SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Summer of Intrigue

Written by Nolan R Beasley

As we explored in the previous chapter of this series, 2004 was developing into a hectic year due to al-Qaida efforts attempted to refocus against Pakistani cities and abroad, and the associated governments attempting to respond against the threat. After security forces secretly apprehended information technology operative Mohamed Naim Noor Khan, they were poised to directly engage against senior al-Qaida militants. The intent was to prevent a potential plot aimed against the impending US elections, resulting in a summer of intrigue.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Africans of the Gujrat Raid

Pakistani authorities raided a safehouse associated with and utilized by al-Qaida external operations commander Hamza Rabia on July 24, 2004 in Gujrat, Punjab province, in hopes of scoring a significant degradation against the terror network. Reports insinuated that a previously captured militant, assumed here to be Khan (Abu Talha al-Pakistani), led accompanying authorities to the domicile1.  While the operation did not yield Hamza Rabia, it did net an FBI most wanted terrorist2.  It is likely that Khan was attempting to lead the Pakistanis to Hamza Rabia, but according to Abu Faraj al-Libi in a report to bin Laden, the Egyptian left the location just prior to the raid3.  Surrounding the house in the evening, the authorities were prepared for whatever might be inside4.  A gunbattle ensued between the encircling police and the suspects within5.  While some sources described the gunfight as an intense affair lasting 12 hours6, the reality was much different.  The battle was more of a standoff with sporadic gunfire through the night and into the morning of July 257. 

Known to al-Qaida as Haitham al-Kini, the Tanzanian Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani was in fact under the command of Hamza Rabia in External Operations8.  Ghailani was originally revealed to the world as one of five indicted operatives announced on December 16, 1998 in New York, all involved in the 1998 Embassy bombing conspiracy, and was thus subject to a State Department bounty of $5 million for his capture 9. He helped procure, smuggle, and assemble the explosives utilized in the attacks; the assembly within a vehicle he helped to purchase, before fleeing to Afghanistan and joining the hive of al-Qaida10. After the US invasion, Ghailani contributed via document forgery, preparing passports, visas, etc, for militants and their immediate families, in order to assist Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and Ammar al-Baluchi in facilitating the fighters’ escapes to their home nations11.  In this role, Ghailani was one of the only document forgers available to KSM in Pakistan12.  Fellow Embassy bombing participant Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan began a training regimen on this topic for Ghailani beginning back in the spring of 200113.  Thus, with the war and responses at high intensity, Ghailani was depended upon by al-Qaida to provide quality work from the KSM safehouses in Pakistan14.  Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf referred to Ghailani as a masterful forger with enhanced computer skills15. After the capture of KSM, Ghailani was shifted by Abdulhadi al-Iraqi to the command of Hamza Rabia16. Ghailani used the Gujrat safehouse as an office, where Hamza Rabia had coalesced all of his important documents and equipment as a staging ground prior to transplanting them to safety elsewhere17.  As such, Ghailani’s capture ruined several of Hamza Rabia’s potential operations.  Hamza Rabia narrowly avoided capture in the event, as he had just previously and briefly inhabited the location18.  Ghailani was found with a host of jihadist media on CDs, due for processing in the residence19.  Captured with the East African, were two South Africans20.  Abu Faraj reported to bin Laden that in addition to the South Africans, two Pakistani militants were apprehended21.  One he describes as Tariq the trainer, indicating that bin Laden would have some familiarity with the individual22.  Reports at the time contain no further information on this instructor.  However, one Guantanamo assessment file refers to an Abu Tariq al-Pakistani, as a well-known trainer at al-Faruq camp, with close relationships with the rest of the camp staff and senior Brigade 55 commanders23.  He is further referred to as Tariq Abu Ahmed, responsible for instruction in map reading, explosives, and other basic tenets24.  The Tanzanian Ghailani meanwhile, claimed to have only joined al-Qaida due to his status as an FBI wanted fugitive, stating that al-Qaida was his only guaranteed safe haven, and that he held no appetite for jihad25.  His previous roles as a training camp instructor, combatant on the front lines, and bin Laden bodyguard seemingly contradict the excuse26.  The Pakistanis reported a total of 16 arrested at the location27.  However, these included Ghailani’s wife and several children28, in addition to the militant personnel mentioned above.  Later clarification proved that 13 were apprehended, including five men, three women, and five children, one of whom was an infant29.  Ghailani’s detained wife was an Uzbek, indicating the African’s assimilation into the militant fold in the Khorasan30.  The Pakistanis did not announce Ghailani arrest until July 29, previously only focusing on the foreigners as two South Africans and a Tanzanian31.

The two captured South Africans were identified as Feroze Ganchi and Zubair Ismail32, and were said to be in possession of potential plans to target South Africa’s Parliament, stock exchange, a major stadium, shopping centers, and a cruise ship, at the time of their arrest33.  It is unknown to what degree any potential planning was advanced, and the pair may have merely just possessed maps of their home nation and blueprints of buildings34.  Nonetheless, the items were to be used as evidence against them. Their acquaintances at home swiftly came to their defense35.  Yet their innocence in the situation is called into question by the fact that they participated in the 12 hour gunfight and standoff in Gujrat, either out of the defense of themselves and Ghailani, or out of a willingness to perish for their jihadist journey36.  Ganchi was a doctor in his 30s, while Ismail was an Islamic student ten years Ganchi’s junior37.  The two were intending on traveling to al-Qaida’s bases in the Shakai valley for training, after having recently arrived in Lahore for what they claimed was a hiking excursion38.  Senior leaders were aware of their presence as Hamza Rabia had been to the office prior to the raid, and Abu Faraj al-Libi later reported their arrest to bin Laden39.  Their training never materialized, and after their capture they were held in Pakistan until being extradited to South Africa in October40.  The South African authorities however, found no reason to hold them further and released them two days later41.  Ganchi and Ismail did not remain stationary and were arrested twice in the coming year, once in December 2004 in Guinea, and again in March 2005 in Indonesia42.  Ganchi even bragged about knowing senior al-Qaida leaders, presumably Hamza Rabia, from the time the pair spent with Ghailani in Gujrat43.  Despite these events, they remained mobile.  The pair was assisted in their travel by Johannesburg based Junaid Ismail Dockrat, who communicated with Hamza Rabia via telephone and email in order to facilitate the travel of South African operatives to train with al-Qaida44.  In spring 2004 Dockrat raised $120,000 for Hamza Rabia to enable operations45.  In January 2007 this action resulted in Dockrat and fellow South African Farhad Ahmed Dockrat being designated by the US Treasury Department for fundraising for and facilitating terrorists46. Later, Ganchi used his status as a doctor as a cover for his extensive travels.  He was detained in 2009 again in Egypt with a medical group on their way to Gaza, but was quickly released47.  In 2019 he was reported killed in a February airstrike against ISIS militants in Beghouz, Syria, where he was purportedly also working as a relief doctor48.  His Pretoria based student Ismail was not involved in further militant activity49.

Meanwhile, Ghailani was assessed as having come to the safehouse in Gujrat the month prior in order to obtain passports to depart the country50.  It was postulated that the Pakistani incursion into South Waziristan earlier in the year drove Ghailani and others out of the tribal agency51.  This is unlikely given his status with Hamza Rabia, and was more a reflection of his trusted status and role with documents and forgery52.  Indeed, the raid resulted in the confiscation of weapons, explosives, chemicals and larges sums of cash53.  By far though, the electronic evidence in the home was the of the most importance. 

The Orange Alert

The Pakistanis and Americans were able to obtain the encrypted information from Mohamed Naim Noor Khan’s computer and compare it with information from two laptops and several CDs of which Ghailani failed to dispose54.  It was herein that the full spectrum of the surveillance information was discovered, pertaining to specific financial institutions in New York, Newark, and Washington55.  Specifically, from Khan’s computer there were individual files relevant to potential targets56.  The Prudential Building in Newark, NJ, the New York Stock Exchange, the Citigroup headquarters, both in New York, and in Washington, DC, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank headquarters57.  There was a plethora of other evidence as well, including photographs and casings of other locations in the same and differing cities58.  Traffic patterns and congestion, traffic light frequencies, parking garages, bridges, ramps, and other significant details of the locales were recorded59.  Khan’s own previous reconnaissance on Heathrow airport was discovered60.  Although, he denied any relevant or current plots against the location61.  The combined data precipitated the Americans raising their terror alert to Orange on July 26, 200462.  For the next three days after the precautionary alert, CIA analysts furiously went through the confiscated information63.  As the CIA had been intimately involved in the arrests thus far64, they were insistent that the collected information was credible and significant65.  In reality, it was July 29 before senior CIA officials in Langley understood the implications of the intelligence, and the next day before President Bush was completely briefed66.  The information from the Gujrat facility and Khan’s computer also pointed authorities in an international direction, to Britain and the operative Abu Issa al-Hindi67. 

On August 1, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge announced the increasing terror alert in the financial districts of New York, Newark, and Washington68.  Without explaining why, each of the surveilled targets received massive attention, with all three cities experiencing traffic blockades and heavy policing and security around the expected targets69.  The NYSE, Citigroup headquarters, Prudential Building in Newark, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank headquarters in Washington, all saw immediate and intense security deployments70.    

Meanwhile, the Pakistanis, having convinced Khan to assist them, began to have their new asset reach out to his al-Qaida contacts, requesting immediate communications71.  Messages were sent to operatives in multiple nations across the globe72.  Significantly, Khan maintained his email contact with the operative Dhiren Barot (Abu Issa al-Hindi) in Britain at the behest of his Pakistani handlers73.  British and American authorities monitored the communications, giving unparalleled insight into the inner functioning of al-Qaida operations74. 

An Intelligence Blunder

The arrest of Khan was not made public until August 275.  Unfortunatley, and bewilderingly, this information release was allowed while Khan was in direct contact with Barot and other al-Qaida operatives and officials76.  The Pakistanis condemned the release of his name, insinuating that the revelation compromised ongoing security and counterterror operations, and could warn other actors within active plots77.  Other Pakistani authorities explicitly stated that al-Qaida officials and operatives escaped due to the leak78.  In fact, NY Senator Charles Schumer fumed at the NSA, Condoleezza Rice (NSA to the President), and White House, accusing them of leaking Khan’s name, noting that the British and Pakistanis were incensed, due to the fact that Khan was remaining in contact with al-Qaida operatives unaware of his capture79.  The assumption was that perhaps American officials wanted to publicly display the effectiveness of the ongoing War on Terror, and in their eagerness to do so, willingly compromised the ongoing security operation80.  Fascinatingly, when the news about Khan became publicly available, some initial reports confused his role with that of Abu Musab al-Baluchi81.  Khan was described as unimportant and probably just a common jihadist soldier, while Baluchi was credited with the plans for attack on financial institutions and other targets in the US and UK82. This may have been purposefully done in order to provide a false sense of security for any of Khan’s remaining contacts, or may have been just a simple matter of conflating the individuals in an intertwined network.  In this report, Abu Musab is attributed with stating that an attack was nearing readiness83.  This may explain why Tom Ridge and the Americans reached the conclusion that despite the age of the information, the terrorists were intending to strike prior to the November 2 US presidential election84.  Especially combined with the fact that a mendacious CIA Asset initiated the questionable belief in the pre-election plot earlier in the year85. Thus, any information obtained from al-Qaida arrests would be assumed to pertain to and be evidence of this plot. Despite this confusion, most reports gave the name of Khan and described his cooperation and computer equipment as being vital in the subsequent series of raids and arrests internationally86.  He was increasingly referred to as implicated in major plots abroad, and represented a potentially worrying new trend, of educated, technologically adept, Westernized jihadists endeavoring on behalf of al-Qaida87. 

The British authorities and MI5 rushed to apprehend Dhiren Barot and his men, given the release of Khan’s identity and previous capture88.  On August 3, Barot, who was in further possession of surveillance materials, and had actually conducted the reconnaissance on American targets, was the subject of extensive police raids in Britain89.  This was admittedly a premature raid, conducted out of necessity and not out of complete preparation90.  In the London suburb of Willesden, an apartment complex was raided91.  Another suspect was chased down at a nearby barber shop92.  This was actually Barot, receiving a hair cut at the time of his arrest, unaware that his network was crumbling around him93.  Further incidents occurred in Luton, Hertfordshire, and Lancashire94.  In all, 13 were arrested, including Barot95.  While no explosives were recovered, the information obtained caused the raids to be considered among the most productive of the British efforts thus far96.  The materials retrieved from Barot corroborated and matched information from Khan and Ghailani97.  These materials included Barot’s surveillance videos taken in April 2001 of various New York landmarks and their security apparatus98.  Just days prior to his arrest, Barot’s deep links to al-Qaida and a journey to Kuala Lumpur with senior operative Walid bin Attash in January 2001 were outlined in the newly released 9/11 Commission Report99.  In this document, he is only referred to as Abu Issa al-Britani100. 

Barot was born in India in December 1971, and came to Britain with his parents at a very early age101.  He converted to Islam at age 20, although it is unknown when or how he was radicalized102.  Among his menial employments were a decent stint as an airline ticket clerk in the early to mid 1990s103.  He departed in September 1995 for a supposed holiday, and instead traversed to Pakistan for militant training104.  He took copious notes on militancy, and fought in Kashmir after the completion of his training for significant time105.  He later migrated to Afghanistan wherein he became an instructor at an al-Qaida camp for a year106.  A local publisher in Britain released a memoir from Barot on his experiences in jihad, under the name Abu Issa al-Hindi107.  From August 2000 to April 2001, Barot and two associates conducted the surveillance at the previously discussed targets in Washington, DC, Newark, NJ, and New York City, on orders from KSM108.  He was accompanied by two associates, Nadeem Tarmohamed and Qaisar Shaffi109.  These two were arrested in the sweeps as well110.  While the British released no names of those captured, the Americans rapidly announced the arrest of Abu Issa al-Hindi, seemingly without being necessary111. 

Separately, on August 4, British authorities arrested 30 year old Babar Ahmed, at the behest of the Americans112.  Babar Ahmed was a cousin of Mohamed Naim Noor Khan and was alleged to have been maintaining two American based websites that encouraged donations and support for jihadists and extremists113.  US officials pushed for the arrest after the raids against Barot and his men114.  He was apprehended on an American extradition request115.  Further accusations against Babar Ahmed included his supposed detailing of US Naval formations in the Strait of Hormuz116.  He had been under surveillance for multiple years, due to the websites’ apparent call to raise funds for militants in Chechnya and Afghanistan117. 

A Delayed Response

American authorities faced further scrutiny in the rapid and immense security response to the reconnaissance information even though the recordings and notes from Barot and other operatives were over three years old at the time118.  Indeed, the videos were dated in that they surveilled the World Trade Center towers119.  The British noted that the release of the information did naught but inflame and scare the public without merit120.  Some of the relevant files on Khan’s computer had not been opened since January 2004, indicating that attacks were not necessarily imminent in these locations121.  While Senator John Kerry chose not to make the same accusations, some political opponents of President Bush, declared that the Administration was frightening the public in order to take advantage of the fears and gain a political advantage prior to the election122.  With the information being older surveillance, the vast response seemed more like theatrics than necessity to some123.  This was a claim strongly denied by administration officials, including Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge124.  Officials also reemphasized that they had not received the entirety of the intelligence gathered until late July125, and felt like an immediate response was warranted.  Other questions revolved around Ghailani.  Despite the necessity in detaining Ghailani due to his involvement with the Embassy bombings and position as an aide to Hamza Rabia, his actual importance regarding current plots or operational planning was limited126.  By August 11, 2004 though, CIA internal communications displayed that the agency coveted the detention and interrogations of Khan, Ghailani, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Hamza Rabia, all four of whom were now linked to this alleged pre-election plot127.  The Pakistanis expressed a willingness to extradite Ghailani to American custody after they finished their own interrogations128.  As it happened, they delivered him to the CIA.  When the agency obtained possession of Ghailani, he endured enhanced interrogation techniques beginning in September, and the CIA operatives subsequently admitted uncertainty as to his external operations knowledge129.  Instead, they relied on his position as an al-Qaida veteran and confidant of the officials in South Waziristan, to perhaps reveal any further intelligence130.  The Tanzanian operative remained in CIA custody for at least 730 days before his transfer to Guantanamo131.    

Meanwhile, the British in August, went on to charge eight of those detained under their Terrorism Act, including Barot and his companions on the reconnaissance mission132.  Despite Barot, Tarmohamed, and Shaffi being indicted in the US during April 2005, the operatives were never extradited133.  Barot was eventually sentenced to life imprisonment in Britain, while his seven associates received significant terms134.   He has endured multiple brutal attacks while imprisoned, to include suffering burns from hot oils135. Meanwhile, Babar Ahmed remained in British prisons for eight years before being extradited to the US in October 2012136. Eventually, he was sentenced after accepting a plea deal but was rapidly released by July 2015, returning home to Britain137.

For the Pakistanis in 2004, despite their frustrations with the American release of Khan’s name and captive status, they celebrated their own achievements and the series of arrests against the terrorist networks during the summer138. 

An Egyptian of Interest and A Deceitful Asset

These achievements also included further arrests on August 4, 2004, when the Pakistanis announced the recent capture of more foreign al-Qaida elements139.  Pakistani Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayyat, confirmed the arrest of two further Africans in Punjab province, the culmination of an extensive search and sweep in the aftermath of the Ghailani arrest140.  Hayyat then proceeded to inflate the importance of those arrested at the time, declaring that the individual was wanted with a significant bounty141.  That he was an African with a bounty seemed to indicate that he appeared on the FBI most wanted terrorist list and thus must have been related to the Embassy bombings, much the same as Ghailani.  As such, future misguided reports declared that the individual arrested was Mustafa Fadhil (fugitive of the US Embassy bombings), due to the Egyptian’s disappearance from the State Department and FBI wanted lists, not realizing that he had actually perished during the Battle of Shah I Kot142.  US officials at the time, greatly credited the Pakistanis for diligently working with the CIA and other American authorities during the string of captures in 2004143.  However, the same officials refused to confirm the arrest of the African with the significant bounty, raising further doubts as to who was actually in custody144.  The identify of the apprehended was Sharif al-Masri, another al-Qaida official, responsible at the time for Kandahar, while residing near Quetta in Pakistan145.  The other apprehended militant was identified only as Akasha by Abu Faraj in internal al-Qaida communications146.

Sharif al-Masri was the Egyptian Mohamed Mohamed Abdulsattar al-Nawihi147.  Internal al-Qaida communications worried over his loss and hypothesized that he was captured due to his contacts, some of which he knew were compromised and associated with the Pakistani ISI148.  He was privy to intimate details in the inner workings of al-Qaida, as seen in the leaked Guantanamo assessments.  This level of trust was earned from a long allegiance to the organization, and certainly due to the fact that he was Saif al-Adel’s brother-in-law149.  For example, Adel entrusted to Sharif al-Masri that he disagreed with KSM and Sheikh Said al-Masri in the decision to murder Wall Street Journal journalist Danial Pearl150.  In an earlier episode, demonstrating his links to notorious al-Qaida officials, in 1997 he helped explosives expert Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah test devices against varying thicknesses of steel plating, in preparation for future bombings151. 

By September 2004, he too was transferred to CIA custody, and displayed a willingness to comply with his new interrogators due to his fear of torture after experiencing it from his previous Pakistani hosts152.  Unfortunately for the Egyptian, the dubious CIA source, known as Asset Y, implicated Sharif al-Masri in the pre-election plot of 2004, and claimed that he retained information on the operation153.  Thus, Sharif al-Masri was subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques for the waning months of 2004154.  However, his denials matched with other detainees, including Ghailani, and assisted in revealing the falsehoods of the CIA asset155.  Despite this, he remained in CIA custody for at least 810 days (over two years), and provided an abundance of information156.  Captured al-Qaida facilitator Janat Ghul was also implicated, and was transferred to CIA custody in July to be subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques during August. Yet the efforts failed to reconcile the discrepancies produced by the suspicious Asset157. There were conflicting reports on the importance of Janat Ghul, with the conclusion being that the CIA leadership held him in higher regard than he deserved, in terms of intelligence value158. While he was a facilitator, he was not an operational commander, intimately involved with al-Qaida senior leadership, or vital to a pre-election plot159. By October 2004, the CIA reengaged with Asset Y, who eventually admitted to the falsehoods of his information160. This included the deception in reporting that he had met with Sheikh Said al-Masri directly in order to confer over the plot details161. Asset Y simply folded under the pressure of his CIA handlers to provide actionable intelligence, and began to fabricate the story162. In the end, there was no urgent need to foil a pre-election plot, because there was no advanced operation in place, only the fantasies of the discredited informant163.

Pakistan’s Six Most Wanted

Another three suspects were arrested in Lahore on August 9164.  All three were identified as Turkish, and no further information was provided165.  What is notable about reports of this incident is that Pakistan began, with comfort, to announced publicly that they were searching for Abu Faraj and Hamza Rabia over the weekend of August 7 and 8166. 

This confidence progressed and on August 18, the Pakistanis officially announced Abu Faraj al-Libi as one of their six most wanted, offering a bounty of 20 million rupees, or nearly $350,000, and displaying a photograph of the Libyan167.  This was a direct result of the involvement of Abu Faraj with the December 2003 Musharraf assassination attempts168. Musharraf was now obsessed with the Libyan. Interestingly, Hamza Rabia was not listed specifically169, but he was mentioned and identified as Egyptian in subsequent press reports170.  Along with his name being revealed to the public, was the information that he had avoided the police sweeps in July 2004171.  The remaining five most wanted were Pakistanis affiliated with Lashkar e Jhangvi and other local Pakistani terror networks interconnected with al-Qaida.  Most prominent were Amjad Hussain Faruqi and Matiur Rahman172.  In their cases, they were both also very closely associated with HuJI173, as well as the perpetrators of the Daniel Pearl abduction and murder174.  

Abu Faraj was seemingly undeterred by his own wanted status.  In October, he confirmed the series of summer developments in a written report to bin Laden175.  Abu Faraj confirmed Hamza Rabia’s narrow escape in the communique, detailing that he had been at the safehouse with Ghailani sometime prior to the raid176.  In the missive, Abu Faraj all but admitted that the Pakistani cities were a lost cause, and must be pulled away from and abandoned177.  He addressed the serious shift in security concerns brought about by the string of arrests, naming specifically the losses of Abu Musab al-Baluchi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Haitham al-Kini and his associates, and Sharif al-Masri178.  He also discussed the previously unreported arrest in Lahore during the summer of an Abu Ahmed al-Yemeni, along with a Palestinian accomplice called Abu Dhiyaa and another individual named Ibrahim179.  The Palestinian was most certainly the facilitator Marwan al-Jabour. 

With the pressure on Abu Faraj by the Pakistani and American governments, he was forced to tread carefully, but there were still others that President Musharraf wanted just as badly from the list.  Amjad Hussain Faruqi also represented the failed attacks on Musharraf and the continued threat to his leadership of the nation.  The Pakistanis had formed a police unit dedicated to finding Faruqi in March 2004, after gathering evidence from the assassination attempts180.  They followed this in May, when Musharraf and the Pakistani authorities went public with Faruqi’s name and role in both the assassination attempts and the Daniel Pearl murder181.  Even at this reporting, Faruqi was named as a Flight 814 hijacker, part of the notorious 1999 incident which freed Pearl abduction instigator Ahmed Omar Said Sheikh182.  In his announcement, Musharraf declared that there was still a mastermind of the assassination attempts above Faruqi; he referenced Abu Faraj without naming him, but was confident that he would be brought to justice183.  For Faruqi that justice was obtained later in the year. 

Faruqi was surrounded by Pakistani authorities in the Sindhi town of Nawabshah, to the northeast of Karachi, on September 26, 2004184.  Coming just a month after the wanted posters’ publications, the Pakistanis were determined to dismantle this rogue network of jihadists, who refused to work under the auspices of the ISI, and who targeted their own government.  According to President Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence diligently labored in tracking Faruqi via his telephone communications, resulting in the effective mapping and prediction of his movements185. From Dera Ismail Khan, he was eventually followed to Nawabshah186. Neighbors described Faruqi’s safehouse as being rented by an innocuous, quiet, observant, religious family, and were surprised at the violent siege187.  In fact, authorities in Sindh had nearly cornered Faruqi thrice in the preceding weeks, before finally trapping him in Nawabshah188.  Despite tear gas and warnings, Faruqi fired upon his pursuers189.  Refusing to surrender, Faruqi was instead gunned down by Pakistani forces, an act which was celebrated by the government, including President Musharraf190.  The two hour firefight seemds to have killed only Faruqi, as his two accomplices were taken alive from the home191.  Musharraf claimed later that Faruqi had donned a suicide vest and held an automatic weapon prior to being eliminated192. Blamed for everything from the Indian Airlines hijacking to the murder of Daniel Pearl, Faruqi was considered an offering in the War on Terror, but mainly was eliminated in order to remove a threat to President Musharraf’s government and its stability.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. Militants Held After Gunfight, The Arab News, July 26, 2004, https://www.arabnews.com/node/252927 ↩︎
  2. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 // Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html // Terror link to South Africa after gun battle, by Andrew Meldrum, The Guardian, August 5, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/06/pakistan.terrorism ↩︎
  3. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  4. THE REACH OF WAR: TERROR ALERT; Rounding Up Qaeda Suspects: New Cooperation, New Tensions, New Questions, by Amy Waldman and Eric Lipton, The New York Times, August 17, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/us/reach-war-terror-alert-rounding-up-qaeda-suspects-new-cooperation-new-tensions.html ↩︎
  5. Pakistan sniffs out trail of al-Qaida, by Paul Haven, The Associated Press, August 7, 2004, https://www.poconorecord.com/story/news/2004/08/07/pakistan-sniffs-out-trail-al/51060239007/ ↩︎
  6. Tech Genius Outed Fiends – The Mole, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, August 7, 2004, https://nypost.com/2004/08/07/tech-genius-outed-fiends-the-mole/ // Al-Qaida Suspect, 15 Others Arrested in Pakistan, PBS News, July 29, 2004, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/asia-july-dec04-pakistan_07-29 // Pakistan Reports Arrest of a Suspect in ’98 Embassy Bombings, by Salman Masood and David Rohde, The New York Times, July 30, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/world/pakistan-reports-arrest-of-a-suspect-in-98-embassy-bombings.html ↩︎
  7. THE REACH OF WAR: TERROR ALERT; Rounding Up Qaeda Suspects: New Cooperation, New Tensions, New Questions, by Amy Waldman and Eric Lipton, The New York Times, August 17, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/us/reach-war-terror-alert-rounding-up-qaeda-suspects-new-cooperation-new-tensions.html ↩︎
  8. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  9. 5 Fugitives Indicted in Embassy Bombings, by John Mintz, The Washington Post, December 17, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/indict121798.htm ↩︎
  10. US Embassy Bombings Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of New York, USA v Osama bin Laden, et al, May 8, 2000, https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/October12/ChargingDocs/Bin%20Laden.%20Usama%20S7%20Indictment.pdf // Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
  11. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
  12. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
  13. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
  14. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
  15. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  16. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
  17. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  18. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  19. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
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  69. Financial centers take urgent steps amid terror alert, by Brian Knowlton of the International Herald Tribune, The New York Times, August 3, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/03/IHT-financial-centers-take-urgent-steps-amid-terror-alert.html ↩︎
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  75. THREATS AND RESPONSES: INTELLIGENCE; Captured Qaeda Figure Led Way To Information Behind Warning, by Douglas Jehl and David Rohde, The New York Times, August 2, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/02/us/threats-responses-intelligence-captured-qaeda-figure-led-way-information-behind.html ↩︎
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  77. Tech Genius Outed Fiends – The Mole, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, August 7, 2004, https://nypost.com/2004/08/07/tech-genius-outed-fiends-the-mole/ ↩︎
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  81. Al Qaeda Arrest In June Opened Valuable Leads, by Kamran Khan, The Washington Post, August 3, 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/08/03/al-qaeda-arrest-in-june-opened-valuable-leads/d23cafe8-d200-4ed8-be69-86372d2a2bd6/ ↩︎
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  94. Surveillance led to terror arrests, by Rosie Cowan and Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, August 4, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/aug/05/september11.terrorism ↩︎
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  97. Bin Laden’s Mystery Man, by Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, Newsweek, August 20, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20070626074907/http:/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5738292/site/newsweek ↩︎
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  108. THREE BRITISH NATIONALS INDICTED ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRING TO USE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS, US Department of Justice Press Release, April 12, 2005, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/April/05_crm_180.htm ↩︎
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  112. Terrorism Suspect Had U.S. Ship Data, by Dana Priest and Glenn Frankel, The Washington Post, August 6, 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/08/07/terrorism-suspect-had-us-ship-data/4535960d-4274-41c6-8ece-b774e2848396/ // Briton charged in terror conspiracy, by Jeanne Meserve and Jonathan Wald, CNN News, October 7, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/06/terror.indictment/index.html ↩︎
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  122. Terror intelligence was years old, by Mark Warner, The Guardian, August 3, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/03/usa.alqaida3 ↩︎
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  132. British Charge 8 Tied to Terror Plot With Murder Conspiracy, by Patrick E Tyler, The New York Times, August 17, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/international/europe/british-charge-8-tied-to-terror-plot-with-murder.html ↩︎
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  135. There’s no justice in a ‘jugging’, by Erwin James, The Guardian, July 26, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/jul/26/1 ↩︎
  136. UK terror suspect Babar Ahmad returns home from US, Al-Jazeera, July 19, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/7/19/uk-terror-suspect-babar-ahmad-returns-home-from-us ↩︎
  137. UK terror suspect Babar Ahmad returns home from US, Al-Jazeera, July 19, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/7/19/uk-terror-suspect-babar-ahmad-returns-home-from-us // Babar Ahmad returns to UK after being sentenced for supporting terror groups, by Rebecca Ratcliffe, The Guardian, July 19, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/19/babar-ahmad-returns-after-jail-sentence-in-us-for-supporting-terrorist-groups ↩︎
  138. Terror intelligence was years old, by Mark Warner, The Guardian, August 3, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/03/usa.alqaida3 ↩︎
  139. Key al-Qaida suspect arrested in Pakistan, by Brian Whitaker, The Guardian, August 4, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/aug/04/usa.alqaida ↩︎
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  146. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  147. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN 10012, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10012.html ↩︎
  148. Al-Qaida Internal Communique entitled “Lessons Learned Following The Fall of the Islamic Emirate,” https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl/english/Lessons%20Learned%20Following%20the%20Fall%20of%20the%20Islamic%20Emirate.pdf  ↩︎
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  166. Pakistan Reports Arrest of a Suspect in ’98 Embassy Bombings, by Salman Masood and David Rohde, The New York Times, July 30, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/world/pakistan-reports-arrest-of-a-suspect-in-98-embassy-bombings.html // Pakistan Trumpets Qaeda Arrests, by Matthew Pennington, CBS News, August 12, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-trumpets-qaeda-arrests/ ↩︎
  167. Pakistan asks public’s help in capturing terror suspects, The Associated Press, August 19, 2004, https://www2.ljworld.com/news/2004/aug/19/pakistan_asks_publics/ ↩︎
  168. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
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  181. Fugitive Named In 2 Pakistan Plots, by Munir Ahmad, CBS News via The Associated Press, May 26, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fugitive-named-in-2-pakistan-plots/ ↩︎
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  184. Pakistan: Security Forces Kill Senior Al-Qaeda Suspect, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 27, 2004, https://www.rferl.org/a/1055033.html // Pakistani Forces Kill Top Fugitive, by Kamran Khan, The Washington Post, September 27, 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/09/27/pakistani-forces-kill-top-fugitive/9fcae1b3-2570-469f-a819-88594f7ec6e7/ ↩︎
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  190. Pakistan: Security Forces Kill Senior Al-Qaeda Suspect, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 27, 2004, https://www.rferl.org/a/1055033.html ↩︎
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