Abdulhadi al-Iraqi held sway over paramilitary operations due to his proximity with the Taliban and links with al-Qaida infrastructure in the FATA. Thus, he was prominent within internal operations.  Yet the imperious Abdulhadi was known as an abrasive individual¹.  From the Shakai valley, he appeared to eventually encroach on External Operations², and separately caused significant issues for the Majlis ash-Shura³.  Essentially, Abdulhadi had inserted himself as leader of the council, and was partaking in various responsibilities for which he had not specifically been appointed by bin Laden and al-Qaida⁴. That being said, previously, in 2002, before the reality of Abdulhadi’s leadership became apparent, bin Laden hailed him as the paramilitary and internal commander of the insurgency, referring to him as an “emir”⁵.  Hassan Ghul confirmed to the CIA that Abdulhadi was the initial internal oversight⁶. From his perch in Iran, Saif al-Adel implored his subordinates in June 2002 to place all northern Afghanistan matters under the command of Abdulhadi⁷. Further internal communications acknowledged that Abdulhadi failed to collaborate with his peers appropriately, and was difficult to engage with⁸.  The Shura considered him disrespectful, narcissistic, and a hindrance to progress⁹.  Insinuated amongst communications was the fact that while the Iraqi was not the preferred leader, he had in fact held the position for some time after the invasion, as conditions only worsened. Ghul solidified the existence of the disaccord and agitation in Shakai to his captors¹⁰. Therefore for al-Qaida, another internal restructuring was in order due to the personality clashes.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Internal Struggles And Communications

From the outside Abdulhadi was viewed as an effective militant officer¹¹, yet interpersonal conflicts threatened to halt any paramilitary progress¹².  Abu Faraj al-Libi consulted with bin Laden on the issue, displaying reverence and respect for Abdulhadi, but detailing the conflicts and problems with the Iraqi¹³.  Sheikh Said al-Masri also expressed his strong opinions to Ayman al-Zawahiri on the matter¹⁴. Zawahiri meanwhile, had his own qualms with the ground officials, and was impatient for Abu Faraj to assume entire command from Abdulhadi¹⁵. The Libyan was needed to effectively rally the forces.

Despite meeting with the Shura council and senior leaders in the Shakai valley multiple times in latter 2003 and early 2004¹⁶, Abu Faraj maintained an ethic of management from afar, much to the consternation of Zawahiri¹⁷. During this time Abu Faraj dwelled in Abbottabad, Pakistan, while sometimes working in Peshawar, before finally transplanting to Bajaur agency in the middle of 2004¹⁸. This too was some distance from his subordinates in South Waziristan, necessitating complex communication networks and methods. For example, a close affiliate of bin Laden, writing under the pseudonym Jaragh al-Din, refused an offer from Abu Faraj to meet directly and interact with the al-Qaida officials on the ground, instead lobbying for the preferred method of written and encrypted messaging¹⁹. Further, this Jaragh al-Din cautioned Abu Faraj on excessive movement and traveling²⁰. For his couriers, Jaragh al-Din implored Abu Faraj to use locals, presumably from Bajaur, to handle his messaging, or if unavailable, to utilize individuals from the Sarhad region, representing the Pashtun North West Frontier Province²¹. Bin Laden reiterated and stressed this point, requesting that his officers greatly restrict their movement, with vital components such as Abu Faraj and Hamza Rabia conducting their affairs and conferences via missives and limited couriers²². As for Zawahiri, bin Laden demanded that his deputy be removed from the jihadist community and placed in a secretive locale, unbeknownst to the other officials²³. Abu Faraj had of course already obliged this order and necessity²⁴. The officers utilized a variety of aliases as well, with Abu Faraj often referred to as Wakil Khan or Tawfiq in internal communiques, Zawahiri as Abu Fatima, and Abdulhadi as Abdullah Khan²⁵.

There was an overall difficulty in messaging, as Zawahiri reported to bin Laden that earlier in 2004 he delivered CDs with information that eventually were destroyed due to a delay in safe passage²⁶. Zawahiri maintained contact with the outside world, providing relatively frequent messages. By October he reported to bin Laden that he had produced eighteen of the issuances, with twelve having seen release²⁷. Worried that the full effect would be lost, Zawahiri desired online transcripts released as well, as news channels only partially aired the statements²⁸. For example, in early October, he spoke out against Israel and the happenings in Palestine. Calling upon the youth, he demanded immediate resistance and results²⁹. Thus, Zawahiri openly celebrated the Taba suicide bombings on the Sinai Peninsula on October 7, 2004, in which three resorts popular with Israeli tourists were attacked³⁰. He coyly stated that the Israelis were placing blame upon al-Qaida, but mainly reveled in the event as a refutation of the Egyptian government’s restraint on jihadists, and his imprisoned former Egyptian Islamic Jihad colleagues who were advocating for peace³¹. Far from attributing the act to al-Qaida, Egyptian authorities implicated independent Egyptian and Palestinian elements as culpable³². That being said, one of Zawahiri’s compatriots, Abu Jihad al-Masri, has been described as linked to Egyptian operations, the Taba incident included, perhaps providing reason for Zawahiri’s mirth in the destruction and certainty that his words were heeded³³. Around the same time, Abu Jihad delivered news to Zawahiri that some of the dissenting faction of EIJ were willing to realign with Zawahiri and al-Qaida, as led by one Mohamed Islambouli via discussions held with the now captured Egyptian Mohamed Omar Abdulrahman³⁴.

As Zawahiri labored to expand the organization and pontificate to the world, he was also keen to avoid the loss of more officers, especially those critical to the propagandizing efforts. He expressed dismay to bin Laden as to why Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was reassigned from Abdulhadi to Hamza Rabia, leading to the Tanzanian’s capture and the endangerment of the latter, one of Zawahiri’s long term men³⁵. Further, Zawahiri ranted that Abu Faraj and Abdulhadi were careless with one of his other close associates, the Moroccan Mohamed Abbatay, known as Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi, the editor of al-Qaida as-Sahab media component³⁶. He was removed from Abdulhadi by Abu Faraj in order to process another individual’s press releases³⁷. Zawahiri felt that it was a rushed and risky maneuver for Abbatay to be in close proximity for so long with the two wanted lieutenants³⁸. Especially when considering the loss of structural leadership over the course of 2003 and 2004.

Zawahiri was wary of other ways al-Qaida could suffer losses, as the deteriorating internal structure resulted in the feuds reaching the Egyptian for his review. As such, Abdulhadi and Sheikh Said continued to express their displeasure over the situations and with each other³⁹. Weapons smuggling and procurement manager Hamza al-Jawfi, also seemingly waivered in his loyalty to the cause, but clarified that he remained staunchly with al-Qaida, but rather just preferred to separate until such as time as Abdulhadi was no longer in command⁴⁰. Much to Zawahiri’s frustration, he explained to the others that Jawfi’s reasoning was flawed and that he did not desire to have multiple insurgent organizations acting in parallel⁴¹. With Zawahiri also hidden away, he could not offer the appropriate level of needed leadership, and was frustrated with Abu Faraj and his parallel command from afar⁴². Zawahiri described Abu Faraj as consistently distant, while simultaneously offering nonsensical excuses for the absence, which Zawahiri perceived as a lack of clarity in his position, and a timidness of interacting in a leadership role with his peers and colleagues⁴³. Abu Faraj mentioned and acknowledged to Zawahiri that his and Abdulhadi’s positions were unsolidified and uncertain⁴⁴.

Reciprocal Incursions

In 2004 al-Qaida could ill-afford such incertitude in leadership, as they continued to trade attacks and engagements with the Pakistanis at home and with coalition forces in Afghanistan. Despite the wealth of knowledge acquired from the Hassan Ghul interrogation, and the Pakistani military responses during the spring, several of the al-Qaida affiliated Arabs in the Shakai Valley remained therein by the summer, even after the extensive incursion⁴⁵.  These included Hamza al-Jawfi and Midhat Mursi (Abu Khabab al-Masri).  Abu Faraj noted that the Pakistanis increased their actions in South Waziristan against not just the Wazir tribe, but also the Mahsud, and that the insurgent forces were obligated to enter into the engagement, with the primary responding belligerents being Tahir Yuldashev and his IMU Central Asians⁴⁶. But not all Arabs avoided the conflict. 

Abdulhadi lost his adjutant, known as Osaid al-Yemeni, or more specifically Osaid al-Taizi, during the March offensive. The native of Taiz was Ayed Qasim Ahmed, known to have come to Kandahar before 9/11 and attend al-Faruq camp before becoming an administrator. Despite a serious illness, he participated in the defense of Kandahar and Battle of Shah I Kot, eventually resettling with Abdulhadi in South Waziristan⁴⁷. Beyond his administrative duties, he fought during operations in Zabul and was eventually assigned to lead a squadron of militants in a new position⁴⁸. However, before his command could increase, he was caught in the Pakistani maneuvers of March, and chose to fight instead of flee, thus becoming one of the few Arab casualties of the battle⁴⁹.

Abdulhadi’s situation was fraught with struggle and varied success in his ambitions, as well as that of his status.  His operational victories were infrequent, as previously discussed.  In the press, he was mistakenly listed as captured beginning in 2002⁵⁰. His attention veered homewards to Iraq. But this did not imply insignificance, and Abdulhadi did not neglect Afghanistan entirely. In fact, he orchestrated another Kabul centered attack on August 29, 2004.  The carnage ensued when a vehicle-borne suicide bomber positioned a truck laden with wood and explosives in front the building housing DynCorp contractors working for the US State Department Civilian Police, in the Shar I Naw neighborhood, and detonated⁵¹.  At least 10 were killed including the Americans John Deuly, Robert Bifano, and Gerald Gibson⁵².  While the Taliban claimed responsibility, it was an al-Qaida operation on their behalf⁵³.  Further demonstrating the blending of foreign elements with local operations, the bombing utilized a central Asian suicide operative⁵⁴.  Al-Zubair al-Turkistani was from Turkmenistan, having fled government oppression in his homeland for Afghanistan via Kyrgyzstan⁵⁵.  He trained in Herat and Jalalabad, before fighting in Khost against the American occupiers⁵⁶.  Despite later being captured in Turkmenistan, he was released, leading him to the opportunity to be an al-Qaida suicide bomber⁵⁷.  One suspect in the attack was rapidly detained at Kabul’s airport due to explosive residue apparent on his hands⁵⁸.  The FBI investigated the bombing and later claimed to have assisted in the arrest and convictions of four individuals in Afghanistan⁵⁹.  However, none of those included the senior al-Qaida operatives involved⁶⁰, in what was at the time the largest bombing in Kabul since September 2002⁶¹.  Abu Faraj offered credit to Abdulhadi for the success, within internal reporting to bin Laden⁶².  This praise was apparently but a veil for the deluge of criticisms.    

Khalid Habib

Complaints inundated Abu Faraj regarding the inability to effectively labor with Abdulhadi, and thus Abu Faraj and the Shura were forced in 2004 to replace him as overall military commander, and appoint the Egyptian Shawqi Marzuq Abdulalim Dabbas⁶³, better known in al-Qaida as Khalid Habib⁶⁴.  Abdulhadi’s last confirmed fatal coordinated attack against the US military appears to have been in May 2004⁶⁵.  Yet as mentioned, Abu Faraj referenced that Abdulhadi completely oversaw the August DynCorp suicide bombing, claiming the attack targeted the FBI as opposed to the actual State Department contractors killed, indicating that Abdulhadi remained functional⁶⁶.  Strangely, American authorities did not follow suit in blaming Abdulhadi for these murders⁶⁷.  In the end, it was Abdulhadi’s ability to coordinate with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq that was viewed as the most advantageous for al-Qaida⁶⁸.  With the controversy, Abu Faraj al-Libi and bin Laden sought to rein in operations under stricter conditions, and provide the proper personnel in the appropriate positions. 

Yet issues persisted. Zawahiri noted to bin Laden that Khalid Habib avoided administrative, financial, and communications duties, instead placing them with Sheikh Said al-Masri, while he focused entirely on paramilitary operations⁶⁹. Khalid Habib defended himself in this decision and sought approval from Abu Faraj⁷⁰. Yet according to Zawahiri, Abu Faraj was enhancing the disputes, by simply being located elsewhere than South Waziristan, and unavailable to intervene in disagreements⁷¹.

With Khalid Habib wary of logistical obligations, Zawahiri feared that the situation would proceed again with multiple leaders and the proclivity for arguments, unless Abu Faraj could ascend properly to his position and rein in the others⁷². As it stood, Abu Faraj was seemingly ignoring the petition from Zawahiri, leaving the latter to desire an abrasive approach of his own, but recognizing that he needed to remain calm⁷³. Thus, Zawahiri urged bin Laden to be assertive with given explicit orders of command to both Abu Faraj and Khalid Habib⁷⁴.

Response From Bin Laden

Bin Laden communicated directly to his lieutenants regarding the Shura council in order to address their concerns on management, and the fact that younger individuals were being given the most responsibilities⁷⁵.  He gave them the example of his own victory in Jaji against the Soviets at a younger age to reference⁷⁶.  He urged patience, understanding, and implored that divisiveness and hostility among the leadership ranks be eliminated; as stability, recruitment and productivity would diminish in response⁷⁷.  In his view this kind of distraction was detrimental to the paramilitary affairs.  He stated that Abdulhadi was naturally the emir of the Shura due to his position as paramilitary leader, but now that he had been removed from that position and rejected as a leader, he was also no longer established on the council⁷⁸.  Furthermore, bin Laden encouraged the councilors not to fret over the development, but continue to be respectful and kind so as to avoid conflicts.  Bin Laden accepted Khalid Habib as being appointed paramilitary commander, but recommended the Egyptian and all future generals to write up a report on proposed operations, budgets, goals, etc⁷⁹.  He also ordered that Khalid Habib be given a deputy.  Finally, he declared that Abu Faraj should not be timid due to his age difference when compared to the Shura.  Bin Laden emphasized that Abu Faraj was the overall official of al-Qaida in the region⁸⁰.  He was adamant that though the Taliban inserted Abdulhadi as the overall paramilitary commander, it was bin Laden himself who placed Abu Faraj in charge of the al-Qaida internal efforts and administration⁸¹.  The insinuation was that Abdulhadi never had bin Laden’s express blessing for the role he had assumed, this despite the fact that bin Laden previously acknowledged Abdulhadi’s position⁸².  Bin Laden ordered that the Shura ensure the communication of Abu Faraj with Khalid Habib and his deputy, resulting in appropriate oversight of military matters, as these were the most important facets of the insurgency⁸³.  Bin Laden viewed these officials not as permanent, but rather as shifting, where all qualified individuals could get their opportunity to prove themselves, in a military sense or otherwise⁸⁴.  Perhaps this idea of rotation, lessened the embarrassment for Abdulhadi during his relief from duty.  Bin Laden recommended that should Khalid Habib not be seen as fit for renewal at the end of his tenure, that he be transferred to training and security, and even gave a list of examples of the items that the Egyptian should ensure so that paramilitary operations would be successful⁸⁵.  This may be a sign of lower confidence in the abilities of Khalid Habib and thus reaffirming earlier discussions in which bin Laden would have foregone him as military commander and instead named him as a trainer⁸⁶. 

Regarding Khalid Habib’s leadership, there is evidence pointing to debate among the ranks.  Previous al-Qaida internal communications revealed a brief discussion on the Egyptian Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, indicating that he may have been put forth as an option for overall military commander, seeing that he had proven himself in battle; all of this of course pending verification of his bayat to bin Ladin⁸⁷.  In this recommendation, Khalid Habib would have been in charge of training and equipping operatives prior to combat⁸⁸.  This was remarked upon in a draft communique from bin Laden, and the final version did not include the mention of Abu Ubaidah as the current military emir⁸⁹.  Thus, Khalid Habib was solidified in the role instead⁹⁰.  Yet bin Laden, in blessing Khalid Habib’s ascension, made the recommendation that the appointment last for approximately a year, and upon expiration the command be given to another of the insurgents, particularly Abu Ubaidah al-Masri or Abu Munthir al-Andalusi⁹¹. He further suggested that the commander being cycled out, maintain responsibility as a lieutenant to the new officer⁹².

Bin Laden urged consultation with Zawahiri as he was his overall deputy, and urged caution when approaching Sheikh Said al-Masri⁹³.  While he praised the latter, he seemed initially and interestingly hesitant to involve him in military or internal matters⁹⁴.  It is possible that this stems from Sheikh Said’s hesitance in supporting the 9/11 attacks⁹⁵.  However, bin Laden needed the older generation of Sheikh Said, his remaining original Shura councilor, but he indicated that care should to be taken in explaining to them the restructuring of leadership, so that all members and scholars in the FATA agreed to the format⁹⁶.  Essentially, if they could manage Sheikh Said onboard with the leadership infrastructure then it would be easier to convince everyone else due to his status⁹⁷.  As Shaikh Said was already on the Shura, this digression indicates that bin Laden was speaking to specific loyalists, instead of the entire council.  The internal politics at hand suggest that if Abdulhadi was a controversial leader for the abundant and elder Egyptian jihadists, then the timid Abu Faraj as a younger Libyan may be rejected as well.  It is of great interest that bin Laden recognized Shaikh Said al-Masri as the most likely candidate among the remaining jihadists in the FATA to assume and inherit leadership.  With the tribulations of the times however, bin Laden needed newer, lesser known, and capable leaders to experiment with and maintain his vision. 

Khalid Habib, now the general military commander, was eventually able to resolve the majority of the issues and complaints that stemmed from the previous administration of Abdulhadi⁹⁸.  In regards to the dilemma of Hamza al-Jawfi, the Egyptian remarked that he was now prepared to work again alongside al-Qaida, and to coordinate with Khalid Habib⁹⁹. Abu Faraj ordered Jawfi to immediately reabsorb into operations and to deliver all of his funds and equipment¹⁰⁰. However, while Jawfi renewed his vow to bin Laden, he refused to gift the organization what he deemed to be his belongings¹⁰¹. Later Jawfi’s flow of weaponry was somewhat impeded. Abdullah Khadr, despite the death of his father, continued through October 2004 to provide armaments to Jawfi¹⁰². In fact, in October he was in the process of purchasing missiles from a Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) operative and then turning them to Jawfi for a 400% profit¹⁰³. That same month however, the US encouraged Pakistani intervention by offering a $500,000 bounty on the Canadian, resulting in his arrest while procuring weapons away from the FATA¹⁰⁴. Undoubtedly this only added to Jawfi’s anxiety and disquiet. Abu Faraj allowed Khalid Habib to handle the issue of personnel, including the recalcitrant Jawfi.

Paramilitary Order Of Battle

As it was, and per the suggestion of bin Laden, Khalid Habib did have a deputy named.  Hamza al-Ghamdi, the former bin Laden security specialist, was given the assignment¹⁰⁵.  This confirms that despite apparently crossing the border into Pakistan alongside of bin Laden¹⁰⁶, the Saudi al-Qaida loyalist did not remain with his emir, and eventually made his way to the FATA.  Paramilitary officers were also appointed for specific provinces in Afghanistan. According to Abu Faraj, the Egyptian Abu al-Hassan al-Masri held responsibility for Zabul and Kandahar, while Abu Munthir al-Maghrebi (al-Andalusi) oversaw Paktika.  Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, who had once held the failing line at Bagram during the invasion in 2001, now commanded forces in Kunar. An unknown Syrian, Abu Dujanah al-Suri, helmed operations in Khost. Of particular interest, Abu Laith al-Libi was stated to be in charge of al-Qaida operations in and around Jalalabad at the time¹⁰⁷. 

Abu al-Hassan al-Masri was described as the initial paramilitary deputy¹⁰⁸.  The change to Hamza al-Ghamdi was undoubtedly to create balance.  Despite some reservations, the primarily North African contingent leading al-Qaida on the ground had appointed Khalid Habib.  Bin Laden acquiesced, but it probably would have been difficult to maintain all factions together with nothing but Egyptians commanding the militant insurgency.  Especially given their dominance in the internal political affairs. Therefore, Hamza al-Ghamdi represented the fighters of Gulf Arab origin.  He also maintained a commanding presence and venerated jihadist history – [A].

Zabul

Abu al-Hassan al-Masri was a long term al-Qaida operative, having originally traveled to the Khorasan region to fight the Soviets alongside his close companion, Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah¹⁰⁹. His paramilitary acumen was honed and formed by deploying with Mohamed Atef on his mission into Somalia in the early 1990s, in order to train local militants and prepare them for combat against the Americans¹¹⁰. With Abu al-Hassan in charge in Zabul, it is important to note that another traditional al-Qaida lieutenant also operated effectively in the region. The Kenyan Fahd Mohamed Ali Musalam, known as Osama al-Kini previously led militants within Zabul province¹¹¹.  Simultaneously, he remained involved in the financing and recruitment for operations in his native East Africa¹¹².  This realignment freed the Kenyan veteran for exclusive operational roles.  Prior to the invasion, he was indicted in December 1998 for his role in the East African US Embassy bombings¹¹³. In 2004, Musalam resided with Mullah Lutfullah, the brother of Guantanamo detainee Mullah Noorullah Nuri, the former governor of Mizar I Sharif and Balkh province¹¹⁴.  Lutfullah had been poised by the Taliban to offer resistance in Zabul, and was apparently assisted by Musalam¹¹⁵.  There were other incidents in the province detailing the obvious cooperation between the foreign elements and local Taliban.

For example, Mullah Rozi Khan was known to have facilitated Arabs fleeing the invasion and fall of Kabul in 2001, from Khost onward to Pakistan¹¹⁶. He later became a senior militant officer in Zabul, plaguing reconstruction and improvement projects in the area, such as when his men abducted a Turkish engineer laboring on the highway between Kabul and Kandahar on October 30, 2003¹¹⁷. Rozi Khan announced his release exactly a month later, ostensibly due to the hostage being a Muslim, but in reality because the Afghan government had agreed to liberate a slew of imprisoned Taliban¹¹⁸. On August 29, 2004, US and associated Afghan forces descended upon Ghazoi village in Zabul, killing Rozi Khan in the resulting battle and taking 22 of his men captive¹¹⁹. Among those that fell with Rozi Khan was the Saudi Ahmed Said Wasus al-Sharif, known as Qashamiyar al-Makki¹²⁰. The Meccan was trained as an educator, but dismissed this occupation for instruction at al-Faruq camp prior to participation in the atrocities at Bamiyan province, to include the destruction of the Buddha monuments in March 2001¹²¹. After the invasion, he was forced to flee Kabul, and migrated to urban Pakistan, before eventually joining the militant forces in the FATA, composing poetry extolling Abu Laith al-Libi during this time¹²². Eventually, Qashamiyar was assigned to Ghazni province, enmeshing with the Afghan resistance, before returning to Abu Laith and his band, participating in battles with these insurgents¹²³. By 2004, he was dispatched to a new position in Zabul, where his men viewed him as an interpreter of dreams¹²⁴. Thus, within jihadist propaganda, his demise with Rozi Khan was twisted into a prophesized event of sorts¹²⁵.

Khost and Jalalabad

For Khost, Abu Dujanah al-Suri was an unfamiliar figure, and represented the relative rarity of a militant from the Levant in a command role. With official command in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, the development of Abu Laith al-Libi as an al-Qaida asset continued.  Abu Faraj described to bin Laden that Abu Laith joined with the militants as a commander, but only took a partial oath due to his initial allegiance to his Libyan Islamic Fighting Group¹²⁶.  Zawahiri confirmed the development to bin Laden, explaining that Abu Laith expressed the desire to fully swear fealty, once he received counsel from higher Libyan militants on the matter¹²⁷. This displayed Abu Laith’s deep connection to al-Qaida and the value that the organization placed upon him, rendering the fact indisputable that Abu Laith was a vital component of the insurgency in Afghanistan as organized by bin Laden’s lieutenants.   Bin Laden was pleased with Abu Laith’s initial vow¹²⁸.

A sizable contingent of other Arabs operated in Jalalabad, including Abu Haitham al-Yemeni, known to organize strikes against local authorities¹²⁹. The Saudi, Sheikh Uwais al-Najdi, also joined supervisory ranks therein, alongside senior Egyptians¹³⁰. In fact, it was Abu al-Hassan al-Masri, operating under the moniker Shakirullah, who was originally recognized as the commander of Jalalabad in 2003¹³¹.

In addition to Abu al-Hassan’s reassignment, other established leaders were lost during the summer, paving the way for the new command structure to assume duties in Jalalabad as the year progressed.  In one hilarious circumstance, described as being four months prior to the US elections (July 2004), leaflets rained down in Afghanistan requesting information on Abu Faraj al-Libi¹³².  The militants on the ground scoffed at the efforts.  But there were other methods by which the jihadists could be tracked.  During this time, Qataris arrived on the battlefield bringing with them GPS devices and detailed maps of Khost.  They joined with the militants and revealed that one of their number was a Qatari diplomat from the Embassy.  Suspiciously, three days into their venture the diplomat remembered that he had diabetes but no insulin and thus needed to depart¹³³. They gifted the GPS, a computer, a watch, a charger, and other electronic equipment to the fighters, which aroused suspicion among the officers even as the lesser militants eagerly accepted.  Specifically, a watch was gifted in Jalalabad to the ground commander Abu Umamah al-Masri, who subsequently destroyed the device with a hammer¹³⁴.  Abu Umamah was an Egyptian jihadist veteran named Awf Mohamed Abdulrahman, who had previously waged war against the Soviets, and attempted to engage in jihad in Tajikistan where he educated the local populace on Islam¹³⁵.  Arriving in 1988, he enmeshed himself into Afghan culture, marrying a Pashtun, but attempted to avoid the frightful Afghan civil war.  When the Taliban provided a revived haven, new opportunities arose for him.  Eventually he returned to Pakistan and later joined bin Laden in Kandahar upon the latter’s arrival from Sudan¹³⁶.  After the US invasion, Abu Umamah fled with the other Arabs to Pakistan before returning on orders to set up resistance in Jalalabad¹³⁷.  Shortly after the incident with the watch, he was killed in an engagement with American forces¹³⁸ . 

It is unknown if the watch contributed, but Abu Umamah did have time to first pen a report on the incident to his superior Abu al-Hassan al-Masri¹³⁹.  Abu Umamah’s eulogy referenced his companionship with Abu al-Hassan while in Jalalabad¹⁴⁰.  He was obviously a senior lieutenant to his fellow Egyptian, and upon Abu al-Hassan’s promotion and departure from Jalalabad, Abu Umamah assumed operational responsibilities¹⁴¹. Thus, with his own demise, there was an opening for the provincial paramilitary command. With the captured Hassan Ghul having reported on Abu Umamah and his role in the war theater, indications are that he was specifically targeted¹⁴².  The Qataris were apparently overt in their efforts to track the jihadists to their dens, and in this case the method paid dividends.

Paktika

Based on his alias alone, Abu Munthir al-Maghrebi (or Andalusi) was obviously a North African who previously dwelled in southern Spain. In internal communications to bin Laden he is referenced by name with no further explanation, indicating that the al-Qaida emir was familiar with this individual¹⁴³. He was also described as the lieutenant with Abdulhadi when the paramilitary commander met with British recruits in Shakai during 2003¹⁴⁴. Now in charge of Paktika, Abu Munthir was expected to maintain the level of violence in the restive province; an easy target just across the border from South Waziristan.

On a single day, September 20, 2004, three US soldiers were killed in combat in Paktika. Two Special Forces operators were victims of an ambush on their convoy near Shakin, an unforunately familiar story¹⁴⁵. A Specialist from the 25th Infantry Division was felled at an observation post elsewhere in Paktika¹⁴⁶. In fact, reports from around this time display insurgent activity this day in several of the referenced provinces. In Zabul there was an exchange in which six militants were killed after firing an RPG against a Black Hawk helicopter, while meanwhile, an IED in nearby Shinkay damaged a Humvee and wounded two soldiers¹⁴⁷. Another IED targeted a convoy in Jalalabad¹⁴⁸. Rockets were deployed against an American position in Paktika¹⁴⁹. It appeared as if the insurgent activity, once sporadic, was now increasing in frequency and ferocity.

Next, a roadside bomb blast obliterated two Humvees in October, rendering one US soldier in critical condition, with two others and their Afghan interpreter also injured and removed to Khost¹⁵⁰. That soldier later succumbed to his wounds¹⁵¹. Yet another ambush on November 1, against a convoy on the road between Paktika and neighboring Uruzgan province, left one soldier deceased and two others badly injured¹⁵². The three were members of the Iowa National Guard, and suffered under an onslaught of RPG and gunfire during the incident¹⁵³. A previous IED attack in mid October killed two more soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division in Uruzgan¹⁵⁴.

Kunar

Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, one of Abdulhadi’s former lieutenants from Brigade 55, inherited one of the most interesting and lethal provincial commands. Of course the story of Kunar and its violent Korengal valley in relation to these al-Qaida leaders is of deeper substance than just the foreign insurgents.  For that matter, Abu Ubaidah was not even the most notorious foreign element in the province. In the 1980s, Arabs flooded into Kunar to establish themselves in the struggles against the Soviets.  Representing various factions at first, they rallied around their common goal.  One such Arab mujahidin was the Egyptian Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, who married into the local populace and remained in Kunar long after the war ended¹⁵⁵.  The former engineering student was implicated with the EIJ back in Egypt and came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in 1988¹⁵⁶. He remained so long in fact, that he picked up arms against the Americans after their invasion and began the fight anew¹⁵⁷.  On November 7, 2003 US forces began Operation Mountain Resolve against members of yet another faction, Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Hezb-i-Islam (HIG) under command of his deputy Kashmir Khan, as well as the separately aligned Arabs fighting with Abu Ikhlas¹⁵⁸.  Kunar was destined again to be a province of bitter battle.  The operation did not dislodge the militants. 

For the Korengal valley specifically, the Americans inadvertently became enmeshed in feudal struggles, not fully understanding the deep divisions among the various factions in the region.  The Safi tribe of Pashtuns are predominant in the province, and have a stranglehold over the timber trade from the Pech valley.  In the nearby Korengal, a Pashai speaking group of Pashtuns, assessed to have some relation to the Nuristani ethnicity¹⁵⁹, held the timber trade from their valley; but were often targets of harassment from the Safis.  As such, a Safi group in the Pech valley managed to convince the Americans to bomb the compound of their rival Haji Matin in the Korengal.  Known more for his lumber business than any sort of militancy, Matin became incensed that members of his family perished in the strike and took his men to join Abu Ikhlas in the resistance, gathering a small local army along the way¹⁶⁰.  Pillaging the mansion of the Korengalis, the Pech valley tribesmen allied with the Americans had now reduced their competition in the timber trade¹⁶¹.  Additionally, the Americans arrested members of Haji Matin’s family, mistaking them for militants based on the Pech valley information¹⁶².  It took until 2007 for the Americans to realize their mistake, but they were embroiled now within a conflict of their own creating, upon which al-Qaida and the Taliban were capitalizing¹⁶³.  Furthermore, the Korengalis were adherents of Salafism, the strict sect of Sunni Islam as followed by al-Qaida¹⁶⁴.  While the Taliban did not subscribe to this sect, the fact that the Korengalis did, allowed al-Qaida militants to encroach upon the locals, gaining support and assisting in their insurgency against the occupation.  Simply, al-Qaida took advantage of the Korengali plight in order to better equip and conduct operations. 

During this time, Abu Ikhlas was the only major figure known to US authorities to initially be operating in Kunar.  While the intelligence was valid, it also distracted from senior al-Qaida officials in the region, and particularly in Kunar, deflected resources from Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, who was now overseeing operations in the province, including those of Abu Ikhlas ¹⁶⁵.  Thus, Abu Ikhlas was a ground asset that could absorb the wrath of Americans, while ensuring that they remained ensnared in Kunar.  A lost US flashdrive, discovered in 2006 at a bazaar in vicinity of Bagram, revealed that at the time, Abu Ikhlas was highly sought after by the Americans and listed as the senior al-Qaida commander in the province¹⁶⁶.  Abu Ikhlas was involved with IED and remote detonator production, attacks on US forces, as well as the attempted acquisition of MANPADs¹⁶⁷.  A multitude of disparate factions fought in coordination with him throughout the province¹⁶⁸.  Yet there were still others involved as well, as al-Qaida directed operations from across the border in Pakistan.  In fact, Bajaur agency, adjacent to Kunar, was haven for a variety of important Arabs, not just Abu Faraj. The explosives trainer Abu Sulaiman al-Jaziri established himself in territory overseen by the local Tehreek e Nafaz e Shariat e Mohamadi militant network¹⁶⁹.  Particularly, TNSM official Maulvi Faqir Mohamed and another jihadist Abu Ali al-Maliki al-Jaziri assisted in facilitating al-Qaida assets and families into the FATA from this perch¹⁷⁰.  Thus, Bajaur was to Kunar what the Shakai valley was to Paktika.

Resolution

Abu Faraj was faced with a reshuffling of assets. Perhaps his distance from South Waziristan was beneficial, especially considering the Pakistani forays had caused unexpected movement among al-Qaida assets. As such, Hamza Rabia and Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah both proceeded on the arduous trek to safety and came to North Waziristan, reestablishing and rejuvenating the al-Qaida training and operational foundation¹⁷¹.  This was at least a temporary haven, and Atwah was able to be instrumental in preparing, instructing, and outfitting bombers, while assembling their devices in the region¹⁷².  Eventually other members helped to enmesh al-Qaida into the Shawal valley of this agency, plus in and around the towns of Miranshah, Mir Ali, Datta Khel, and Sedgai¹⁷³.  Abu Laith al-Libi also migrated to North Waziristan to establish a foundation¹⁷⁴.  It was under the auspices of Jalaluddin Haqqani and his family influence in North Waziristan, that these insurgents flourished, as the Haqqanis provided for the safety and operational capabilities of the relocating Arabs.  As for other local assistance, with Amjad Faruqi dead, Abu Faraj needed another link into the Pakistani militant underworld. This came in the form of Rashid Rauf, a British-Kashmiri militant, who previously met with Abu Faraj and other al-Qaida along with Faruqi in 2002¹⁷⁵. Now, with circumstances as they were, Rauf became the primary contact and was integral to future plots¹⁷⁶.

Abu Faraj corresponded with bin Laden on a host of issues besides disputes, including marriages. Such discussions of unions were a sensitive subject to bin Laden, in that his son Khalid was in need of a wife¹⁷⁷. Thus commenced a long and futile obsession with the issue. Others, even while in hiding, had better marital fortune. As-Sahab editor Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi was now married¹⁷⁸, and his spouse revealed to be Zawahiri’s daughter¹⁷⁹. The Moroccan, enmeshed in al-Qaida prior to 9/11, arrived in the Shakai in 2003 from Iran, after previously fleeing there after the invasion¹⁸⁰. Now, through the nuptuals he was catapulted into senior responsiblities. Additionally, as Zawahiri had married into the local populace, he fathered another daughter, which was a cause for celebration among the militants¹⁸¹. Yet the most important familial note to bin Laden was that his own son-in-law, Abdullah al-Halabi (married to his daughter Khadija), had arrived in 2004 to be with the entrenched Arab community in the FATA¹⁸². Bin Laden requested that Halabi be utilized to acquire and deliver financial assets to which the newly arrived Saudi would have access¹⁸³.

In December 2004, Abu Faraj met with Khalid Habib in Bajaur to discuss operations including external plans, suggesting that Khalid Habib was now finally onboard with the Shura Council and the hierarchal structure¹⁸⁴.  This in addition to his military responsibilities, confirmed that he was settling into the role of insurgent commander.  Conferring in this manner assuredly alleviated the concerns of Zawahiri in regards to both Abu Faraj and Khalid Habib. Together they trekked to further operational summits and travails.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

• [A] For additional information on Hamza al-Ghamdi, see the Chronicles In Zealotry report: Hamza Al-Ghamdi: US State Department Announces Reward For Veteran Yet Enigmatic Al-Qaida Majlis al-Shura Councilor – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/2024/06/14/hamza-al-ghamdi-us-state-department-announces-reward-for-veteran-yet-enigmatic-al-qaida-majlis-al-shura-councilor/

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115. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mullah Noorullah Nuri, ISN 06, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/6.html ↩︎
116. Guantanamo Assessment File, Idris Ahmed Abdulqadir Idris, ISN 35, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/35.html ↩︎
117. Taliban Releases Turkish Engineer, CBS News via The Associated Press, November 30, 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taliban-releases-turkish-engineer/ ↩︎
118. Taliban Releases Turkish Engineer, CBS News via The Associated Press, November 30, 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taliban-releases-turkish-engineer/ ↩︎
119. Suspected Taliban Fighters Arrested, The Los Angeles Times via The Associated Press, August 29, 2004, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-aug-29-fg-afghan29-story.html ↩︎
120. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
121. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
122. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
123. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
124. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
125. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
126. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
127. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
128. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
129. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
130. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
131. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
132. In Kurram, Kandahar, and Khost, measures thereon for all of Afghanistan, letter dated 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/In%20Kuram,%20Kandahar,%20and%20Khost,%20measures%20thereon%20for%20all%20of%20Afghanistan.pdf ↩︎
133. In Kurram, Kandahar, and Khost, measures thereon for all of Afghanistan, letter dated 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/In%20Kuram,%20Kandahar,%20and%20Khost,%20measures%20thereon%20for%20all%20of%20Afghanistan.pdf ↩︎
134. In Kurram, Kandahar, and Khost, measures thereon for all of Afghanistan, letter dated 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/In%20Kuram,%20Kandahar,%20and%20Khost,%20measures%20thereon%20for%20all%20of%20Afghanistan.pdf // Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
135. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
136. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
137. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
138. In Kurram, Kandahar, and Khost, measures thereon for all of Afghanistan, letter dated 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/In%20Kuram,%20Kandahar,%20and%20Khost,%20measures%20thereon%20for%20all%20of%20Afghanistan.pdf // Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
139. In Kurram, Kandahar, and Khost, measures thereon for all of Afghanistan, letter dated 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/In%20Kuram,%20Kandahar,%20and%20Khost,%20measures%20thereon%20for%20all%20of%20Afghanistan.pdf ↩︎
140. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
141. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
142. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
143. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 // Al-Qaida Internal Communique entitled “Lessons Learned Following The Fall of the Islamic Emirate,” https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl/english/Lessons%20Learned%20Following%20the%20Fall%20of%20the%20Islamic%20Emirate.pdf ↩︎
144. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
145. Bomb narrowly misses Afghan politicians, NBC News via The Associated Press, September 20, 2004, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6052395 // Family buries Oconee Co. soldier killed in Afghanistan, WIS 10 News, September 29, 2004, https://www.wistv.com/story/2366726/family-buries-oconee-co-soldier-killed-in-afghanistan/ ↩︎
146. Schofield soldier dies after bombing, by Gregg K. Kakesako, Honolulu Star-Advertiser, https://archives.starbulletin.com/2004/10/30/news/story3.html ↩︎
147. U.S. attacks insurgents in Afghanistan, bomb injures two Americans, by Noor Khan, The Associated Press, September 20, 2004, https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/2004/sep/20/us-attacks-insurgents-in-afghanistan-bomb-injures-/ ↩︎
148. U.S. attacks insurgents in Afghanistan, bomb injures two Americans, by Noor Khan, The Associated Press, September 20, 2004, https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/2004/sep/20/us-attacks-insurgents-in-afghanistan-bomb-injures-/ ↩︎
149. U.S. attacks insurgents in Afghanistan, bomb injures two Americans, by Noor Khan, The Associated Press, September 20, 2004, https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/2004/sep/20/us-attacks-insurgents-in-afghanistan-bomb-injures-/ ↩︎
150. Afghan ambush injures US soldiers, Al-Jazeera via Reuters, October 21, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/10/21/afghan-ambush-injures-us-soldiers ↩︎
151. Schofield soldier dies after bombing, by Gregg K. Kakesako, Honolulu Star-Advertiser, https://archives.starbulletin.com/2004/10/30/news/story3.html ↩︎
152. U.S. soldier dies in Afghan attack, NBC News via The Associated Press, November 1, 2004, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6383461 ↩︎
153. Iowa soldier dies in Afghanistan, by Michelle Spitzer, The Associated Press, November 2, 2004, https://thefallen.militarytimes.com/army-spc-james-c-kearney-iii/487255 ↩︎
154. Afghanistan ambush targets US troops, Al-Jazeera, October 16, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/10/16/afghanistan-ambush-targets-us-troops ↩︎
155. The ‘Other Guantanamo’ (13): What should Afghanistan do with America’s foreign detainees?, by Kate Clark, Afghanistan Analysis Network, March 2, 2015, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-other-guantanamo-13-what-should-afghanistan-do-with-americas-foreign-detainees/ ↩︎
156. The ‘Other Guantanamo’ (13): What should Afghanistan do with America’s foreign detainees?, by Kate Clark, Afghanistan Analysis Network, March 2, 2015, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-other-guantanamo-13-what-should-afghanistan-do-with-americas-foreign-detainees/ ↩︎
157. Afghanistan’s Heart of Darkness: Fighting the Taliban in Kunar Province, by Brian Glyn Williams, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 12, November 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/afghanistans-heart-of-darkness-fighting-the-taliban-in-kunar-province/ ↩︎
158. Afghanistan’s Heart of Darkness: Fighting the Taliban in Kunar Province, by Brian Glyn Williams, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 12, November 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/afghanistans-heart-of-darkness-fighting-the-taliban-in-kunar-province/ ↩︎
159. The American War in Afghanistan: A History, Carter Malkasian, Oxford University Press, 2021 ↩︎
160. Afghanistan’s Heart of Darkness: Fighting the Taliban in Kunar Province, by Brian Glyn Williams, CTC Sentinel, Volume 1, Issue 12, November 2008, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/afghanistans-heart-of-darkness-fighting-the-taliban-in-kunar-province/ ↩︎
161. Battle Company Is Out There, by Elizabeth Rubin, The New York Times, February 24, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html ↩︎
162. Battle Company Is Out There, by Elizabeth Rubin, The New York Times, February 24, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html ↩︎
163. Battle Company Is Out There, by Elizabeth Rubin, The New York Times, February 24, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html ↩︎
164. The American War in Afghanistan: A History, Carter Malkasian, Oxford University Press, 2021 ↩︎
165. The Hardest Place: The American Military Adrift in Afghanistan’s Pech Valley, Wesley Morgan, Random House, 2021 ↩︎
166. Afghanistan Five Years After 9/11, by Paul Danahar, BBC News, September 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5335060.stm ↩︎
167. Guantanamo Assessment File, Yaqub Mohamed al-Tayisha, ISN 720, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/720.html ↩︎
168. Guantanamo Assessment File, Yaqub Mohamed al-Tayisha, ISN 720, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/720.html ↩︎
169. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
170. Guantanamo Assessment File, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
171. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
172. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
173. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
174. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
175. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, CTC Sentinel, Volume 5, Issue 7, July 2012, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
176. A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative, by Raffaello Pantucci, CTC Sentinel, Volume 5, Issue 7, July 2012, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-biography-of-rashid-rauf-al-qaidas-british-operative/ ↩︎
177. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
178. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
179. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated December 9, 2004 ↩︎
180. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
181. Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Osama bin Laden, dated October 20, 2004 ↩︎
182. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
183. Letter providing direction, from Osama bin Laden, dated approx December 2004, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2017/english/Letter%20providing%20direction.pdf ↩︎
184. Guantanamo Assessment File, Mustafa Faraj Mohamed al-Jadid al-Uzaibi (Abu Faraj al-Libi), ISN 10017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10017.html ↩︎

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