SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 31 – Abnormalcy In Strategy)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment VIII – Occupation Of The Sky (Chapter 31 – Abnormalcy in Strategy)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

In 2010, strategic changes abounded on both sides of the conflict. With American aerial strength on display, there may have seemed no viable route forward for AQAP, yet herein we examine how the US temporarily fumbled via a misguided airstrike, offering relief to the organization. This was of course not the first mistake, and the accumulation of errors created variables in offensive strategy. From their encampments, AQAP was compelled to adjust their propagandizing. This was precipitated by the untimely and mysterious demise of their senior most lieutenant overseeing this aspect of their endeavors. Thus, new propaganda was aimed in an unlikely direction, with changes in language, recruitment, and structure. We examine traditional militant offerings, and the rapid evolution of extremist literature, both in substance and primary editors, due to the new necessities arising in 2010. An abnormal jihadist magazine was thus born, determined to undermine US security and spread hatred. Finally, through its propaganda channels the organization announced itself as a paramilitary front as opposed to a mere criminal enterprise.

Demise of a Propagandist

As was mentioned, on May 17, Qasim al-Rimi formally announced the deaths of militants Jamil al-Anbari and Amin al-Maqaleh in the March 14 JSOC airstrike, and in addition to these, he revealed the death of a Saudi most wanted List E member [1].  This individual was an integral part of Nasir al-Wuhaishi’s AQAP and had been implicated as a part of the growing network back in 2007 when he was charged as part of the cell that conducted the Queen of Sheba suicide bombing [2].  Naif Mohamed Said al-Kodari al-Qahtani (E-81) had just previously, on May 11, been officially designated by the US State Department as a terrorist [3].  He had also been added to the list of those associated with the Taliban or Al-Qaida by the UN Sanctions Committee [4].  He was joined in these designation announcements by Qasim al-Rimi who received the same treatment by both the US State Department and the UN [3,4].  Qahtani (also known as Abu Hammam al-Qahtani) was declared in the designation to be a key link between the Saudi and Yemeni branches of Al-Qaida both prior to and after the merger [3,4].  The Saudis had stated that he was closely linked to Ammar al-Waeli and Hamza al-Quayti of AQAP [5].  He also was said to help oversee, as well as being involved in operations for AQAP, and was seen as responsible for some funneling of money from abroad for the group [5,6].  Qahtani was categorized by the Saudis in a group of List E members said to be specifically targeting oil infrastructure along with Ibrahim Hassan al-Assiri (E-1) and Walid Mashafi al-Assiri (E-83) [7].  In fact, Qahtani is said to have been very close to Ibrahim, his brother Abdullah, and the unrelated Walid once they all arrived in Yemen [5].  The young Qahtani had once been described as the pre-merger de facto leader for the Saudi militants despite his age, and he was originally suspected of playing some role in the AQSA Eastern province cell under Abdulaziz al-Muqrin’s cousin Abdullah [8,9].  These assertions were not mentioned in Qahtani’s official AQAP eulogy, but his story was described upon his entering into Yemen [10].  There in the northern province of Saada, he entered a militant encampment and trained with weapons, explosives, and propaganda methods before becoming a part of the Queen of Sheba bombing cell [10].  His intelligence caught the eyes of his fellow militants even though he was young [10].  As to his age, his eulogy states that he was not yet 25 at the time of his death and thus some reports place him at 24 years [6,10].

Naif Mohamed al-Kodari al-Qahtani

One of his primary responsibilities became overseeing AQAP media and propaganda activities as well as ensuring the release of Sada al-Malahim every two months [10,11].  Once he had established himself with Wuhaishi, he was allowed to start publishing the magazine and slowly built his propaganda machine into an integral function of AQAP, which according to Walid al-Assiri, had been Qahtani’s dream all along [10].  Furthermore, Qahtani is said to have been on the phone with his close friend Abdullah al-Asiri during the latter’s assassination attempt against Saudi Prince Mohamed bin Naif [5].  Abdulilah al-Shayi, a Yemeni journalist with intense ties to Anwar al-Awlaki, Fahd al-Quso, and other senior members of AQAP first reported Qahtani’s death on May 15 [6,12].  He asserted that US intelligence on the group was insignificant since they had not known of Qahtani’s death [6].  Shayi also stated that Qahtani was an important part of the network, helping to bring in new recruits, train them, and oversee operations such as the Prince’s near assassination [6].  The reporter claimed that Qahtani had been killed the previous month while in Saudi Arabia during a clash with security forces [6].  This would be excellent news for the Saudis and Americans.  However, Shayi’s claims are very suspect, because no evidence ever materialized that Qahtani had in fact been killed by the Saudis. 

The Saudis had maintained an excellent track record in reporting the time and circumstances of the deaths of wanted militants.  Had the Saudis killed one of their most wanted they would have immediately announced it or most certainly would have shared the information with American intelligence.  The US therefore would not have designated a dead man as a terrorist.  The Saudis did not report such a feat and it seems as if Qahtani was not killed by the security apparatus of that nation.  Furthermore, if the Saudis had killed the man, his death would be reflected on their Ministry of the Interior website which tracks the status of their most wanted militants.  Throughout the 2010s, Qahtani was not listed as deceased, therefore the Saudis never came into possession of his body [13].  An AQAP announcement in May, shortly after Qahtani’s death, states that the young Saudi was killed in Abyan province, Yemen, and not in his native Kingdom [14]. 

Next, the US claimed that Qahtani was killed in an accidental bomb explosion in Abyan [14].  They said that Qahtani was working with a device when it prematurely detonated and killed him [14].  The US officials did not say from where they received their intelligence, but also stated that the US had nothing to do with the death [14].  This also seems unlikely as it has been mentioned that premature detonations of explosive materials being handled by wanted militants are common cover stories for covert assassinations [15,16].  With JSOC hunting down so many AQAP militants in the region, Qahtani’s name would definitely have been on their list.  Thus, it makes sense that it was a US military operation that killed the young man and that his death was being covered, either by the Americans or AQAP itself.  AQAP finally released a biography of Qahtani, penned by Walid al-Assiri (under the name Abu Khalid al-Assiri), in December of 2010 [10].  This publication (the 4th issue of “Martyrs of the Peninsula”) also does not state the time or location of Qahtani’s death, although alludes to the fact that he had recently taken up more military aspects of the jihadist lifestyle as opposed to purely propagandizing [10]. 

Qahtani’s death and importance in AQAP were questioned by his mother and brother in the days to come [17].  As mentioned, Qahtani had left for Yemen around 2007 to join militants and trained there with AQAP elements [10,17].  His family emphasized that he had not received any militant training in either Iraq or Afghanistan, yet it must be mentioned that AQAP had not made these particular claims about Qahtani either [10,17].  Qahtani’s brother Said stated that Naif was too immature, taciturn, and impressionable to have been an effective leader for AQAP and that his status was an overhyped creation of the Saudis and Yemenis [17].   The young Saudi had left a pregnant wife when he joined AQAP and Said claimed that Naif intended to abandon militancy and come home in order to see, for the first time, his son Mohamed [17].  This statement was made during their last phone conversation, but during the call Naif quickly changed tones and became hostile once again [17].  After Naif disappeared he had remained in sporadic contact with his family although he disregarded requests by his mother and brothers to repent and return [17].  According to Said, he had become extremely radicalized and eventually, prior to 2010, the family was incorrectly told that Naif had been killed in Yemen [17].  This report’s untruth was proved when Naif called his family during the Yemenis’ conflict with the Houthi rebels along the Saudi border [17].  Said had wished after that first report that his younger brother was indeed dead, in order to relieve the pressure on his family and help heal their name [17].  Since they had been told of his death once before, Qahtani’s family felt sure he would be seen alive once again [17].  This time though, Qahtani really was deceasad, yet the circumstances in which he died were the unknown factors.

One last theory as to how Qahtani perished was put forward in Saudi newspapers.  The story hearkens back to the Yemeni claim that the al-Majalah attack had killed two members of List E [5].  The Saudi Gazette reported in late May of 2010 that Qahtani was killed in this strike and subsequently buried by his peers [5].  His death had not been initially known or reported, and AQAP worked to hide the news [5].  Two other members of List E had been wounded and taken to a hospital in Lawdr where they were rescued by their comrades from certain arrest [5].  This theory still does not explain who the second List E member killed might have been.  Nor does it explain the specifics of why AQAP would want to hide the death.  With other deaths, they had been quick to release statements proclaiming the martyrdom of their fallen.  However, as mentioned at the beginning of this Segment, the Saudis and Yemenis had originally been confidant that Ibrahim al-Najdi (Abdullah Farraj al-Juwair E-46) was neutralized in the Majalah airstrike, before that body was revealed to actually be a non-listed Saudi.  So, the Saudis may well have reported what they believed to be true with the two deceased List E members:  Qahtani dead and Juwair believed to be dead.  Further evidence comes from the timeline given by Qahtani’s family.  They explained that they last spoke to him on the phone during the Houthi conflict of late 2009, which peaked during Saudi intervention in November of that year [17,18].  The lack of communication since the time period right before the Majalah strikes occurred seems to give credence to this idea of Qahtani’s demise.  Plus, AQAP was intent on manipulating the civilian deaths of Majalah for propaganda and their own gain [19].  Therefore admitting that the strikes did lead to the death of a major figure like Qahtani, and that his presence within the camp had endangered all of the women and children, was not an option for the organization.  This may explain why false intelligence concerning the death was spread by AQAP, including the obviously untrue assertion by Abdulilah al-Shayi that Qahtani had been gunned down by Saudi forces.  However, the Majalah version of Qahtani’s demise remains just a theory.  There is no doubt that Qahtani is dead, but the why and how of the situation persists as a mystery.  Most likely he was killed in a US operation.  The JSOC strikes and supposed ground operations in Yemen were not inflicting a heavy toll on AQAP, but they were slowly degrading important elements.  Meanwhile, the US military continued to seek in Yemen, the same freedom enjoyed by the drone campaign in Pakistan.

Inadvertant Assassination

The news of Qahtani’s death, the suspicious series of explanations as to its occurrence, was washed out in the media by the story of a controversial US strike on May 24, 2010.  On that Monday night in the Wadi Abida district of Marib province, deputy governor Jabir Ali al-Shabwani was meeting with a local militant named Mohamed Said Jardan in order to secure the man’s surrender to the Yemeni government [20,21,22,23].  Although these surrenders usually are nonsensical and lead to the release of the militants shortly thereafter, Shabwani had been acting as a mediator between the government and the radicals [20,21,22,23].  As mentioned, Shabwani’s cousin Ayed was the leading militant in the province, thus Jabir had significant connections [25].  This night however, JSOC chose to target Jardan in a strike in order to remove whatever threat he may have posed.  Jardan was revealed to actually be Ali Said Jamil al-Obaidi, also known as Muwahid al-Maribi [26], and was also stated to be a primary leader of AQAP in the province of Marib [20].  Ali Said Jamil was a known member of AQAP who had engaged with Yemeni forces in the famous “Battle of Marib,” and thus became wanted by his government as a dangerous militant [26,27].  Together with his brother Ismail, he was very influential within the Wadi Abida district [28].

Although it was asserted that a Predator drone was used in the strike, it was initially in doubt, as the Yemeni government yet again claimed responsibility for this strike [23,25].  The precision of the strike reflected the sincere possibility however that a drone was used, as do the series of reports after that reference a drone strike [25,29].  Furthermore, US officials eventually claimed the precise airstrike [30].  Regardless of the precision of the missiles, the accuracy of the airstrike proved to be poor.  Deputy Governor Jabir Ali al-Shabwani was hit instead of the intended target.  Shabwani and two of his bodyguards were killed, while his Uncle Fahd al-Shabwani and others were wounded [20,21,22,23,25]. The US government was both angry and embarrassed at the incident and the locals rose up against the Yemeni government [29,31].  Jabir’s father and members of his tribe attacked an oil pipeline which crossed Marib province in response to the death of his son [29].  Others continued a lengthy series of attacks against security forces and government installations in the months to come within Marib, before tribal mediation quelled the rising violence between government and tribal forces [29].  Ali Said Jamil meanwhile was wounded in the strike but survived and escaped [20].  The US apparently did not realize the possibility of a deputy governor being at the site of the strike and suspiciously the intelligence gathering had been conducted by the Yemenis [31].  Some US military officials later asserted that they were purposefully given poor intelligence by the Yemenis and that JSOC neglected to have the most up to date information available [31].  Yemeni officials may have manipulated the drone campaign to assassinate one of their own.  Some tribal sources aimed their anger towards AQAP as well and claimed that Ali Said Jamil had lured the deputy governor into false surrender negotiations knowing that he would be targeted [32].  He was thus disowned by his own tribe and family for causing such unrest in Marib.  Among the violent incidents which occurred after the strike, an AQAP commander named Hassan Abdullah al-Aqili, led a successful assassination of Yemeni General Mohamed Saleh al-Shayef in Marib, further inflaming the government/military/tribal relations of the region, and leading specifically to the destruction of the Marib pipeline [29].  Aqili was also disowned by his family [32].

After these incidents, all US military strikes were noticeably halted in Yemen.  It is conceivable that elements of the Yemeni government, sympathetic to AQAP could have helped to arrange the death of a public official.  The resulting outcry would negatively affect the US military’s campaign in Yemen, a theory which turned out to be true.  AQAP, through the death of Jabir al-Shabwani, had won itself a reprieve.  Wuhaishi and his core leadership had survived the first salvo of US firepower aimed at them and remained almost completely intact.  The Americans would no longer “occupy the sky,” and this absence gave AQAP the time needed to regain their own supremacy.  As such, they continued to attempt to find clever ways to strike at the Saudis and Americans through the air. 

Inspire and Infuriate

Next, AQAP released a video that gave remarkable insight into their propaganda and ever evolving structure.  The hour long video, entitled “America and the Final Trap,” included three prominent speakers interspersed throughout.  They were Qasim al-Rimi, USS COLE bombing conspirator Fahd al-Quso, and Othman Ahmed al-Omaira al-Ghamdi (E-53), the former Guantanamo prisoner [33].  The men spoke heavily on the al-Majalah strike and attempted to capitalize on the fact that so many civilians had died [33].  They were using the attack in order to try and turn public sentiment in their favor due to the Yemeni government’s cooperation with the Americans on the recent airstrikes.  The video highlights Quso’s expanding role in the organization and proved that he had been back in the jihadist community since his 2007 prison release [33].  Also, Ghamdi was revealed to have been promoted from a mere fighter to a field commander after the deaths of other ranking jihadists [33].

Othman al-Ghamdi from America and the Final Trap
Fahd al-Quso from America and the Final Trap
Qasim al-Rimi from America and the Final Trap

In fact, the video eulogized three AQAP officers killed in the winter operations.  The biographies of these men, Mohamed Saleh al-Kazemi, Mohamed Ahmed Saleh Omayr al-Kalawi al-Awlaki, and Abdullah al-Mihdhar removed any doubt as to whether or not they were AQAP members of some significance [33].  The video stated that they were mujahidin fighters and highlighted Kazemi, whom they referred to as Abu Saleh al-Kazemi, for his time in Afghanistan as well as in a Saudi prison [33].  The video showcased Mohamed al-Awlaki as a vibrant student of Islam, a public speaker, and an ideologue for the group, profiling many statements from him [33].  Finally, in a biography of Mihdhar, the group claimed that he was more than just a Yemeni criminal, but rather was a devoted mujahidin who had sought out the chance to fight abroad but instead waged war at home [33].  The video confirmed that Mihdhar had been a member of Abu Ali al-Harithi’s cell, as was mentioned earlier in this Segment, and that he died while fighting valiantly against the American and Yemeni government oppression of their people and organization [33].  While the video offered the best evidence as to their importance to the organization, the strikes and circumstances that killed these men were still being used to galvanize other fighters to join the militants and sway public opinion in favor of AQAP.

Perhaps this effective use of propaganda in the impoverished country did yield some results as AQAP ramped up its attacks against internal targets during the summer of 2010.  They also expanded upon their communication machine when they began to publish the aptly named English language magazine Inspire [34].  The periodical was edited by Samir Zafar Khan, the young jihadist from North Carolina who had met with the Christmas day bomber during training [35,36].  Khan, a Pakistani-American born in Riyadh, had been raised in New York and North Carolina before travelling to Yemen in 2009 in order to act upon his radical religious beliefs [36,37].  Despite earnest attempts from his family and community to persuade Khan in a direction other than extremism, the young man grew more and more militant [36].  While still in America he gained a small name for himself by hosting a radical blog [37].  Once in Yemen, AQAP used his mastery of the English language to their advantage as can be seen by Khan’s publication [38].  The magazine was designed to do just what its title implied:  to inspire individuals like Khan himself, Major Nidal Hasan, and others to join the group or wage jihad against Western interests independently.  The first issue included a plethora of articles, including an interview with Wuhaishi in which he stated that America was forcing his hand into attacking, due to their human rights violations and their supposed war on Islam [38].  Wuhaishi also played up the failed Christmas day bombing as a success against American security [38].  The magazine also consisted of disturbing pieces such as “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom,” “What to Expect in Jihad,” and statements by ideologues such as Anwar al-Awlaki [38].  Several messages were recycled statements from Abu Musab al-Suri, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden himself [38].  Others were more personal as was the case with “The Fight over the Mountains,” by former Guantanamo detainee Adnan Mohamed al-Sayegh (E-55), which highlighted his experiences fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan prior to the 9/11 attacks [38]. 

Cover of First Issue of Inspire

Army of the Caliphate

On July 11, 2010, the same day as Khan’s first Inspire issue was fully published [39], the Yemenis made an announcement that it had broken up an important AQAP cell in Hadhramout, led by a man with a familiar name [40].  During the week before, on July 6, security forces raided a home in Mukallah, Hadramout which resulted in a gun fight.  Three soldiers were killed in the battle and two AQAP suspects were arrested [40].  Several others escaped, but in the coming days eight members of the cell were arrested including one wanted Saudi [40].  He was Abdullah Farraj Mohamed Hamud al-Juwair (E-46), the brother of Fahd Farraj al-Juwair, the deceased former AQSA commander [40].  The group was plotting attacks against strategic Yemeni installations and at least one suicide bomb vest was obtained in the initial raid [40].  The Yemenis gleaned important intelligence from Juwair, including his involvement in the large AQAP presence in and around Saada during the Houthi conflict of late 2009 [41].  During this time period, AQAP had actively sent members to perpetrate attacks within Saudi Arabia [42].  Juwair was involved in yet another plot to attack within the Kingdom during the period of December 2009 [41].  Juwair’s immediate group was led by a Saudi militant named Ahmed Abdulaziz al-Jasser [41].  This newly named AQAP militant was revealed to be playing a large role in organizing AQAP operations aimed externally at the Saudis and internally at the Yemenis [41,43].  The Yemenis announced a huge reward for information leading to Jasser and another of his Saudi accomplices named Turki Saad Mohamed Qalis al-Shahrani on October 20, 2010 [43].  Jasser and his cohorts were operating along the Saudi Arabian/Yemeni border province of Saada [41].  The AQAP contingent in Saada and northern Yemen had contained deceased members Fahd al-Jutaili, Yusef al-Shehri, Rayed al-Harbi, Mohamed al-Rashid, Sultan al-Otaibi and others [42,44], and now Juwair was one of four AQAP accomplices of Jasser’s who factored into List E [41].  Another, Naif al-Qahtani had already since perished [41].  Qahtani, according to his brother Said, had indeed been along the northern Yemeni border during the outburst of battles with the Houthis [17].  Murtada Ali Said al-Makram (E-76), a former Guantanamo prisoner, and Walid Ali Mishafi al-Assiri (E-83) rounded out Jasser’s major cohorts [41].  Assiri was described as a religious leader for the AQAP militants in the north, while Juwair admitted to having fought in Iraq before using a false passport to enter Yemen and join AQAP [41].  Juwair’s confession led to the Yemenis issuing an arrest warrant and reward for Jasser [41,43].  It later appeared as if Yemen had retained custody of Juwair as there were no reports of his extradition back to Saudi Arabia.  However, he did not remain in Yemeni confinement for long as will be discussed in the next Segment. 

In addition to Juwair’s arrest, the Yemenis announced on August 19, 2010, that Hizam al-Mujali had surrendered to them [45].  Perhaps, with US airstrikes occurring earlier in the year Mujali wanted the reassurance of being in Yemeni custody and gaining a security guarantee with the protection it encompassed.  As mentioned, Mujali’s brother Arif had been earlier arrested in the raids of Arhab on December 17, 2009 before being released in April of 2010.  It is unknown how long if at all Hizam remained in custody. 

The summer of 2010 was a time in which the most dedicated and stalwart followers of Wuhaishi and AQAP came out in force and began a campaign of attacks and assassinations [46].  These events were aimed at destabilizing the Yemeni government and allowing the paramilitary organization that AQAP was becoming to gain a foothold in the country as far as territory and political gains were concerned.  AQAP released a statement during this time claiming to have built a 12,000 man strong army prepared to take the fight to the Yemeni government [46] – [A].  The gross exaggeration of strength was released via audiotape recorded by political prison escapee Mohamed Said Hassan Ali al-Umdah (Abu Gharib al-Taizi, G-6) [46].  “We have good news for the Islamic nation, that an army of 12,000 fighters is being prepared in Aden and Abyan…By this army, we will establish an Islamic Caliphate,” the former detainee and bin Laden bodyguard proclaimed, further addressing the Yemeni government, “This is a message to the Yemeni government security and the National Security Service:  Our swords are ready and we are resolved to cleanse the land…You are covering for American crimes (a reference to the al-Majalah airstrikes and other events) to subjugate the people of this country to serve US interests in the region.  These crimes will be responded to decisively [46].” 

With the dearth of airstrikes aimed at upending their creative efforts, AQAP next launched a unique and truly frightening attempt at delivering explosives into America. This conspiracy was again centered on the skills of Ibrahim al-Assiri. Yet the US and their allies seemingly possessed another unique method in which to potentially disrupt the jihadists.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] The initial rounds of the ensuing fighting will be discussed thoroughly in the Chapters of Segment IX. 

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

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