition after his arrest in Yemen.  The confidence of AQAP as to Juwair’s freedom hinted in a not so subtle manner that the wanted man was yet again active in the theatre.  

On the same day as the release of the informative communique, July 22, AQAP launched an operation on the Yemeni military in Shabwa province, which was detailed at the beginning of this segment.  The military convoy was hit by members of AQAP’s Mohamed Omayr al-Kalawi al-Awlaki Brigade and the ambush resulted in the deaths of one military officer and five soldiers [2,4,5].  The militants made away with large amounts of ammunition and four large machine guns according to an AQAP release describing the event [5].  On July 24, the same brigade of AQAP launched the attack in which Talut al-Sanaani perished along with six more Yemeni soldiers [2,3,7,8].  In response to this incident, the Yemenis attempted to remain more vigilant in Shabwa and also fired two leading military officers over the set of attacks [8].  AQAP released a statement on the events acknowledging two of its members having been killed [7]. The two were identified as Talut al-Sanaani and Sheikh Zayed al-Daghari al-Awlaki [2,6,45].  Daghari had taken Talut al-Sanaani and others under his wing, and was known to them as Abu al-Bara al-Awlaki [2].  Later on in October 2010, Ibrahim al-Rubaish gave a eulogy for Daghari [45].  Daghari, a leader of the Mohamed Omayr al-Kalawi al-Awlaki Brigade was dead, yet both his name and the name of the man for whom his brigade was named would be brought up by AQAP in the future to incite the members of the Awlaki tribe to violence against their government. 

While the Yemenis were learning of Daghari’s death, AQAP was readying itself for an attack that continued their obsession with the British mission within Yemen.  A vehicle raced past the British Embassy but allowed for gunmen to unleash an intense volley of fire onto the main gate and even fire an RPG [46].  No one was hurt nor was there any significant damage done [46].  The occurance was just a brazen example of how brave the militants were becoming.  Their propaganda reflected this as well.  On July 30, Mohamed Said al-Umdah (G-6) aggrandized the organization, declaring that AQAP could count among its ranks a total of 12,000 fighters, and that these men heralded the coming Islamic Caliphate in Yemen [47].  The numbers were an exaggeration and a reference to Islamic tradition and prophecy, yet nonetheless the message was chilling because Umdah continued to threaten Yemeni forces, and referenced some of the recent attacks [47].  AQAP was indeed growing in number and their attacks were disturbingly increasing.  To expand upon the murkiness of who may be responsible for the growing unrest in southern Yemen, only crimes claimed by AQAP have thus far been referenced.  Yet similar crimes were being committed without the group taking credit.  For example, on August 5, militants ambushed a group of security force officers in Zinjibar near their intelligence and security headquarters [48].  The gunmen rode on motorcycles and fired machine guns, killing three officers before fleeing [48].  This fit the model of recent AQAP attacks, especially in light of the fact that the intelligence headquarters had just been struck by militants.  The Yemenis arrested AQAP militants linked to the killings, yet this could have just been a claim of government propaganda linking all attacks to the terrorists [49]. 

Eradicating Malice

The organization continued its attempts to silence and assassinate government figures [24].  One successful attempt was undertaken on August 13 when AQAP gunmen assassinated Ali Abdulkarim Fazal al-Ban, an intelligence director in Lahaj province of the south [50,51].  He had investigated both AQAP and secessionist rebels, and his death was attributed to AQAP in an October 6 communique describing Lahaj incidents [51,52].  Next on August 16, Qasim Abdulkarim al-Dhali, an intelligence officer of Abyan was gunned down in Zinjibar, while a police director in Abyan named Mohamed Said al-Mawri was injured in a similar attack, both of which seemed linked to AQAP [51].  AQAP communiques labeled their surge in violence in the south as “Operation Eradicating Malice,” and shifted from focusing on large scale operations to multiple attacks on soft targets and security infrastructure.  In addition, AQAP and related groups were apparently gathering reliable intelligence on their enemies and carrying out an effective assassination campaign.  In fact, in September of 2010 AQAP released a list of 55 government officials, police, and intelligence officers that it planned on neutralizing [53]. 

August progressed with a series of militant ambushes of police and military patrols in the south [24].  The attacks left several soldiers dead while the Yemenis were claiming some successes against AQAP and the rebels.  Yet it would be reasonable to be skeptical of the Yemenis’ confidence.  For example, during intense fighting in Lawdr district, Abyan province, the Yemenis reported the killing of 27 year old Adel Saleh Hardaba, a supposed AQAP commander in the district, as well as several associates [54].  Hardaba was an unknown figure, and more importantly AQAP never claimed him as one of their own.  The Yemenis were most likely claiming that any protester, separatist, or rebel as AQAP soldiers and leaders.  Meanwhile, AQAP did shed light on their responsibility for some of the August ambushes in a September 6 series of communiques [55].  The most prominent one occurred on August 28, when AQAP militants used RPGs to destroy a military checkpoint on the outskirts of Zinjibar [56,57].  At least eight soldiers were killed initially, but the death toll rose to eleven plus a civilian [56,57].  The same communique claimed responsibility for an ambush in Zinjibar that left three policemen dead, as well as describing other attacks [55]. 

Frighteningly, August also saw the release of an AQAP statement from Said al-Shehri, under his kunya Abu Sufyan al-Azdi [58].  Shehri explained the evils of Saudi and American cooperation [58].  Because of this relationship, Shehri implored members of the Saudi military, security forces, and Interior Ministry to break ranks and act in accordance with AQAP [58].  As AQAP members had failed in their missions when sent from Yemen to the Kingdom, Shehri was hoping to inspire others already there to act.  He asked for security members to give information on the whereabouts and travel routes of intelligence officials and the Interior Ministry staff so they could be targeted for assassination [58].  He also asked these Saudis to defect and prepare for an overthrow of the Saudi government [58].  Shehri finished by asking these potential recruits not to participate in actions against AQAP [58]. 

Within Yemen, the embers smoldered, threatening to light into another insurrection inside Saudi Arabia. The persistence of AQAP in their belligerence towards the Saudis, plus the plethora of radicals fighting and training in Iraq and Afghanistan, poised to return home and repeat the devastating cycle, precipitated the announcement of yet another most wanted list. This one too, focused on the threat abroad. For the Yemeni government meanwhile, the fires of the jihadists already raged.

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