SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Obdurate Militancy

Written by Nolan R Beasley

A renewed urgency swept through the encampments of al-Qaida and their allied movements in 2005. It would be a mistake to assume that the jihadist focus on paramilitary and political matters in Iraq meant an abandonment of operations in Afghanistan. Instead there was an increase in violence, as the extremists vehemently pursued their insurgency in a wanton display of obdurate militancy.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Suicidal Intensity

Events in 2005 also precipitated a change in ideology and commitment encompassed by both al-Qaida and various Taliban forces.  For al-Qaida, bin Laden was initially reticent on attacking the Pakistanis, but at the insistence of Zawahiri and others, he relented, opening the doors to a multitude of actions against Pakistani authorities.  Next, al-Qaida was able to convince the Taliban to allow the usage of suicide bombers in 2005, creating a weapon to draw attention again to the Afghanistan war1.

Suicide bombings as a valid tactic in the war were relatively rare, with only six discernable incidents between 2002 – 2004. As previously chronicled, four of the detonations can be attributed directly to al-Qaida operatives (plus an additional failed attempt not accounted for in the six). The remaining two instances from this time period were equally as disturbing, but their perpetrators remain unidentified. A December 28, 2003 attack may have been incidental, when two assailants were arrested in vicinity of the Airport in Kabul, and placed into a police vehicle. Within the car, the bombers remained unsearched, resulting in one detonating an explosive vest, while the other wrought chaos with a device constructed from a pressure cooker2. Five security force officers joined the militants in death. Kabul authorities declared the men as foreigners, yet their bodies were ravaged beyond recognition. Later on October 23, 2004, a militant vouched for by the Taliban, detonated grenades attached to his person in the form of an impromptu suicide vest, in a crowded market district of Kabul. Apparently aiming for NATO soldiers, the fanatic killed Jamie Michalsky, a young American translator and former Army Reservist, visiting the city for medical care while laboring in the region3. Thus, these incidents were fairly uncommon and startling when employed. However, with the Taliban fully embracing the method in 2005, the utilization of suicide bombers drastically increased, with at least 17 such events occurring during the year4.

Displayed during the initial six months of the year were the various circumstances and results of these nefarious actions. The first prominent instance of 2005 aimed to kill Uzbek military commander General Abdulrashid Dostum, formerly of the Northern Alliance5. Appearing at a gathering of worshippers in vicinity of a mosque in Sheberghan, Jowzjan province, in northern Afghanistan, a suicide bomber approached within 10 meters from the General, only to be halted at a perimeter of guards6. The January 20 detonation injured 20 guards and civilians, some seriously7. Dostum’s own brother Abdulqadir, received shrapnel to the face while shielding the General8. Despite the effort, Abdulrashid Dostum remained uninjured.

A cell phone recovered from the bomber indicated that he was a foreign militant9. The martyred assailant was an ethnic Tajik from Takhar, Afghanistan. Abdulmunim al-Tajiki trained at al-Faruq and Khaldan camps from the age of 17, before proceeding to Tajikistan to achieve his dreams of jihad10. Finding himself in Pakistan for the 9/11 attacks, he quickly moved to join the fight against the invasion, participating in the defense of Kabul, before fleeing11. Reconvening eventually with the Arab militants in the FATA, he focused the next two years in joining militant raids12. Abdulmunim was selected by al-Qaida as the suicide operative to target Dostum and thus deployed to northern Afghanistan. Yet he was obstructed from detonating against or within Dostum’s vehicle by diligent guards. Nonetheless, he was able to depart the scene and prepare for a different opportunity. Abdulmunim bided his time until Dostum’s public address at the soccer field near the mosque, striking then but failing to neutralize his intended victim, reportedly thwarted by his suspicious unkempt appearance13.

The Taliban meanwhile manipulated the impoverished and ignorant, unleashing them in unsophisticated suicide bombings14. For example, a disillusioned Afghan, identified by friends as “Qari” Sami, was rendered bereft at the downfall of the Taliban governance, resulting in his dependency on anti-depressents and an increasingly erratic religious radicalization15. A pariah among his university peers, he openly discussed participation in the insurgency. He was eventually recruited, and detonated a suicide vest on May 7, 2005, in the Park Internet Cafe in Kabul, destroying the business, and murdering both an Afghan customer and a Burmese UN employee who lived in an attached residence16. Experts noted that while al-Qaida revered and celebrated their bombers like Abdulmunim, the local Afghans like Qari Sami were not given the same respect, seemingly viewed only as tools of war instead of sacrificed assets17.

The tactics were instrumental in the Taliban reaching desired targets in the developing Afghan government. A suicide bomber disguised as a guard stalked and assassinated General Akram Khakrizwal, the new security chief of Kabul, in the entry way of Kandahar’s primary mosque. The destructive attack on June 1 killed a score of innocents, and was aimed at the funeral service for a recently assassinated anti-Taliban cleric in Kandahar18. Interestingly, the Taliban denied responsibility, and the Kandahar governor asserted that the sacrificial assailant was an Arab of al-Qaida19. This was probably misdirection from both sides, an effort by the local government to avoid admitting that Afghan citizens were now engaged in such despicable acts, and the Taliban not yet fully comfortable announcing an attack entirely perpetrated against their fellow Afghans.

Embracing The Tactic

Any hesitance in claiming culpability for suicide attacks ebbed rapidly. Embracing the tactic of suicide attacks, the Afghan Taliban heralded a new era in severity extending into the latter months of the year. Observers initially noted the rarity of these crimes when compared to their occurrence in Iraq20, but 2005 shattered this expectation.

Kabul native Sardar Mohamed drove his motorcycle into a line of buses ferrying Afghan National Army officers and personnel home from a military camp in the capital city, on September 2821. Once amongst them, he detonated, killing eight of the soldiers22. Yet again, Taliban spokesman Abdullatif Hakimi celebrated the bombing via satellite phone to news outlets23. It would be one of his final such communications during this stage of the conflict. On October 5, 2005, the Pakistani Information Minister announced that Hakimi was captured in a raid in vicinity of Quetta, Balochistan24. He was rapidly transferred to Islamabad25. US officials and the press were cynical of the arrest, which came fast after US authorities implored Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to incarcerate the Taliban leadership in Quetta and just a year after the outgoing US Ambassador sardonically questioned how Hakimi, Taliban leader Mohamed Omar, and paramilitary officials could operate in the open without consequence in the Balochi capital26. Hakimi was a sacrificial figure, and his loss was not one that would be felt operationally for the Taliban. Especially given that the senior most Afghan Taliban officials under Mohamed Omar, responsible for rekindling the Taliban paramilitary infrastructure and insurgency, were Mullah Akhtar Mohamed Osmani (former commander of the Kandahar Corps), Mullah Dadullah Lang (former commander of the Kabul Corps), and Mullah Obaidullah Akhundzada (former Minister of Defense)27.

On November 14, coordinated militants attempted three suicide bombings against NATO forces, all along the primary route between Kabul and Jalalabad. In the first a Toyota Corolla was purposefully driving into a coalition convoy of German peacekeepers and detonated. Approximately an hour later Greek forces were similarly targeted just 100 meters distant. A third bomber failed to detonate within minutes of the latter incident, when coalition forces thwarted the approaching vehicle, shooting and killing the driver28. Together the two successful suicide assailants killed one German peacekeeper and at least eight Afghans29. A mere two days later, on November 16, another suicidal militant drove his vehicle borne explosive into an American and Afghan convoy, killing three Afghans upon detonation30.

By December 2005, Afghan Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah boasted to the Associated Press via satellite telephone, that he controlled approximately 200 willing suicide operatives, ready to be dispatched against the new Afghan government31. Mullah Dadullah went further, acknowledging his intimate relationship with al-Qaida and admitting that as many as 10% of insurgent forces were provided through the Arabs and other foreign elements32.

It is unlikely that American, Afghan, or coalition forces truly understood what these increasing suicide bombings heralded for the future of the war. The Taliban embracing the tactic meant that it was now commonplace, and a potentially effective weapon. Despite the horrors of these acts in 2005, press and public focus remained on the usage of suicide bombers in the London attacks of July, offering the jihadists a reprieve from the belief that they were defeated, and an opportunity to expand upon the success with renewed propaganda efforts.

Propaganda Response

Compounding the shock of the London bombings was the appearance the bombers providing their martyrdom testimony, released September 1, 2005, in a scene juxtaposed with statements by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The video began to fracture the illusion that Mohamed Siddique Khan coordinated the operation alone and that al-Qaida was not thoroughly involved in the plot. Siddique Khan in his diatribe attempts to provide justification for the atrocity. As translated from Arabic by the Guardian:

” Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

“Until we feel security, you will be our target. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight.

“I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe33.”

Zawahiri condoned the attacks and framed the murders as a proper response to the British government’s support for Israel and their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan34.

Tanweer’s testimonial was saved for maximum affect, being released on July 6, 2006, to coincide with ceremonies marking one year since the tragedy35. Tanweer goads his audience from the grave:

“What have you witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and become stronger…until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq36“.

Of note, in addition to a statement by Zawahiri37, the American Gadahn yet again appears in a propagandizing effort38.

Obviously flush with leadership figures, several of whom remained in the spotlight, al-Qaida had the ability to gloat and focus on propaganda, capitalizing on the attacks.  Also after the London operations, an Egyptian named Husam Abdulrauf (Abu Muhsin al-Masri) became the editor of Vanguards of the Khorasan, a new al-Qaida media publication and outlet39.  He seems to have succeeded the previous editor, Abu Baraa al-Sharqi, a Saudi extremist, now a Military Committee member engrossed in battle40.  Born in 1958, Abdulrauf obtained a degree in agriculture and then briefly engaged with the mujahidin in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1986, before returning home.  By 1989 he was back in the region, working for the MAK organization founded by Abdullah Azzam and bin Laden.  After the former’s slaying, Abdulrauf remained with the organization as a treasurer and unsurprisingly the editor of a jihadist magazine.  By 1995 though, he was located in Kabul supposedly managing an orphanage and charity until the 9/11 attacks brought him back into jihad.  By the aftermath of the London attacks in 2005, Vanguards of the Khorasan was first released, under Abdulrauf as proper editor41. 

To commemorate the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, communications operative Adam Gadahn, his appearance obscured, released an 11 minute video diatribe referencing the London bombings, but promising future, unrestrained, and catastrophic operations against Los Angeles and Melbourne, while assuring that American and British soldiers were to suffer in the theatres of war42. In October, the American Gadahn was quietly indicted for providing material support to the jihadist network43.

The reality on the ground, despite the boisterous claims of infinite reach abroad, was that al-Qaida remained a small militant network, susceptible to great loss if miscalculations were made in their assaults. They were enmeshed in an obligatory manner with numerous other combatant contingents, some of which were able to brutally engage with American forces more effectively than the vaunted jihadists. In Pakistan, the militant Pashtun movements aligned with the Taliban deterred frequent and massive government sweeps, resulting in sporadic operations against belligerent organizations.

Besieged By Winter

The Pakistanis continued to make these occasional incursions into the FATA even after the peace agreements signed with the tribal militants of South Waziristan in November 2004 and February 2005 respectively. Particularly, jihadist outposts in North Waziristan were targeted. For instance, a ferocious two hour gunbattle raged on the evening of March 5, in which a home utilized by foreign elements was surrounded in the Dawijar area of North Waziristan44. Within, al-Qaida militant Abu Muslim al-Tajiki chose to fight to the death, along with one of his men, while eleven others were apprehended45.

The Tajik extremist, of a wealthier family, majored in political economics in his homeland, but was swayed by religious radicals until such a time as he abandoned his wife and child to engage in jihad46. Eventually, he enmeshed with the Arabs in their camps in the FATA, becoming one of their companions. He became close to several including the Syrian facilitator Yasin al-Suri47. Due to the 2004 Pakistani military exploits in South Waziristan, and a following harsh winter, Abu Muslim was one of the many forced to displace to the north48. There during the March winter night, in his outpost but a mile from the Afghan border, Abu Muslim became yet another vanquished radical. Yet his demise did nothing to quash the lingering threat posed by his al-Qaida seniors, nor did the incident represent an imminent Pakistani maneuver against local tribal militants.

Red Wings and Kunar

Returning to the observation of smaller unknown militant factions operating against Afghan and coalition troops, we must look no further than Kunar province. Throughout 2005 Kunar remained a hellacious destination for coalition soldiers. With the obvious shift of Abu Ubaidah al-Masri to an operational capacity, there were openings for paramilitary commanders in the province. Especially considering that in the immediacy following the London bombings, Abu Ubaidah went to ground to wait and avoid any repercussions from his involvement. Operative Marwan Hadid al-Suri soon held sway across the Pakistani border in the Bajaur agency of the FATA49, providing support for militants like Abu Ikhlas al-Masri in restive Kunar. Further candidates for command shifted to this front as well. Assigned to and having migrated to Nuristan province, 25 year old Yemeni Abu Hassan al-Rimi (Ali Abdullah Ibrahim al-Rimi), commenced a role in 2005 of assisting in overseeing missions in nearby Kunar, representing the continual ability for al-Qaida to promote from within their ranks50.

Yet Kunar contained several factions of militants, not just the expected al-Qaida and Taliban forces. While most of these units worked in tandem, it is important to note the fractured nature of the combatants early in the conflict. Thus while the public may have assumed that US forces were engaging constantly with known enemies, often their targets were random local squadrons. Such was the case in Kunar during June 2005.

US Marines operating in Kunar conducted several successful missions in early 2005 against militant factions, and even convinced one prolific insurgent to surrender and reconcile with the new government51. These operations offered blueprints to incoming Marines and US Special Forces as to how to yield desired results from the forays. As the Marines prepared for additional maneuvers they were made aware of local militant Ahmad Shah Dara I Nur, believed responsible for further IEDs and ambushes52. Known also as Commander Ismail, he was an initial adversary of the Taliban in the region, but later transformed his seemingly inconsequential faction into a parallel movement named the Bara Bin Malik Front53. Once aligned with foreign elements and Taliban combatants, his activities came under the scrutiny of coalition forces. Despite rampant claims that Ahmad Shah was closely affiliated with senior al-Qaida leadership, of vast importance, and commanded hundreds of men, these claims were falsehoods54. In fact Ahmed Shah was instead aligned with the HiG (Hezb e Islami – Gulbuddin) of Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, and held sway over a minimal, albeit well-armed, collection of bandits55. Furthermore, his men were assessed to be mercenaries as opposed to ideologically linked to their commander56. Ahmad Shah was simply a lowly character in the war, targeted due to his potential instead of any actual connections to relevant Taliban or al-Qaida hierarchies.

While developing the mission to disrupt and remove Ahmad Shah, eventually known as Operation Red Wings, the Marines were compelled to include US Special Forces into their plan57. As such, a reconnaissance unit of four US Navy SEALs was deployed under darkness on June 27 to covertly approach and identify the targets. Additional forces comprised of Marines securing a cordon and SEALs assaulting the objectives were to be inserted via US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters. During the morning of June 28, the ground force SEALs were identified by civilians and reported upon to Ahmad Shah58. The militant Commander Ismail subsequently approached with a squad believed to have numbered no more than a dozen and launched a hellacious assault on the SEALs. Ahmad Shah and his men held elevation and armament advantages forcing the SEALs into a desperate firefight59.

The reconnaissance unit was reduced via the intense combat by three deaths. The final SEAL was wounded but escaped with the help of a local villager, later to be rescued by friendly forces60. Able to call for assistance during the engagement, the SEALs had alerted their command and inadvertently precipitated more tragedy. Two Chinooks were launched in order to aid the imperiled reconnaissance team, but Ahmad Shah and his men were able to down one of the helicopters upon approach with a fortuitous RPG shot61. The responding Chinook which was destroyed resulted in the loss of a further eight SEALs and eight Army Night Stalkers (members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment – piloting and crewing the helicopter)62.

Ahmad Shah assumed the role of a local hero in the aftermath of the failed operation, and avoided targeted attempts on his life before crossing the border to Pakistan, wherein despite being an insignificant figure before, he was now a well-known militant asset63. In fact, due to the success of his ambush he was absorbed by the Taliban, and later in 2005, was interviewed by the American press, boasting of the engagement and deliberately mentioning being under the command of the Taliban64.

The story of Ahmad Shah exemplifies the wide range of factions involved in the Afghan conflict, their inherent danger to coalition forces, and the ease in which they could be enfolded into the broader insurgency, when their influence was allowed to expand. The feudal nature of Afghanistan made it near impossible to occupy, but in terms of the foreign fighters and Taliban, should also have made it difficult for their efforts of resistance. Despite this, they progressed forward slowly gaining momentum in the conflict.

Another Downed Aircraft

While the disaster of Operation Red Wings is the most remembered engagement of 2005, there were several others. Among them was yet another circumstance in which a US Army helicopter was lost. We look no further than the al-Qaida assets fighting in eastern Afghanistan, often under the Libyan paramilitary commander Abu Laith al-Libi. Despite supposedly being relegated to Jalalabad in Nangarhar province, his influence and men were seen in several other provinces. A subordinate of his, Abu Luqman al-Makki for instance, eventually operated in Zabul. Abu Luqman al-Makki was committed to both the insurgency and his superior Abu Laith al-Libi from the earliest stages of the war.

Responsible for administrative duties, Abu Laith extracted Abu Luqman and assigned him in a purely paramilitary position, allowing for his rapid ascension to one of the Libyan’s most senior lieutenants65. Al-Qaida boasted of the Meccan’s operational prowess, emphasizing how he commanded a unit which shot down an American air asset via a surface to air missile in Zabul during the course of 200566. Researching this claim offers slight difficultly, but there was indeed a US Chinook that crashed in the province on September 25, 2005 after deploying their cargo of ground forces and while attempting to return to their base of origin. With all five crewmembers slain, US military officials rushed to assure the public that hostile fire played no role in the downing67. However, the ever present Taliban spokesman Abdullatif Hakimi immediately claimed that an anti-aircraft projectile destroyed the helicopter68.

Quietly, the US later confirmed that the Nevada National Guard air asset was shot down from the sky69. Insinuating that a fortuitous RPG launch brought a Chinook to ruin for the second time that year, US military officials avoided giving any credence to the idea of SAM involvement70. This incident is possibly the action attributed to Abu Luqman and his team, which appears to have included a Uyghur triggerman known as Abdulkabir al-Turkistani71 – [A]. Despite the ambiguity of the circumstance, the downing increased the militant momentum and swelled the legend of Abu Laith al-Libi. As such, these al-Qaida units persisted in their hostilities into the autumn.

The Battle of Lwara

Undoubtedly, al-Qaida and its allied movements, enveloped by the Haqqani Network and Afghan Taliban in their insurgency against the coalition, engaged in multitudinous skirmishes and battles during the early and mid-aughts. For al-Qaida propaganda, a small amount of these received an inordinate amount of attention, apparently due to the excessive loss of jihadists during such instances. Much like Shinkay in 2003 was emphasized via several eulogies, the so-called 2005 Battle of Lwara was equally treated. Located within the hostile Paktika province, the district was well within reach of the marauders just across the border.

Coordinated between al-Qaida and the Haqqani Network, the assault aimed to launch artillery into patrolling American forces and utilize surface to air missiles to down responding helictopers72. Planning for and helming the foreign combatants were Abu Laith al-Libi and one of his lieutenants, Abdullah al-Mudir al-Libi73. Together they operated in close proximity to Mullah Sangeen Zadran, a local Haqqani paramilitary official in preparation for the bilateral engagement74. Abdullah al-Mudir (translated as Abdullah the Manager) was considered a source of vast knowledge regarding electronics, explosives, and particularly artillery75. Hailing from Misrata, Libya, his actual name appears to have been Abdullah al-Bashir76. He was proclaimed by Hamza Rabia in 2004 as one of the significant remaining subordinates to Abu Laith, indicating that senior al-Qaida recognized his worth77.

Several prominent Arab al-Qaida officers joined the venture, to include Abu Baraa al-Sharqi, Osama al-Hamawi, and Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri78. Sharqi, appointed to the al-Qaida Military Committee by Abdulhadi al-Iraqi79, held an elevated position during the ambush, from which he and his men intended to fire the missiles against approaching helicopters80.

Militants advanced to a designated rear position and after a wait progressed forward during the dark of night to the location of the ambuscade, lingering for a day. During the wait, two Algerian combatants, Abu Waqas al-Jaziri and and explosives expert Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri prepared detonators, inadvertently triggering one device, resulting in a near fatal blast81. Abu Waqas rapidly took cover and Abu Sulaiman sustained injuries, though neither was mortally wounded82. Surviving the accident, the militants all continued their wait. By nightfall they were compelled into a withdrawal due to inclement weather and fog to the rear safety position, followed the next day by advancing again to their intended stand. They waited until near evening on October 2983 before the opportunity arose to launch their artillery and fire upon the American soldiers.

Assessments at the time estimated some 60 militants engaged in the ambush84. For 90 minutes, paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division battled and withstood the ferocious assault, the seventh such engagement in six months85. Despite taking enormous fire and receiving wounds, Staff Sgt Travis Nixon, gallantly maneuvered the battlefield, essentially an outcropping of stone, in order to assist his comrades, ensure ammunition supplies, and direct counter fire. He perished managing to destroy an enemy gunnery position and defeat a militant surge via grenades and rifle fire86. From their elevated perch, Abu Baraa al-Sharqi and his men waited in futility for the arrival of adversarial helicopters. Their patience was to no avail, and they eventually retreated with the artillery and ambush squads towards their rear positions during the night. Instead of helicopters, an AC-130 gunship eventually arrived to drive away the militants, and jihadist Abu Rawahah al-Suri’s launcher malfunctioned and prevented his attempt to engage the fixed-wing aircraft87. The ambush at Lwara was deemed a success by the al-Qaida and Haqqani fighters.  However, upon resting for sustenance long after the conclusion of hostilities, the retreating jihadist forces came under intense and unexpected aerial bombardment88. An American barrage claimed several of the militants, the majority of their casualties occurring during this incident as opposed to the actual engagement. Highlighting the travails of the al-Qaida guerilla tactics, the Battle of Lwara demonstrated the coalition air supremacy negated the supposed stealth maneuvers of the militants. Once engaged, the combatants were easily discernable from the air, and therefore became viable targets long after an engagement ceased.

Casualties of Lwara

Al-Qaida eulogist Abu Ubaidah al-Filistini (Maqdisi) mourned the losses in great detail. Local Pakistani Pashtun fighters Abu Bakr al-Waziri and Darwish al-Waziri were among those slain89.  Darwish al-Waziri appeared to be an educated tribesman and spent at least five years in the United Arab Emirates before returning to the FATA. Therein he welcomed the foreign element fighters, became trusted by them, worked in their administration, and was a leadership figure in the jihadist community of his village90. During the battle he participated in carrying and firing artillery shells against the Americans, before an airstrike decimated his unit, bisecting him in front of his comrades91. By contrast, Abu Bakr al-Waziri was a very young fighter from Wana, known as Haq Nawaz92. At the urging of the Uyghur commander Hassan Mahsum, the young Waziri was taken in for training by Abu Laith and his men93. Despite hesitance on the part of Abu Laith due to the young age of the applicant and sincere efforts to dissuade him, Abu Bakr eventually succeeded in gaining a place as an aide to the Libyan and earned the respect of his lieutenants to include Abu Luqman al-Makki94. He then became a combatant, and upon surviving the initial battle at Lwara, perished in the subsequent airstrike95. Supposedly his funeral in Wana was attended by the masses96. The romanticism of his story is but a cynical veil for the obvious usage of child soldiers in the conflict; often those hailing from poor villages under enormous pressure from religious militant influences.

The fortune of Abu Waqas al-Jaziri in avoiding the premature detonation the day prior to the ambush was but short lived. He was Mukhtar, hailing from Tiaret in northern Algeria, and upon disenchantment after immigrating the France, instead arrived in Afghanistan prior to 9/1197. He trained first in Jalalabad with other Algerians before next moving to Kandahar and graduating from al-Faruq camp98. Fittingly, during the defense of Kandahar during the US invasion Abu Waqas was wounded by a surface to air missile’s premature detonation99. This precipitated a long medical journey in which he first dwelled in Pakistani hospitals, and then maneuvered well into 2003 amidst safehouses within the nation. Finally he made his way to and joined the militants in the FATA, acting as an administered, before his old wounds forced his return to inner Pakistan, and his eventual capture. For the next year, he was subjected to Pakistani and supposedly American intelligence interrogations, yet he was never transferred out of the country100. On the contrary, he was released, and regained his position with the insurgents, adjusting his role from administration to combat, before dying in the field at Lwara101.

Central Asians of course participated in the attack, and Zaid al-Dagestani fell in the airstrike targeting the retreating ambush units102.  A native of Makhachkala, he repeatedly failed to obtain entry into the Chechen theatre for jihad. Instead, his father led him to the Khorasan, wherein he joined the ranks of the jihadists within, fated to only progress as far as Lwara.

Abu Amir al-Sudani, Mustafa of Khartoum, adherent and admirer of Abu Mohamed al-Maqdisi in Jordan, came to the front in Pakistan after receiving training at the makeshift camps103. Although wavering between commitment to jihad in his homeland and the Khorasan, he remained and completed additional courses. Abu Amir was on a mortar squad during the battle104. He appeared to have a close relationship with his own eulogist Abu Ubaidah, who was accompanying him afterwards, and watched him succumb to the late night airstrike in the aftermath of the ambush105.

Zubair al-Turki of Istanbul, was but 22, when he was killed in the bombardment returning from Lwara. Prior to Afghanistan he engaged in a failed attempt at reaching Chechnya, before obtaining Afghanistan. Fighting in Zabul, he and companions in his squad once narrowly avoided coalition helicopters descending on their position106. After he made another failed attempt at a change in theatre, this time for Iraq via Iran107. His return was celebrated, yet his tenure was brief.

From the Levantine Arabs, lost were the Syrians Abu Osama al-Hamawi and Abu Rawahah al-Suri108.  The former was Radwan Abdulrahman al-Sharif, raised in a jihadist household in Hama, while the latter was an orphan from Aleppo, named Anas Ihsan Bengali109. Training at al-Faruq camp before 9/11, Abu Rawahah then fought in Kandahar and eventually Shah I Kot. Abu Osama was a respected instructor and was wounded fighting the Northern Alliance. After recovery, he too attempted to resist the US invasion, following a similar path through Shah I Kot to the FATA. Therein, he again became a senior instructor and logistician. Later from this same FATA training infrastructure, Abu Rawahah deployed and established himself within the contingent of militants in Jalalabad, laboring in administrative duties. After two years he joined Abu Laith as a combatant and at Lwara was a component of the failed anti-aircraft unit110. Abu Osama participated in transporting and firing artillery shells, and fell too at the rear retreat rendezvous. Attempting to assist the wounded from the battle delayed Abu Rawahah enough to also perish in the subsequent bombardment111.

More importantly, among the foreigners killed was Fahd Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, the Saudi otherwise known as Abu Baraa al-Sharqi112. Hailing from al-Ahsa in the eastern portion of the Kingdom, he was a veteran of jihad Bosnia and subsequently Saudi prisons. He was released and commenced proselytizing to his peers in an incendiary manner, only to be incarcerated again after the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing against the US Air Force in Saudi Arabia113. After his release, the 9/11 attacks gave him reason to depart for Afghanistan, where he defending Kabul, fled to Khost, and followed the militants to the Battle of Shah I Kot114. Once in the FATA, he spent eight months on administrative duties before Abdulhadi al-Iraqi promoted him to the al-Qaida Military Committee115. He was committed to returning to Saudi Arabia and participating in the ongoing insurgency within, but was convinced to stay in the Khorasan instead, resulting in his doomed assignment at Lwara116. The aircraft he so desperately sought during the battle, instead found he and his contingent as prey in the mountains117.

Abdullah al-Mudir supposedly dreamt of his own martyrdom during late Ramadan of the year prior (corresponding to late October, early November 2004), and thus confirming the late October 82nd Airborne engagement as the Battle of Lwara as referenced in militant propaganda.

Abdullah al-Mudir was born to an affluent family and studied engineering at university in Libya, but became incensed at his nation’s regime. Thus, he joined the Libyan Islamic Fight Group while they were stationed by necessity in Sudan118. After starting a family while deployed on LIFG orders to Yemen, he migrated again, this time to Afghanistan to where his comrades had relocated119. There he immersed himself in militant training and responsibilities. After the US invasion, he fought by the side of Abu Laith from Kabul to Khost and into the FATA120. From this militant perch he began to be revered by subordinates and peers alike for his abilities, and participated in multiple assaults121. Some ten days after the devastating airstrikes at Lwara, the Manager Abdullah al-Bashir succumbed to his wounds122, denying Abu Laith the services of yet another lieutenant.

Joining Abu Ubaidah in grieving, the compatriots of the deceased reveled in their sacrifice, including ascending paramilitary officers such as Sufyan al-Maghrebi, who lauded and venerated his friend Zubair al-Turki123. As mentioned, it appears that the engagement is so often referenced in jihadist lore simply due to the loss of so many dedicated militants as opposed to any sense of massive success against coalition forces. It was certainly not a glorious moment in their insurgency, and depleted their already battered veteran ranks. In fact, al-Qaida internal communications labeled the event as a “slaughter” and attributed the apparent usage of vehicles at the rear assembly point as having drawn in American aircraft to include the AC-130 gunship124.

Yet the ability of American forces to evolve tactics and target militant units egressing to Pakistan after an assault further developed and became more frequent. For example, on December 21, 2005, US Special Forces outmaneuvered such a unit after sustaining small arms and RPG fire on their positions, allowing for air support from a B-52 bomber and A-10 Warthogs to coalesce upon the paramilitary elements, killing six125.

Further Note On Command

Khalid Habib was named in the press in November as holding paramilitary command of southeastern Afghan provinces, in what was the first public acknowledgement of his position overseeing the jihadist combatants126. Interestingly, the same reports stated that Abdulhadi al-Iraqi was reassigned as the officer over southwestern provinces, indicated what could be perceived as a shared command structure127. The information originated with an al-Qaida video release entitled “Defeating The Cross,” in which the two and their geographic commands are referenced specifically128. However, earlier internal communications provided clear delineation of this hierarchy with Khalid Habib in charge. Scholars acknowledged this established tier with Khalid Habib commanding paramilitary efforts but maintaining a some specific provincial duties129. Abdulhadi meanwhile, since he was apparently not migrating to Iraq, was of too much value to waste, and thus utilized again in a paramilitary role, this time subject to the regulations of the Egyptian130. Perhaps most striking was that jihadist media may have simultaneously maintained an even more contradictory viewpoint. According to researcher Kevin Jackson, by the autumn of 2005 propagandists referred to Abu Laith al-Libi as the “commander of the Arab Mujahidin,” thus instilling the mirage of a parallel command structure131. This does not mean that Abu Laith was proceeding at odds with al-Qaida, as we have established that he functioned under Khalid Habib in the hierarchy, but rather that he was the most recognizable and charismatic figure available, when compared to Khalid Habib’s reticence and withdrawn nature.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] Leaked US assessments, in 2010, revealed that the insurgents in Zabul and Kandahar came into possession of surface to air missiles by at least September 2005, around the time of the Zabul incident132. However, the first reported sightings of the weapons in use were not until June 2006 in Kandahar133. There was a later lethal downing of a Chinook on May 30, 2007 in Helmand province, in which a SAM was the acknowledged culprit134. Therefore, it is possible that the “2005” downing attributed to Abu Luqman and his men utilizing a SAM is actually a reference to the May 2007 incident, with the stated date an error. It is also possible that since jihadist propaganda refered to the incident in “2005” as occuring in Zabul as opposed to Helmand, that the September downing is indeed the described event.
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  2. Afghanistan: Taliban Claims Tactical Shift As Police Arrest Three After Bomb Blast, by Ron Synovitz, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 30, 2003, https://www.rferl.org/a/1105440.html ↩︎
  3. American killed in Afghan suicide attack, NBC News via The Associated Press, October 23, 2004, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6311811 ↩︎
  4. Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan – (2001-2007), United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, UN Security Council Report, September 1, 2007, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf ↩︎
  5. Suicide bomb attack misses regional Afghan leader, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, January 21, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/world/asia/suicide-bomb-attack-misses-regional-afghan-leader.html // Afghanistan: Powerful Warlord Escapes Suicide Attack, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, January 20, 2005, https://www.rferl.org/a/1056971.html ↩︎
  6. Suicide bomb attack misses regional Afghan leader, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, January 21, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/world/asia/suicide-bomb-attack-misses-regional-afghan-leader.html // Afghanistan: Powerful Warlord Escapes Suicide Attack, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, January 20, 2005, https://www.rferl.org/a/1056971.html ↩︎
  7. Suicide bomb attack misses regional Afghan leader, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, January 21, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/world/asia/suicide-bomb-attack-misses-regional-afghan-leader.html // Afghanistan: Powerful Warlord Escapes Suicide Attack, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, January 20, 2005, https://www.rferl.org/a/1056971.html ↩︎
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  124. Al-Qaida Internal Communique entitled “Lessons Learned Following The Fall of the Islamic Emirate,” https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl/english/Lessons%20Learned%20Following%20the%20Fall%20of%20the%20Islamic%20Emirate.pdf ↩︎
  125. Afghanistan war logs: US Special Forces attack militants escaping into Pakistan, The Guardian, File Tracking Number 2007-033-004215-0025, December 21, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/world/afghanistan/warlogs/2A525398-6352-4033-A07B-6FC87D853ED3 ↩︎
  126. Al Qaeda Reportedly Appoints Commanders for Afghanistan, Pakistan Tribune, November 12, 2004, http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=125112 ↩︎
  127. Al Qaeda Reportedly Appoints Commanders for Afghanistan, Pakistan Tribune, November 12, 2004, http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=125112 ↩︎
  128. Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership: Khalid Habab, Afghan Field Commander, by Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/habib.html#top ↩︎
  129. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  130. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
  131. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
  132. Afghanistan War Logs: US Covered Up Fatal Taliban Missile Strike On Chinook, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-taliban-missile-strike-chinook ↩︎
  133. Afghanistan War Logs: US Covered Up Fatal Taliban Missile Strike On Chinook, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-taliban-missile-strike-chinook ↩︎
  134. Afghanistan War Logs: US Covered Up Fatal Taliban Missile Strike On Chinook, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, July 25, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-taliban-missile-strike-chinook ↩︎

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