SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 28 – A Mistake At Al-Majalah)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment VIII – Occupation Of The Sky (Chapter 28 – A Mistake At Al-Majalah)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

Coinciding with the horror at Fort Hood, American authorities in late 2009 manuevered to directly and overtly intervene in Yemen against AQAP for the first time. The intricacies of a new US Administration combined with the need for retaliation against the extremists result in a complex military scenario in a primitive environment. Along with Yemeni raids, the American response is both flawed and brutal.

Simultaneous Objectives

Mohamed Saleh al-Kazemi

A former prisoner of the Yemeni PSO worked diligently on December 17, 2009, digging a well near the village of al-Majalah, in the Abyan province of Yemen [1-3].  The man, a Saudi, lived within the al-Ambori tribe, had married into them, and was a respected local militant leader [3-5].  In this remote area he not only provided for his family and tribal followers, but allegedly was providing a base of training and operations for AQAP jihadists [5,6,3].  Despite this, as he and an associate dug the well, the man was living freely in Yemen, having been released by the PSO after the intervention of his tribe [2,5,6].  The Yemenis supposedly allowed him free movement even though they knew of his dangerous connections, his militant past, and his suspect associations [2].  Stronger than these linkages was the fact that he was closely associated with Yemeni security forces as well [2].  Mohamed Saleh Mohamed Ali al-Kazemi fought in Afghanistan before coming to Yemen and was part of an eleven man cell described in Segment VI, which also contained four members of List G (February 2006 Sanaa prison escapees) [1,7,8].  After his conviction, and due to the persistent demands from his tribe to the government, he had been released [1,5,6].  His name reappeared as a part of the 2007 AQAP cell led by Abu Basir al-Yemeni (Nasir al-Wuhaishi), which essentially rebuilt the Arabian Al-Qaida franchise [2,7,9].  This cell was responsible for the car bombing deaths of seven Spanish tourists [2,7,9].  Despite this fact, and the observation that Kazemi was living openly in al-Majalah, he had not been targeted or apprehended by Yemeni authorities [2,4].  Kazemi seemed to be leading a normal life yet American intelligence saw a much different picture [10,11].  As such, on this December day the US military selected the man for death [11].

Simultaneously in Arhab district, Sanaa province, Hani Abdah Muslih Shaalan was training and preparing for a martyrdom operation [12].  He and his fellow jihadists, under the eager eye of Wuhaishi’s AQAP, were preparing to launch devastating attacks on targets within Sanaa [5,12].  As such, Shaalan was said to be participating in a plan to strike the British Embassy [12].  The cell was also preparing to hit other foreign targets as well as Yemeni government installations and figures [5,12].  While the American government readied themselves for their first airstrikes in Yemen since 2002, a contingent of Yemeni commandos trained by US Special Forces equally prepared for raids in much more populated areas against their foes [13]. 

The US had chosen Kazemi as a primary target due to the belief that he was actively plotting to attack the US Embassy in Sanaa [11].  The intelligence pointed to the fact that Kazemi and his men were prepared to strike [11].  The US was eager to avoid another Embassy attack similar to the one which had taken place over a year prior.  Kazemi was said to be training suicide bombers outside of al-Majalah at the camp [5,6,11].  The camp and the settlement of tribal nomads were located in very close proximity to one another if indeed a camp existed [3].  This supposed camp was said to have been overseen by influential local jihadists such as Abdulmunim al-Fathani and Tariq al-Fadhli [2].  (Fathani was said to be linked to the Nashiri network [14] and Fadhli was a known jihadist with a long history in Yemeni politics [15]).  The US military made the decision to strike Kazemi and other targets in Yemen preemptively in order to prevent carnage in Sanaa and at their Embassy [11].  Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), in charge of US Special Forces in the region, had codenamed their targets after cities in Ohio [11].  On December 17, 2009, Kazemi was known as Objective Akron [11]. 

In the Arhab district of Sanaa governate, AQAP was preparing eight suicide bombers for the operations in Yemeni capital against the British Embassy and other unspecified targets [3,5].  Shaalan’s group was led by familiar AQAP personalities Hizam and Arif Mujali (G-13, G-14) [5].  The Mujali brothers had been close associates of Fawaz al-Rubayi and worked under Abu Ali al-Harithi and thus also Nashiri back in the early days of al-Qaida’s operations in the Peninsula [16,17].  Shaalan, meanwhile, was seemingly an unknown individual, yet he was in fact notable for something entirely different.  The man was a member of quite an exclusive group of Yemenis.  Shaalan was one of a very few Yemenis to have been released from the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center [18].  In fact, as late as 2013, the majority of the remaining prisoners in the detention facility were Yemeni [19].  This was due to the fear that these alleged militants would not be properly held within their homeland, and would be released only to wage jihad once again [19].  Shaalan would be cited as an example of just this type of scenario in the future [20].  Shaalan (ISN 225) had been influenced by radical clerics in Yemen and recruited into the folds of Al-Qaida [21].  By the spring of 2001 he left Yemen for Pakistan and eventually arrived in Afghanistan [21].  He stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses, conducted training (most likely at al-Faruq), and subsequently fought on the front lines with Brigade 55 at Bagram near Kabul [21].  He was said to have been merely a cook for the other fighters [21,12].  Yet an online eulogy instead offered a glimpse of Shaalan as a brave jihadist fighter referred to as Abu Salman al-Sanaani [22].  After the US bombing campaign commenced, Shaalan found himself fighting at Tora Bora before crossing the Pakistani border while fleeing the intensity of the fight [21,22].  According to a close friend, Shaalan was among the last fighters to withdraw from Tora Bora, alongside of the militant commander of this storied battle, Ibn Sheikh al-Libi (Ali al-Fakhiri) [22].

Hani Abdah Muslih Shaalan

Kazemi also fought in Afghanistan but made it back to the Arabian Peninsula to continue his jihad [2,4,8].  As mentioned, he was arrested in Yemen as part of the eleven man cell charged with trying to form a militant cell within the country [8].  They were also charged with attempting to assist and join militants in Iraq or Afghanistan [1,8].  Charged and sentenced to two years imprisonment with Kazemi were Saddam Hussein al-Husaimi, Ahmed al-Qardai, Abdullah al-Wadai (G-23), Faris al-Barraq and Shafiq Ahmed Omar Zayed (G-15) [1].  The other defendants were acquitted [1].  Although the men were acquitted and released, many later proved to be violent jihadists.  In addition to the nefarious escapees, one of the eleven man group, Saddam Hussein al-Husaimi, gained infamy in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theatre, as the handler for infamous suicide bomber Abu Dujana al-Khorasani [23,24].  Husaimi was also said to have been a student in South Waziristan of al-Qaida bomb maker and chemical expert Abu Khabab al-Masri (Midhat Mursi Said al-Omar) [23].  Kazemi meanwhile avoided such notoriety and had eluded Yemeni authorities since his release and reintroduction to militancy.  It appeared that after the initial surge of interest in destroying Wuhaishi’s original AQAP cell in the summer of 2007, the efforts had waned and the Yemenis were actually doing very little to combat the remainders.  While some local AQAP members were killed (Ali Doha, Abdulaziz Jardan and Naji Jardan), and a known Egyptian militant not strongly tied to any plot was assassinated (Ahmed Bassiouni Dewider), the staunchest elements of the group, and the foreigners such as Kazemi remained alive and at large [9,25,26].  Some accused the Yemenis of assisting the militants and of using them to help in the government’s political wars, such as combating the Shiite Houthis in the north [27,28].  AQAP meanwhile grew stronger and was actively attacking government installations, institutions, and personalities that did not mesh with their belief systems.  They were also attacking those individuals and institutions that were not on friendly terms with their organization.  The Americans had thus decided that it was time to intervene.  After a vivid legal debate about assassinations being conducting in the Arabian Peninsula, the US government relented and allowed the military to strike [11].

In addition to Objective Akron (Kazemi), the military also had Objectives Toledo and Cleveland [11].  Government lawyers determined that Toledo was fair game, and thus the Yemeni commandos were sent in to kill the target [11].  Although it was not confirmed who Toledo really might have been, the best estimate is that he was Qasim al-Rimi.  The military chief of AQAP was, along with Shaalan, in Arhab district that day [5].  Shaalan’s disturbing slip back into militancy may be attributed to men like Rimi, who convinced youth like him to train and die for the jihadist cause.  After his capture in Pakistan, Shaalan was considered of only medium risk and of low intelligence value while in Guantanamo [12,21].  Shaalan was considered so minimal a threat that he was released on June 18, 2007 into PSO custody in Yemen [12,18].  The Yemenis obviously did not keep Shaalan incarcerated [12].  He was set free and rejoined his criminal activities [5].  Perhaps Shaalan was a dedicated radical throughout his detention, or perhaps the detention sent Shaalan over the edge.  Perhaps the man was recruited into AQAP because of status as a former Guantanamo Bay detainee.  Men like Said al-Shehri had achieved status in the organization due to this fact.  Regardless of what may have radicalized him, by the time the commandos descended upon him, Shaalan was fully dedicated to fight to the death.  As is indicative of a lot of religious fundamentalist organizations though, his leaders were not [5].

As the commandos attempted to kill their primary target, a red Nissan sped away from the scene in the area of al-Tabbah [5].  Inside the vehicle were Hizam al-Mujali and Qasim al-Rimi along with an unidentified militant [5].  Rimi and Mujali left their men to fend for themselves elsewhere in Arhab.  The raid in the Nawbah area of Arhab netted the bombs and materials to be used in the upcoming Sanaa operations [5].  The bombs showed evidence of being constructed by the same individual who created AQAP’s previous well-conceived devices of destruction:  Ibrahim al-Assiri (E-1) [5].  The commandos killed three of the AQAP fighters in Nawbah, during the raid [5].  Two of the men were later identified as Muti al-Ratas and Samir al-Mutairi [5].  The third jihadist shot down in the raid was Hani Shaalan [5,12,22].  His recidivist days had been extinguished short of his martyrdom operation.

In the last portion of the Arhab raid, the commandos were ambushed by AQAP militants and engaged them in a gun fight at Bait Mujali until eight combatants were eventually apprehended [5].  It is surprising that these eight men were not killed in the battle, as history displays that these types of engagements end with jihadists fighting to their deaths.  The eight arrested were identified as Qasim al-Esami, Ali al-Qutaish, Faraj Hadi Masoud al-Ghodra, Radman Hadi Masoud al-Ghodra, Abdullah Mushin al-Hakami, Ahmed Muhsin al-Hakami, Ahmed Ali Saleh al-Muharis and Arif al-Mujali (G-14) [5].  As can be seen, in addition to the Mujali brothers, more sets of brothers were involved in the plots as well.  AQAP was certainly taking advantage of familial loyalties, tribal ties, and local allegiances to fill their ranks.  With a Sanaa Political Prison escapee such as Arif Mujali involved in the raid, the Yemenis may have been more willing to capture him alive than to kill him, although this is pure speculation. 

Tomahawks at al-Majalah

Meanwhile, in Abyan province, the nomads living next to the alleged al-Qaida camp outside of al-Majalah had come under siege by a literal rain of fire [29,30,10,11].  Five Tomahawk Cruise missiles containing cluster bombs descended upon the settlement [29,30,10,11].  Mohamed Saleh al-Kazemi was dead, yet in addition to the militant and some of his men it was subsequently shown that at least 44 civilians were also killed [2-7,10].  These victims were of the clans which acted as living support for Kazemi and his supposed training camp [10,2,3].  The Yemenis attempted to take credit for the strike but pictures of pieces of US munitions and eventual cable leaks revealed the Americans as the culprits [5,30].  It was said that Objective Toledo (possibly Rimi) was not hit with missile fire due to the risk posed to civilians, yet it seems incredible to think that Kazemi, Objective Akron, was hit with cruise missiles while he was in vicinity of so many of the tribesmen he lived amongst [11].   With CIA strikes in which Predator or Reaper drones are used, firing Hellfire or Scorpion missiles, the death tolls are usually smaller and more specific individuals are killed.  This military operation with cruise missiles and cluster bomblets inexplicably killed many more people than was necessary.  The killing of so many civilians to take out a little known AQAP militant lieutenant was viewed negatively, despite the fact that his death was apparently necessary to prevent suicide attacks against American and Western interests.  While the strikes were initially praised, many questions arose as to why Kazemi had not been targeted in an alternate manner [5,2,3].

Everyone knew that Kazemi was an AQAP militant and that he remained close with members of the group [3].  However, most civilians and his tribal allies saw him as having restructured his life, buying into the local nomadic mode of existence [10].  Kazemi was by all outward appearances a shepherd [10].  In fact, well over 1000 sheep and goats belonging to the tribal group were killed in addition to the 58 human deaths [3,10].  It is believed that Kazemi and his militant allies were using the tribal families as a support structure, having them cook for them, care for them, and provide shelter for them [3,5,6].  If a training camp was in existence, then hiding it amongst a settlement of shepherds made sense as a form of camouflage and protection. 

In addition to Kazemi, his wife and four young children were killed in the strike [10].  They were part of the al-Ambori tribe into which Kazemi had married [10].  As mentioned, a total of 44 civilians were reported to have perished in the bombing [10,13].  In all, 27 members of the Ambori tribe and 14 members of the Haydara tribe were killed [10].  Three additional civilians were later killed by a cluster bomblet that did not initially explode [10,13].  The Yemenis declared that these three deaths occurred due to land mines planted around Kazemi’s camp, which was their attempt to cover up the unexploded US ordinance [5].  Furthermore, it was originally claimed that most of the dead were actual militants, and state sponsored media and Yemeni officials propagated this as fact [4-7].  Unfortunately, most of the dead were women and children within the encampment [10,13].  This was an embarrassing and quite devastating blow to the US efforts against AQAP.  However, the Americans and Yemenis continued to play off the event as a necessary and successful operation for months to come, before the Yemenis admitted the mistake of it in March 2010 [2].

As can be seen, the Abyan airstrike at al-Majalah was a very confusing yet very pivotal moment in the battle against AQAP.  It introduced direct US action against the militants after a respite of seven years.  The US assertion that Kazemi was in the midst of planning the aforementioned suicide attacks in Sanaa, and the fact that they were willing to use cruise missiles against him, gives credence to the story that he was an significant character [11].  This must be coupled yet again with his history and with local sources of knowledge admitting that Kazemi was indeed an AQAP militant under Wuhaishi’s command [1,3].  However, these sources also claimed that while he was an AQAP member, Kazemi had no training camps at al-Majalah and should have been arrested or killed separate from his family and nomadic allies [2,3].  In the end, the truth of the matter is one very difficult to flesh out.  It seems to make little sense why Kazemi was not targeted in a much simpler and precise operation, even though he was working for Wuhaishi.  Perhaps the fear of letting any of Kazemi’s supposed suicide bombers escape was what led to the decision of using the cruise missiles.  As mentioned, Kazemi was also reported to have had close ties with security forces, accounting for why he was able to move about so freely and why he had not been corralled earlier for his role in the deaths of the seven Spanish tourists [2].  Some Yemeni sources professed that Kazemi was allowed free movement between Shabwa and Abyan provinces where he operated for AQAP [2].  If his movements were that unrestricted, then Kazemi probably did little to hide himself, therefore his death or capture could have been accomplished in a cleaner action.  However, State Department lawyer and legal advisor Jeh Johnson, who helped to make the decision to target Kazemi, saw video of the strike and claimed that there was indeed a training camp under fire that fateful day, amidst the civilian population [11].  Thus if the US intelligence was partially correct as to Kazemi’s encampment, then the explanation for the cruise missiles is apparent:  The complete obliteration of Kazemi and his men before their activation.  It must also be mentioned that Gregory Johnsen, in The Last Refuge, refuted the claim of a large training camp and pointed out that Kazemi and any men with him were guests of the nomads [31].   

The reckless actions of the Abyan bombing led to the deaths of so many civilians and were used as a propaganda coupe by Wuhaishi and his men [32].  The arrest of the younger Mujali brother could not be seen as a full victory either, since his history proved that he would most likely be released yet again.  The other militants and/or potential suicide bombers in training killed with Kazemi were shrouded in mystery as well.  While 58 were believed killed in the airstrike, only 44 were reported as civilians, thus some must have been militants with Kazemi, although this becomes a gray area [10].  For instance, tribal elder Abdullah Sheikh Awadh, aged 65, could be considered as one of the civilians killed in the strike due to his position within the Ambori tribe, yet sources did not list him as such, but rather as a leading local militant who was killed along with his family [10,5,33].  Two of his sons, Muqbil and Ahmed, were listed as militants killed in the bombing as well [5,10,33,34].  Other supposed combatants killed were listed as:  Mithaq al-Jalad, Samir Sheikh Mohamed Amqida (cousin of Abdulmunim al-Fathani), Mohamed Mohamed Rajeh al-Tharan, and others [5,33,35].  Awadh and Kazemi were purported to run the training camp and use their families as logistics support, and in fact, Kazemi was married to Awadh’s daughter [5,10]. 

It was also initially reported that only two Saudis died in the strike:  Kazemi and another militant listed as Mohamed Mohamed Rajeh al-Tharan [2,5,33,35].  This militant’s death was also reported under the name Ibrahim al-Najdi, though this is a kunya of List E member Abdullah Farraj al-Juwair (E-46) [36].  It appears to be a case of mistaken identity as initial reports stated that a body was found with Tharan’s identification and that the government believed it was Najdi [5,33,35]. Thus, it appears Tharan was mistaken for Juwair and the latter remained alive for future engagements [36].  Others killed in the Mujalah strike were said to have been buried before they could be identified, possibly including more Saudis [5].  Saudi media was quick to claim success with the strike as well, as two Saudis from List E were originally stated to have been killed, including Najdi (Juwair) [35].  Several other wounded militants were taken to Lawdr district and hospitalized; some of them later escaping with help from AQAP [5,35].  The Yemenis reported that two of these men were on List E [35].  In the end, it can be positively confirmed that Kazemi and Tharan were two Saudis killed in the strike, although neither appear on List E. 

Strike on Xmas Eve

Following the Abyan strike, it was reported that Wuhaishi and other top AQAP militants met at the house of Abdulmunim al-Fathani (supposedly the associate of Kazemi who helped him found the camp) near al-Majalah to discuss the incident [5].  The US did not strike the populated area containing the home, although it is unsure if they even knew that a meeting occurred [5].  The conference was also attended by Badr Saud Owaid al-Awfi al-Harbi (E-15) the cousin of Mohamed Atiq al-Awfi al-Harbi [5,37].  Other reactions to the strike included a visit to the area by local tribal leaders, who implored a neutral governmental investigation into the bombing and its civilian casualties [3].  AQAP was also represented at this December 21 gathering in al-Majalah [3].  A man identified as Mohamed Ahmed Saleh Omayr al-Kalawi al-Awlaki (Mohamed Ahmed Saleh al-Awlaki) rallied the crowd and expressed rage at the strikes, as well as demanding vengeance for the victims [3,38,39].  Kalawi was from Shabwa province and a member of the Awlaki tribe [40].  He was a close cousin and associate of Fahd al-Quso [3,40].  At the rally, Kalawi exclaimed that “The war in Yemen is between Al Qaida and US, and not between Al Qaida and the Yemeni army,” which was said in an attempt to draw attention away from the growing AQAP campaign against elements of the Yemeni government [3].   “The soldiers should understand that we do not want to fight them, there is no problem between us and soldiers, the problem is between us and America, so, they must not stand with America; the victory is coming soon for us [3].”  Quso’s relative rallied the crowd but it would become clear that he was followed back to his hideout by American military surveillance.

On Christmas Eve 2009, the US military struck again, bombarding the hideout of Mohamed Ahmed Saleh al-Awlaki (Kalawi), killing him and four associates [13,39-41].  All of the dead were said to be militants in league with the wanted Quso [40].  Initially, the early morning bombing in Wadi Rafadh, Shabwa province was purported to have killed 34 AQAP militants at the hideout of Anwar al-Awlaki [39-43].  Allegedly, Nasir al-Wuhaishi was also at the meeting [39,41].  The media ran with these falsehoods because the Yemeni government claimed that Awlaki, Wuhaishi, and Shehri were present when they were not [43].  In reality, Kalawi was the primary target and only 5 AQAP elements were killed [40,41,44].  All of the dead were of the Awlaki tribe, which may have led to the speculation that Anwar al-Awlaki had been assassinated or targeted [40].  One of them was identified as Saad al-Fathani, perhaps another relative of the AQAP associate Abdulmunim al-Fathani [39].  The Yemenis initially took credit for the bombing via their Embassy press release, yet leaked US diplomatic cables and human rights reports revealed that it was indeed an American operation, along with the previous Majalah strike [43,13].  However, what was not explained was just exactly why Kalawi was targeted.  Kalawi may have been described as a primary al-Qaida point man in Yemen prior to Wuhaishi’s restructuring of the network [44].  One report claims someone by the name of Mohamed Omair al-Awlaki (possibly the same as Kalawi) was a significant player in militancy within the country from the late 1990s up until Wuhaishi’s escape from prison [44].  This may or may not be accurate.  However, this report of the leadership potential of Mohamed Saleh al-Awlaki may account for the need felt by the Americans to carry out the assassination.  If nothing else, he was obviously acting for AQAP during his rally on December 21, and possibly could have led the US to more valuable targets.  In fact, Fahd al-Quso, as Kalawi’s relative, had also been residing in Wadi Rafadh since his release from prison, although he was unharmed in this strike [45].   

For better or worse, America was now a combatan in the conflict revolving around AQAP and Yemen. In the next chapter, we examine the AQAP response to the developing hostilities, solidifying the network as the most pertinent threat to the US homeland.

CITATIONS:

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a comment