Bounty For AQAP Commander Saad Atef Al-Awlaki Swells To $10 Million

Written by Nolan R Beasley

A Concerning AQAP Commander

The US has proclaimed the mostly unknown commander of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is of grave enough concern to demand a bounty of $10 million. Herein, we briefly examine the history and motivations of this particular extremist: Saad Atef al-Awlaki.

The UN in its Thirty-Sixth monitoring report on worldwide militancy and terrorism as related to al-Qaida and ISIL, released in July 2025, noted that Saad Atef al-Awlaki spent his first year in power over the organization solidifying his position, and maintaining control over an estimated 3000 AQAP members1. He was stated to have offered a noticeable increase in qualify of life for his militants, affording him the opportunity to remold the terrorist entity to his will2. He was also instrumental in the prevention of espionage and spies within the network3. Enablers and key lieutenants, the Sudanese Ibrahim al-Qosi, and the Egyptian Ibrahim al-Bannah, confirmed Awlaki in power and shielded him from any repercussions stemming from the demise of the previous AQAP commander, Khalid al-Batarfi4.

Saad Atef al-Awlaki

Almost immediately in response to the July 29 report, the US Department of State Rewards for Justice Program increased their outstanding bounty on Saad Atef al-Awlaki from $6 to $10 million, explaining that his command since 2024 over operations against Americans, to include abductions, warranted the increase5. The bounties for his colleagues Qosi and Bannah remained at $4 and $5 million respectively6.

The initial $6 million bounty was announced on November 7, 2019, in which the State Department declared Awlaki as the provincial commander of Shabwah, Yemen, and as an inciter noted for hostile statements against the US7. At the time, he was listed alongside long serving al-Qaida member and rising AQAP official Qosi8. Yet not much was known of the local figure. It seems that his existence as a native Yemeni, enmeshed in tribal affairs, were what initially shielded him. While most the AQAP hierarchy were known al-Qaida members, Guantanamo recidivists, disconcerting ideologues, or Saudi extremists, garnering intense public attention, Awlaki toiled silently from behind the scenes. In 2011 he was an element comprising the origins of the AQAP local political front Ansar al-Sharia9. From there he labored for several years in successful management of Shabwah province, culminating in a position on the AQAP Shura council in 201510. While it was destined that Awlaki would ascend further, a cadre of loyalists to central al-Qaida supplanted his stature11.

Political Maneuvering

However, his standing within the local tribal elements maintained the possibility of his eventual rise. When concerns of AQAP succession were abundant in early 2020, it was postulated that Awlaki would be the candidate to assume the command, before it was later given to fellow Yemeni militant Khalid Batarfi12. Despite being considered a primary lieutenant to Batarfi13, there were significant disputes between the two, and for three weeks the AQAP Shura council debated. Yet the Iran based senior al-Qaida official, Saif al-Adel, was able to influence the decision to his favor and the various factions were united under his conniving to see Batarfi named as leader14. Much of this was due to his son Khalid Mohamed Salahuddin al-Zaidan having been deployed to Yemen to interfere in the political machinations of the network15. Awlaki maintained an intriguing position thereafter, refusing to openly challenge the leadership of Batarfi, while essentially removing himself from the faltering core of the network, allowing others to observe his disagreement with its apparent trajectory16. This deftly allowed for the avoidance of a splintered organization, while Awlaki awaited his opportunity.

Shortly thereafter the UN, in its Twenty-Seventh Monitoring Report, inaccurately claimed that Batarfi was captured, while Saad Atef al-Awlaki was killed, in a Yemeni raid against an AQAP position in Ghaydah City, Mahrah province17. This widely reported falsehood was simply an instance of a militant arrested who possessed a similar name to Khalid Batarfi18. Despite this, mystery abounded as to the fate of Awlaki.

Another factor in the swelling bounty is related to Awlaki’s growing propaganda profile, which by default negated rumors of his demise. Previously his appearances were rarities, with analysts startled at a video release issued in February 2023, theorizing that it was an attempt to maintain support amongst tribal elements19. In the issuance Awlaki railed against both the Shiite Houthis the Abu Dhabi funded Southern forces and implored for the tribes to retain their commitment to a Sunni jihadist Yemen, offering himself as an example of a homegrown militant role model.20

In the midst of a multifaction Yemeni civil war, it was hypothesized that Batarfi was restricting funding to Awlaki and his tribal affiliates, in order to curtail their belligerence against the Houthis21. In fact, the Houthis and AQAP leadership appear to have entered into an uneasy alliance, one exemplified by the sudden usage of militant drones by AQAP22. This undoubtedly was met with disapproval by Awlaki. However, there was apparently a developing tension between Saif al-Adel and Batarfi over leadership positions in the group after numerous drone strikes depleted the pool of candidates. Thus, Batarfi was forced to pander to Awlaki to ensure his support and to keep the organization stable, even offering to renege on the apparent Houthi affiliation23. Afterwards, Awlaki played to both sides, Adel and Batarfi, to guarantee his own relevance. Both Batarfi and Adel’s son Khalid perished under very suspicious circumstances in early 2024, which when coupled with other Adel loyalists falling in drone strikes, finally allowed for Awlaki to be voted as leader March 202424. For the US, the development gave rise to the fear that he could consolidate support for the jihadist entity yet again, even in a very fractured Yemen25. His ascension was rapid and fully ushered by Qosi, while Bannah, distrustful due to the odd deaths of Batarfi and others, was forced to fall in line and placate dissention due to Awlaki’s local support26.

Reciprocity is Legitimate

It is important to note that Saad Atef al-Awlaki, on June 7, 2025, directly offered threats against US President Donald Trump and members of his Administration27. A distributed video of the AQAP commander emphasized the appetite for vengeance against US and Arab authorities for their complicity in the horrors occurring in Gaza against the civilian population28. The AQAP militants were utilizing their propaganda to merely capitalize from the atrocities committed against the Palestinian people during the ongoing brutal war. According to the militant diatribe, the threshold for violence was met due to the suffering of Gaza, with Awlaki declaring, “Reciprocity is legitimate29.”

Indicating their inability to stage attacks abroad, or deploy adequate operatives, Awlaki requested likeminded but unaffiliated jihadists to commit individual strikes against Arab leaders (in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc). Further imagery seeded the implication that Awlaki was calling for assassins to target not just President Trump, but his advisor Elon Musk, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of State Pete Hegseth30.

The UN report combined with Awlaki’s threats to a US Administration mired in controversy assuredly drew the attention and ire of American authorities. Beginning as an unknown jihadists, Saad Atef al-Awlaki was now rising to unwanted heights: as an increasingly viable target of the US counterterrorism campaign.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

[A] For a thorough history of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), please refer to the ongoing Chronicles in Zealotry special Series: Fugitives of the Peninsula – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/, which will eventually thoroughly document the narratives within this article.

  1. Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, July 24, 2025 ↩︎
  2. Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, July 24, 2025 ↩︎
  3. Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, July 24, 2025 ↩︎
  4. Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, July 24, 2025 ↩︎
  5. Rewards for Justice al-Qaida Rewards, Saad Atef al-Awlaki, US Department of State Rewards for Justice Program, July 29, 2025, https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/saad-bin-atef-al-awlaki/ // Rewards for Justice Reward Offer for Information on the Leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), US Department of State Press Release, July 29, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/rewards-for-justice-reward-offer-for-information-on-the-leader-of-aqap ↩︎
  6. Rewards for Justice Reward Offer for Information on the Leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), US Department of State Press Release, July 29, 2025, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/rewards-for-justice-reward-offer-for-information-on-the-leader-of-aqap ↩︎
  7. Rewards for Justice-al-Qaida Rewards (Saad Atef al-Awlaki), US Department of State Rewards for Justice Program, November 11, 2019, https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/atef_al_awlaki.html // Reward Offers for Information on Senior Leaders of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, US Department of State Press Release, November 7, 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov/reward-offers-for-information-on-senior-leaders-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula/ ↩︎
  8. Reward Offers for Information on Senior Leaders of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, US Department of State Press Release, November 7, 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov/reward-offers-for-information-on-senior-leaders-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula/ ↩︎
  9. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  10. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  11. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  12. Khalid Batarfi and the Future of AQAP, by Gregory Johnsen, Lawfare, March 22, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/khalid-batarfi-and-future-aqap ↩︎
  13. Twenty Years After 9/11: The Jihadi Threat in the Arabian Peninsula, by Elisabeth Kendall, CTC Sentinel, Volume 14, Issue 7, September 2021, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-arabian-peninsula/ ↩︎
  14. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  15. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  16. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  17. Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, February 3, 2021 ↩︎
  18. Myth of Batarfi’s Arrest Plays into Weakened AQAP Narrative, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, March 18, 2021, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/13466 ↩︎
  19. Al-Malahim Foundation: How does AQAP’s Media Communicate Inside Yemen?, by Ibrahim Ali, April 4, 2023, South24 Center for News and Studies,
    https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=3267     ↩︎
  20. Al-Malahim Foundation: How does AQAP’s Media Communicate Inside Yemen?, by Ibrahim Ali, April 4, 2023, South24 Center for News and Studies,
    https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=3267     ↩︎
  21. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Drone Attacks Indicate a Strategic Shift, by Reuben Dass, Lawfare, August 20, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-s-drone-attacks-indicate-a-strategic-shift ↩︎
  22. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Drone Attacks Indicate a Strategic Shift, by Reuben Dass, Lawfare, August 20, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-s-drone-attacks-indicate-a-strategic-shift ↩︎
  23. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  24. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  25. Saad al-Awlaki named new leader for al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch, Al-Arabiya, March 27, 2024, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/03/27/Saad-al-Awlaki-named-new-leader-for-al-Qaeda-s-Yemen-branch ↩︎
  26. Batarfi’s Death and Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s New Emir: What Comes Next?, by Hussam Radman, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, May 31, 2024, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22765 ↩︎
  27. Yemen’s al-Qaeda leader threatens Trump, Musk over Israel’s war on Gaza, Al -Jazeera, June 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/7/yemens-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-trump-musk-over-israels-war-on-gaza ↩︎
  28. Yemen’s al-Qaeda leader threatens Trump, Musk over Israel’s war on Gaza, Al -Jazeera, June 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/7/yemens-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-trump-musk-over-israels-war-on-gaza ↩︎
  29. Yemen’s al-Qaeda leader threatens Trump, Musk over Israel’s war on Gaza, Al -Jazeera, June 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/7/yemens-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-trump-musk-over-israels-war-on-gaza ↩︎
  30. Yemen’s al-Qaeda leader threatens Trump, Musk over Israel’s war on Gaza, Al -Jazeera, June 7, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/7/yemens-al-qaeda-leader-threatens-trump-musk-over-israels-war-on-gaza ↩︎

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

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