SERIES: Dark Years Of Al-Qaida – Threat To An Election

Written by Nolan R Beasley

With an impending American presidential election in 2004, al-Qaida, the pre-eminent enemy of the Bush Administration, could ill-afford to be relegated to obscurity or forgotten. Having established and discussed the internal politics and evolving insurgency of al-Qaida through 2003, we delve into 2004, where a multitude of further incidents thrust the network into focus yet again, and continued to set the foundation for the impending drone war. Among them a mendacious CIA asset promising imminent destruction, an unfocused FBI alert, a series of raids and arrests, localized violence in Pakistan, and the inherent fear that during an American election year, al-Qaida was again prepared to launch an offensive. This proved the most relevant concern, as the CIA pushed an insincere belief that there was an ongoing plot to be perpetrated prior to the voting later in November1. With this in mind, the various personalities involved in a frenetic year are explored. The chapter commences with a Pakistani operative, whose knowledge and status helped facilitate and project al-Qaida goals established in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, outward again into the nation’s cities.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

ABU TALHA AL-PAKISTANI

Mohamed Naim Noor Khan

Mohamed Naim Noor Khan (known as Abu Talha al-Pakistani) became the primary al-Qaida contact in Karachi after the arrest and removal of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM), Walid bin Attash (Khallad), and Ammar al-Baluchi2.  He previously assisted KSM with facilitating external operations3.  In fact, it was early into the post-9/11 phase of al-Qaida, in March 2002, when KSM brought the new Pakistani asset into the fold4.  Mohamed Naim Noor Khan was born in Karachi, and obtained a computer engineering degree by 20025.  From a Pashtun family of professionals and well educated, Khan could speak Arabic, Urdu, and English with a British accent, and represented a new style for al-Qaida external operations6.  After being influenced by a cousin at a wedding in Dubai, he made a life altering decision to seek militant instruction7.  He trained in an al-Qaida camp and fought along the front lines in Afghanistan8.  Specifically, he participated in hostilities along the Kabul front at Qarabagh between 2000 and 20019.  To the jihadists he was known as Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and KSM deployed him accordingly for external missions10. By November 2002, KSM dispatched Abu Talha al-Pakistani to surveil Heathrow airport in London, for a potential, complicated, and fanciful attack, involving multiple aircraft and diversionary explosions11.  Abu Talha traveled to Britain multiple times for the casings, taking advantage of his father’s status as a steward and later senior financial official on Pakistani International Airlines, in order to acquire affordable tickets12.  Ostensibly, Abu Talha was in the UK in order to attend a human resource management course13.

The plot thoroughly disrupted and his superiors incarcerated, he next offered different services to al-Qaida, while simultaneously continuing to groom lingering plots in the UK and US.  Abu Talha met with the upper echelon of al-Qaida during August 2003 in Wana, South Waziristan, consisting of Abu Faraj al-Libi, Hamza Rabia, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, and Hamza al-Jawfi14.  It seems that therein, he was designated as al-Qaida’s technology emir, a role that he assumed in December 2003 within the Punjabi city of Lahore15.  He was given a stipend for living, his rent was paid, and a marriage was arranged by al-Qaida superiors16.  According to President Pervez Musharraf, this information technology role was previously overseen by Hamza Rabia after the arrest of KSM17.  Although initially it may seem a curious move, it makes sense in that computer technology would readily be available in the cities as opposed to the tribal agencies.  Thus, Hamza Rabia would have struggled with the duty, but Abu Talha, with a computer engineering degree from a prestigious Karachi institute, would conduct the job with ease18.  His role involved acquiring communications from al-Qaida officials in the FATA and emailing them forward in coded messages19.  His recipients were of various nationalities, in multiple locations including Saudi Arabia, Britain, and Afghanistan20.  He was also said to be an excellent hacker and was further described as a computer genius by authorities21. 

Yet Abu Talha was not permitted to neglect his native and familiar Karachi.  Described as a strikingly imposing and large figure22, Abu Talha relied on his previous training and combatant experience for his other roles.  This included training at an al-Qaida camp during June 199823. In 2003, he was reportedly put in command of a 12 person unit of Pakistanis that was trained in the Shakai Valley and dispatched back into the city in order to potentially attack American and other interests24.  Trained in October and November 2003, those receiving instruction were dissident members of the Pakistani militant outfit Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)25.  They broke away from their parent organization due to a conflict of personalities between two senior HuM officials, Fazlur Rahman Khalil and Masud Azhar26.  While Fazlur Rahman Khalil was the commander of HuM, Masud Azhar had only been liberated after the infamous December 1999 Indian airliner hijacking, and went on to found another local militant command, Jaish e Mohamed27.  The Shakai valley offshoot was of neither faction, and the unit consisted of veterans of the jihad against the Soviets, all from the city of Karachi and of middle-class families28.  They were led by one Attaur Rahman and referred to themselves as Jundallah29.  Abu Talha also relied on the KSM nephew Abu Musab al-Baluchi in Karachi to coordinate with these local elements30. 

ABU ISSA AL-HINDI

Yet another former KSM operative played a part in the drama of 2004. His story began in early 2001 when bin Laden ordered KSM directly to dispatch an operative into the United States in order to case relevant targets of economic importance and those associated with Judaism31.  The selectee, Dhiren Barot, was known to his al-Qaida handlers as Abu Issa al-Hindi (or al-Britani), and was a weapons instructor at al-Faruq camp by 199832. He earned his reputation in jihad by fighting in Kashmir33. He was a convert to Islam, having been raised by Hindu parents before they moved their family to the UK; living first in India and then Kenya34.  In April 2001 he was in New York City, circling Manhattan with a video camera, and taking copious notes on targets35.  These included details for bomb placement, escape routes, security, pedestrian concentration, etc, at locations such as the Citicorp building, Prudential Building, and New York Stock Exchange36.  He video taped the NYSE, the World Trade Center towers, New York Police and Fire Department activity, and the city’s subway system37.  In this case, bin Laden and KSM continued to labor on plots with direct connection, lacking any sort of middle men or bureaucracy, and indicating the level of existing trust, as well as the independence of KSM.  Dhiren Barot maintained contact with his al-Qaida superiors, eventually including Abu Talha, in order to move forward with casing targets for the network. 

Dhiren Barot, known as Abu Issa al-Hindi

Barot rendezvoused with militants in the Shakai valley, South Waziristan, and remained from February to March 2004, integrating with al-Qaida and training for incendiary oriented missions with explosives expert Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah38.  In April 2004, al-Qaida internal and external operations managers Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabia convened with Barot to discuss plots against the US and UK39.  Initially reported as happening in March, the summit was vital to future external operations40.  Another elusive operative, Adnan al-Shukrijumah is reported to have also attended41.  Specifically, Barot was seeking clarification on how to accomplish these external ambitions42.  He apparently, gave a 39-page presentation, which included ideas such as utilizing limousines laden with propane tanks, to detonate in the parking garages of important financial centers43.  This was complimented by a potential radiation bomb, meant to cause sincere panic and social destabilization44.  He also recommended attacks on vital British subway stations45. 

Abu Talha al-Pakistani was of course intimately involved with the British plot, given his previous surveillance on Heathrow Airport46.  Interestingly, Abu Talha was said to also frequently visit South Waziristan47, and was married to the sister of an important Taliban commander killed in action during the American invasion48.  His excursions into the FATA eventually drew undesired attention. Allegedly, he surreptitiously met with Barot and an Arab explosives expert in Lahore during March 200449.  Pakistani officials were adamant that no such South Waziristan summit occurred, instead emphasizing Barot and Abu Talha meeting in Lahore50.  Eager to deflect attention from failed policies, the Pakistanis were loathe to admit such a meeting occurred in South Waziristan in March or April, the very time they were conducting incursions into the agency in order to clear it of al-Qaida and foreign element influence51. 

Detainees and Assets

By at least May, American authorities were sharing warnings and information about Abu Talha with the Pakistanis52.  While not in possession of his name, they were aware of his important status as a Pakistani with access to Britain, a fluent English speaker, and knew of his travels to South Waziristan by motorcycle or automobile; detailing to the Pakistanis their belief that he was to be involved in some sort of upcoming operations53.  It seems as though this information came from interrogations of the captured KSM54.  In fact, later it was directly attributed to information gleaned from detainees55. 

In fact, American agencies were still collecting prisoners of varying al-Qaida importance in 2004. Two such Palestinian detainees were destined to spend years in secretive CIA custody. American and Pakistani authorities were desperately trying to find an advantage in the search for more al-Qaida officials and the destabilization of their network.  In Peshawar during February 2004, Pakistani authorities apprehended Ahmed Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim, known as Abdulbari al-Filistini56. Of note, he previously labored on mass manufacturing remote detonation devices while dwelling within the KSM safehouse network in Karachi57. Once transferred into CIA custody, he remained for at least 770 days, providing information on various al-Qaida contacts58. On May 9, 2004 in Lahore, the Palestinian Marwan al-Jabour was having dinner at a friend’s home59.  Jabour was associated with Abu Faraj and Hamza Rabia in the facilitation and assistance of fleeing foreign element fighters in regards to their medical needs, sheltering, and travel60.  As Jabour moved his vehicle, he was approached and apprehended61.  His host and another dinner guest were taken as well62.  Jabour was accused of assisting known al-Qaida members’ movements out of Pakistan, as well as handling funds meant for militant weapons laboratories63.  He too was remanded to CIA custody in hopes that his knowledge could lead authorities to vital al-Qaida assets and commanders64.  Jabour claims to have assisted foreign elements fleeing the fighting in Afghanistan, but not to have associated with or facilitated the hiding of senior al-Qaida65. However, he assisted two African al-Qaida operatives in their sojourn out or attempted exit of Pakistan. One was probably Ibrahim Sulaiman Adnan Adam Harun, known as Spin Ghul, a Nigerien involved in the ambush deaths of two US servicemen, deployed by Hamza Rabia to Niger in order to stage an attack against the US Embassy in Abuja66. By speculation, the other was most likely Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani.

While this arrest appeared to display a fractured communications network for Abu Faraj al-Libi and senior al-Qaida, they were in fact able to coordinate remarkably well. Much communication centered on the fluid political situations concerning Iran and Iraq. As a representative facet of the complex al-Qaida-Iran relationship, an opportunity presented itself to Abu Faraj in the summer of 2004.  The KSM nephew, Abu Musab al-Baluchi, busy in Karachi with al-Qaida operations, received an intermediary from the Iranian government67.  The emissary came with an inquiry and request.  Essentially the Iranians wanted to know what kind of control al-Qaida held on the Iraqi based jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and desired for al-Qaida officials to rein in the Jordanian, preventing him from attacking and destroying Shiite holy sites within68.  In exchange they were willing to discuss the potential release of senior al-Qaida detainees69.  Abu Musab al-Baluchi quickly composed a letter with the information and sent it along to Abu Faraj70.  

While Abu Faraj, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, and senior leadership maintained focus on the evolving situation in Iraq, American authorities were certain that their attention was turned to US politics. As such, a concerning revelation greeted the CIA in March 2004, when a protected asset declared that an attack was imminent prior to the US election later in the year71. Known as Asset Y, the informant implicated al-Qaida affiliated facilitator Janat Ghul as both the reliable origin of the plot, and intimately involved in the happenings72. In fact, Janat Ghul was to establish a parlay between Asset Y and Abu Faraj, in regards to the purported attack73.

Yet even in March 2004, CIA officials expressed skepticism as to the reliability of the asset74. Highly situated officials displayed distrust and believed the informant to be rather vague, perhaps being subjected to an al-Qaida test with sensitive information75. But in June 2004, a foreign government, assuredly Pakistan, moved to apprehend Janat Ghul, giving the CIA valuable insight into the pre-election plot76. Asset Y informed the CIA that Janat Ghul coordinated a meeting between the asset and Sheikh Said al-Masri, al-Qaida Majlis al-Shura member and financial chief77. Janat Ghul was revealed to be an al-Qaida associate separately by the captured courier Hassan Ghul, who himself informed the CIA that Janat Ghul had once fabricated a story about his ability to obtain anti-aircraft missiles for al-Qaida paramilitary leadership78. Thus al-Qaida leadership was hesitant of the man and refused to work with him79. Given this, Asset Y’s assertion that Janat Ghul was in possession of vital knowledge to the pre-election plot was dubious at best. Regardless, these circumstances created a situation in which the FBI was willing to issue an alert for wanted terrorists in hopes of preventing any such operation against the US or its interest.

THE 2004 FBI ALERT

As such, May 26, 2004, included a press conference from US Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller80.  Therein, it was announced that credible intelligence warranted caution and an alert, due to increased al-Qaida activity and the determination of the organization to attack prior to the election in any one of many viable targets, to include the party conventions81.  Ashcroft gave the sense that an attack was in late preparation stages, and near to readiness82.  The Madrid transit bombings in March of that year also seemed to be a catalyst for the precautions83.  Further, FBI Director Mueller announced that the FBI was seeking information on seven individuals belonging to or associated with al-Qaida as part of the alert84.  They were Abdulrauf Jdey, who had yet to be found after his martyrdom video was discovered in the rubble of deceased al-Qaida military commander Mohamed Atef’s home in Kabul85; Aafia Siddiqui, the former wife of KSM nephew Ammar al-Baluchi; Adam Gadahn, an American citizen, who trained in Afghanistan and was now providing services to al-Qaida; Adnan Gulshair al-Shukrijumah, an operative of KSM; Amir al-Maati, who was a trained pilot, and a Canadian citizen of Arab descent; Harun Fazul, the Comorosi wanted for his roles in the 1998 Embassy bombings and 2002 Mombasa attacks; and finally Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, also wanted for his role in the 1998 Embassy attacks86. 

Jdey was completely missing after the discovery of his martyrdom testament and subsequent identification in early 2002, with his last known location in Montreal, Quebec87. He was previously subjected to an FBI alert in September 200388. Aafia Siddiqui, from a wealthy and well-connected Pakistani family, moved to America in 1990 for the purpose of education89. Achieving this goal with a degree from MIT, she become a doctor in neuroscience90. Having married a fellow Pakistani doctor from Karachi, she engaged in activism and Muslim causes, slowly radicalized by the plight of her religious peers in Bosnia and elsewhere around the globe91. In a sense, she became obsessed with jihad and the preservation of her religion92. She drew attention to herself and her husband after 9/11 with purchases of body-armor, night vision goggles, and questionable insurgent manuals, presumably to provide to the resistance in Afghanistan93. She became irascible and demanding, intent on being in the theatre of war94. By August 2002, Siddiqui was a divorced mother of three, now transplanted into Karachi, Pakistan95. Siddiqui was rapidly incorporated into the KSM network, and even returned to the US briefly for al-Qaida related menial tasking96. In February 2003, as previously chronicled, she married Ammar al-Baluchi in a secretive ceremony97. With the captures of her compatriots, she was subject to an FBI alert in March 2003, after which she promptly disappeared98. It was insinuated by her former husband and an uncle, that the infamous Siddiqui was hidden or watched by the Pakistani ISI, intending to use her against al-Qaida assets in Pakistan99.

Adam Yahiye Gadahn was an anomaly, as an American citizen having joined al-Qaida. He was raised with a ardent interest in Christianity on a southern California goat farm, before converting to Islam in the mid-1990s100. His previous interests subsided, and his focus was revitalized and readjusted to Islam101. Initially, this was a harmless life restructure, but Gadahn was slowly and perfidiously radicalized by two of the senior members of his local mosque and Islamic society102. One was the Palestinian Khalil al-Deek, an associate of Abu Zubaydah, logistician of the Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, and himself an al-Qaida affiliate103. Deek funded Gadahn’s initial sojourn to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the late 1990s104. By the time of the invasion, Gadahn was enmeshed with al-Qaida, providing services that began as servitude and administration and culminated in a role in the organization’s media committee105. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed initially offered Gadahn a position in one of his many plots, particularly the plan to destroy American petroleum stations as assigned to the Pakistani Majid Khan106. Gadahn refused as he was beginning a family while in hiding with the network107. Yet his media experience and cultural heritage were utilized by al-Qaida in 2002 in order to translate a bin Laden diatribe into English for a Western audience. It was a portent of Gadahn’s expanding influence and position in the network, as he transformed into al-Qaida’s Azzam al-Amriki108.

Shukrijumah was born in Saudi Arabia, but held a Guyanese passport, was fluent in English, and familiar with American society after living in the US for 15 years109. American authorities were first familiarized with him while interrogating Abu Zubaydah in the spring of 2002, when the Gazan described Shukrijumah as Abu Jafar al-Tayyar and reported having smuggled him into Pakistan from Bermal, Afghanistan in January 2002110. KSM alternately reported on Jafar al-Tayyar as a participant in the Heathrow/London plot, a component of Majid Khan’s efforts, and as associated with Jose Padilla’s attempts, giving him an undisputed air of importance while simultaneously eliciting disbelief due to his appearance in the various conspiracies111. It was Padilla who eventually confirmed Shukrijumah’s actual identity to investigators112. This resulted in the first separate FBI alert for the operative in March 2003113. He was also a subject in the same alert as Jdey, later in September of that year114.

Maati, as a verified pilot of Egyptian and Syrian heritage, had allegedly entertained the proposal of hijacking a flight of Canadian origin and crashing it into an American structure115. That Harun Fazul was suspected of involvement in operations was of no surprise.  Ghailani however, was an interesting addition, as he was seemingly a low ranking operative in the organization, in terms of what information was available to the media at the time.  Of course, both were indicted and wanted for their involvement with the 1998 East Africa US Embassy bombings116. Fazul was further responsible for the Mombasa attacks in November 2002117. However, the CIA reported knowledge that Ghailani was in South Waziristan with al-Qaida central leadership in October 2003118.  Given that the captured Hassan Ghul reported on events around this time, it makes sense that he informed on the Tanzanian as well.  This is especially clear considering that Abdulhadi al-Iraqi had reassigned Ghailani to work for Hamza Rabia in external operations119.  Armed with this knowledge, and combined with Ghailani’s history of involvement in a previous major al-Qaida attack, US officials felt justified in the alert for the operative. 

FBI Seeking Information Alert containing names and photographs of the seven wanted individuals

JUNDALLAH

Meanwhile, the militant organization Jundallah, trained by al-Qaida in the Shakai valley in late 2003, was prepared to strike in 2004.  Thus, they commenced a series of bombings in the spring within Karachi120.  Attaur Rahman and his men are assessed as being responsible for the majority of criminal attacks in Karachi for the first half of 2004121.  The January 17, 2004 car bombing outside of a Bible Center wounded 15, including first responders, and damaged the facility122.  After being drawn to the scene with a telephoned warning, the first responders were targeted with an explosive hurled from a moving vehicle, followed by the detonation of a bomb in a parked car123.  On March 19, Attaur Rahman and Shahzad Bajwah led an assault, firing on a Pakistani Rangers van transport under a bridge, killing one Ranger and one civilian124.  Before morning prayers on April 4, up to 12 gunmen stormed the Gulistan e Jauhur police station, firing over 200 rounds, overtaking two chambers within and killing five policemen, while facing minimal resistance125.  More significant events followed.  On Friday May 7, during the congested Friday afternoon prayers in a Shiite mosque, a suicide bomber concealed himself among worshippers in the third row126.  Upon detonation, 15 Shiites were slain, and the Shia community of Karachi was enraged127.  On Monday May 31, another suicide bomber leveled destruction at another Shiite mosque during evening prayers, killing 16128.  Initially it was thought that an explosive was abandoned in the mosque, or that one was thrown into the crowds of worshippers129.  However, the suicide bomber was revealed to be Akbar Khan, a police recruit in training130.  He was apparently radicalized as one of the many Pakistani volunteers recruited to fight against the American invasion in Afghanistan131.  Again, the frenzied Shia community rioted in response132.  Additional Shiites perished from their wounds or from circumstances involving the rioting in the days that followed133.  Between the attacks on the Shia, on May 26, there was a dual car bombing in the heavily fortified neighborhood housing the American consul general and an American educational institute for the English language, the Pakistani-American Cultural Center134.  The explosives detonated about half an hour apart from one another, thus drawing in and targeting responders135.  The first bomb was planted in the vehicle of a visitor to the educational institute, while the second was in a vehicle hijacked just prior to the incident136.  One policeman was killed and at least 34 other people wounded137.  Police had yet to link the series of assaults and detonations to Jundallah.  For the dual bombing, authorities initially blamed Kamran Atif, linked to a previous assassination attempt on Musharraf in April 2002138.  However, Kamran, a member of a breakaway portion of HuM, was apprehended in Karachi on May 19, before the bombings139. 

The attacks culminated on June 10, with Jundallah’s attempted assassination of the Karachi Corps Commander LT General Ahsan Salim Hayat, one of only nine such Corps Commanders in the Pakistani military, and a senior confidant of President Musharraf140.  At 0900 as Hayat’s convoy approached the Clifton Bridge area of Karachi, a mere half mile from the US Consulate in the city, Attaur Rahman, the leader of Jundallah, and his associates sprang into action141.  Jundallah militants sprayed fire from their automatic weapons, killing six soldiers, three police, one civilian, and wounding the General’s chauffeur142.  In the return volley, only one militant was wounded due to the ambush nature of the exchange, and the Jundallah militants escaped143.  LT Gen Hayat escaped injury that day, but the sense of security in Karachi was rattled yet again144.

Authorities rapidly spread through the city searching for the assailants.  Apparently, they had escaped the scene utilizing a stolen van, which was later discovered by police145.  With the owner’s assistance, police were able to obtain descriptions of the militants, and efficiently trace them to their lairs146.  On June 12, two raids commenced in Karachi, netting ten operatives of Jundallah and al-Qaida147.  Other reports noted that only nine of those arrested were specifically connected to al-Qaida148.  A large cache of weapons and explosives was obtained along with the suspects149.  Jundallah soldiers did not fight to the death, but instead were surprised and apprehended150.  Among those arrested were Attaur Rahman himself, and one of his deputies, the Pakistani youth Shahzad Bajwah151.  Bajwah had joined Attaur in the Shakai valley for the training152.  Suspiciously, the Pakistanis declared that Chechens and Uzbeks were responsible for the assassination attempt and that they were among those arrested153.  This may have been an attempt to defer from the obvious problem of native militants destabilizing Pakistani culture.  It was easier to blame the foreign elements.  However, all of those arrested were Jundallah operatives, natives of Karachi154.  Initial reports declared either eight or nine of the ten total arrested in the raids were Jundallah, directly responsible for the attack155.  Authorities expressed dismay by the group, noting that they had never heard of them or observed them conducting terrorist actions prior156.  This despite the fact that the moniker had been seen in localized militant propaganda157.  Karachi police clarified eight of those arrested as Jundallah158.  By September those involved were officially charged with their crimes and facing severe consequences159.  By the middle of October, additional arrests of the cell were conducted, including that of Adnan Shah, known as Tipu, bringing the number of Jundallah apprehended and charged in the attack to 11160.  The only principal member to escape was the wounded militant from the actual ambush, Qasim Toori, who was seeking medical assistance161.  Attaur Rahman was initially and perhaps specifically not named by the Pakistanis.  Although the Pakistanis alluded to the arrest of the primary responsible person for two separate attacks in Quetta earlier in the spring162.  This appeared to be the ninth individual arrested.  He was Daud Badini of the militant anti-Shia organization Lashkar e Jhangvi163.  This precipitated fears of multiple unknown organizations and splinters of condoned militant networks beginning similar campaigns across the nation164. 

Abu Musab Al-Baluchi And A Trap In Lahore

The remaining and tenth arrest, in the other raid, was of KSM nephew Abdulkarim Yusef165, known as Abu Musab al-Baluchi166.  He was a significant enough target that the Pakistanis admitted to CIA involvement in the search for a capture of the operative167.  In fact, CIA communications interceptions were instrumental in the capture of Baluchi168.  At the time, he had a $1 million bounty from the Pakistani government169.  Press reports often referred to him as Musad Arochi170.  He was assessed as having been involved in all of the previous Karachi attacks171.  Some authorities noted that he was an overseer of the militants in Jundallah172.  Abu Musab al-Baluchi was deeply connected to the al-Qaida leadership based in the Shakai valley, in addition to his obvious familial connections through KSM173.  He had dispatched the letter to Abu Faraj al-Libi to inform his commander about the Iranian requests, just the day prior to his own arrest174.    

Initially, Baluchi was not provided for court hearings, most likely due to interrogations being conducted by the Pakistanis on behalf of the CIA175.  Abu Musab al-Baluchi was not transferred to CIA custody however, as no variations of his name or alias appears on a Senate list of those specific detainees176.  That being said, reports at the time claimed he was only in Pakistani custody for three days prior to being flown from the country on a plane with CIA operatives177.  In August, his wife and lawyer attempted to claim that the man, whom they named as Abdulkarim Mahbub was incorrectly detained178.  In the proceedings, they did admit that he resided in both Kuwait and Pakistan, further exposing the links to the KSM family179.  As mentioned, Abu Musab al-Baluchi is Abdulkarim Yusef, reported by President Musharraf as the brother of Ramzi Yusef180.  Going off of the oft-reported fact that he was a nephew of KSM, most media stories from the time declared him as Yusef’s cousin181.  The arrest of Attaur Rahman, his adherents, and an important al-Qaida operative in Baluchi, seemingly broke the militant resolve in Karachi, yet there were still more jihadists in the major cities.  As important as the arrests were, Baluchi’s interrogation led to a higher prize, as he was instrumental in giving up the location of Mohamed Naim Noor Khan (Abu Talha al-Pakistani)182.  The CIA assessed that Baluchi was in consistent communication with Khan183.  Pakistani authorities commenced a month long operation of surveilling and following Khan as he conducted his usual business in Lahore184. 

Khan was continuing his role as a conduit of al-Qaida information185.  Utilizing internet services in Turkey, Nigeria, and elsewhere, he maintained al-Qaida encrypted communications186.  As officials in the FATA delivered messages on CDs to radical madrassas, additional couriers delivered the items to Khan in Lahore, who then properly encrypted and forwarded them187.  All the while, his responsibilities in Karachi appear to have been overseen by Abu Musab al-Baluchi. 

Eager to obtain custody of the operative after the American warning about him earlier in the spring, the Pakistanis sprang their trap on the morning of July 13188.  Khan was lured to Lahore International Airport expecting to acquire a parcel delivered from his father in Karachi189.  Pakistani authorities surreptitiously surrounded and apprehended Khan, in such a manner, that his arrest was not mentioned in any media sources190.  Rushed to a high security prison, Khan immediately began interrogation191.  Police discovered Khan’s casings and photographs of Heathrow airport on his laptop, along with emails in code to various al-Qaida officials and operatives192.  His computer contained specific details and surveillance of particular financial institutions in New York City, Newark, NJ, and Washington, DC193.  The information and surveillance was based on the KSM ordered April 2001 casing expedition by al-Qaida operative Dhiren Barot on American targets194.  The sophistication of the reconnaissance was both impressive and frightening to American authorities195.  As they carefully went through Khan’s meticulous records, a sense of wonder overcame the American investigators, as they realized what they were viewing, and just how important Khan’s communications and surveillances were196.  It was expressly concerning that al-Qaida had members on the ground in America prior to 9/11 observing security on potential targets197.  Khan was compelled to turn on his al-Qaida associates, apparently by convincing him that his cooperation was necessary in maintaining safety and security for Pakistan198.  Therefore, playing on whatever sense of patriotism he maintained, Khan fell under the sway of the authorities.  As this occurred, his arrest remained a secret, not yet exposed to the media199.  In order to prove his willingness, Khan brought authorities to an al-Qaida documents facility and external operations hub in Punjab200.  External operations commander Hamza Rabia was their target.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  1. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  2. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  3. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ali Abdulaziz Ali, (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISN 10018, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10018.html ↩︎
  4. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  5. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  6. THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE GO-BETWEEN; Arrested Qaeda Operative: Life of Degrees and Aliases, by Amy Waldman, The New York Times, August 6, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/06/world/threats-responses-go-between-arrested-qaeda-operative-life-degrees-aliases.html / THE REACH OF WAR: TERROR ALERT; Rounding Up Qaeda Suspects: New Cooperation, New Tensions, New Questions, by Amy Waldman and Eric Lipton, The New York Times, August 17, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/us/reach-war-terror-alert-rounding-up-qaeda-suspects-new-cooperation-new-tensions.html ↩︎
  7. THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE GO-BETWEEN; Arrested Qaeda Operative: Life of Degrees and Aliases, by Amy Waldman, The New York Times, August 6, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/06/world/threats-responses-go-between-arrested-qaeda-operative-life-degrees-aliases.html ↩︎
  8. Tech Genius Outed Fiends – The Mole, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, August 7, 2004, https://nypost.com/2004/08/07/tech-genius-outed-fiends-the-mole/ / In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
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  15. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  16. THREATS AND RESPONSES: INTELLIGENCE; Captured Qaeda Figure Led Way To Information Behind Warning, by Douglas Jehl and David Rohde, The New York Times, August 2, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/02/us/threats-responses-intelligence-captured-qaeda-figure-led-way-information-behind.html / THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE GO-BETWEEN; Arrested Qaeda Operative: Life of Degrees and Aliases, by Amy Waldman, The New York Times, August 6, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/06/world/threats-responses-go-between-arrested-qaeda-operative-life-degrees-aliases.html ↩︎
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  19. THE REACH OF WAR: TERROR ALERT; Rounding Up Qaeda Suspects: New Cooperation, New Tensions, New Questions, by Amy Waldman and Eric Lipton, The New York Times, August 17, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/us/reach-war-terror-alert-rounding-up-qaeda-suspects-new-cooperation-new-tensions.html ↩︎
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  21. Tech Genius Outed Fiends – The Mole, by Andy Soltis, The New York Post, August 7, 2004, https://nypost.com/2004/08/07/tech-genius-outed-fiends-the-mole/ ↩︎
  22. THREATS AND RESPONSES: INTELLIGENCE; Captured Qaeda Figure Led Way To Information Behind Warning, by Douglas Jehl and David Rohde, The New York Times, August 2, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/02/us/threats-responses-intelligence-captured-qaeda-figure-led-way-information-behind.html ↩︎
  23. THREATS AND RESPONSES: INTELLIGENCE; Captured Qaeda Figure Led Way To Information Behind Warning, by Douglas Jehl and David Rohde, The New York Times, August 2, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/02/us/threats-responses-intelligence-captured-qaeda-figure-led-way-information-behind.html ↩︎
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  25. Jundallah: A Militant Group With Multiple Lives, by Salman Siddiqui, The Express Tribune, July 13, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/27429/jundullah-a-militant-group-with-multiple-lives ↩︎
  26. Jundallah: A Militant Group With Multiple Lives, by Salman Siddiqui, The Express Tribune, July 13, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/27429/jundullah-a-militant-group-with-multiple-lives ↩︎
  27. The curious case of Amjad Farooqi, by B Raman, Rediff.com, September 30, 2004, https://www.rediff.com/news/2004/sep/30raman.htm ↩︎
  28. Jundallah: A Militant Group With Multiple Lives, by Salman Siddiqui, The Express Tribune, July 13, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/27429/jundullah-a-militant-group-with-multiple-lives ↩︎
  29. Jundallah: A Militant Group With Multiple Lives, by Salman Siddiqui, The Express Tribune, July 13, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/27429/jundullah-a-militant-group-with-multiple-lives ↩︎
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  31. 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims At The American Homeland, 2004 ↩︎
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  33. Bin Laden’s Mystery Man, by Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, Newsweek, August 20, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20070626074907/http:/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5738292/site/newsweek ↩︎
  34. How a barbershop arrest led to heart of al-Qaeda’s web, by Jamie Doward, The Guardian, November 11, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/nov/12/alqaida.terrorism ↩︎
  35. Al-Qaida’s New York surveillance video released, by Robert Windrem, NBC News, June 15, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19254592 ↩︎
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  40. Report on “Terror Summit” Denied, Dawn, August 17, 2004, https://www.dawn.com/news/367699/report-on-terror-summit-denied ↩︎
  41. A Mystery Man Who Keeps the FBI Up at Night, by Josh Meyer, The Los Angeles Times, September 3, 2006, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-sep-03-fg-manhunt3-story.html ↩︎
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  46. Guantanamo Assessment File, Ali Abdulaziz Ali, (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISN 10018, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10018.html ↩︎
  47. Pakistan sniffs out trail of al-Qaida, by Paul Haven, The Associated Press, August 7, 2004, https://www.poconorecord.com/story/news/2004/08/07/pakistan-sniffs-out-trail-al/51060239007/ ↩︎
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  57. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulrahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1460, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1460.html // Guantanamo Assessment File, Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, ISN 1461, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1461.html ↩︎
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  60. The Case of Marwan Jabour, Human Rights Watch, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0207/2.htm // New light shed on CIA’s secret prisons, by Dafna Linzer and Julie Tate, NBC News, February 27, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17372067 ↩︎
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  66. Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison for Terrorism Offenses Targeting Americans Overseas, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-sentenced-life-prison-terrorism-offenses-targeting-americans-overseas ↩︎
  67. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
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  85. Authorities Name 5th Suicide Terrorist, CNN News, January 25, 2002, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-01-25/justice/inv.fifth.suspect_1_abderraouf-jdey-martyrdom-messages-khalid-ibn-muhammad-al-juhani?_s=PM:LAW ↩︎
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  89. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
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  91. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
  92. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
  93. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
  94. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
  95. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
  96. Guantanamo Assessment File, Majid Khan, ISN 10020, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10020.html ↩︎
  97. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
  98. The Mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui, by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, November 23, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida ↩︎
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  100. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
  101. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
  102. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
  103. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
  104. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
  105. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
  106. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true // Guantanamo Assessment File, Majid Khan, ISN 10020, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10020.html ↩︎
  107. Azzam the American, by Raffi Khatchadourian, The New Yorker, January 14, 2007, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/22/azzam-the-american?printable=true ↩︎
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  113. FBI Alert for Saudi Terror Suspect, by Joel Roberts, CBS News, May 7, 2003, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-alert-for-saudi-terror-suspect/ // FBI Hunts ‘Al Qaeda Field Commander’, ABC News, March 20, 2003, https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90755&page=1 ↩︎
  114. FBI seeks 4 suspected of terrorist activities, CNN News, September 5, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/09/05/fbi.bolo/index.html?_s=PM:US ↩︎
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  116. Transcript: Ashcroft, Mueller news conference, FBI Alert, CNN News, May 26, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/US/05/26/terror.threat.transcript/ ↩︎
  117. Guantanamo Assessment File, Abdulmalik Bajabu, ISN 10025, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/10025.html ↩︎
  118. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  119. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
  120. A Top Pakistani General Escapes an Assassination Attempt That Kills 10 People, by Salman Masood, The New York Times, June 11, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/11/world/a-top-pakistani-general-escapes-an-assassination-attempt-that-kills-10-people.html ↩︎
  121. Jundallah: A Militant Group With Multiple Lives, by Salman Siddiqui, The Express Tribune, July 13, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/27429/jundullah-a-militant-group-with-multiple-lives ↩︎
  122. Bomb injures 15 in anti-Christian attack, The Sydney Morning Herald via The Associated Press, January 17, 2004, https://www.smh.com.au/world/bomb-injures-15-in-anti-christian-attack-20040117-gdi6c3.html ↩︎
  123. Bomb injures 15 in anti-Christian attack, The Sydney Morning Herald via The Associated Press, January 17, 2004, https://www.smh.com.au/world/bomb-injures-15-in-anti-christian-attack-20040117-gdi6c3.html ↩︎
  124. Karachi: Order Deferred in Van Attack Case, Dawn, February 22, 2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/179774/karachi-order-deferred-in-van-attack-case ↩︎
  125. Five Die in Attack on Karachi Police Station, Dawn, April 5, 2004, https://www.dawn.com/news/393251/five-die-in-attack-on-karachi-police-station ↩︎
  126. Karachi mosque attack kills 15, Al-Jazeera, May 7, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/5/7/karachi-mosque-attack-kills-15 ↩︎
  127. Karachi mosque attack kills 15, Al-Jazeera, May 7, 2004, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/5/7/karachi-mosque-attack-kills-15 ↩︎
  128. Pakistan mosque blast kills 16 people, NBC News via The Associated Press, May 31, 2004, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna5105527 ↩︎
  129. Pakistan mosque blast kills 16 people, NBC News via The Associated Press, May 31, 2004, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna5105527 ↩︎
  130. Al-Qaida spreads its tentacles in Karachi, by Anwar Iqbal, United Press International, June 15, 2004, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2004/06/15/Al-Qaida-spreads-its-tentacles-in-Karachi/58651087336895/ ↩︎
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