Enemies Of A Former Enemy: ISIS and Hurras Al-Din After The Collapse Of Assad

In the aftermath of a turbulent American election cycle, US forces in Syria and Iraq prepared intensified responses to ISIS and the threats posed by these extremists. Other factions were to be targeted also, most notably Hurras al-Din, or Guardians of the Religion, a network born of the dissolved Syrian al-Qaida franchise in 2018, and the bearer of the standard of Ayman al-Zawahiri and traditional al-Qaida philosophy in the region. The impetus of the renewed passion for preemptive conflict was the astounding toppling of the Bashir al-Assad regime, as conducted and accomplished by Ahmed al-Sharaa’s (Abu Mohamed al-Jolani) insurgent Islamic political entity, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). With Assad removed from power and his military apparatus hapless, confused, and dissolved, geographic areas were now opened to US intervention that were previously restricted.

Previously Untouchable

On December 8, merely a day after Assad was usurped¹, the US Air Force unleashed a hellish barrage upon central Syria, aiming to disrupt and destroy ISIS operations and training camps, before they could gain advantage and coalesce as a result of the Syrian governmental implosion². Leadership and operations personnel of the Islamic State were apparently fired upon as well³. Thus, over 75 valid ISIS targets were struck, utilizing an impressive arsenal of B-52 Stratofortresses, A-10 Warthogs, and F-15 Eagles⁴. These assets were able to fly freely due to the disappearance of Syrian military defense. Though the strikes were extensive, no casualty numbers were provided by USCENTCOM, except to declare no civilian deaths having occurred⁵.

Just over a week later, on December 16, a series of strikes fell upon Syria, in regions previously untouchable as they had been controlled by the Russians and Assad regime⁶. A total of a dozen ISIS personnel perished in the bombardment⁷. USCENTCOM reiterated that America would prevent ISIS from reassembling in the ever chaotic Syria during the nation’s turmoil of transition in governance⁸. Just days later on December 19, an airstrike in Deir al-Zawr, another area formerly controlled by Assad and the Russians, rendered two ISIS operatives deceased, including one leadership figure known as Abu Yusef, or Mahmud⁹. The debris of the Hellfire missile displayed that the munition utilized was specifically an R9X, a kinetic but non-detonating projectile that employs six blades to eliminate a target just prior to impact¹⁰. There appears to be no confirmation of Abu Yusef’s status or identity within the militant network, yet much the same as his predecessors, his death was heralded as a victory.

This new round of strikes seemed to be opportunistic, as the same Deir al-Zawr province suffered a strike on December 23, killing two more ISIS operatives and wounding a third, as they transported a truck laden with weaponry for sinister purposes¹¹. That the US would announce the destruction of what appeared a simple transport indicates that all targets of opportunity were to be taken in the efforts to prevent regrowth of ISIS.

Presented with the waning days of the Biden Administration, the efforts intensified with a multitude of multilateral missions from December 30, 2024 through January, 6 2025¹². Employing F-16s, F-15s, and A-10s, American air support engaged ISIS combatants as they attempted to resist and counter US and coalition ground forces during raids throughout the Hamrim mountains, designed to deter and prevent terrorist operations¹³. While one non-American coalition soldier was killed, there appeared to be many more ISIS casualties, with one particular A-10 bombardment reported to have cleansed an entire cave complex of the jihadists¹⁴.

Meanwhile, in Deir al-Zawr, Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, in conjuction with American support raided an ISIS position from January 2-3, achieving the arrest of an ISIS attack cell commander¹⁵. While not reported by USCENTCOM, a vehicle was a destroyed by a drone on January 10, in the al-Rasafah desert in proximity of al-Raqqa, killing a purported senior ISIS operative named Mohamed Jadoua¹⁶. Further, a supposed American drone strike against an two individuals on a motorcycle in Samarda, Idlib killed a “former” ISIS officer, Mohamed Fayad al-Dhaiban and Naif Hamud Alawi, according to HTS sources and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights¹⁷. Syrian activists noted that Dhaiban was “retired” from militancy after stints with ISIS and Jund al-Aqsa¹⁸. The other casualty and driver of the motorcycle, Alawi, was described as a student¹⁹.

After the Trump Administration assumed power in the US, the strikes were allowed to continue. On January 31, USCENTCOM assisted the Iraqi Security Forces in precision airstrikes against an ISIS unit near the northern city of Kirkuk²⁰. While five operatives were slain, there was more interest in the discovery of suicide explosive belts amidst the debris, indicating the malicious intentions of the cell²¹. In a similar circumstance days later on February 10, USCENTCOM again supported the ISF in an airstrike, killing two more operatives, with yet more explosives and a suicide belt revealed²². Five more ISIS militants, in possession of grenades, suicide vests, and additional weaponry were eliminated in another of these type of strikes, this time in Rawa, Iraq on February 12²³. USCENTCOM began to praise the capabilities of the ISF²⁴ despite the reported consistent US assistance, presumably as a precursor to the eventual departure of American military expertise and aid.

From the UK Operation Shader against ISIS in Syria, a Royal Air Force drone targeted a pedestrian described as a known ISIS combatant with a Hellfire missile while walking in Aleppo on February 25²⁵. Thus it is possible that some of the unaccounted for drone activity and actions were conducted by other coalition members to destabilize the ISIS hierarchy.

Concerning additional command figures during this period, Syrian Democratic and USCENTCOM forces successfully raided a location on March 6, near Shahil, Syria, recovering an abundance of weaponry to include a sniper rifle, and arresting an individual described as an ISIS cell leader, Salah Mohamed al-Abdullah²⁶. However, senior and known leadership appeared to persist, at least for a few more days.

A Global Deputy

Perhaps the most impressive operation during this period actually removed a known, or at least previously named, ISIS commander from his advanced position in the organization. Known as Abu Khadijah, the commander was Abdullah Makki Musleh al-Rufayi, and was declared by USCENTCOM as the overall deputy global officer of ISIS²⁷. As such, he was responsible for significant finances, logistics, formulating plots, and operations for the entire network²⁸. An erstwhile governor of the ISIS Iraqi province, Rufayi was promoted to oversight of the General Directorate of Provinces, ensuring the operational and financial means and existence for the various ISIS provinces, earning himself a terrorist designation from the US Depatment of the Treasury on June 8, 2023²⁹. Specifically, Rufayi was the officer of the Bilad al-Rafidayn office of the GDP in Iraq, while his comrade designated on the same day, Abu Bakr Mohamed Ali al-Mainuki oversaw the GDP al-Furqan office in the Sahel region of Africa³⁰. Scholars describe the GDP having developed from the initial ADP, or Administration of Distant Provinces, which enabled connectivity among the provinces, and maintained the collective purpose of each within ISIS³¹. As a portion of ISIS governance, the GDP became vital to the anatomy of the organization, ensuring the perpetration of external global operations, thus demonstrating the advanced role of an individual such as Rufayi³². He may have assumed this tasking in full after the assassination of GDP senior administrator Abu Sarah al-Iraqi (Abdulrauf al-Muhajir) in Idlib, Syria, during February 2023³³. The UN went even further and clarified that Rufayi was also responsible for the al-Ard al-Mubaraka office of the GDP, and that his specific territories included Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and the Levant region³⁴. USCENTCOM released a video along with their announcement, displaying the precision airstrike that destroyed a vehicle and killed Rufayi along with one of his men³⁵. Sweeping the location, Iraqi and American forces found the bodies, and again a variety of weapons, including the suicide vests both operatives were apparently donning³⁶. As Rufayi had previously escaped a raid, his DNA was gathered and matched with the bodies in the targeted vehicle, confirming his demise for the coalition forces³⁷.

Kurdish security forces enhanced the operation by apprehending and delivering an associate of Rufayi’s for interrogation, resulting in information allowing investigators to find the wanted commander³⁸. Other clues were gathered during Anbar raids the previously August³⁹. Finally, another meandering pathway to Rufayi was revealed from Syria. Labeled the General Security Service, the intelligence force of the nascent HTS Syrian government, received details from American intelligence on an impending incendiary ISIS plot to strike a Shiite shrine in vicinity of Damascus, in order to encourage religious infighting⁴⁰. In displaying a willingness to share sensitive data with the HTS, the Americans placed faith in the organization to combat ISIS, after which the GSS apprehended the conspirators on January 11⁴¹. As a direct consequence, the subsequently garnered evidence allowed the GSS to successfully raid and capture Abu Harith al-Iraqi, a dominant operative in the ISIS Iraq province, who in turn pointed authorities in the direction of his superior Rufayi⁴².

One major figure, albeit publicly known, was a victory for USCENTCOM, but by no means represented an end to ISIS. American forces seemed to be shifting focus in the aftermath of the HTS takeover in Syria, in order to target Hurras al-Din.

Again, two days later on February 25, there were reports of a US drone strike in Aleppo, killing a militant on a motorcycle, identified locally as Fadi Farah, also known as Abu Ahmed al-Shami⁴³. The victim was reported as associated with both ISIS and Hurras al-Din⁴⁴. However, unlike the previous two strikes, USCENTOM appears to have never acknowledged such a drone strike.

Guardians of the Religion

Hurras al-Din actually announced a cessation to its activites in the aftermath of the HTS overthrow of the Assad Regime, seemingly clearing away a potential rival Ahmed al-Sharaa. However, despite the issuance, American forces increased their campaign against Hurras al-Din officials and their affiliates, coinciding with the mission against ISIS.

The first evidence of an increased campaign came when an airstrike on January 30, in northwest Syria, targeted and killed a “senior operative” of the supposedly dissolved entity, identified by USCENTCOM as Mohamed Salah al-Zabir⁴⁵. With USCENTCOM General Michael Erik Kurilla declaring, “CENTCOM will continue to hunt and kill or capture terrorists, and defend our homeland, against groups that plot to attack US and allied personnel⁴⁶,” it was now obvious that Hurras al-Din remained in the crosshairs of American firepower.

This was the first effort specifically against the jihadist syndicate since August 23, 2024, when a senior commander, allegedly overseeing external operations was neutralized in an airstrike within Syria⁴⁷. He was Abu Abdulrahman al-Makki⁴⁸, a known member of Hurras al-Din, and a veteran al-Qaida official⁴⁹. He represented a linkage between Hurras al-Din and the central leadership of al-Qaida in the Khorasan region, especially given his participation in media releases⁵⁰. In the months following the Saudi’s assassination, the al-Qaida affiliate was largely ignored. The primary exception was that of a strike on September 24, resulting in the elimination of nine Hurras al-Din operatives in northwest Syria⁵¹. Among them was Marwan Bassam Abdulrauf, described as the syndicate’s paramilitary commander within the tumultuous nation⁵².

However, after the January 2025 incident, a series of subsequent strikes commenced. A February 16 USCENTCOM announcement proclaimed that the day prior, an airstrike in northwestern Syria terminated a single senior financial and logistical officer for Hurras al-Din⁵³. However it appears in actuality that two such figures met their demise in the mission, both Libyans, operating under the monikers of Abu Abdulrahman al-Libi and Abu Fadlallah al-Libi⁵⁴. The latter in particular was a productive recruiter of foreign elements for the organization⁵⁵.

On February 21, another airstrike targeted and eliminated a Hurras al-Din facilitator and leadership figure identified as Wasim Tahsin Bayraqdar, in order to “disrupt and degrade efforts by terrorists to plan, organize, and conduct attacks against civilians and military personnel from the U.S., our allies, and our partners throughout the region and beyond⁵⁶.” Some sources stated that Bayraqdar, who was killed in a drone strike on his Jeep⁵⁷, was deeply involved in internal security for the network. Interestingly, Arab press reported that Wasim’s brother, Samir Bayraqdar was currently the Syrian Minister for religious endowments, demonstrating the complex interconnections between the competing factions within the Syrian civil war and developing new government⁵⁸. Further, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights contradicted the claims, declaring their belief that a disenchanted Wasim Bayraqdar renounced and exited Hurras al-Din some five years prior⁵⁹.

In a startling image, on March 1, USCENTCOM released a video of a February 23 drone strike utilizing an R9X missile against a truck in northwestern Syria⁶⁰. The strike was lethal and efficient, with the vehicle and its two deceased occupants veering from the road slowly to their final stop⁶¹. Inside was Mohamed Yusef Ziya Talay, whom USCENTCOM described as the overall paramilitary commander of Hurras al-Din, while again emphasizing the network’s association with central al-Qaida⁶². It appears that he was a Turkish national from Ankara, and at 39 years of age, was a personality familiar to the Turkish Interior Ministry and their counterterrorism efforts⁶³. Some sources maintain that despite being affiliated to al-Qaida, that Abu Jafar was an asset of Turkish intelligence (MIT), and a component of a more expansive program in which the MIT utilized al-Qaida operatives to facilitate efforts against the Assad regime⁶⁴.

The trend may appear obvious, in that US airstrikes, while neutralizing some vital jihadist operatives, were predominantly removing enemies of HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa, the new components of Syrian government. Thus, helping to stabilize the fledgling rulers would delay or prevent deadly unrest. However, the deeper motive may simply be to degrade ISIS and al-Qaida regional capabilities while able, owing to the impending departure of American forces from the region. The strikes may merely be a means to give the appearance of an intense campaign against, and a willingness to combat, the extremists. Therefore, the Americans could declare that the terrorism threat was reduced and justify ceasing the mission. Regardless, it all leads to an abandoning of Iraq and the Levant again to the machinations of the religious radicals.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

For the previous article describing missions against ISIS after the announcement of an impending American withdrawal from the region, please see: Mowing The Lawn: Maintaining Operations Against ISIS In Syria And Iraq – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/2024/11/06/mowing-the-lawn-maintaining-operations-against-isis-in-syria-and-iraq/

Chronicles in Zealotry

An attempted in depth chronicle and analysis of the militant religious extremism that gave rise to the Global War on Terror, subsequent conflicts, and the personalities involved.

Enemies Of A Former Enemy: ISIS and Hurras Al-Din After The Collapse Of Assad

Previously Untouchable

A Global Deputy

Guardians of the Religion

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Previously Untouchable

A Global Deputy

Guardians of the Religion

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