SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Replenishment And Admonishment

Written by Nolan R Beasley

During this tumultuous period, in the time since Abu Faraj al-Libi was captured and Hamza Rabia killed, the American press particularly emphasized the remaining and new al-Qaida commanders climbing in the ranks due to the supposed power vacuum. As it was, these individuals were always present within the organization and their camps, and were natural successors to those who fell, yet they were not figures often publicly known in the US. The most pertinent examples of this succession at the time were Shura councilor Sheikh Said al-Masri and a hitherto unremarkable Libyan known as Atiyah Abdulrahman. Together they were at the forefront of this replenishment of the al-Qaida upper echelon and were thus responsible for the maintenance and even admonishment of their subordinates and regional branches.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Reserve Ranks

American authorities eventually confirmed that after the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qaida internal operations and management were taken over by Sheikh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Othman Abu al-Yazid)1.  The Egyptian was already involved in important decision making and gatherings. For example, he was confirmed to have been present in separate planning meetings in Pakistan with paramilitary captains Abdulhadi al-Iraqi and Khalid Habib prior to 20062.  However, Sheikh Said, aged in his 50s at this point3, was not publicly revealed as having assumed command until a video release in May 20074.

Sheikh Said also entwined his sons within the jihadist infrastructure of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, known to his fellow militants as Mohamed Khan, was born in Egypt’s Sharqiya province in 1986, and spent the majority of his youth moving between extremist bases until arriving in Afghanistan. Therein, at the mere age of 15, he commenced training at al-Faruq camp. After the invasion and his father’s relocation to the FATA, he began in 2005 to be an integral part of the program to find accommodations and housing for militant families in South and North Waziristan. Then in early 2006 he was assigned to Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, operating under his tutelage and absorbing knowledge5.

In the American press, one publication, The Washington Post, eventually explored the personalities that its experts determined were the new rising generation of al-Qaida officers during this particular time period. Sheikh Said was of course a focal point of this release. Others detailed as participants in the replenishment were Khalid Habib (the report misidentified him as a Moroccan and gave a false alias of Khalid al-Harbi6), Egyptian explosives expert Midhat Mursi (described as a mercenary utilized for his enhanced abilities in chemical and biological weaponry experimentation7), American propagandist Adam Gadahn, and the Libyans, paramilitary official Abu Laith, and Bagram escapee and ideologue Abu Yahya. Interestingly, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Saif al-Adel were also highlighted, even though they were long standing members with the organization, and the latter was entrapped in Iranian detention. In fact, all of the militants described were significant veterans of the organization or at least had been affiliated with the network since prior to 9/11.

The New York Times concurred, adding Abu Ubaidah al-Masri to the list of those observed to be rejuvenating al-Qaida senior ranks8. Upon Hamza Rabia’s death, Abu Ubaidah assumed control over External operations, having fully transitioned from weapons instructor and battlefield commander, to international terrorist coordinator9. He was inherently trusted by al-Qaida command, as a paramilitary leader and officer10. Now he was to be tasked with Osama bin Laden’s primary ambitions. Furthermore, the younger generation reverred him and his direction11. This allowed for a proven charismatic jihadist to incite and inspire assailants from among the ranks.

To the American public, these were mostly unfamiliar names, thus justifying their inclusion on the newspapers’ lists of ascending senior al-Qaida extremists. Yet another Libyan was profiled in the pieces, unknown to the intelligence community until a fascinating missive was discovered in 200612, detailing al-Qaida orders to and concerns with their Iraqi chapter.

Admonition In Iraq

The infamous correspondence, composed in late 2005, was directed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, and was utilized to reprimand the Jordanian for his unbridled volatile actions. Zarqawi was essentially autonomous in his endeavors, but did maintain connections, associations, and communications with senior al-Qaida officials in the east. As he was sworn to the organization and operated in their name, he was expected to conduct himself as al-Qaida deemed appropriate and to follow orders.

The intermediary and author of the letter was a Libyan jihadist from Misrati, named Jamal Ibrahim Mohamed al-Shitaiwi13.  He was better known as Atiyah Abdulrahman, and later as Sheikh Mahmud al-Libi14.  The Libyan developed a relationship with Zarqawi in Herat, in western Afghanistan, beginning in 199915.  That being said, Atiyah was a sincere bin Laden loyalist.  Born in the late 1960s, Atiyah ventured to Afghanistan in the 1980s as a teenager and joined bin Laden’s contingent therein16.  By the 1990s he was fighting in Afghanistan, and developed into a respected Islamic scholar as well as obtaining a proficiency in weapons and explosives17.  Due to his nationality, it was inevitable that he would also become enmeshed with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) contingent in the Khorasan, to which he also became renown18.  After al-Qaida displaced to Sudan, Atiyah entered into a mission in another African nation.  He was deployed by al-Qaida in 1993 to Algeria as an emissary to the GIA (Groupe Islamique Arme) militant group within19.  Atiyah was met with hostility by the extremist faction, and instead of cooperation was dealt incarceration, torture, and the sentence of execution20.  However, five months into his ordeal, Atiyah and his companions escaped21.  The trauma of the experience prevented him from immediately rejoining militancy, and he was critical of the divisions among the jihadists, as ideally, they should maintain common ambitions22.  This assuredly explains his willingness to maintain the cordial relationship between bin Laden and Zarqawi.  Oddly, he is described by the US government as also having fled from the Congo, although it is unknown if this is a published inaccuracy23.  Regardless, after some years of emotional healing from his Algerian debacle, Atiyah traveled to Afghanistan to enter into the service of al-Qaida yet again in the late 1990s24.  His work as an emissary and connection to Zarqawi were to prove pivotal. Atiyah cited the situation in Algeria as a warning and as the epitome of an Islamist movement poised to topple an apostate government and rule, only to fracture and collapse in failure25.

The communication between Atiyah and Zarqawi, in the form of the sternly composed letter, delivered uncompromising instruction, one al-Qaida official to another26.  Having returned to bin Laden’s service, the Libyan was proving to be an invaluable asset in the post-9/11 conflict27.  Being an unknown to the American authorities allowed him a certain freedom of movement.  As such, al-Qaida utilized him as an emissary to other factions, most notoriously to Iran28.  Due to his relationship with Zarqawi, he was seen as the best option for emissary to Iraq as well, and thus composed the letter accordingly29. 

The Libyan revealed that he was physically located with senior al-Qaida officials in the FATA, and that his superiors desired reconnection and established parameters with the Iraqi jihadist branch30. Atiyah cautioned Zarqawi, warning the Jordanian that he was now world renown, and a representative of Islam and jihad for a global audience, resulting in the increased scrutiny of his every action, along with possible glory for success, and certain dissent, disdain, and vehement criticisms of his less than savory operations31.

Reminding Zarqawi of his inherent loyalties, Atiyah chided that declarations of war against Shiites or other religious factions, and the spread of operations outside of Iraq, should in the future be strategic issues discussed with and approved by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and even Zarqawi’s political and shariah experts within his own network, prior to implementation32. He suggested that Zarqawi consult with a variety of Iraqi religious authorities, even those with whom he did not concur or strictly align33. Atiyah was adamant that these Sunni clerics, even though they divurged in opinion from Zarqawi, be respected as opposed to being targeted with haphazard violence. They would be needed for the future, and Zarqawi was at risk of creating an irreparable schism. Equally, Atiyah was wary of Zarqawi utilizing the al-Qaida brand exclusively and recklessly, recommending that he focus on cooperation with all Sunni factions, despite any differences, explaining that loyalty was first owed to their god and religion, followed next by their earthly organization34.

In a political sense, Atiyah felt that Zarqawi was too singularly focused on the paramilitary apparatus, and was destined to only sow chaos among the Muslim populations of Iraq. Instead, Atiyah suggested that Zarqawi labor to increase his profile in such a manner that people respected as opposed to feared him, acquiring the local support through amicable means35. Atiyah ironically preached tolerance, asking that Zarqawi engage with the populace, accept their improprieties while building a relationship, and avoid actions that could result in his estrangement from the very locals he needed for his organization to thrive and survive as a theocratic governance.

While acknowledging the necessity of belligerance, Atiyah reminding Zarqawi of the importance of providing an adequate example to the youth and his followers: “Let us not merely be people of killing, slaughter, blood, cursing, insult, and harshness; but rather, people of this, who are unopposed to mercy and gentleness. Let us put everything in perspective. Let our mercy overcome our anger and precede it. We need to give our followers and our coming young meanings that have balance, completeness, and moderation in ethics and concepts36.”

Angered over recent bombings in Amman, Atiyah demanded that Zarqawi prepare and deploy trusted associates to act as emissaries and messengers to senior al-Qaida leadership in the FATA, thus ensuring that communication lines remained open and that future undesired operations could be prevented37. Feeling that envoys could traverse the path from Iraq to the Waziristan agencies with more ease than the reciprocal route, senior militants were otherwise preoccupied with their own regional adversaries and travails, unable to ensure the proper oversight of Zarqawi’s forces, without meaningful effort from the problematic commander38.

Discontent arose as Zarqawi deployed his resources for three suicide bombings at major hotels in the Jordanian capital on the evening of November 9, 2005, an event in which at least 54, mostly local civilians, were slain39. The operations were extremely unpopular and were met with swift and vociferous condemnation as Zarqawi was seen to be slaughtering his fellow countrymen and Muslims40. Zarqawi claimed the attacks as a direct message to Jordan’s King Abdullah II and declared that the hotels were targeted due to being a luxury for Jews, Christians, apostates, and those he deemed unworthy or averse to Islam41. Ironically, his disciples only managed to bring destruction upon those of their own faith. A nihilist by nature, Zarqawi was now wantonly opening another theatre of his already multipronged campaign. He was however, forced to clarify his intentions, and in an audio message employed as a twisted justification released days later, attempted to divert blame by stating that innocent Muslims were not his intended victims. Although, in the same issuance he warned Jordanians that they should avoid havens of immorality, as he labeled the hotels, military bases, and other locations deemed as viable targets42.

Atiyah emphasized the improvement of communication and proper operational command, imploring to the Jordanian: “the significance of your correspondence with your brothers here, and continued mutual discourse and consultation, as well as going along with them in well-laid plans, and mutual understanding, harmonizing, and guidance, are more important than many of the large scale operations43.” Insinuating that Zarqawi could be replaced if an appropriately qualified candidate were to be found, Atiyah noted that a realignment was not currently obligatory, but demanded that Zarqawi focus on rectifying his behavior and that the recalcitrant militant “remedy the deficiency” on the ground44.

Interestingly, as Atiyah concluded his missive, he provided Zarqawi with the best regards from his apparent Libyan supporters in the network, Abu Laith al-Libi and his deputy Abu Sahl, and also from the Egyptian faction via Khalid Habib and Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah45.

Zarqawi had already received a warning on this exact matter from the Egyptian faction, in the form of a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri on July 9, 200546.  Zawahiri emphasized steps of a plan consisting of an initial expulsion of American forces from Iraq, immediately followed by the establishment of an Islamic State in the region once conditions were favorable. Thus, Zawahiri also implored Zarqawi to consider public opinion and the impending political necessities of the struggle, warning that the jihadists needed to be cognizant and wary of angering the Iraqi masses while willing to continue developing the intended emirate after the wars faded47. In fact, Atiyah referenced this missive, detailing to Zarqawi that its contents were true and that he should study the directives48. Zawahiri’s warning was apparently disregarded, as within the interim between the letters during September 2005, Zarqawi issued a direct threat of execution against both Sunni and Shiite authorities accused of cooperating with American and coalition forces49. While al-Qaida struggled to rein in their most prominent regional commander, they still needed to maintain focus on the ostensibly forgotten theatre of the Khorasan.

Truce and Logistics

While operational endeavors garnered the most attention, there remained other facets of al-Qaida in war, including diplomatic, religious, propaganda, and financial. In the bin Laden audio message released January 19, 2006, but composed during December 2005, the al-Qaida emir offered a deal framed as a truce to the Americans, stipulating that coalition forces withdraw from their dual theatres of war. Otherwise, the entrenched jihadist demagogue threatened continuation of a “raging” war in Iraq and “increased operations,” in Afghanistan, acknowledging the chaos of the former and the precarious circumstances of the latter50. Bin Laden would have possibly known of and felt the pressure of the demise of Hamza Rabia, but recorded the message too early to capitalize from the public unpopularity of the January Damadola incident.

While the disarray caused by and revolving around the airstrike of Damadola was being sorted, Sheikh Said al-Masri continued to coordinate supplies, funds, and operations.  German militant facilitator Aleem Nasir first journeyed to Pakistan in January 2006 eventually meeting with Sheikh Said in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, after an Afghan contact arranged it51.  Nasir gifted 6,000 Euros to Sheikh Said, who in turn introduced him to one of his senior lieutenants, a Saudi known as Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi, based in Jani Khel, Bannu, a district outside of the FATA52.  The Bait al-Mal, or al-Qaida financial center, was based therein53.  The Saudi worked closely with logistics and recruits for the network as well, as they had to enter the tribal encampments via his permissions54.         

Aleem Nasir conducted his second sojourn to Pakistan in the summer of 2006, again meeting in Jani Khel with Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi in order to transfer funds to the organization55.  As a reward, the Saudi facilitated Nasir’s entry into the militants fighting in Afghanistan and staging in the FATA56.  Nasir attended a North Waziristan based camp with other jihadists, and consulted while there again with Sheikh Said57. 

While primarily focused on internal affairs, Sheikh Said also sought to rectify the issues happening in Iraq under Zarqawi.  The Egyptian Shura councilor reported to bin Laden on March 1, 2006 that members of the Kurdish-Iraqi extremist network Ansar al-Sunnah had arrived in Pakistan to meet with him and al-Qaida leadership, to include Khalid Habib58.  Therein they complained about the dangerous conditions fostered by Zarqawi59.  Sheikh Said acted decisively.  In addition to his severe communique, Atiyah was appointed to chair a delegation to Zarqawi in order to resolve the issues60.  He was to lead a contingent of two other senior officials, who were to depart later61.  One of those selected was one of Sheikh Said’s Egyptian compatriots, Abu Jihad al-Masri.  In terms of further diplomacy and interoperability with allied movements, Sheikh Said reported a parlay with Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which resulted in an agreement of cooperation62. All of these relationships were potentially endangered by the thus far infrequent CIA drone strikes, a fact acknowledged by Sheikh Said when he reported that increased caution and security to prevent such assassinations came at the expense of desired operational productivity63.

Reveling in his position as the organization’s financial official, Sheikh Said next readily reported the status of al-Qaida debts, payments, and monetary conundrums. However, the budget for the insurgency only totaled around 178,000 Euros64. Of note, the paramilitary budget was dwindling, and during the first months of 2006 was a mere 15,000 Euros65. Additionally, despite eight of his men marrying, they were denied the usual stipend to assist with their changing circumstances. Senior and long-standing officials were deprived of their usual excess payments derived from a surplus; a source that was now simply infeasible.66 Furthermore, the financial assistance offered to approximately 50 militant families (some 30 of which belonged to deceased or incarcerated jihadists) sheltering in Peshawar was at risk67. All of the financial concerns were indicative of a movement on tenuous territory, but able to survive.

While Sheikh Said fretted over the plight of the jihadists in Pakistan, his men labored in remaining relevant within Pakistan via their local network of operational support.

The Karachi Consulate

Reverting to an urban setting, the embedded militants of the FATA next orchestrated a vehicle-borne explosives plot against the US Consulate in Karachi, again bringing destruction to the oft targeted metropolis. Handling of the small cell fell to a Karachi native and Lashkar e Jhangvi officer known as Qari Mohamed Zafar68. As an adherent to Taliban ideology, he joined them in their military campaign during the 1990s, wherein he also affiliated with al-Qaida69. Zafar was already named in August 2005 as one of Sindh province’s most wanted militants70. Three Pashtuns of the North West Frontier Province were selected as his perpetrators. All three were veterans of the Taliban military apparatus and previously engaged against the Northern Alliance before returning home71. Additionally they were affiliated with the militant organization Jaish e Mohamed72. After the invasion, Zafar established himself in South Waziristan, and developed multiple cells for action, including the recruitment of the three Pashtuns deployed against the Consulate73. The selected suicide bomber was alluded to as Othman al-Pakistani, and was unsurprisingly trained and outfitted with his device by Atwah74.  The destined martyr’s actual identity was Raja Mohamed Tahir75, and his biography included his capture at age 18 by the Northern Alliance on the Kunduz front and subsequent shipment to Sherberghan by General Abdulrahim Dostum in late 2001 as the Taliban fell to the US invasion76. The accomplices were Osman Ghani and Anwar al-Haq77. The conspirator Haq required the amputation of his leg due to his own combat on behalf of the Taliban78. Ghani was but 21 when he too was captured on the Kunduz front and joined his comrade Tahir in Sherberghan. Tahir was released after a year due to a Tuberculosis diagnosis and Ghani soon followed79. They apparently seethed with disdain for their enemies after the ordeal. Later, Ghani and Anwar al-Haq labored alongside Zafar as he acquired the necessary chemicals and components for the device in South Waziristan80.

The vehicle, a Toyota Corolla, was acquired through theft and outfitted with its lethal cargo of explosives in the FATA, assuredly at the al-Qaida encampments81. By the time it reached Karachi, the Toyota was laden with an estimated 880 pounds of C4, readied for detonation82. The family of Raja Tahir reported their son departed his home in the Karachi borough of Landhi on March 2, 2006, never to return83. Apparently, the operation was prepared and launched as a precursor to US President Bush arriving in Islamabad a mere two days later84. Anwar al-Haq journeyed with Raja Tahir to the Consulate and they parked the Toyota near an entrance, where they could observe and assault a diplomatic convoy85. It was a parking spot meant for Naval personnel at a nearby Naval hospital86, and Tahir was inconspicuous there with his relatively new vehicle87. Anwar al-Haq was stationed away from the Toyota, where he could conduct the reconnaissance and call Tahir via cellphone to forewarn him of the approaching vehicles88. After approximately 30 minutes, the expected diplomat arrived, aiming to enter via a security gate on the road between the Consulate and the adjacent Marriott Hotel89. Once the convoy was within reach at 0858 in the morning90, Tahir traveled in reverse, crashing his Toyota into the targeted vehicles and detonating91.

The resulting explosion, approximately 20 yards from the Consulate gate, obliterated the primary vehicle, a Toyota Land Cruiser92, flinging it across a barrier onto the property of the Marriott93. The blast wave shattered windows across both the hotel and Consulate buildings, and produced a massive crater in the street94. Killed within the targeted vehicle were an American diplomat and his chauffeur95. They were identified by the State Department as Foreign Service Officer David Foy and local Consulate employee Iftikhar Ahmed96. Adjacent security vehicles were also greatly damaged, and one police ranger and two additional security guards succumbed to their injuries from the explosion97. The circumstances of the attack were indicative of some sophistication, particularly in the surveillance of the Consulate, diplomats, their vehicles, and their schedules.

In the Landhi borough, Raja Tahir’s relatives were met by a mysterious individual who informed the family of their son’s martyrdom and provided three separate payments as compensation98. It was not until August 21, 2006 that Anwar al-Haq and Osman Ghani were captured by Pakistani authorities in a Karachi raid99. Two years later in early March 2008, a Pakistani court sentenced Anwar al-Haq to death for the crime, but acquitted Osman Ghani due to lack of sufficient evidence100. Overseer of the operation Qari Mohamed Zafar meanwhile, was added to the US Department of State Rewards for Justice program website in January 2007, with a bounty of $5 million101.

At least one American source reported that some Pakistani authorities were under the impression that the bombing may also have been linked to Matiur Rahman, one of Pakistan’s most wanted jihadist militants102. In fact, as a replenishing factor for the organization, Matiur Rahman was seen as a vital connection between al-Qaida and the Pakistani militants they were now relying upon for operational success. He was also believed to be directly plotting a vague assault against American interests103. Despite this no evidence was presented actually connecting him to the Consulate attack, while Qari Mohamed Zafar himself was now proven as an al-Qaida asset willing to engage in violence.

The Harshest Front and Conspicuous Actors

From South Waziristan where Qari Mohamed Zafar based, foreign elements Tahir Yuldashev of the IMU, and al-Qaida operatives including Abu Laith and Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, and the Egyptian ideologue Sheikh Issa al-Masri enjoyed open condonement from the likes of Haji Omar Khan and and the bandit Abdullah Mahsud104. In North Waziristan, where most of these outsiders now resided, the situation was much more nuanced.

As the Pakistani Taliban of North Waziristan attempted to lessen combat with government forces, foreign elements were a sincere point of contention – [A]. Abu Okasha al-Iraqi, known also as Abdulrahman and Malang, came to the region to fight the Soviets, and fought for the Taliban through 2001105. The American invasion precipitated his displacement to Masokai, near Mir Ali, North Waziristan, amidst the Dawar tribesmen. Within he enmeshed himself in tribal affairs, attempting to foster comradery among the locals, arbitrating their minor conflicts with one another, and attending jirgas and meetings with various elders106. He participated in the struggle against Pakistani government forces; and while his religiosity expanded his notoriety, the inability of the adversarial forces to destroy his home compound did so exponentially107. He was also respected by his fellow Arab jihadists.

Abu Okasha initiated a sort of divorce from al-Qaida during the twilight of 2005, citing the undue influence of Egyptians upon the network108. This remark seems reliable, as in December of that year, his 20 year old son Abu Bakr was reportedly slain in the same drone strike as Hamza Rabia in North Waziristan. The son was a student of local languages and English, perhaps having provided Hamza Rabia with an efficient translator prior to their demise109.

When the North Waziristan Taliban officials grew impatient with his continual and obvious movements among the local populace and their politics, Abu Okasha agreed to depart, especially with the potential of an impending peace accord with the government that could further jeopardize foreign fighters. He again displaced, this time to Wana, South Waziristan in August 2006, but briefly appeared again in Mir Ali in November to announce his final exit from Pakistan110.

Local Pashtun militants in North Waziristan were also perturbed by the open and conspicuous movements of Bagram escapee Abu Nasir al-Qahtani in the summer of 2006111. Family of Abu Nasir, the alias of Mohamed Jafar Jamal al-Qahtani, claimed that merely four months after his egress from the American base and prison, that he was contacting them to arrange surrender112. Yet he pursued militancy instead. This was evidenced in October 2005 when Abu Nasir detailed the deed via hand drawn map and described fleeing to the Taliban for safety113. Evidently, the obvious actions by these men gained them increased stature, as seen when Sheikh Said al-Masri, in a March 2006 missive to Osama bin Laden, specifically offered the al-Qaida emir greetings and regards from both Abu Nasir and Abu Okasha114.

By October 2006 Abu Nasir was reported in the press to be assisting al-Qaida operations in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. This focus was evidenced by an increase in operations against al-Qaida in Khost province. For example, coalition forces captured four al-Qaida militants at a safehouse in late July 2006, taking them unawares115. Another coalition raid and firefight on August 11, 2006, occurring within the village of Yaqubi, and intending to neutralize a known facilitator, resulted in three al-Qaida operatives killed and three captured116. This particular cell was affiliated with various IED attacks and thus an arsenal was discovered at their location and was disposed117. Further raids on August 15 and 16 allowed for the capture of twelve and eight al-Qaida facilitated militants respectively, and the confiscation of their weaponry118.

In addition to acting on behalf of Abu Laith al-Libi, Abu Nasir was also entwined with other leadership, specifically the al-Qaida lieutenant Abu Wafa al-Saudi, with whom he coordinated ambuscades and assaults in said provinces119. Abu Wafa, the alias of Saudi national Abdulrahman Mohamed Zafir al-Dubaisi al-Jehani, was ascending the ranks and responsibility of al-Qaida in 2006120. Abu Laith meanwhile, was already nearing the zenith.

Abu Laith al-Libi, specifically commanding missions in Jalalabad by late 2004, in 2006 was spreading influence and operatives throughout eastern Afghanistan. For example, during 2006, the reliable Abu Luqman al-Makki was delegated to officiate operations in Paktika, specifically the now notorious Lwara region121. Abu Salamah al-Najdi was yet another Saudi veteran of the Battle of Shah I Kot, having arrived in Afghanistan’s al-Qaida camps just prior to 9/11. Joining the numerous Arab militants in Jalalabad, Abu Salamah persisted for two years. While operating on this front in 2004, he was absorbed into the ranks of Abu Laith, becoming a lieutenant122. By 2006 he was appointed responsible for militant actions within Khost; most interestingly the sites comprising two other previous and infamous battles: Dabgai and Shinkai (of Khost and Zabul provinces, respectively)123.

On October 23, 2006, a cross border raid, labeled by the militants as the Battle of Eid, cost Abu Laith the lives of three operatives known as al-Zubair al-Sudani, al-Zubair al-Libi, and Salahuddin al-Afghani124. None of these militants were specifically eulogized in al-Qaida’s “Martyrs in a Time of Alienation125” document, however they were remembered by Abu Laith’s own propaganda publication enterprise in February 2007126. Unsurprisingly, one of the deceased, al-Zubair al-Libi previously offered effusive prasie of Abu Laith via poetry127. Of further interest, another of them, al-Zubair al-Sudani, arrived in the Khorasan alongside his contemporary, described as a “brother,” named Khallad al-Farisi. Known also as Bara’a Mohamed Salim al-Sudani, Farisi reportedly held a degree in communications, and was utilized in combat against Pakistani forces in North Waziristan; evidencing that Abu Laith’s efforts extended inward against the nation in which he based, as well as outward into Afghanistan128. Eventually, while engaging in vicinity of Miranshah, North Waziristan, Farisi was one of several militants apprehended129. After months detained in Pakistan, he was extradited to Sudan for incarceration130. This demonstrated the foreign elements’ proclivity for violence against the Pakistani government in North Waziristan, and the inevitable travails this would bring to the local militants and their tribes. Counterterror operations meanwhile continued to corral other, more prominent foreigners.

Thereafter on November 6, American authorities announced an al-Qaida asset was captured in Khost alongside five others, stated to be of Saudi and Pakistani origins131. Police in Khost clarified that one Arab, four Afghans, and a Pakistani comprised the squadron132. Gear including assault rifles, armor-penetrating ammunition, grenades, and surveillance recorders were retrieved133. A week later on November 13, the media revealed that the apprehended Arab officer was Abu Nasir al-Qahtani, complete with footage of a local military bases on his camera134. He was apparently transferred into Pakistan after his capture135. It was not until approximately April 2007 that Abu Nasir’s family in Saudi Arabia obtained confirmation from the Red Cross of his status as a prisoner. Remarkably, in May of that year, Abu Nasir was revealed to be at Muhail prison in Riyadh, and was allowed to meet with his astonished kin136. The Americans, Afghans, nor Pakistanis chose to retain custody of this now prominent al-Qaida lieutenant. Perhaps his intelligence value was exhausted in interrogations already, or perhaps the Americans wished to entirely avoid having to to face the reality and embarrassment of a militant that escaped CIA detainment. Either way, he was delivered to the Saudis for justice.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] A series of Pakistani engagements and raids against foreign elements during the spring precipitated increased fighting with local militants, resulting in the desire for a truce. These incidents and their relation to al-Qaida and the overarching militant narrative will be discussed in detail within the coming chapters.
  1. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  2. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  3. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Liaison to the Taliban, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/yazid.html#top ↩︎
  4. Al-Qaeda’s Afghan Head ‘Named’, Al-Jazeera, May 24, 2007, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/5/24/al-qaedas-afghan-head-named-2 ↩︎
  5. Martyrs of the Khorasan, Part 1, The Knight and Emir Abdullah Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Mohamed Khan) ↩︎
  6. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Khalid Habab, Afghan Field Commander, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/habib.html#top ↩︎
  7. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, Weapons Expert and Trainer, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/omar.html#top ↩︎
  8. Qaeda is Seen as Restoring Leadership, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, April 2, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/world/middleeast/02qaeda.html ↩︎
  9. Alleged al-Qaeda Chief Dead, Officials Say, by Sebastian Rotella, The Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-masri10apr10-story.html / Who is Abu Ubaidah al-Masri and Why Should We Care: An Obituary, by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SITE Intelligence ↩︎
  10. Draft of a Letter to subordinates, believed from bin Laden, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Draft%20of%20a%20letter%20to%20subordinates.pdf ↩︎
  11. Letter addressed to Sheikh (from Abdullah al-Halabi to bin Laden), dated December 15, 2008 ↩︎
  12. Letter: Al-Zarqawi Had Falling Out With Al-Qaida, NBC News via the Associated Press, October 2, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna15109937 ↩︎
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  19. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
  20. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
  21. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
  22. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
  23. Atiyah Abdulrahman, US Department of State Rewards for Justice Program, June 2007, https://web.archive.org/web/20070611075228/http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=atiyah_abd ↩︎
  24. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
  25. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, dated December 12, 2005, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-original-language-2/ ↩︎
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  27. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
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  29. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, Liaison to Iraq and Algeria, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#top ↩︎
  30. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, dated December 12, 2005, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-original-language-2/ ↩︎
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  34. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, dated December 12, 2005, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-original-language-2/ ↩︎
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  36. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, dated December 12, 2005, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-original-language-2/ ↩︎
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  38. Letter from Atiyah Abdulrahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, dated December 12, 2005, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-original-language-2/ ↩︎
  39. Deadly Explosions Rock Three Jordan Hotels, NPR News, November 9, 2005, https://www.npr.org/2005/11/09/5006157/deadly-explosions-rock-three-jordan-hotels ↩︎
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  41. Iraq: Al-Zarqawi Brings Al-Qaeda’s Jihad To Jordan, by Kathleen Ridolfo, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 10, 2005, https://www.rferl.org/a/1062842.html ↩︎
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  78. 2 Al Qaeda Suspects Arrested, Dawn, August 22, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/206989/2-al-qaeda-suspects-arrested ↩︎
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  83. US Consulate Blast Case Defence Counsel Terms Charge-Sheet Flawed, Dawn, February 10, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/938355 ↩︎
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  88. Blast That Killed U.S. Diplomat Tied To Qaeda, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, February 24, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/24/world/asia/24pakistan.html ↩︎
  89. U.S. Diplomat Murdered by Pakistani al Qaeda Suicide Bomber, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, March 2, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/03/us_diplomat_murdered.php ↩︎
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  93. Pakistan car bomb kills U.S. diplomat, 3 others, NBC News, March 1, 2006, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11631196 ↩︎
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  96. Terrorist Attack on U.S. Consulate Karachi, Sean McCormack, Spokesman, US Department of State Press Release, March 2, 2006, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/62472.htm ↩︎
  97. Blast That Killed U.S. Diplomat Tied To Qaeda, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, February 24, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/24/world/asia/24pakistan.html ↩︎
  98. US Consulate Blast Case Defence Counsel Terms Charge-Sheet Flawed, Dawn, February 10, 2008, https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/938355 ↩︎
  99. Briefly: Police arrest 2 suspects in attack on U.S. envoy – – International Herald Tribune, The New York Times, August 21, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/news/21iht-briefs.2554036.html ↩︎
  100. Death for Pakistani for murder of U.S. diplomat, Reuters, March 5, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/death-for-pakistani-for-murder-of-us-diplomat-idUSISL41708/ ↩︎
  101. US Department of State, Rewards for Justice Program, Qari Mohamed Zafar, https://web.archive.org/web/20080928150623/http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=Zafar&language=english // Country Reports on Terrorism, United States Department of State Publication, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2008, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf ↩︎
  102. EXCLUSIVE: New Al Qaeda Leader Planning Attack Against U.S., ABC News, March 1, 2006, https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1676096&page=1 ↩︎
  103. EXCLUSIVE: New Al Qaeda Leader Planning Attack Against U.S., ABC News, March 1, 2006, https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1676096&page=1 ↩︎
  104. Al Qaeda, Taliban behind the Waziristan Accord, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, September 23, 2006, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/alqaeda_taliban_behi.php ↩︎
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  112. The Sad Story of Abu Nasir Al-Qahtani, by Muhammad Al-Garni, Arab News, May 9, 2007, https://www.arabnews.com/node/298161 ↩︎
  113. U.S.: Senior al Qaeda leader captured in Afghanistan, CNN, November 13, 2006, https://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/11/13/afghan.capture/index.html // Al-Qaeda ‘lieutenant’ killed in Iraq, Al-Jazeera, September 26, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/9/26/al-qaeda-lieutenant-killed-in-iraq ↩︎
  114. Letter from Sheikh Said al-Masri to Osama bin Laden, dated March 1, 2006 ↩︎
  115. Four Al-Qaeda Members Captured in Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, July 29, 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1070190.html ↩︎
  116. Al Qaeda suspects ‘killed in raid’, CNN, August 11, 2006, https://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/08/11/afghan.alqaeda/ ↩︎
  117. Al Qaeda suspects ‘killed in raid’, CNN, August 11, 2006, https://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/08/11/afghan.alqaeda/ ↩︎
  118. Suspected Al-Qaeda Hideouts Raided In Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, August 16, 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1070624.html ↩︎
  119. Al-Qaeda active in Pak tribal areas: Report, Hindustan Times, October 13, 2006, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/al-qaeda-active-in-pak-tribal-areas-report/story-CeUQtvmnn6OejseIw1TzqO.html ↩︎
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  123. as-Sahab Media Production, Winds of Paradise, Part 5, Eulogizing Five Martyrs, October, 2010 ↩︎
  124. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  125. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
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  127. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  128. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf // Sudanese al-Qaida fighter killed in Yemen, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, April 18, 2012, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/04/sudanese_al_qaeda_fi.php ↩︎
  129. Sudanese al Qaeda fighter killed in Yemen, by Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, April 18, 2012, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/04/sudanese_al_qaeda_fi.php ↩︎
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