SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Mesopotamian Expansion

Written by Nolan R Beasley

With Hassan Ghul captured in early 2004, the intrinsic bond of the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies may have been imperiled, but Ghul’s interrogation displayed the organizations’ adamant intent on merging, and the unlikelihood that lines would be severed. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abdulhadi al-Iraqi worked to reopen the communications between central al-Qaida and Iraq1. According to Ghul, Zarqawi intended on trading missiles and chemical agents to Abdulhadi in exchange for specific personnel, equipment, and instruction2. Zarqawi also conceded that in order for the two entities to coalesce, he would negotiate any disdain or existing arguments with Abdulhadi, so as the two could labor together as partners3. The Arabs of the Shakai valley were fatigued, and this new theatre offered rejuvenation, necessitating a connection that had to be reestablished4.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Abu Jafar al-Iraqi

This was accomplished via a courier named Abu Jafar al-Iraqi during the middle of 20045. There was an Abu Jafar al-Iraqi, whose name was identified on a list of al-Qaida associates discovered on the computer of Mustafa al-Hawsawi upon the latter’s capture in Rawalpindi6. According to Guantanamo detainees, Abu Jafar al-Iraqi acted as a facilitator for the jihadist networks, recruiting out of Syria and the Levant7, yet it was noted that the eventual courier was not initially laboring for al-Qaida, but was instead a close associate of Abu Zubaydah8. Abu Faraj al-Libi confirmed to bin Laden that Abu Jafar was affiliated with Abu Zubaydah and Ibn Sheikh al-Libi of the Khaldan camp infrastructure9. Regardless, he now was the senior emissary from Zarqawi to al-Qaida10. His actual identity appears to be Laith Ibrahim Abdulfatah al-Farha11 – [A]. Abu Faraj was compelled to meet with Abu Jafar without Abdulhadi, owing to the envoy’s rushed schedule12. The Libyan eagerly accepted this condition13. This was an interesting development, as Abu Faraj purported that Abdulhadi was elsewhere, unable to travel14. While Abdulhadi may have been the preferred mediator due to his preexisting relationship with the contact, one must wonder whether Abu Faraj desired to engage the courier sans the interference from the troublesome militant.

Abu Jafar presented a situation ripe for al-Qaida manipulation and intervention. The courier clarified the al-Qaida knowledge and understanding of circumstances in the tumultuous nation, and in addition hand delivered a Zarqawi message15. Based on accounts from June 2004, almost all militant operations in Iraq were already under the command of and conducted by Zarqawi, with multifarious well-armed groups having sworn to him, composed of abundant operatives from Iraq and beyond16. These numbers were enhanced by exorbitant recruiting through established smuggling routes from neighboring and other nations17. Foreign elements, including a multitude of Saudis, were flooding the militant infrastructure to the point where the influx needed to be restricted, and some trainees returned to their homelands post instruction18. An incredible amount of weaponry and equipment from the Iraqi Army was now the property of the jihadist paramilitary force, with Zarqawi rapidly attempting to purchase and control the Iraqi black market weapons as well19. In fact, the availability of discarded munitions and weapons allowed for Zarqawi to maintain a stable financial situation, often relying on internal methods for financial security, generated by their own local operations as opposed to garnering money from abroad through ransoms20. Abu Jafar referenced that territorial control over many cities was established by Zarqawi’s forces, including within the infamous Fallujah21. In fact, in Fallujah, the security and police forces were corralled and controlled by Zarqawi’s men, ensuring that their custody of the city was token, and the real power rested with the jihadists22. Ramadi, Baqubah, and Samarra were among the others subjected to this dominance, across several provinces23. Ayman al-Zawahiri reiterated these circumstances to bin Laden in a separate correspondence, also reporting that the Iraq based network was establishing cells in neighboring countries (assuredly through the returned trainees) for upcoming operations24.

Early Atrocities

Abu Jafar implicated Zarqawi as the direct culprit in several atrocities from the initial stages of the war25. These actions comprised a series of bombings in 2003 that instigated chaos in the occupied nation. Among them was the infamous suicide bombing of the UN primary HQ compound in Baghdad, resulting in the deaths of 23 civilians including UN Envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira De Mello26. The assassinated Brazilian diplomat was a decades long public servant and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights27. The attacks included a November 12 suicide bombing in Nasiriya, in southern Iraq, an incident in which militants fired upon a compound entrance, allowing a petroleum tanker truck to be driven into an Italian Carabinieri base and detonated28. Nineteen Italians were among those killed, including 12 Carabinieri29. Previously in April, Zarqawi released an audio issuance claiming a dozen major terrorist incidents, including the UN attack30.

As a point of contention, Zarqawi via his envoy, acknowledged responsibility for the attacks on Shiite targets, including mosques and personalities31. Most notorious among them, the August 29, 2003 suicide car bombing that decimated the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Iraq as hordes of worshippers milled around the grounds32. Early reporting held 125 deceased, but chief among them was the Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, the revered spiritual head of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and overall Shia influence in Iraq33. In fact, Hakim was forced into exile to Iran during the reign of Saddam Hussein, but triumphantly regained his proper position in Iraq after the American invasion, to be viewed as a potential ally as a centrist moderate willing to unite Shia factions for the common good34. For Zarqawi to assassinate such a figure, his intentions were confirmed to be malicious and intent on tearing the delicate Iraqi religious and political fabric asunder. Owing to criticisms from al-Qaida and beyond, Zarqawi claimed that these attacks were necessitated as a response to rampant Shia oppression against Sunnis in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government35. This was merely a way to divert from his actual intention of causing untenable sectarian violence, rendering Iraq unoccupiable by the Americans. Particularly, Zarqawi deflected blame to the Badr Corps, a militant unit of the SCIRI, stating that the Americans intended to install them as the security apparatus, and implicating the organization in assaults on Sunni mosques, leaders, and women36. Yet the Badr Corps was mobilized in response to Zarqawi’s lethal campaign, producing a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Even with his output much more prolific than the Afghan insurgency, Zarqawi was able to maintain control over operations, primarily through the staunch loyalty of his subordinates. Much the same as bin Laden, Zarqawi was encircled by enthusiastic and reverent myrmidons. In fact, the Najaf attack was perpetrated by the father of Zarqawi’s second spouse, a man named Yasin Jarrad. A Jordanian native, also of the town Zarqa, Jarrad entered Iraq surreptitiously shortly prior to the attack, and helmed an ambulance burdened with a massive explosive device to the mosque and to his demise37. Thus, Zarqawi could ensure the success of certain operations, given that the perpetrators maintained intimate connections with their commander.

Foreign Element Influence in Iraq

Born Ahmed Fadhil Nazal al-Khalayleh in Zarqa, Jordan, the eventual jihadist demogogue began his career as a common, albeit enterprising street criminal38. Zarqawi was properly radicalized in a Jordanian detention facility in the 1990s, growing obsessed and fanatical in his newfound identity as an enforcer and protector for ideologue Abu Mohamed al-Maqdisi39. Liberated along with his other jihadist adherents following the coronation of the new King Abdullah II in 1999, in a brazen attempt to placate radical religious conservatives, his government later held sincere hesitance and regret over Zarqawi’s freedom40. Authorities went as far as to obtain a guarantee that Zarqawi would abstain from departing the nation41. Instead he fled to Afghanistan in order to join a common community.

In a sense, Zarqawi was tolerated in Afghanistan, as even then his views were strikingly too extreme for bin Laden, particularly on the subject of Shia Islam42. Via the intervention of bin Laden lieutenants, Zarqawi was allowed to operate a camp in Herat province, far from the ordinary al-Qaida infrastructure43. Motivation seems to have centered on countering rival Levantine operators in Afghanistan, and to revamp and expand al-Qaida influence in the Levant (locations to include Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon)44. The Jordanian however, did not swear fealty to bin Laden.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Surviving the American invasion, Zarqawi journeyed to Iraq and engaged in coordination with militants in the northern Kurdish sector of Iraq, sowing the seeds for the future insurrection. Detailed by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in February 2003, Zarqawi was incorrectly described as a sworn al-Qaida operative and asset, with various alleged exploits proving his connection with both Saddam Hussein and nefarious terroristic plotting45. He was the recipient of significant medical care in Baghdad commencing in May 2002, with officials declaring the falsehood of Zarqawi’s leg being amputated46. Despite the inaccuracies, Zarqawi was in fact preparing for the coming war, although he did so independently, and acted as a separate entity until such a time as he could connect with al-Qaida and offer the conditions of a proper merger. By the time these productive communications were progessing, Zarqawi’s insurgency was in full bloom, with lethal attacks and instability plaguing the already critically wounded nation.

In addition to desiring previously discussed resources, Zarqawi also specifically requested the services of certain foreign elements encamped with Abdulhadi. These included Qattal al-Uzbeki and a Palestinian militant known as Osama al-Zargoi47. The Uzbek was likely engaged in human smuggling, bringing additional militants to the base in Shakai, as Hassan Ghul reported that he previously observed Qattal with Janat Ghul, as the latter was engaged in conducting three Arabs to the camp via Iranian routes48. Qattal dwelled in the Shakai safehouse reserved for unaccompanied militants, along with others to include Janat Ghul, Osama al-Filistini (assumed to be Zargoi), the Kurdish Qassam al-Suri, and the Baluchis, Muawiya and Yusef, themselves known for logistics and smuggling routes49. The Kurdish resident was likely the militant Yasin al-Suri. Osama al-Filistini was Abu Ubaidah al-Filistini, known to have escaped the March 2002 Faisalabad raid that netted the infamous Abu Zubaydah50, and later become the author of a multitude of al-Qaida and militant eulogies51. As it happened, Qattal was unavailable for Zarqawi’s request, revealed to be in CIA custody in early 2004, transferred sometime after Hassan Ghul’s own capture52. The Uzbek remained under CIA control for at least 800 days53, and may well have been captured along the same routes that brought Hassan Ghul to Iraq. It is worth noting that Janat Ghul was arrested at approximately the same time and given over to CIA supervision54, lending credence that they may have been obtained while together, working these trafficking paths, and even perhaps from information as provided by Hassan Ghul.

Abu Faraj was cognizant of Zarqawi’s desire for experienced militants and lieutenants. However, he suggested to bin Laden that he be permitted to deploy Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah and Hamza Rabia, with the subtle goal of migrating the entire external operations infrastructure to Iraq55. Vexed by relatively simple tasks now cumbersome, such as renting safehouses for plotting, the making of telephone calls, and the movement or smuggling of personnel, Abu Faraj envisioned an apparatus in Iraq free from the burdens. Pakistani operations in 2004 were persistently pressuring the militants. In fact, Abu Faraj highlighted that the human trafficking routes to Iraq were much more efficient and abundant as compared to those into the FATA, resulting in a plethora of personnel, in both numbers and options56. Furthermore, the Egyptian officers would benefit from the turmoil in Iraq, giving their students and subordinates ample opportunity, resources, and equipment in order to gain real world training and experience amidst the thriving insurgency57. Also selected for the sojourn was the Saudi Abu Ikrimah al-Ghamdi, of the al-Qaida Military Committee58.

While acknowledging that several senior lieutenants were slated for transfer to Iraq, there were some concerns with the arrangement. Abu Faraj and al-Qaida were also wary of the perception that the Iraqi insurgency was purely a construct of foreign elements, but were reassured by Abu Jafar that Zarqawi was aware of the problem and appointing new Iraqi leaders for operations59. However, Abu Jafar briefed that at the moment there was no viable option for an Iraqi insurgent or political commander60. Among other specific details discussed, was that of Zarqawi’s men being poised to strike in other Arab countries against what were viewed as apostate governments. Abu Faraj and Ayman al-Zawahiri both preferred that Zarqawi remain focused on the Americans before turning attention to Lebanon, Jordan, etc61. There was however, one method to counter the perception of foreign element command, and to provide an Iraqi face to the resistance.

A Dilemma of Abdulhadi

With the evolution of the Iraqi insurgency and the establishment of communications with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the tumultuous nation, Abdulhadi decided to enter Iraq himself and take stock of the overall situation62.  But this inherently interfered with his local paramilitary responsibilities as they stood.  Abdulhadi was overtasked as it was, albeit by his own doing, and his potential departure would leave a void in al-Qaida paramilitary leadership.  It may have been a welcome void to other al-Qaida officials in the FATA, due to Abdulhadi’s austere and grating presence. Also, Zarqawi was not of a mind to have Abdulhadi circumvent his own leadership, and previously denied the Iraqi the assistance he needed in traversing the difficult route to his homeland63. 

Bin Laden however, seemed content to allow Abdulhadi to migrate and transplant his militancy into Iraq. Primarily, he was eager to use Abdulhadi to offer trusted situational reports, to establish trafficking routes for additional personnel, and to utilize his influence to foil Zarqawi’s seeming obsession with waging war against the Shia64.

Eventually though, with Abdulhadi’s demotion and reassignment, his focus completely shifted to Iraq and the still blossoming insurrection therein, creating trepidation among the senior ranks.  Abu Faraj and the leaders of al-Qaida were apprehensive over Abdulhadi’s eventual role in Iraq, wary of him recreating interpersonal conflicts therein, and suppressing what was the most promising theatre for jihad against Western ideals and assets65.  In fact, Egyptians Hamza Rabia, Khalid Habib, Atwah, and Abu al-Hassan al-Masri all initially acted to block Abdulhadi’s redeployment over these concerns66.  Abu Faraj inquired to bin Laden as to what occupation Abdulhadi would hold, and offered suggestions on each option.  As a deputy in Iraq, Abdulhadi would be difficult for Zarqawi to order and to assign operations.  Abu Faraj considered it unfeasible to have Abdulhadi set up an independent network of operators in theatre, and inappropriate to place him above Zarqawi in the hierarchy67.  Thus, Abu Faraj and the Shura recommended to bin Laden that Abdulhadi be sent as an advisory official for Zarqawi and to act in a manner to rally and recruit the masses and inspire the youth to the cause of the resistance and insurgency68. 

Bin Laden eventually reneged on the decision to dispatch Abdulhadi, instead preferring to suspend this deployment and have the Iraqi remain in the FATA, for whatever assignments Abu Faraj deemed him responsible for in the meantime69. However, bin Laden did eagerly support the transplanting of Hamza Rabia for external operations to Iraq, but only after the route was coordinated with Zarqawi and safety was ensured70. Hamza Rabia was also to establish communications with Zarqawi, coordinating needs and expectations, in order to provide for a smooth transition and amicable working relationship between the two71. The intention was for Hamza Rabia to helm a functional network within the Iraqi resistance, focused entirely on external terroristic operations, while utilizing personnel and resources as provided by Zarqawi72. However, while Hamza Rabia did maneuver out of South Waziristan, as previously discussed, he migrated instead to North Waziristan and remained. This likely indicated that the route was too perilous at that moment, given bin Laden’s insistence on security during the journey73. Meanwhile, Abu Ikrimah al-Ghamdi was deployed instead for Afghan operations in Kunar province74.

Conditions in Theatre

Zarqawi previously dispatched a detailed missive to bin Laden concerning the circumstances in Iraq, in which he accused America of attempting to expand Israeli influence to the Euphrates, and insinuated that the Kurdish were nothing more than agents of the Israelis and Americans in the endeavor75. He also described the need to combat the Iraqi police and security forces as necessary targets76. However, his sincerest wrath and disdain was reserved for the Shiites, whom he referred to as evil, cunning, serpentine in nature, and committed to upending order77. He described them as ostensible allies, who treacherously turned on the jihadist movement and labored against Zarqawi’s forces78. Most of his letter is insidious justification of his murderous campaign against the Shia. He also described the Sunnis as wandering aimlessly without proper leadership, a situation from which he was poised to benefit79. He complained of an unwillingness amongst the Iraqi mujahidin to fight to the death, acknowledging that they were apt to fight from afar, in order to safely return after each mission80.

Thus, Zarqawi was explaining the necessity and reasoning behind foreign control over the jihadist activities in Iraq. In fact, in the letter he advocated for continuous foreign recruitment, and implored that they have a singular organization to which to rally81. He painted a dire picture in which the American occupation was endangering the jihadist movement, unless he, his men, and recruits could persevere82. To that end, by the end of 2003, he claimed upwards of 25 major operations against his detailed foes, with particular focus on the Shiites83. To Hassan Ghul, Zarqawi described his intention of creating a civil war between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, particularly via a rampage of violence against Shia leaders and masses, presenting the American coalition with an impossible security situation to maintain84. The letter was confiscated along with Hassan Ghul, necessitating the eventual negotiations and conference with Abu Jafar al-Iraqi.

Final Negotiations and Merger

Zawahiri was given the opportunity by Abu Faraj to review the terms and submit requirements regarding the merger. While delayed due to movements, Zawahiri eventually provided his list of preconditions to Abu Faraj for the impending absorption of Zarqawi’s forces85. Of note was the instruction that he should, with haste, swear an genuine oath of loyalty, yet do so not as an individual, but as a force encompassing the entirety of paramilitary and jihadist actors. These included not just those whom Zarqawi directly oversaw, but all whom were active in Iraq86. Zawahiri also desired a cessation of hostilities and aggressions against the Shia, Shiite authorities, and foreign governments viewed as apostates (to include Iraq), in order to prevent parallel fronts from fracturing and thinning available forces87. Instead, Zawahiri wished for the Jordanian to focus efforts on expelling the Americans and coalition forces88. Abu Faraj was hesitant of a stipulation prohibiting attacks on the Shia before the merger, out of fears that the order would contradict potential realistic necessities seen by the group within Iraq89.

Notably, Abu Faraj and Zawahiri also attempted to assuage bin Laden’s disquiet with Zarqawi’s actions against the Shiite populations, attempting to explain that the attacks were merely responses to Shia aggression as perpetrated and supported by Iranian actors in the theatre90. Bin Laden was also informed of the sheer amount of personnel and land controlled by Zarqawi’s forces, and their eagerness to pledge to bin Laden, thus making the merger all the more tempting and acceptable91. Yet communications regarding the assimilation of Zarqawi’s insurgency were oft completed independently, with Abu Faraj and Zawahiri labeling themselves as the decision makers and approval authorities92.

Due the necessity of hiding, bin Laden was obviously unable to participate in these negotiations, or maintain punctual or immediate communications. Thus, the Libyan and Egyptian managed with what instructions and orders they already had from bin Laden, and attempted to alleviate any and all concerns with the process.

Despite the awkward communication structure, Abu Faraj and Zawahiri were then able to gift bin Laden with Zarqawi’s entire organization swearing fealty to and joining al-Qaida. Abu Faraj informed Abu Jafar that in his mind, the matter was already settled93. While Zawahiri desired that Zarqawi swear under the banner of the entire mujahidin presence in Iraq, the other senior Egyptians, namely Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah and Hamza Rabia, disagreed with this proposal and instead wished for Zarqawi to swear under the name of his specific command94. Zarqawi approved of the recommendation and declared that an announcement would be made imminently95. As for the name of this group, Zarqawi delayed the announcement in order to propose utilizing the name of al-Qaida instead of his previous moniker96. Abu Faraj subsequently reaffirmed Zarqawi on the matter97. Thus, on October 17, 2004, Zarqawi declared his oath to bin Laden publicly98.

In it he proclaimed, that the faithful militants would not be divided, concocting a justification and reasoning to implore remaining factions to announce their own oaths to bin Laden99. Zarqawi named he and his network as loyalists of bin Laden and adherents to the al-Qaida philosophy. He insinuated that the announcement coming in Ramadan, after eight months of negotiation, was a fortuitous and portentous omen100. Rather inaccurately, he further discussed how al-Qaida accepted and approved his actions, situation, and methods101. Finally, he noted the consternation caused to the Americans by the merger, and how the American position in Iraq was precarious and destined to fail102.

Abu Faraj immediately wrote to bin Laden, having been sought by his courier at an opportune time to discuss the Iraqi situation and detail the merging process103. This was especially fortuitous, as Zarqawi desired bin Laden to publicly address and accept the oath, even as Abu Faraj cautioned that communications were difficult with their emir104. The timing allowed for a possible timely response, which could give an indication to the world that bin Laden remained relevant and in command. Zawahiri also rapidly penned a letter in the days following the declaration105.

Of note, the US Department of State declared and designated Zarqawi’s organization, under it’s original moniker, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Holy War), as a terrorist entity just days earlier on October 15106. Now the American coalition was faced with the inevitable evolution of the entity into a product and franchise of al-Qaida.

Zawahiri rejoiced in the merging, but sulked over the fact that while Arabian media covered the story, Western outlets seemingly disregarded the announcement107. Despite this assertion, several major news outlets did in fact cover this development in detail108. Other academic endeavors abstained from recognizing the announcement until confirmed and verified by American intelligence109.

Delayed Response From The Emir

Bin Laden reviewed the reports well after the merger was publicly announced. In the end, bin Laden openly welcomed Zarqawi into the fold, and viewed the event as a positive, hoping to utilize the happenings as a blueprint for coalescing and uniting disparate jihadist factions worldwide and not just in Iraq110. He asked that each individual Iraqi group publicly swear fealty to Zarqawi, and thus by default to bin Laden himself111. His hope was to encourage others, notably Abu Laith al-Libi, to enfold their units with al-Qaida, and to that end bin Laden requested that Zawahiri speak on unity in his upcoming releases112.

Bin Laden was adamant that Zarqawi’s forces should avoid engaging on multiple fronts, instead remaining attentive to the Americans, their coalition, and the new Iraqi government113. He was keen to diverge from the path of potential civil war and the deaths of multitudinous Muslims, although he acknowledged that Zarqawi must defend himself from any supposed Shia aggression, and that while underground, bin Laden could not possibly submit appropriate orders and observations for the reality on the ground in Iraq114.

In regards to global factions of al-Qaida, bin Laden was also eager to directly connect with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula115. Via this attempted communication, he hoped to encourage them to assassinate Saudi royals and destabilize the Kingdom, as well as remove intellectuals and clerics speaking against the jihadists, men whom bin Laden referred to as “hypocrites and apostates116.” Bin Laden also delivered an audio message intended for the Arabian contingent, that he wished to be published in mid-December117.

The al-Qaida commander provided his subordinates with another audio release for the public of Iraq, in which he displayed an overt support for Zarqawi, while warning against engaging in votes for their new “apostate” government118.

Further Potential Gains

Abu Faraj also reported on the Iranian emissaries approaching al-Qaida through Abu Musab al-Baluchi earlier in the year, and their request of restraint upon Zarqawi and his targeting of Shiites119. Bin Laden saw an opportunity for advantage and freedom for his detained Shura councilors. Thus, he ordered Abu Faraj to maintain communications, and to request the liberation of either Abu Khayr al-Masri or Abu Mohamed al-Masri (whom bin Laden refers to as Ahmed Hassan and al-Zayat respectively), along with clarification of the Iranian governmental inquiries120. It is worth noting that bin Laden did not stress for the chance to liberate Saif al-Adel or Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, two of the Shura who disagreed with him on the 9/11 attacks121. Zawahiri discussed with bin Laden that one of his men, Abu Jihad al-Masri, delivered his belief that the Iranians were prepared to ransom the detainees or sell them to a Western authority, due to the fact that al-Qaida aligned militants were being separated from regular jihadists in captivity122. Furthermore, Abu Jihad offered his services to interact with an negotiate with the Iranians on behalf of the detained al-Qaida officials123. Another operative, Yasin al-Suri, of the unaccompanied militants’ house, became the primary al-Qaida emissary to Iran124. The Kurdish envoy, born in Qamishli, Syria as Izzaldin Abdulaziz Khalil, commenced operating in Iran in 2005, facilitating the migrations of militants and large sums of money from Arabia to the Khorasan via Iran125. The arrangement indicated that al-Qaida must have responded positively to the Iranians and their request to rein in Zarqawi.

Bin Laden was also keen to determine and control finances of the organization, requesting a budget from his lieutenants and worrying over the value of the dollar. In fact, he desired funds be held as Euros126. Further he requested his son in law, Abdullah al-Halabi, provide a plan for obtaining additional funding127. Another major concern for the distant emir was the issue of espionage among the ranks, and those accused of being an implanted traitor128. He was adamant that the accused be given a fair trial before a militant deemed righteous and knowledgeable enough to be seen as a religious judge129. He wished to prevent arbitrary punitive actions against these potential moles, but understood that the issue could be one that plagued his network, providing a reason for his lieutenants to turn suspicions upon one another130. This was especially true given there were additional militants joining the camps, perhaps a method in which a foreign adversary could plant a spy. Yet these recruits were vital to the survival of the organization. New adherents needed to be reached through al-Qaida media efforts first, to both to encourage them to join, but also to display continuing relevance and survival of the jihadist movement.

Rapid Releases

The year was productive for al-Qaida media releases, with Zawahiri in particular very active. For example, two separate audio releases were received by Arab press in February, with the Egyptian refuting claims of progress against al-Qaida made by President Bush in his State of the Union speech, and the other focusing on the supposed immorality of the French in response to their restrictions on female traditional head garments131. A video message in September displayed a seemingly healthy Zawahiri lambasting US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and guaranteeing their eventual defeat132. His previous video was from the year prior, also in September, recorded to celebrate the second anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, and to declare solidarity across multiple jihadist fronts133. An October 1, 2004 release focused on Palestine, and attempted to frame the conflict as solely a religious cause, as opposed to political, in an attempt to conflate motivations and to drag the resistance into a fanatical Islamic dogma134. Al-Qaida relied on their media creation team, labeled as-Sahab media production, to devise, shoot, edit, and release these videos and recordings, often with a high degree of quality editing and effects, considering the organization’s status underground135. Studios were required and the videos themselves were hand delivered to their consumers through convoluted courier networks136. This fell under the purview of senior militant and Zawahiri son-in-law, Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi, as the editor of as-Sahab137.

Abu Abdulraman al-Maghrebi

In a move intended to capture the collective American attention prior to the elections, a video message from bin Laden was released on October 29138. The diatribe reiterated that long standing American foreign policy as it related to Middle Eastern matters was directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks and the current wars in which the nation found itself embroiled139. Recounting the heavy toll of the combat, bin Laden described the American losses in blood and finance140. He lectured that the nations which did not manipulate or intervene in the region’s security were to be avoided in conflict141. Bin Laden presented what he described as the failings of President Bush, but closed by remarking that security was solely in the hands of Americans themselves, and not provided by their leader142. Zawahiri was seen on November 29, in a very delayed parallel video, pushing the same point, highlighting how al-Qaida intended the removal of US forces from Muslim nations, and how the elections played no role in preventing this result143. The uppermost echelon of al-Qaida were not the only individuals allowed to release such rantings.

Azzam al-Amriki

Also in October, a masked spokesman, Azzam al-Amriki, appeared in a video interview, declaring himself an American seeking to bring death and vengeance to his fellow countrymen. In the video, he justified this by describing his loyalties being first to his religion and god, before any nation or family144. He defended al-Qaida against the assertion that they are just a fringe movement of Islam, unrepresentative of the actual religion. Forebodingly, he promised that American streets “shall run red with blood145“. Oddly, the FBI desperately sought to identify Azzam, releasing his disguised picture and belligerent words146. Yet his identity was easily discernable. He was of course, Adam Gadahn, rising through the ranks of the media committee, graduating in October 2004 to his first dedicated video release147.

When bin Laden wrote to his senior most deputies on December 9, 2004, he included voice recordings for release, meant to provide praise and support for his two nascent franchises, in the Arabian Peninsula and in Iraq148. He desired the message to the Arabian Peninsula to be broadcast either December 14 or 15149, paralleling a planned anti-Saudi royal protest organized by dissidents. Despite the fact that it was not released until December 16150, it is still remarkable how rapid the delivery and publication were considering the sheer amount of security considerations involved. A scathing denunciation of the Saudi Royal family, and praise for the Arabian al-Qaida branch, having just attacked the US Consulate in Jeddah were included in the recording151. The second message was broadcast to the world on December 27, specifically for bin Laden to acquiesce to Zarqawi’s desire and need for acceptance. Bin Laden welcomed Zarqawi into the fold within the audio release, ostensibly condoning his actions, and declaring the Jordanian and his organization as a portion of al-Qaida152. A warning was issued also in the recording, aimed at preventing Iraqis from voting in the upcoming January elections, and declaring any who did were to be viewed as infidels153.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] Another Guantanamo detainee source names him as Talib Mohamed Yaqub154.
  1. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 // Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  2. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  3. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  4. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  5. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 // Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  6. Guantanamo Assessment File, Jihad Ahmed Mustafa Diyab, ISN 722, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/722.html ↩︎
  7. Guantanamo Assessment File, Jihad Ahmed Mustafa Diyab, ISN 722, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/722.html ↩︎
  8. Guantanamo Assessment File, Riyadh Mohamed Tahir Barhumi, ISN 510, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/510.html ↩︎
  9. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  10. Guantanamo Assessment File, Riyadh Mohamed Tahir Barhumi, ISN 510, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/510.html ↩︎
  11. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎
  12. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  13. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
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  15. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
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  24. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
  25. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  26. CIA: Zarqawi tape ‘probably authentic’, by Pam Benson, CNN, April 7, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/07/zarqawi.tape/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD ↩︎
  27. Top UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello killed in terrorist blast in Baghdad, UN News, August 19, 2003, https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/08/77212-top-un-envoy-sergio-vieira-de-mello-killed-terrorist-blast-baghdad ↩︎
  28. Suicide blast wrecks Italian base, BBC News, November 12, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3263087.stm ↩︎
  29. Italians mourn their Iraq slain, The Guardian, November 18, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/18/iraq.italy ↩︎
  30. CIA: Zarqawi tape ‘probably authentic’, by Pam Benson, CNN, April 7, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/07/zarqawi.tape/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD ↩︎
  31. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  32. Najaf bombing kills Shiite leader, followers say, CNN, August 30, 2003, https://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/29/sprj.irq.najaf/index.html ↩︎
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  35. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
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  37. Zarqawi’s father-in-law linked to deadly suicide blast in 2003, by Mohamad Bazzi, The Seattle Times, February 8, 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20190702144518/https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/zarqawis-father-in-law-linked-to-deadly-suicide-blast-in-2003/ ↩︎
  38. Black Flags: The Rise of Isis, Joby Warrick, Doubleday, 2015 ↩︎
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  75. Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden, dated January 2004 ↩︎
  76. Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden, dated January 2004 ↩︎
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  99. ZARQAWI’S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU’ASKER AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21, by Jeffrey Pool, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume 2, Issue 24, December 16, 2004, https://jamestown.org/program/zarqawis-pledge-of-allegiance-to-al-qaeda-from-muasker-al-battar-issue-21-2/ ↩︎
  100. ZARQAWI’S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU’ASKER AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21, by Jeffrey Pool, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume 2, Issue 24, December 16, 2004, https://jamestown.org/program/zarqawis-pledge-of-allegiance-to-al-qaeda-from-muasker-al-battar-issue-21-2/ ↩︎
  101. ZARQAWI’S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU’ASKER AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21, by Jeffrey Pool, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume 2, Issue 24, December 16, 2004, https://jamestown.org/program/zarqawis-pledge-of-allegiance-to-al-qaeda-from-muasker-al-battar-issue-21-2/ ↩︎
  102. ZARQAWI’S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU’ASKER AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21, by Jeffrey Pool, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume 2, Issue 24, December 16, 2004, https://jamestown.org/program/zarqawis-pledge-of-allegiance-to-al-qaeda-from-muasker-al-battar-issue-21-2/ ↩︎
  103. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  104. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  105. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
  106. Foreign Terrorist Organization: Designation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad and Aliases, Richard Boucher, Spokesman US Department of State Press Release, October 15, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/37130.htm ↩︎
  107. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
  108. Al-Zarqawi: Allegiance to al-Qaida, Al-Jazeera, October 18, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/10/18/al-zarqawi-allegiance-to-al-qaida ↩︎
  109. ZARQAWI’S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU’ASKER AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21, by Jeffrey Pool, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume 2, Issue 24, December 16, 2004, https://jamestown.org/program/zarqawis-pledge-of-allegiance-to-al-qaeda-from-muasker-al-battar-issue-21-2/ ↩︎
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  120. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
  121. 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 7: The Attack Looms, 2004 ↩︎
  122. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
  123. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
  124. Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point, US Department of the Treasury Press Release, July 28, 2011, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1261#:~:text=Khalil%20(a.k.a.%20Yasin%20al%2DSuri,within%20Iran’s%20borders%20since%202005. ↩︎
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  130. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
  131. Two al-Zawahiri audiotapes, on State of the Union Speech and on French
    headscarf ban, February 24, 2004     ↩︎
  132. Al-Zawahiri videotape saying US defeat a question of time, September 9, 2004 ↩︎
  133. Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri On The Second Anniversary of 911, September 12, 2003 ↩︎
  134. Al-Jazirah: Al-Zawahiri Urges Defense of Palestine, Forming ‘Resistance’
    Command, October 1, 2004     ↩︎
  135. Tracking Al-Qaida’s Media Production Team, Renee Montagne interview with Evan Kohlmann, NPR News, July 11, 2006, https://www.npr.org/2006/07/11/5548044/tracking-al-qaidas-media-production-team // Terrorists turn to the Web as base of operations, by Steve Coll and Susan B Glasser, NBC News, August 6, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8854296 ↩︎
  136. Terrorists turn to the Web as base of operations, by Steve Coll and Susan B Glasser, NBC News, August 6, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna8854296 ↩︎
  137. Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi, The US Department of State Rewards for Justice program, Listed January 12, 2021, https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abd-al-rahman-al-maghrebi/ ↩︎
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  141. Full transcript of bin Ladin’s speech, Al-Jazeera, November 1, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/11/1/full-transcript-of-bin-ladins-speech ↩︎
  142. Full transcript of bin Ladin’s speech, Al-Jazeera, November 1, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/11/1/full-transcript-of-bin-ladins-speech ↩︎
  143. Al-Zawahiri videotape denouncing US elections as irrelevant, November 29, 2004 ↩︎
  144. Text Transcript of Video Clip Interview With “Azzam The American”, FBI Archives, October 2004, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2004/october/transcript-of-azzam-video ↩︎
  145. Text Transcript of Video Clip Interview With “Azzam The American”, FBI Archives, October 2004, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2004/october/transcript-of-azzam-video // Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true  ↩︎
  146. FBI Seeking Information – Azzam al-Amriki, October 30, 2004, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2004/october/seeking_info103004 ↩︎
  147. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true  ↩︎
  148. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
  149. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
  150. CIA: New bin Laden tape likely al Qaeda leader, CNN News, December 17, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/16/bin.laden.tape/index.html ↩︎
  151. CIA: New bin Laden tape likely al Qaeda leader, CNN News, December 17, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/16/bin.laden.tape/index.html ↩︎
  152. Purported bin Laden tape endorses al-Zarqawi, CNN News, December 27, 2004, https://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/27/binladen.tape/ ↩︎
  153. Purported bin Laden tape endorses al-Zarqawi, CNN News, December 27, 2004, https://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/27/binladen.tape/ ↩︎
  154. Guantanamo Assessment File, Jihad Ahmed Mustafa Diyab, ISN 722, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/722.html ↩︎

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