SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 22 – Global Ramifications Of Local Disorder)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment VI – A Subdued Silence (Chapter 22 – Global Ramifications)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

This chapter explores the effects of the rising AQAP internationally, from their inseparable linkage to Somalia to the Western nations they targeted. The slow and inevitable growth of AQAP as a dangerous force is ensured by an absence in urgency from the Yemenis to remove or eliminate the actual threats. The Yemeni dedication to exterminating the extremists is thus readily called into question, by their dubious operations and intentions. 

Somali Sojourn

While the Saudis continued to successfully remove names from their wanted lists and round up associated fugitives, the Yemenis claimed to be surmounting their very similar task.  As mentioned earlier, the Yemenis were proud to announce in April 2006 that they had corralled six of their wanted prison escapees after they had arranged for their surrenders.  The men, being released on security guarantees, eventually found their way back into action.  Mohamed al-Dailami was a prime example of one of those six men rejoining the ranks of Wuhaishi and being a member of an evolving AQAP infrastructure [1].  Another example of the failure of the security guarantees was Mansur Nasir Awad al-Baihani (G-17).  Baihani and his brother Zakariya had surrendered to the Yemenis and had been subsequently released [2,3].  The men were not supposed to leave Yemen, but Mansur found an easy enough way.  Mansur, also known as Abu Asim al-Tabuki, was a veteran jihadist whose family was thoroughly engaged in extremism [4,5].  In addition to his brother Zakariya, a fellow escapee, Mansur had two brothers, Tawfiq and Ghalib, imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay (ISN 893 and ISN 128) [6,7]. 

Mansur, upon being radicalized, traveled to Afghanistan in the 1990s to receive training at Al-Qaida camps [4,5].  Upon completion he is believed to have fought in Bosnia, but more importantly spent a significant amount of time fighting in Chechnya [4,5].  He witnessed the siege of Grozny and fought for Ibn Khattab, the leader of Arab fighters in Chechnya (whose real name was Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailim) [4,5].  Suwailim was eventually poisoned by the Russians and killed [8].  Mansur, during his fighting in Chechnya, was wounded in his right eye [4].  At some point, he traveled to Afghanistan and became a weapons trainer at al-Faruq and other al-Qaida locations [6,7].  He was said in the Guantanamo assessment files of his brothers to be high ranking and to report directly to senior leadership of the organization [6,7].  After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Mansur contributed to the fight.  He is reported to have helped supply Taliban and Al-Qaida fighters along the front lines in Kandahar [6,7].  He was one of many fighters who were able to escape the fighting and make their way back to the Arabian Peninsula [5], most likely through Tora Bora.  Prior to returning to the Arabian Peninsula, Mansur had set up base in Iran in order to assist fleeing jihadist fighters from Afghanistan [6].  Once back in the Kingdom, Mansur and brother Zakariya were apprehended by the Saudis and extradited to Yemen in a series of exchanges between the two nations that took place in 2003 [6,7].  Strangely of all the charges he faced in Yemen, he was only convicted of forging passports [4,9].  It is believed that Mansur and his associates were preparing for jihad in Iraq [9].  In the end, Mansur found another theatre of action to express his loyal tendencies to Al-Qaida.

Upon his escape, surrender, and release, Mansur made his way to Somalia where he joined jihadist fighters therein [4,5].  He apparently fought in battles alongside of al-Shabaab (a Somali Sunni extremist group that eventually swore fealty to Al-Qaida [10]) fighters and then began training them [5].  He apparently trained American jihadist Omar Hammami (Abu Mansur al-Amriki) who rose to a form of fame within al-Shabaab as a propagandist [5].  Mansur was a part of the entourage of Harun Fazul and quite possibly his bodyguard or loyal soldier [5].  Harun Fazul was a leader of Al-Qaida’s East African branch and overseer of the group’s operations within the Horn of Africa [11].  He had been an important member of bin Laden’s staff when based in East Africa and later a member of Mohamed Atef’s military committee [12,13].  Fazul (Fazul Abdullah Mohamed) had played an important and direct role in the 1998 Embassy bombings and drove a lead vehicle for the Nairobi suicide bombers Owhali and Harazi [13].  He was later seen as a liaison to al-Shabaab as the two organizations became very closely aligned [11].  By 2007, The US began to target the Somali Council of Islamic Courts leadership within Somalia (A Taliban-esque theocracy), al-Shabaab leadership, and Al-Qaida in East Africa members to coincide with Ethiopia’s invasion into Somalia [14].  Supported by the Americans, the Ethiopians intended on clearing the extremists from their control of Somali cities [14,15]. Eventually the Ethiopian invasion drove the Somali Council of Islamic Courts from power and helped secure the rule of the Somali transitional government [15].  This however, opened the door for Shabaab and their Al-Qaida allies to become powerful underground figures fighting a war against the new Somali government and taking territory by force in the volatile nation [16].  Harun Fazul was a major player in this operation [11].  Fazul, in addition to the 1998 Embassy Bombings, had come to fame for playing a significant role in the 2002 Mombasa attacks [13,17].  He had been indicted in the US and wanted by the FBI for years [13].  He had supposedly been targeted in Somalia and initially believed killed in a round of US airstrikes in January 2007 [14].  Despite this assertion, the successful militant survived.  All of these things considered, he had a lot of credit within jihadist circles and men were willing to follow him.  Harun Fazul later clarified that he was not a member of al-Shabaab but did actively support them logistically and with security [18].  Abu Talha al-Sudani, whom Mohamed Atef had placed in charge of the 2002 Mombassa attacks was a primary figure in al-Shabaab and coveted Harun’s membership [18].  As such he dispatched Mansur al-Baihani to persuade Fazul, but the latter respectfully declined, maintaining that al-Qaida did not support franchises, and viewed himself as but an extension of central leadership [18].  Abu Talha al-Sudani had revealed to Harun Fazul that several List G escapees would be displacing to Somalia.  As such, Fazul assisted them as he could, including with forged travel documents.  It appears that at least three of the escapees made it to al-Shabaab.  From summer of 2006 until Spring 2007 they participated in fighting Ethiopian forces alongside of al-Shabaab [18].  They did however, draw the attention of the Americans.

The US Navy on July 2, 2007 launched strikes from the destroyer USS CHAFEE at the port of Baar Gaal in Puntland in an attempt to assassinate Fazul [4,19,20].  US Special Forces had clashed in boats with militants along the coast which resulted in the intense Naval fire [5].  Harun Fazul reportedly escaped but several of his retinue were killed [5,19,20].  Initially it was reported that eight militants perished and that the bodyguards and entourage hailed from various countries including Yemen [19,20].  Among the dead was Mansur al-Baihani (G-17) [4,5].  Harun Fazul later reported that he was not with the group.  In January 2007, at least one of the escapees returned to Yemen via boat.  This June excursion was another return venture, this time with Mansur al-Baihani in charge.  The group consisted of several ethnicities of fighters and drew the attention of the CIA, leading to the subsequent battle [18]. 

Freedom After Surrender

It is unknown if Zakariya followed his brother to Somalia as he was released with him from Yemeni custody within the same security guarantee [3].  However, another member of the original six escapees who quickly surrendered to Yemeni authorities only to be released did end up in Somalia [4].  Ibrahim Mohamed Abdah al-Maqri (G-21) was released on a security guarantee after his surrender with Fawzi al-Wajeh but he too broke the laws and made his way to the Horn of Africa [3,4,21].  Upon fleeing the Ethiopian invasion and the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union he was arrested by Kenyan authorities while attempting to cross the border into their nation and was held in prison there for a time [4,22,23].  Maqri, as it turns out, was eventually extradited to Yemen and held in prison there for his crimes yet again [23].  AQAP in the future demanded his release along with the release of dozens of other prisoners [23].  Not surprisingly in February of 2009 the Yemenis did liberate 112 prisoners in a deal with known jihadist fighter Tariq al-Fadhli, and Maqri was the most well-known of the newly freed [23].

As for the escapee who surrendered alongside of Maqri, Fawzi Mohamed Abdulqawi al-Wajeh (G-12) had been held in a Yemeni prison for a brief time before being released on a security guarantee [3,21].  By July 2007 his story was profiled in the media to show the ridiculousness of Yemen’s security guarantees with militants [24].  Thus, Wajeh had promised to obey the law and not participate in jihad and was allowed back into society [24].  He was released along with former Al-Qaida member Nasir Ahmed Nasir al-Bahri (Abu Jandal) [24].  In fact, the Associated Press was able to interview Wajeh, a man who had been convicted for his role in the Limburg bombing and who had also been a bin Laden bodyguard in Afghanistan [24,25].  After Wajeh had returned to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan he participated in multiple illicit activities including the Limburg bombing and was eventually caught by the Saudis and extradited to Yemen to stand trial [4].  Interestingly, Wajeh told the Associated Press that he maintained contact in his freedom with central AQAP leadership including Wuhaishi [24].  While Yemen was quick to flaunt Wajeh as an example of a former jihadist agreeing not to engage in criminal activities or militancy, the former bodyguard was still not answering for his past crimes.  For example, in the United States charges against Al-Qaida operative Ahmed al-Darbi, Al-Qaida leader Abdulrahim al-Nashiri is shown to have sent Darbi on a mission to bomb tankers and ships in the Strait of Hormuz [26].  From Segment I it may be remembered that many of Nashiri’s men were involved in the plot.  These included the now infamous Khalid al-Jehani who assisted Darbi in searching for boats and equipment, and Khalid Ali al-Hajj who handled finances for the attack [26,27].  Nashiri sent men to help Darbi crew his boat and to be the actual bombers.  The indictment of Darbi reveals his crew to have been:  Fayez Hussain Ali al-Najjar (Fawzi Yahya Qasim al-Hababi), Munir al-Sharabi (Bashir Numan Said al-Safari) and Bassam Waji (Fawzi Mohamed Abdulqawi al-Wajeh) [26].  This coupled with Wajeh’s actual conviction in the Limburg bombing shows that the man was an integral part of the Nashiri network.  Thus, the Yemenis had allowed a known member of this network, who was involved in multiple maritime bombing plots in Yemeni waters, to walk from their prison system and maintain contact with Nashiri’s successor Wuhaishi. 

Wuhaishi and his core cadre continued to elude the authorities even as more of their members chose to take the route of security guarantee and freedom.  On May 22, 2007, both Jabir al-Bannah and Abdulrahman al-Basurah (G-4, G-22) surrendered to Yemeni authorities [4,28,29].  The Yemeni government reported him in custody and despite the fact that the US had Bannah on their wanted lists, the Yemenis were not willing to hand over the extremist [29,30].  Thus, began an intense observation of the legal circumstance of Bannah, his time in custody, his subsequent release, and court appearances [30,31].  These observations were by the US Embassy which eventually made a startling discovery in the process [31].  Importantly though, Bannah’s ability to remain free was just further evidence that the Yemenis were willing to cut absurd deals [30].  Part of Bannah’s security agreement was that he would avoid being extradited to the US [30].  Due to the security agreement, Bannah entered an appeals court in March 2008 as a free man despite have turned himself in during May of the previous year [30].  The American jihadist claimed he had surrendered to President Ali Saleh directly and received his deal [30].  Furthermore, Bannah had been convicted in the November 2007 trial pertaining to the Marib and Hadhramout oil facility bombings in absentia, displaying a disturbing trend where the Yemenis allowed convicted criminals to remain free or under slight house arrest [30,33].  The trend only continued.  In August 2006 for instance, Hizam Mujali and his brother Arif (G-13, G-14) surrendered to authorities after negotiations and were released on security guarantee [4,32].  Their surrender was mediated by Hadi Dulqum, the tribal leader and arms dealer who had been involved in the COLE bombing plot [32,34].  Suspiciously this was the second time Arif had been apprehended since the escape [2].  Abdullah Yahya Saleh al-Wadai (G-23) also surrendered sometime after the escape, although it is not known exactly when, and he was subsequently released [4]. 

As mentioned, even Zakariya al-Yafai, who was actually captured instead of just surrendering [35], was rapidly released [3].  Yafai, after released, was involved in a bizarre incident within the ranks of AQAP.  Yafai agreed in June 2007 to carry Faris al-Rimi (a fighter from Afghanistan and Qasim’s younger brother) from Sanaa to the location of his brother Qasim for a visit [4].  Faris was later found shot in the head and eventually died at the hospital after some time lingering [4].  It is assumed that Yafai shot him or that Qasim shot his own brother.  If Yafai shot him, it appears to be on AQAP orders as he was never renounced by the organization for the occurrence.  In the end, the Yemenis’ release of the recaptured escapees did nothing but bolster Wuhaishi’s cause and ranks.

Queen of Sheba Attack

It must be said that Wuhayshi is not just suspected of being the leader of AQAP at this time but that the appointment was actually made official via press release.  Qasim al-Rimi made the announcement on June 21, 2007 and Wuhayshi also spoke on the audio release stating, “I have been nominated leader of al-Qaida in Yemen and I say no to any surrender to government forces. Ignorance and Islam can never blend together. Several tyrants have tried to insert ignorance in Islam but they have all failed….They want us to renege our beliefs and to repudiate some of our principles. But during this time when they have been waging their Crusader war, the enemies are being defeated as is happening in Afghanistan at the hands of the mujahidin [36,37].”  Further evidence of Wuhaishi as the AQAP commander came from the aforementioned oil facility bombings trial of 2007.  The defendants claimed that while Fawaz al-Rubayi and Qasim al-Rimi trained them in weapons and prepared them for various operations, it was Wuhaishi who led the overall structure of the group [38].  In fact, it was Wuhaishi who had led them to swear fealty to al-Qaida and bin Laden [38].  The June announcement of leadership was quickly followed by another operation conducted by Wuhaishi’s fledgling network.  

At around 1800 on July 2, 2007 one of Wuhayshi’s operatives, a youth named Abdah Mohamed Said Ahmed Ruhaiqa drove his Land Cruiser to the Queen of Sheba Temple in Marib, also known as the Mahram Baqlis in Arabic [39-43].  The Queen of Sheba Temple had been a very popular tourist attraction, but in the 1990s the lawless Marib province became a haven for kidnappers capitalizing on European and American tourists in order to extort money from their families and governments [39,40].  In recent months however, tourism to the Temple had greatly increased as the security situation improved dramatically [40].  Ruhaiqa inquired as to who a convoy of tourist cars belonged to in the area, and was told that they contained Europeans [44].  Ruhaiqa departed and returned in his explosives-laden vehicle, ramming into the convoy [39,40,41,44].  In the end Ruhaiqa killed seven Spanish tourists, two Yemeni drivers/interpreters as well as himself [39,40,41].  The new found, but apparently frangible tranquility of the tourist attraction was shattered yet again. 

Wuhaishi’s cell had perpetrated a successful attack against Westerners [42,43].  The US had recently warned its citizens to stay away from Yemen and other governments soon followed suit [40].  Wuhaishi found targets nonetheless.  An operative named Hamza Ali Saleh al-Dhayani was said to have recruited Ruhaiqa to their cause from his village of Makal in Raima [42,43].  Dhayani trained the suicide bomber in driving with a taxi (a claim Dhayani later disputed as he stated he himself lacked the ability to drive [45]), and eventually took him to Marib to further prepare [42,43].  Once in Marib the two joined the central cadre of AQAP at Wadi Abida [42,43].  Ruhaiqa was briefed and prepared in his operation by the cell consisting of Wuhaishi, Rimi, Hamza al-Quayti, and local Yemenis Ali Ali Nasir Doha and Ammar Abadah al-Waeli (an al-Qaida arms/explosives supplier, H-4 [46]) [42,43].  The group also contained an up-and-coming Saudi al-Qaida youth, Naif Mohamed al-Qahtani [42,43].  The cell was sponsored and sheltered by Naji Saleh Ali al-Jardan, Abdulaziz Said Mohamed al-Jardan as well as by Doha [42,43].  In addition, the cell is said to have consisted of the Saudi militant named Mohamed Saleh al-Kazemi, and supposedly an Egyptian national who was a prominent EIJ member with asylum status in Yemen [43,47].  Kazemi was from the 11 man group of veteran jihadists that went to trial in February of 2005 and that also contained four escapees (Mansur al-Baihani, Maqri, Zayed, and Wadai) [48]. The evidence for the Egyptian’s role in the cell is dubious at best [47].  The Spanish, Americans and others immediately called for the Yemenis to crack down on the perpetrators, and as such, the FBI had even been sent to investigate [47].

The cell had also conducted an important assassination in Marib beforehand.  Col. Ali Mahmud al-Qasaylah was the top criminal investigator in Marib and AQAP members suspected him of being involved in helping the CIA track down and kill Abu Ali al-Harithi and Kamal Derwish [49].  As such, Wuhaishi had Jardan, Doha, and the other Jardan gun him down on March 29, 2007 [49].  AQAP triumphantly claimed responsibility a month later [49].  In yet another showing of Yemen’s inability to keep criminals in prison, both Abdulaziz Jardan and Ali Doha had facilitated Yemenis into Iraq via Syria to fight US forces [49].  Jardan and Doha were arrested in Yemen after this activity and kept imprisoned from roughly 2004-06, but were inexplicably released early [49].  As for his radicalization, Doha met Wuhaishi while in prison, and was thusly brought into the fold, leading AQAP operations in Marib after his release [50].  Qasaylah’s death helped Wuhaishi and his men begin a campaign of selectively assassinating Yemeni officials that they viewed as being in the way of potential AQAP gains.  These assassinations also assisted in combating the potential security response to their actions. 

The Unfortunate Egyptian

Shortly after the Queen of Sheba attack, the Yemenis made their first significant, albeit suspicious, advance against the cell.  The aforementioned former EIJ member suspected of belonging to the group was a man named Ahmed Bassiouni Dewider [47,51].  Dewider had been sentenced in absentia to life in prison in Egypt [47].  The case in which Dewider was charged was a famous and relevant Egyptian court proceeding known as the “Returnees from Ablania” case in which dozens of defendants were accused of terrorist activities, including some rendered back to Egypt from Albania after being captured by the CIA in the summer of 1998 [47,52,53].  This was one of the most successful instances of rendition conducted by the CIA, but would not be the last [53].  That being said, 62 of the 107 defendants were charged in absentia and most all of them were members of the EIJ [47,52,53].  A core leadership cadre for the EIJ was established in the trial, consisting of fifteen men including Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, the emir, and several of his deputies such as Thirwat Saleh Shehata [54].  Two members of the cadre: Nasir Fahmi Nasir al-Hussanain (Mohamed Saleh[55]) and Tariq Anwar al-Said Ahmed (Amir al-Fateh[55]) were reported killed in bombing raids on Al-Qaida positions in the initial phases of the US invasion of Afghanistan [56]. Although, it now appears only the former was actually killed, as the latter was referenced as alive in letters by central Al-Qaida leadership years later in 2010 [57].  Shehata seems to have fled to Iran after first operating in Iraq [58,59].  Another two, Adel Abdulbari and Ibrahim Eidarious were indicted in the East African Embassy Bombings case [60], with Abdulbari being extradited to the US in October of 2012 and Eidarious dying of Leukemia in 2008 while they were both in British custody [61,62].  The supposed founder of the group, who was a close associate of Dr. Zawahiri, was Said Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadhil) [63].  The man also found himself in Yemen but was arrested in 2004 alongside of Abdulrauf Nassib, the survivor of the Harithi strike [64].  This was around March 2004 when the original Yemeni prison escapees, consisting of Badawi, Quso and eight others, were negotiating their surrender [64].  As mentioned, Nassib was released in 2006, shortly after the escape of his cohorts.  Sharif meanwhile was extradited to Egypt and sentenced to life [63].  Yet another of the fifteen man leadership core of the EIJ was Dewider [54].  The fugitive had been in charge of security for the group within Egypt and had sought political asylum for himself and his family within Yemen during 2001 [47,54].

Strangely, the Yemeni government had known of Dewider’s location for years and probably of his activities, as he had even married a Yemeni woman [47,51]. He was also living in the northern portion of Sana’a [51].  Either Dewider was indeed actually involved in the Queen of Sheba attack or the Yemenis chose him as a scapegoat in order to satisfy the Egyptians, Spanish, and the Americans.  The latter seems the most likely.  The facile reasoning insisted that his death, if obtained, would satisfy a certain need for justice and take out an actual wanted terrorist that happened to be easily within grasp for the Yemenis.  Around the time of the bombing, an intimate associate of Wuhaishi and Rimi, named Hani Mohamed Mujahid, privately renounced AQAP and became an informant [65]. He later claimed to have warned the Yemeni security apparatus twice about the impending attack against the tourists, and about how Rimi noted that the operation could be conducted with ease [65]. Mujahid went on to declare that the Yemeni government was satisfied with allowing some al-Qaida attacks within the nation, as it ensured that the US would provide much needed financial aid, due to the American obsession with prosecuting the War on Terror [65]. Thus, President Saleh of Yemen was walking a precarious path.

American involvement was already apparent, as the FBI had actually entered into the investigation even though no Americans were killed in the attack [47].  They had arrived solely because the attack was carried out by AQAP.  On July 6, 2007 just four days after the Marib incident, the Yemenis continued with a dragnet search for suspects which had yielded twenty people thus far and supposedly led them to Dewider [47].  The security forces surrounded his apartment and engaged him, during which Dewider reputedly responded with gunfire and explosives [47,51].  The resulting battle left five soldiers and policeman wounded, while Dewider himself perished [47,51].  After the Yemenis killed the Egyptian, they found suspected bomb making materials, forged passports, and forgery supplies all used in order to move jihadists into Iraq and other countries from Yemen [47,51].  It is most likely that Dewider was only participating in the facilitation of militants from Yemen to Iraq and perhaps providing them with training and explosives.  There has been little evidence to show that Dewider was a central militant involved in the Queen of Sheba attack although the Yemenis continued to claim such [47].  Perhaps, based on his abilities, he was associated with the 11 man group that had been charged with attempting to fight in Iraq, thus forging a convenient relationship for the Yemenis to exploit.  The Egyptians meanwhile requested a DNA sample from the Yemenis before officially listing the fugitive as killed [47].  The FBI, without doubt, pressured the Yemenis for more results as the 20 suspects arrested and one killed were not in the primary ranks of AQAP.  By the middle of July, only Dewider had been dealt justice in connection to the attacks, and yet another Spanish tourist died of her wounds from the bombing, bringing the Iberian toll to eight [66].

Occasional Justice

To their credit the Yemenis seemingly responded, perhaps due to the backlash they received from having tourists within their borders yet again targeted by extremists.  While AQAP successfully set up camp in the province of Marib, they had still not entirely escaped the long reach of American intelligence and the resolve of the Yemeni security forces.  These very security forces set Qasim al-Rimi in their crosshairs next, undertaking an operation aimed at eliminating the AQAP military chief and stunting the organization’s continual growth.  On August 5, President Saleh himself traveled to Marib in order to plead with tribal elders to assist in the hunt for AQAP members [67].  It is assumed he received the go ahead for a strike against AQAP during these negotiations.  Interestingly, just days before on August 2, the Yemenis released more details about Wuhaishi’s cell, naming the above mentioned men as the perpetrators but replacing Dewider’s position as a “mastermind” to a “material supporter” of the attack [67].  Furthermore, on August 6, the US Embassy underscored the importance of the campaign against AQAP and the evolving threat it posed when it warned American citizens within Yemen to remain vigilant [68].  The Embassy stated that “We are now experiencing terrorist actions previously unseen in Yemen,” and warned its citizens against unnecessary travel and actions [68].  Two days later, on August 8, the Yemenis commenced their foray against Rimi and his men [68].  Yemeni intelligence traced two cars traveling fifteen km north of the capital of Marib to the Al-Sahim area near Raghwan, where security forces literally descended upon the militant hideout (via parachutes [42,68]).  These forces were joined by attack helicopters and ground forces [42,68].  The subsequent battle resulted in two security forces wounded and four militants killed [42,68].  There was immediate celebration as two of the dead were announced to be Qasim al-Rimi himself and Ali Ali Nasir Doha, while the other two bodies were beyond recognition [68].  It was suspected that Naji Jardan was amongst the dead while Abdulaziz Jardan had escaped [42]. 

Unfortunately for the Yemenis and American intelligence, the bad news quickly circulated.  One of the wounded security force members succumbed to his wounds, while the supposed body of Qasim al-Rimi was revealed to not be the wanted escapee [69].  However, three of the men who composed the Queen of Sheba attack cell were indeed amongst the dead:  Ali Doha, Naji Ali Jardan, and Abdulaziz Saleh Jardan [70].  It may be assumed that Rimi was the operative to actually escape since it is obvious that Abdulaziz Jardan did not.  The last body belonged to an 18 year old from al-Jawf province named Amir Hassan Saleh Harradan, who had been recruited to be the next suicide bomber for the cell [67,70,71].  The three wanted suspects were connected to the oil installation attacks as well as the murder of the Spanish tourists [70].  They were wanted for harboring the prison escapees, providing them with assistance in their plots, and murdering Col. Qasaylah [70,72].

While the raid seemed an auspicious commencement of Yemeni pressure upon the militants, it must be remembered that the Yemenis had failed multiple times to maintain commitment against the jihadist threats. As seen above, there was political advantage to gain in having such a menace within their borders. Next we observe some of the specific composition of the renewed al-Qaida franchise, while again witnessing the phenomenon of al-Qaida campaigning against the local government under the guise of a front organization. It builds to a crescendo of violence in 2008.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

© Copyright 2025 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a comment