Unsurprisingly, Nashwan Abdulrazzaq Abdulbaqi al-Tamir, the leader of Brigade 55, known as Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, commanded the al-Qaida paramilitary response to the American invasion¹.  His frontline lieutenants in the north, Abdulsalam al-Hadhrami and Gharib al-Sanaani were slain in 2001 defending their positions at Khawaja Ghar near Kunduz² and in the subsequent Qala I Jangi massacre³ respectively, but his deputy and original al-Qaida member Mustafa Fadhil had assumed command along the remaining lines⁴.  The beleaguered Taliban response to the invasion was imperiled and took a while to organize.  Foreign forces in Afghanistan initially fell under the purview of Juma Namangani, paramilitary commander of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan⁵.  Yet he too fell at Kunduz⁶, affording Abdulhadi the opportunity to be anointed by the Taliban as their preferred commander over foreign elements conducting the insurgency⁷.  This was due to his previous successful command of the Arab Brigade 55, and ensured continuity in the insurgency being conducted under the name of the Taliban⁸. This also allowed Abdulhadi to foist himself upon the al-Qaida Majlis ash-Shura due to his paramilitary position, and into dispute with many of the leading al-Qaida members, mostly Africans⁹.  It also put him in an awkward position with Abu Faraj al-Libi, whom Abdulhadi had brought into the insurgency as a logistician, but whom bin Laden appointed as his internal operations manager¹⁰.  In fact previous communiques named Abdulhadi as “emir,” and referred to Abu Faraj as the “deputy emir¹¹.” Simply, Abdulhadi was respected, but difficult in command¹². While basing out of the FATA, in the Shakai Valley of South Waziristan, Abdulhadi struck across the border with al-Qaida and associated forces in provinces including Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Paktika, Paktia, Khost, etc; particularly border provinces within reach of the entrenched militant forces. 

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Enemy Order at Shah I Kot

While not directly involved in military operations in the region, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed still funneled approximately $100,000 to Abdulhadi al-Iraqi in the Spring of 2002, in order to fund military operations in Afghanistan and to also target Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, as has been documented¹³.  By late 2002, Abu Faraj al-Libi, previously hiding in Peshawar, was providing supplies in the categories of medicine, energy, meals, attire, and more to the fighters¹⁴.  Abdulhadi’s insurgency was developing alongside these al-Qaida senior officials. Initially though, Abdulhadi’s belligerents needed to survive intensive mountain combat in Afghanistan before relocating to South Waziristan.

The insurgency itself began mere weeks after the rout at Tora Bora, with some militants vowing to defend Afghanistan and not depart. In early 2002, fighters were gathering at a madrassa in Zormat, while al-Qaida and senior militants were poised in the nearby mountains for the coming combat¹⁵. The Zormat madrassa was utilized as a logistics hub and ensured the provisions for combatants in the valley and peaks of Shah I Kot¹⁶. US intelligence began to understand around the same time that militants were convening in Paktia province at the valley¹⁷. Operation Anaconda, or the Battle of Shah I Kot, commenced on March 2, 2002, as a response, having first allowed further belligerents to arrive¹⁸. American military officials surveilled the valley of Shah I Kot, itself at high altitude, low temperature, and now spotted with snow¹⁹. Therein they saw numerous combatants gather after coalescing near Gardez, the capital of Paktia²⁰. The belligerents took position in the valley, utilizing caves and other rudimentary bunkers to give fight and defense²¹.

While the battle of Shah I Kot raged, the Americans faced a determined enemy in the mountains.  Taliban forces were coordinated by Saifur Rahman Mansur, the former head of the Taliban’s Eighth Division²².  He had held sway over the military garrison at Kargha, in vicinity of Kabul, prior to the American assault²³.  Fleeing home to Zormat after the invasion, he allowed for and encouraged the regrouping of Taliban and other militant forces in nearby Shah I Kot²⁴.  He was perhaps manipulated by and influenced by senior Taliban leaders, but nonetheless, his name became synonymous with the battle in the valley²⁵.  His own father was a folk hero from the resistance to the Soviet invasion, but was assassinated in 1993 via car bombing by a rival warlord²⁶ – [A].  Despite his father’s support of a differing faction, Mansur readily joined the Taliban and rose through their military ranks, culminating in his defense at the valley of Shah I Kot²⁷. 

Under the overall command of Mansur, the foreign elements played a key role despite their diminished numbers.  Remaining Al-Qaida specific and Arab forces were commanded by Abdulhadi al-Iraqi and Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil²⁸.  The Iraqi and Egyptian swore an oath to the death to remain in Afghanistan defending against the Americans, thus giving al-Qaida senior assets in Paktia province for the battle²⁹.

Fadhil was an early member of al-Qaida, known to have helped establish and create the curriculum used at the militant training camps of Afghanistan, before he joined his superiors in Sudan³⁰.  He was described as a representative of the second tier of al-Qaida commanders³¹.  In 1993, he participated as a forerunner to Mohamed Atef’s excursion into Somalia in order to train forces there against American intervention, earning a leadership position in the endeavor³².  Known then as Abu Jihad al-Nubi, he was listed as number 28 on al-Qaida’s infamous roster from the 1990s³³.  Fadhil remained in Africa after bin Laden relocated to Afghanistan, and as such was enfolded into the 1998 Embassy bombings plot in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam³⁴.  Just prior to the attacks, he fled to Afghanistan in order to join the organization in its new base³⁵.  Fadhil was named in one of five additional indictments announced on December 16, 1998 in New York against the bombing conspirators and was subject to the State Department offering a $5 million bounty for his capture³⁶.  In Afghanistan, he was now known as Abdulwakil al-Masri, and conducted advanced instruction at al-Qaida camps in 1999 and 2000, including training on communications, infiltration, and explosives³⁷.  By 2001, Fadhil was known as second only to Abdulhadi in Brigade 55, and was in charge of forces in Kabul, while Abdulhadi focused on the front lines to the north, against the Northern Alliance³⁸.  In fact, Mustafa Fadhil was said to have assumed this role commanding the Kabul lines as early as 2000³⁹. After 9/11 he was declared one of the 22 most wanted terrorists by the Bush Administration on October 10, 2001⁴⁰.

They were joined at Shah I Kot by a variety of Arab militant lieutenants and commanders, including Abu Haitham al-Yemeni, and two Saudis, Ikrimah al-Ghamdi and Abu Baraa al-Sharqi, both of whom Abdulhadi promoted in the future to be a members of the al-Qaida Military Committee⁴¹.  The Egyptian Midhat Mursi (Abu Khabab al-Masri) fought there as well⁴². Another component to the command at Shah I Kot was Ali Ammar al-Ruqayi, the formidable Abu Laith al-Libi, a paramilitary commander of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.  From the hellacious confines of this mountain combat, Abu Laith al-Libi arose as a jihadist folklore hero.  His skills and commitment were commended and praised, and he stepped into a vacancy for leadership created by the swift departure of his contemporaries at the beginning of the war. The majority of foreign fighters were not Arab, but rather Tahir Yuldashev’s ferocious Uzbeks and central Asians of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan⁴³.  Still reeling from their defeat at Kunduz, the IMU fighters constituted a formiddable foe during the mountain battle, engaging under command of their political leader. 

While Mansur, Yuldashev, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, and Mustafa Fadhil were using their men wisely, they still had but few.  American estimates initially placed the number of entrenched combatants at approximately 200, when it may have been closer to 1000 total⁴⁴. The militant force positions, while manned, faced a dearth of supplies, sustenance, and protection from the harsh elements⁴⁵.

Saifur Rahman Mansur distributed leaflets to the surrounded population aimed at the village of Zormat, warning against cooperation with American forces⁴⁶.  Mansur requested that Mustafa Fadhil and his men ascend the mountains and defend, in order to prevent the Americans from gaining a hold in the elevation⁴⁷.  This proved to be a vital order.  Fadhil and several of his men, including his close companion Abu Bakr al-Maghrebi, climbed to dig in and face whatever battle was offered⁴⁸.

Operation Anaconda and Takur Ghar

Delayed by winter weather, the coalition military of numerous countries, but led by the Americans and their Special Forces, moved to encircle the valley and decimate the militants within on March 2⁴⁹.  US Special Forces established observation posts and called in air support to destroy militant gunnery positions that threatened aircraft⁵⁰. Local forces under Afghan commander Zia Lodin maneuvered into the valley from the south, assisted by US Special Forces⁵¹. Zia Lodin led a Pashtun militia from Logar province, which comprised an American attempt to build a reliable Pashtun force in the south to mimic the victorious Northern Alliance of Tajiks and Uzbeks⁵². They were unfamiliar with the province and relatively undisciplined⁵³. Immediately Zia was forced to retreat, sustaining mortar fire to his position and vehicles, and a second ambuscade as they fled⁵⁴.  Air support called in was misdirected against Zia’s own position, and American Special Forces Operator Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L Harriman was slain in the onslaught⁵⁵.  Harriman and some of the Afghans diverged from the primary convoy and led a smaller incursion into the valley⁵⁶.  Due to their trucks not being properly outfitted with coalition signals to indicate friendly forces, the AC-130 gunship in the sky mistook them for enemy fighters and targeted the convoy⁵⁷.  A rattled and discombobulated Zia completed his full retreat from the valley, with the al-Qaida and associated militants having disrupted the first foray⁵⁸.  Subsequently the 10^th Mountain Division and 101^st Airborne Division were forced to move into positions sealing the valley and securing positions blocking militant egress routes at the south and north respectively⁵⁹.  They faced resistance in various degrees of intensity (particularly fierce in the beginning), took casualties, and inflicted damage on the militant forces, via their own means and through air support⁶⁰.

On the night of March 3 into the morning of March 4, US Special Forces engaged in the fiercest battle of the war in Afghanistan thus far.  The reconnaissance teams were to be replaced prior to daylight, and thus officers rushed to get the Special Forces in place in the darkness⁶¹. In an attempt to obtain a vantage point over the militant forces below, a Chinook helicopter ferrying a Navy SEAL unit came under intense RPG fire while attempting to land at the base of a specific peak near the village of Marzak, known as Takur Ghar⁶².  Their intention was to ascend the mountain in the dark and observe the enemy forces⁶³.  The targeted helicopter did not experience a grenade detonation but the impact of a munition was enough to damage the hydraulics and dislodge door gunner and Navy SEAL Special Operator First Class Neil Roberts, sending him careening onto the ground below⁶⁴.  Yet Roberts only fell approximately 10 ft and was thus still alive and in need of recovery⁶⁵.  The militants encircled Roberts, apprehending him, and executing him with a shot to the head, followed by an attempt to decapitate the Navy SEAL⁶⁶.  Meanwhile his team of five surviving SEALs and their radioman, Air Force Technical Sergeant John Chapman, arrived again on the scene via helicopter hours later in the early morning for an attempt to locate and recover Roberts⁶⁷.  The unit engaged in furious combat attempting to climb the mountain towards their fallen comrade, resulting in Chapman falling wounded⁶⁸.  After further fire wounded another SEAL, the Senior Chief Petty Officer leading the charge assessed Chapman as deceased and ordered the retreat of his men, unable to dislodge the militants on Takur Ghar⁶⁹.  He desired to call in air support and attempt again to now recover two fallen comrades, but the militant fire was overwhelming and further retreat as well as reinforcements were required⁷⁰.  However, on Takur Ghar, overhead drone imagery later confirmed that Chapman was merely unconscious and was indeed still alive⁷¹.  Awakening alone just minutes after the retreat, Chapman fought the enemy combatants from three angles before sheltering in a militant bunker on the mountain⁷².  Roughly an hour after landing, Chapman withstood an RPG against his position and shot down an oncoming assailant, followed by slaying another in close quarters fighting⁷³.  Finally, as a second rescue Chinook descended to offer reprieve, Chapman opened fire again on the enemy and was cut down and killed by a reciprocal militant volley⁷⁴. 

The responding Chinook was part of a two helicopter arrival, ferrying a Quick Reaction Force of Army Rangers to the scene from Bagram Airbase⁷⁵.  However, a late warning was not received, imploring the Rangers not to attempt landing at Takur Ghar due to the obscene resistance⁷⁶.  The primary Chinook immediately took resounding fire from the militant positions on the peak, with the Rangers’ door gunner Sgt Phil Svitak responding in kind⁷⁷.  Before the helicopter even touched the ground, Svitak was hit by enemy fire and killed⁷⁸.  An RPG to the engine helped finally bring down the Chinook⁷⁹.  The remaining crew and the Rangers rushed to depart their downed aircraft via the ramp but were exposed to intensive volleys ripping into their undesirable position.  Three Rangers: Specialist Marc Anderson, Sergeant Bradley Crose, and Private First Class Matthew Commons were all killed attempting to egress the aircraft⁸⁰.  The entrapped force was taking wounded and attempting to defend their position.  Two medics, including Air Force Senior Airman Jason Cunningham labored furiously to assist their comrades⁸¹.  Both medics were eventually hit while working in the exposed environment and critically wounded by rounds penetrating them below the protections of their vests⁸². 

The second helicopter of the Quick Reaction Force landed further away and its Ranger compliment was forced to hike to the position of the downed Chinook, taking fire along the way before joining⁸³.  The first team called in air support that included the innovative usage of the CIA Predator drone armed with hellfire missiles⁸⁴.  The CIA Predator launched upon and destroyed a gunnery position in a bunker above the Rangers⁸⁵.  When the second Ranger unit joined, together the teams fought against the remaining militants and explored the cleared enemy bunkers, discovering with horror the remains of Roberts and Chapman in the very same position to which they had called the CIA hellfires to destroy⁸⁶.  Yet Roberts and Chapman were both deceased before that point in the battle.  There was a delay in extracting the beleaguered Rangers, and the stricken medic Cunningham subsequently bled out⁸⁷.  Much later in the day, the Rangers, their wounded, and their dead were recovered and removed from the battleground of Takur Ghar⁸⁸.  Conquering the insurmountable summit cost the American military seven elite combatants.  The battle encouraged the Taliban to deploy even more forces, with observance of hundreds moving from positions in Khost and South Waziristan⁸⁹.

Casualties in the Valley

Through March 5, coalition forces had deployed 450 explosive munitions against the extremists⁹⁰. By March 6, the Taliban staged 100 militants as reinforcements in Zormat, waiting for a weaponry resupply before they trekked into the mountains to provide support⁹¹.  On the same day, US forces recovered a list from the battlefield detailing approximately 60 missing and killed militants from Qala I Jangi, site of one of the fiercest initial battles in 2001 after the invasion⁹². This discovery proved the presence of al-Qaida and foreign elements in the engagement. A last real flurry of militant activity occurred from March 7 to 8, with US forces responding with air power⁹³. Meanwhile, with local Pashtun forces proving unreliable, the Northern Alliance dispatched Tajik warlord Gul Haider with armored vehicles and tanks to the arena on March 7, and they arrived on March 9 due to adverse weather⁹⁴. There were significant tensions between the Pashtun and Tajik forces, both based from Logar⁹⁵. Eventually, after the US forces pressured the militant forces through March 11, the Tajik forces cleared Shah I Kot on March 12, with little fanfare as the battle was complete⁹⁶.

A hasty militant retreat was in order though by the end of the engagement, as the American pressure was relentless, yielding unsanitary and unsustainable conditions among the fighters.  They were not in fact entrapped in the valley. An injured Abu Laith gained recognition for his successful flight from the perils of war⁹⁷.  He was smuggled into Pakistan via an Afghan comrade’s safehouse near Khost⁹⁸. Yuldashev left some seventy men dead on the field of battle⁹⁹, while from the dozens of Arabs, at least fourteen lost their lives¹⁰⁰, to include most prominently Abdulwakil al-Masri, the wanted Egyptian deputy Mustafa Fadhil¹⁰¹.  While Fadhil’s death was not announced in the media, he was just a few short years later removed from the FBI most wanted list and State Department’s Rewards for Justice webpage. 

Among the others of the 14 listed by their contemporaries was Abu Bakr al-Maghrebi who was described as a close companion of Fadhil’s, who had come to Afghanistan for training just weeks prior to 9/11¹⁰².  The Moroccan was a former student of Abu Laith’s from these days at the Abu Yahya camp for North Africans north of Kabul¹⁰³. Another of the felled Arabs was an individual named Zaid al-Khair.  As Zaid al-Khair was the name of a companion to the Prophet Mohamed, it stands to reason that multiple jihadists could operate under that moniker.  However, very early press compilations of wanted al-Qaida members listed a Zaid al-Khair as an operational commander¹⁰⁴.  In addition, Zaid al-Khair was described by Guantanamo detainees as having been a trainer at al-Faruq during spring and summer 2001¹⁰⁵.  It is unknown if this is the individual killed at Shah I Kot.  Others killed at Shah I Kot were North African Abu al-Bara’a al-Maghrebi; Palestinians Abu Hamza al-Filistini, Abu Amir al-Ashqar al-Filistini, Abu Bakr Azzam al-Filistini; Somalian Abu al-Hassan al-Somali; Jordanian Abu al-Bara’a al-Maqdisi; Syrian Abu Ahmed al-Suri; Peninsula natives Sahab al-Taifi, Abu Khalid al-Islambouli al-Ghamdi; al-Aam Hassan of indeterminant origin; and apparently one jihadist linked to France, Abu Bilal al-Faransi¹⁰⁶. 

According to Martyrs in a Time of Alienation (a work describing al-Qaida and affiliated fallen during this time period), the identities of more than just Abu Bakr al-Maghrebi can be ascertained. Abu Ahmed al-Suri was Mahmud Mustafa Kamal al-Bakri of Aleppo, Syria, who was on his second trip to Afghanistan after training in the Abu Musab al-Suri camp¹⁰⁷.   Abu Bara’a al-Maqdisi was also known as Izzaldin al-Maqdisi, and he worked as a military trainer in Kabul and Kandahar prior to the war¹⁰⁸.  Abu al-Hasan al-Somali was known only as Ibrahim.  Reared in Kenya, he battled in Somalia prior to joining jihad in Afghanistan¹⁰⁹, and was a friend to the 1998 Embassy bombings conspirators¹¹⁰ – [B].  Abu Bakr Azzam was a Palestinian raised as a refugee in Jordan, named Iyad Adel al-Qanna¹¹¹.  A veteran of the jihad against the Soviets, he returned to Jordan and was trained as a pharmacist¹¹².  He migrated back to Afghanistan and offered his services to the Taliban and al-Qaida in Kandahar¹¹³.  Abu Amir, likewise was of the Palestinian diaspora, dwelling in Kuwait and Yemen before traveling to train at al-Faruq¹¹⁴. Despite an eye injury at the camps, he remained and fought in defense of Kandahar before falling at Shah I Kot in an anti-aircraft position¹¹⁵.

Some of Yuldashev’s many fallen men were appropriately eulogized as well.  For example, Qwandiq Suji, known as Abdulrahim al-Uzbeki, was raised in his communist homeland, and was encouraged and eager to train with Islamist militants after the fall of the Soviets¹¹⁶.  After completing training with the IMU in Tajikistan, he came to Afghanistan and joined them along the front lines¹¹⁷.  Another was Ulugbek Asta, known as Abdulrahman al-Uzbeki al-Khwarizmi, who had also first operated in Tajikistan¹¹⁸. At Shah I Kot both fell as additional migrant fighters in the country, manipulated by the likes of Yuldashev. 

Attacks from Angor Adda

Despite his oath not to leave, Abdulhadi relocated across the border into Pakistan. It is of vast importance to reiterate that Abdulhadi was entrenched in the Shakai valley of South Waziristan and that the agency shared a border with Paktika province in Afghanistan.  The foreign elements were welcomed to and protected within this sanctuary by local Pashtun fighters, including the young and capable Nek Mohamed Wazir in South Waziristan¹¹⁹. Shakai was where al-Qaida set up a form of headquarters upon fleeing from Afghanistan, providing a staging ground for their forays across the border¹²⁰.  Thus Abdulhadi’s influence in the region made sense as he could travel or deploy his men across the porous border in order to attack American and coalition forces. Other locations where he ordered strikes were feasible. For example, Ghazni province is to the west of Paktika making it within reach. He also attacked Forward Operating Base Lwara in Khost province with small arms fire (later known as FOB Tillman)¹²¹.  Kabul was much further away and required coordination to implement strategy and conduct attacks.  It is likely that this coordination occurred with warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his family members.  Haqqani’s network of militants were already suspected of ambushing American forces on January 4, 2002, near his homestead of Khost, resulting in the death of Green Beret Sgt First Class Nathan Chapman¹²².

An early scholarly assumption that Abdhulhadi initially focused only on northeastern Afghanistan¹²³ can be immediately contested and examined based on his record of cross border attacks¹²⁴.  The resulting fatalities of which he is accused display that Abdulhadi was focused and restricted to a particular swathe of Afghan provinces, corresponding to the border with Pakistan and his South Waziristan base, and overlapping with the region specifically influenced by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his family.  Thus, Abdulhadi’s units were active in the southeast, simultaneous to and coordinating with Abu Laith al-Libi, whom the US believed to be commanding this area based on detainee statements¹²⁵.  Abdulhadi’s initial raids and attacks resulted in at least the deaths of numerous American, Canadian, German, British, and Norwegian coalition members, plus a French civilian¹²⁶.

Abdulhadi stationed the Egyptian Khalid Habib in Angor Adda, South Waziristan, indicating that Khalid Habib was now a forward commander for the network¹²⁷.  Angor Adda is directly across the border from Shakin, Paktika, where a large percentage of the attacks took place.  Habib was joined by several subordinates, including Firas al-Yemeni, reportedly an “experienced killer,” known jihadist fighter, and respected marksman¹²⁸. 

In examining the lethal attacks coordinated by Abdulhadi, we start with the death of US Army Sgt Steven Checo near Shakin¹²⁹, who was killed at a time when American military casualties due to hostilities in Afghanistan were a rarity.  Yet at 0400 on 21 December 2002, the 82^nd Airborne paratrooper was mortally wounded during an attack by a small squad of Abdulhadi’s militants, numbering no more than nine¹³⁰.  Though the militants left one dead in the exchange, Sgt Checo died at a nearby field hospital¹³¹.  He was felled close to his base just outside of Shakin, when the squad attacked his unit, and the remainder of these assailants fled across the border to Pakistan¹³².  This was a point of contention within the military ranks, and the loss of this soldier highlighted the dilemma¹³³.  The Americans needed to find a way to target the jihadists once they disolved across the border to their camps. Thus, as early as 2002 the case to justify the eventual cross border drone strikes was being constructed.

Yet who exactly comprised these militant squads? As an representative of the types of individuals working directly for Abdulhadi in these circumstances, an incident on April 25, 2003 must be examined¹³⁴.  The exchange was a harsh battle in which American Army personnel at FOB Shakin met with 15-20 al-Qaida assailants¹³⁵.  The American forces were investigating suspicious actions around the site of a previous rocket attack when the firefight commenced¹³⁶.  The primary operator of this squadron of al-Qaida fighters was Ibrahim Sulaiman Adnan Adam Harun, better known as Spin Ghul, who fired upon responding troops with a Kalashnikov rifle and tossed grenades¹³⁷.  Although wounded in the battle, Spin Ghul managed to escape, leaving behind his leather bound Quran in the fray¹³⁸.  US Airman 1^st Class Raymond Losano was gravely wounded while attempting to call in air support and passed away later in the day, while US Army Pvt Jerod R Dennis was deemed missing and later recovered deceased from the scene of the battle¹³⁹.  A soldier took the discarded leather Quran as a sort of war trophy, before eventually turning it into authorities, who were able to discover the fingerprints of Spin Ghul¹⁴⁰.  The Saudi born Nigerien¹⁴¹ arrived in Afghanistan for militant training just prior to the 9/11 attacks, and eventually ended up the FATA under the command of Abdulhadi¹⁴².  In fact, Abdulhadi compensated him and the other fighters after the attack¹⁴³.  Spin Ghul eventually recovered and was deemed loyal and determined enough to meet with Abu Faraj al-Libi in the summer of 2003, requesting to attack the US Embassy in Nigeria¹⁴⁴.  He was deployed in August 2003¹⁴⁵.   As a new external missions operative, Spin Ghul maintained a close relationship with Hamza Rabia, and in fact, after departing for Nigeria continued to directly communicate with the external commander¹⁴⁶.

An Insurgency Born in Assaults

Commencing August 27, 2003, US military officials noted that for the next six weeks, the series of ambushes and attacks emanating from South Waziristan against Shakin units displayed paramilitary organization, adamant determination, technical sophistication, and tactical diligence¹⁴⁷. On August 31, just days after the initial assault, two 10th Mountain Division snipers, SPC Adam Thomas and PFC Chad Fuller were slain in the onslaught¹⁴⁸. Surprisingly, these deaths were not later attributed to Abdulhadi¹⁴⁹. Responding forces cornered a Chechen militant attempting to fire upon and record coalition forces before he committed suicide via hand grenade¹⁵⁰. Thus, perhaps the evidence of Central Asians in the attack insinuated that Tahir Yuldashev’s IMU was responsible. Yet the US already understood that these movements were coalescing into one insurgent force¹⁵¹.

Abdulhadi also attempted to manipulate the propaganda value of his attacks. A September 29, 2003 incident was a coordinated attack, and a video was produced entitled Harb wa Salib, at the direction of Abdulhadi, in which US Army PFC Evan W O’Neill’s death was recorded and displayed¹⁵².  The attack, plotted and perpetrated by Abdulhadi, yet again targeted a troop concentration nearby the military outpost in Shakin¹⁵³.  PFC O’Neill was killed in the intense ambush, and two of his comrades were wounded¹⁵⁴.  The engagement transcended normal combat, merging with both guerilla warfare and war crimes, as Abdulhadi ordered his men to fire RPGs upon a responding medical helicopter attempted to medevac the wounded¹⁵⁵.  Responding fire felled two of the many assailants, but Abdulhadi and the rest were able to escape to Pakistan¹⁵⁶. 

American officials pressured the Pakistanis on the cross-border raids, proving via imagery that the militants were originating from and fleeing to South Waziristan, with no interception from Pakistani border forces¹⁵⁷. Some residences utilized for paramilitary purposes were also discovered by the Americans and the information relayed to the Pakistanis within the six week impactful rise in assaults¹⁵⁸. Thus, the Pakistanis were coerced to deploy troops into the region to actually engage al-Qaida militants, especially with an impending visit by the US Deputy Secretary of State¹⁵⁹. The resulting anomaly of a Pakistani raid against the militant presence in Angor Adda, South Waziristan, in early October, confirmed the presence of senior al-Qaida and allied officials with the deaths of Ahmed Said al-Khadr and Hassan Mahsum. Subsequently the pace of the assaults was slowed¹⁶⁰. While indeed an important victory, it was arguably a positive for Abdulhadi as it removed an obstinate Egyptian in Khadr who was opposed to his leadership style¹⁶¹. For American forces the proof of al-Qaida leadership just across the border invariably resulted in the increase in presence of those agencies hunting for the these targets. Despite the temporary respite, Abdulhadi was not deterred in his actions by the Angor Adda raid. Just weeks later, an October 25, 2003 ambush targeted an American convoy near Shakin aimed at individuals that Abdulhadi recognized as of increased significance, believing them to be diplomats or other important dignataries¹⁶².  Abdulhadi’s men launched RPGs and fired upon the convoy, an operation outfitted and paid for by the Iraqi¹⁶³.  Leading the assault was Abu Ayman al-Masri, a trusted associate of the al-Qaida command¹⁶⁴.  The Egyptian was Mamduh Mohamed al-Said, an EIJ loyalist, and renowned trainer of jihadists¹⁶⁵.  He turned his attention to Palestine during the Afghan civil war, before his arrest in Syria¹⁶⁶.  After release, he ventured back to Afghanistan and al-Qaida¹⁶⁷.  He was a trainer at the Malik Military Center, or Camp Nine¹⁶⁸.  After the invasion, he assisted in coordinating forces for retreat and realignment from Afghanistan at Zormat, Paktia province¹⁶⁹.  He next fled to South Waziristan, organizing with Abdulhadi’s forces¹⁷⁰.  He was given command of assaults in the Gomal District of Paktika province, a region containing the readily available target of Shakin¹⁷¹.  His close associate Hamza Rabia proclaimed that the assailants knew that they were targeting American intelligence¹⁷².  The firefight in question was extensive, lasting for six hours and costing Abdulhadi 18 of his men according to reports at the time¹⁷³.  Other sources say only 10 militants were killed in the responding fire and from air support munitions¹⁷⁴.  Hamza Rabia admitted in a communique that Abu Ayman perished in this engagement, and mourned others who also fell¹⁷⁵.  Among those slain with Abu Ayman was Riyadh native Abdulrahman al-Hussanain, known as Abdullah Haydara¹⁷⁶. He came to Afghanistan after 9/11, participating in training, which led to him becoming an instructor and respected combatant in the FATA, after fleeing Kabul through Khost¹⁷⁷. Yunis al-Alami, a 30 year old hailing from Casablanca, Morocco, graduated from al-Faruq camp prior to 9/11 and defended Kabul¹⁷⁸. Failing to flee Pakistan due to compromised safehouses, he settled into militancy in the encampments of South Waziristan. He fell when the al-Qaida ambush position was outflanked by the American response¹⁷⁹. Two former US Special Forces and current CIA paramilitary operatives, William Carlson and Christopher Glenn Mueller, were killed in the hostilities as well¹⁸⁰.  As such they were the third and fourth CIA operatives killed in the war in Afghanistan under hostile conditions -[C].  They were in Paktika to track high level terrorists in the region, assuredly including Abdulhadi and his cohorts across the border who ordered the eventual attack against them¹⁸¹.  As casualties of the firefight were coalesced to one specific collection location, Abdulhadi’s men engaged there as well, firing upon the wounded and their medical caretakers, in another demonstration of war crimes¹⁸². 

Abdulhadi paid a bounty of up to $300 to Taliban operatives to assassinate French aid worker Bettina Goislard, employed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)¹⁸³. She was shot to death in her vehicle while navigating a bazaar in Ghazni, capital of the province of the same name¹⁸⁴. The incident exemplified a Taliban campaign to disrupt reconstruction efforts in the war ravaged nation¹⁸⁵, and proved that civilians were targets for Abdulhadi as well.

Innovations in Ambush

Traditional ambushes were not Abdulhadi’s only offensive method. The Iraqi provided suicide bombers for fatal Kabul attacks on June 7, 2003, January 27 and 28, 2004, plus a March 29, 2004 incident in Jalalabad, aimed at a US military convoy, in which there were no casualties¹⁸⁶.  Saudi Abdullah al-Musa, known as Abu Abdulrahman al-Najdi, acted as the suicide bomber against a German transport carrying soldiers in Kabul during the June incident, killing four of the European peacekeepers and wounding dozens ¹⁸⁷.  Having come to Afghanistan just prior to the 9/11 attacks in order to train for jihad at al-Faruq, Najdi gained renown after supposedly being in the first group to capture an American weapon¹⁸⁸.  He then volunteered for a special mission that turned out to be his martyrdom, and as such, he was celebrated as the first al-Qaida suicide bomber effectively deployed in the war theatre¹⁸⁹. Abdulhadi additionally provided the appropriate funding for the January attacks in Kabul¹⁹⁰.  In the January 27 incident, a suicide operative detonated his vest in the midst of a Canadian convoy, murdering one Canadian soldier, Cpl Jamie Brendan Murphy¹⁹¹, in Kabul¹⁹².  The following day, the second bomber utilized a vehicle to target a British and Estonian convoy in the capital, detonating and killing one British soldier, named as Pvt Jonathan Kitulagoda¹⁹³.  Hamdi Mohamed Ibrahim al-Thib, an Egyptian who went by the kunya Abu Mohamed al-Masri was the suicide operative for the first attack¹⁹⁴.  He had only traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, setting up in eastern Afghanistan under the command of Abdulhadi¹⁹⁵.  He participated in the futile defense of Kandahar and later in Shah I Kot fought beside of Midhat Mursi (Abu Khabab al-Masri), assisting in helping his wounded commander achieve safety¹⁹⁶. As an Egyptian terrorist, he was mourned in internal communications by Hamza Rabia¹⁹⁷. The operative flung himself onto the Canadian jeep prior to detonation¹⁹⁸. Taliban officials insinuated that Canadian-Egyptian Abdullah al-Khadr (son of the slain Ahmed Said al-Khadr) was the suicide bomber, but the elusive Abdullah appeared in February for an interview with Canadian broadcaster CBC to dispute the accusation and give substance to his tale of life on the run⁵.  The Taliban actually openly claimed both January attacks via early spokesman Mullah Abdullatif Hakimi¹⁹⁹, demonstrating the inseparable coordination between militant factions as Abdulhadi conducted them, and displaying the al-Qaida need and desire to work with their former Afghan hosts in order to broaden the scope of their strikes. In fact, the second bomber was named as Hafiz Abdullah of Khost, the first native Afghan to be deployed as a suicide operative²⁰⁰.

The March 29 incident occurred after Abdulhadi dispatched a unit to Jalalabad, and approved the young Saudi known as Faruq al-Madani to be a suicide operative²⁰¹. The Medina native was Badr Abdullah al-Anazi, who had traveled to Afghanistan after 9/11 in order to join the jihad, but had only participated in the retreats from cities and the battle of Shah I Kot before ending up in the FATA for training²⁰². Finally approved for martyrdom, he launched himself against an American convoy in Jalalabad, yet his vehicle-borne device failed to properly detonate, leaving Faruq al-Madani with no choice but to draw his firearm in a futile exercise that resulted in his death²⁰³. More Abdulhadi assaults on international forces occurred in Kabul, as exemplified by a May 23, 2004 attack in which a Norwegian soldier was killed²⁰⁴. Tommy Rødningsby²⁰⁵, died when his small patrol convoy came under RPG fire returning to the capital²⁰⁶.

For Abdulhadi, other means to attack the coalition precluded him from having to lose men and equipment in ambushes or battles.  Another form of surprise assault, that became the hallmark of strikes against US and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, even more so than suicide bombings, was the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED, planted along or within the road to destroy military vehicles and the personnel within.  On October 2, 2003, the method was employed near Kabul against Canadian peacekeeper vehicles and killed Sergeant Robert Short and Corporal Robbie Beerenfenger²⁰⁷. This attack sowed confusion as the tactic was not prominent and the Canadians openly wondered if the explosion resulted from an old landmine from the Soviet invasion²⁰⁸, when in fact Abdulhadi’s men had planted a device²⁰⁹. A later May 29, 2004 incident was another such operation²¹⁰.  Abdulhadi paid for and supplied equipment to his men to plant a device along a route in Qalat, Zabul province, over which American vehicles would drive²¹¹.  The device was pressure plated and armed to detonate when a Humvee was over the top of it²¹².  The four Americans killed in the incident were assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan²¹³.  One, SO1 Brian J Oullette was a Navy SEAL, while the other three, Capt Daniel W Eggers, SSgt Robert Mogensen, and Pfc Joseph A Jeffries were US Army Green Berets²¹⁴.  Family members were informed approximately a month later that the specific men responsible for planting the device had been found and eliminated in Afghanistan²¹⁵.  A Saudi working with Abdulhadi eventually became an informant, reporting on the Iraqi’s overall coordination of this bombing²¹⁶. 

By 2004 though, while Abdulhadi had moderate success in attacking US forces in Afghanistan, his goals began to shift towards his native lands. This focus on Iraq provided an opening for Abu Faraj to solve the quandary of Abdulhadi’s grating paramilitary command, and presented opportunities for Abu Laith al-Libi and Khalid Habib to assume the now established insurgency.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

• [A] Hekmatyar Gulbuddin
• [B] Particularly Fahd Ali Muslalam, known as Osama al-Kini, himself wanted by the FBI and a known al-Qaida paramilitary commander of the time. Abu al-Hassan al-Somalia was a squad leader for militants that included his own eulogist Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi.
• [C] Operative Johnny Michael Spann was killed in hostilities at Qala i Jangi; while Green Beret Sgt First Class Nathan Chapman was revealed to be on a CIA team mission when he was killed in an ambush in Khost on January 4, 2002, suspected to be at the behest of Haqqani fighters²¹⁷.

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96. Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002, by Adam Geibel, Military Review March-April 2002, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Operation-Anaconda-Shah-i-Khot-Valley-Afghanistan/ // Zia Lodin, Leader Afghan Military Force, American Enterprise Institute, May 2012 ↩︎
97. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
98. Guantanamo Assessment File, Bostan Khan (Karim), ISN 975, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/975.html ↩︎
99. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
100. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
101. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
102. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
103. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
104. List of Some Al Qaida Figures, The Associated Press, September 13, 2002, https://www.ourmidland.com/news/article/List-of-Some-al-Qaida-Figures-7133938.php ↩︎
105. Guantanamo Assessment File, Omar Mohamed Ali al-Rammah, ISN 1017, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/1017.html ↩︎
106. Abu al-Laith al-Libi, by Kevin Jackson, CTC Jihadi Bios Project, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTC_Abu-al-Layth-al-Libi-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-1.pdf ↩︎
107. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
108. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
109. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
110. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
111. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
112. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
113. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
114. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
115. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
116. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
117. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
118. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
119. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
120. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
121. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
122. After 13 years, CIA honors Fort Lewis Green Beret killed on secret Afghanistan mission, By Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The Washington Post,
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123. Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, by Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 9, December 30, 2008 ↩︎
124. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
125. Guantanamo Assessment File, Bostan Khan (Karim), ISN 975, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/975.html ↩︎
126. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
127. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
128. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
129. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
130. Afghan battle kills sergeant from Elizabeth, by Beverly M Reid, The Star-Ledger, December 22, 2002 ↩︎
131. Afghan battle kills sergeant from Elizabeth, by Beverly M Reid, The Star-Ledger, December 22, 2002 ↩︎
132. Afghan battle kills sergeant from Elizabeth, by Beverly M Reid, The Star-Ledger, December 22, 2002 // THREATS AND RESPONSES: PARATROOPER; American Soldier Killed in Afghanistan Had Wanted to ‘Do Something for His Country’, by Elissa Gootman, The New York Times, December 23, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/23/nyregion/threats-responses-paratrooper-american-soldier-killed-afghanistan-had-wanted.html ↩︎
133. Afghan battle kills sergeant from Elizabeth, by Beverly M Reid, The Star-Ledger, December 22, 2002 ↩︎
134. Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison for Terrorism Offenses Targeting Americans Overseas, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-sentenced-life-prison-terrorism-offenses-targeting-americans-overseas ↩︎
135. A top al-Qaeda operative is about to be sentenced for killing U.S. troops 15 years ago in Afghanistan, by Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-top-al-qaeda-operative-is-about-to-be-sentenced-for-killing-us-troops-15-years-ago-in-afghanistan/2018/02/14/e7a3a400-ec04-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html ↩︎
136. 2 CIA Employees Killed in Ambush, by Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, October 29, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/29/2-cia-employees-killed-in-ambush/ec4809f2-8249-4650-b9ce-4fb036135d27/ ↩︎
137. Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison for Terrorism Offenses Targeting Americans Overseas, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-sentenced-life-prison-terrorism-offenses-targeting-americans-overseas // A top al-Qaeda operative is about to be sentenced for killing U.S. troops 15 years ago in Afghanistan, by Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-top-al-qaeda-operative-is-about-to-be-sentenced-for-killing-us-troops-15-years-ago-in-afghanistan/2018/02/14/e7a3a400-ec04-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html ↩︎
138. A top al-Qaeda operative is about to be sentenced for killing U.S. troops 15 years ago in Afghanistan, by Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-top-al-qaeda-operative-is-about-to-be-sentenced-for-killing-us-troops-15-years-ago-in-afghanistan/2018/02/14/e7a3a400-ec04-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html ↩︎
139. A top al-Qaeda operative is about to be sentenced for killing U.S. troops 15 years ago in Afghanistan, by Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-top-al-qaeda-operative-is-about-to-be-sentenced-for-killing-us-troops-15-years-ago-in-afghanistan/2018/02/14/e7a3a400-ec04-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html ↩︎
140. A top al-Qaeda operative is about to be sentenced for killing U.S. troops 15 years ago in Afghanistan, by Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-top-al-qaeda-operative-is-about-to-be-sentenced-for-killing-us-troops-15-years-ago-in-afghanistan/2018/02/14/e7a3a400-ec04-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html ↩︎
141. Alleged al Qaeda Operative Charged in New York for Terrorism Offenses Against Americans Overseas, FBI New York Field Office press release from the US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, March 20, 2013, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2013/alleged-al-qaeda-operative-charged-in-new-york-for-terrorism-offenses-against-americans-overseas ↩︎
142. Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison for Terrorism Offenses Targeting Americans Overseas, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-sentenced-life-prison-terrorism-offenses-targeting-americans-overseas ↩︎
143. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
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145. Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison for Terrorism Offenses Targeting Americans Overseas, US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/al-qaeda-operative-sentenced-life-prison-terrorism-offenses-targeting-americans-overseas // A top al-Qaeda operative is about to be sentenced for killing U.S. troops 15 years ago in Afghanistan, by Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-top-al-qaeda-operative-is-about-to-be-sentenced-for-killing-us-troops-15-years-ago-in-afghanistan/2018/02/14/e7a3a400-ec04-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html ↩︎
146. Hamza Rabia letter to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
147. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
148. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
149. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
150. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
151. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
152. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
153. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
154. Soldier from Haverhill killed in gun battle in Afganistan, The Associated Press, October 1, 2003, https://www.southcoasttoday.com/story/news/nation-world/2003/10/01/soldier-from-haverhill-killed-in/50301674007/ ↩︎
155. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
156. Soldier from Haverhill killed in gun battle in Afganistan, The Associated Press, October 1, 2003, https://www.southcoasttoday.com/story/news/nation-world/2003/10/01/soldier-from-haverhill-killed-in/50301674007/ ↩︎
157. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
158. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
159. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
160. America’s bloody hunt for Bin Laden in Mad Max territory, by Christina Lamb, The Sunday Times, October 19, 2003, https://www.thetimes.com/article/americas-bloody-hunt-for-bin-laden-in-mad-max-territory-dg0hwr2bhp8 ↩︎
161. Guantanamo’s Child: The Untold Story of Omar Khadr, Michelle Shephard, John Wiley and Sons Canada, 2008 ↩︎
162. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
163. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
164. Hamza Rabia letter to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
165. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
166. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
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168. Guantanamo Assessment File, Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, ISN 837, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/837.html ↩︎
169. Guantanamo Assessment File, Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, ISN 837, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/837.html ↩︎
170. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
171. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
172. Hamza Rabia letter to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
173. 2 CIA Employees Killed in Ambush, by Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, October 29, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/29/2-cia-employees-killed-in-ambush/ec4809f2-8249-4650-b9ce-4fb036135d27/ ↩︎
174. CIA: Two dead in Afghan ambush were agency workers, by David Ensor, CNN, October 28, 2003, https://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/28/cia.afghanistan/index.html ↩︎
175. Hamza Rabia letter to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
176. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 // Hamza Rabia letter to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
177. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
178. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
179. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
180. 2 CIA Employees Killed in Ambush, by Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, October 29, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/29/2-cia-employees-killed-in-ambush/ec4809f2-8249-4650-b9ce-4fb036135d27/ ↩︎
181. 2 CIA Employees Killed in Ambush, by Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, October 29, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/10/29/2-cia-employees-killed-in-ambush/ec4809f2-8249-4650-b9ce-4fb036135d27/ // Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
182. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
183. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf // UN says relief work in Afghanistan cannot continue on existing terms, by James Astill, The Guardian, November 20, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/21/afghanistan.france ↩︎
184. UN says relief work in Afghanistan cannot continue on existing terms, by James Astill, The Guardian, November 20, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/21/afghanistan.france ↩︎
185. UN says relief work in Afghanistan cannot continue on existing terms, by James Astill, The Guardian, November 20, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/21/afghanistan.france ↩︎
186. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
187. THREATS AND RESPONSES AFGHANISTAN; Kabul Bombing Kills 4 German Soldiers and Wounds 29, by Carlotta Gall, The New York Times, June 8, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/world/threats-responses-afghanistan-kabul-bombing-kills-4-german-soldiers-wounds-29.html // Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
188. as-Sahab media production, Winds of Paradise 1 The Martyrdom Seekers, July 19, 2007 ↩︎
189. as-Sahab media production, Winds of Paradise 1 The Martyrdom Seekers, July 19, 2007 ↩︎
190. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
191. Canadian soldier killed in suicide attack, by Carly Weeks, The Globe and Mail, January 27, 2004, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canadian-soldier-killed-in-suicide-attack/article1126426/ ↩︎
192. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
193. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf // Private Jonathan Kitulagoda killed in Kabul, four injured, UK Ministry of Defence Press Release, January 28, 2004, https://www.gov.uk/government/fatalities/private-jonathan-kitulagoda-killed-in-kabul-four-injured ↩︎
194. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
195. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
196. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
197. Hamza Rabia letter to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
198. Afghan Suicide Bomber Kills 2 in Kabul, by James Astill, The Guardian, January 27, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/28/afghanistan.jamesastill ↩︎
199. British soldier killed in Afghan blast, The Guardian, January 28, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/28/afghanistan.uk ↩︎
200. Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan, by Brian Glyn Williams, Janes Islamic Affairs Analyst, September 2007, https://www.brianglynwilliams.com/IAA%20suicide.pdf ↩︎
201. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
202. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
203. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
204. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
205. Killed Norwegian Soldier Honored, by Carin Petterssen, Nettavisen, May 27, 2004, https://www.nettavisen.no/killed-norwegian-soldier-honored/s/12-95-230964 ↩︎
206. Kabul Police Investigate Attack that Killed Norwegian Peacekeeper, VOA News, May 24, 2004, https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2004-05-24-22-1-67496337/282632.html ↩︎
207. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf // Death of 2 Canadian Peacekeepers in Afghanistan Under Investigation, VOA News, October 3, 2003, https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2003-10-03-46-death-66836602/375041.html ↩︎
208. Death of 2 Canadian Peacekeepers in Afghanistan Under Investigation, VOA News, October 3, 2003, https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2003-10-03-46-death-66836602/375041.html ↩︎
209. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
210. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
211. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
212. Abdulhadi al-Iraqi Charge Sheet, February 3, 2014, https://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/alIraqi/Hadi%20Al%20Iraqi%20Referred%20Charge%20Sheet.pdf ↩︎
213. Navy SEAL Dies in Afghanistan, by Caryle Murphy, The Washington Post, June 1, 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2004/06/01/navy-seal-dies-in-afghanistan/c773a8a6-f47b-41e1-a9b8-3ad5e859a673/ ↩︎
214. Navy SEAL Dies in Afghanistan, by Caryle Murphy, The Washington Post, June 1, 2004, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2004/06/01/navy-seal-dies-in-afghanistan/c773a8a6-f47b-41e1-a9b8-3ad5e859a673/ ↩︎
215. Parents of fallen Cape Coral soldier Daniel Eggers await justice 14 years later, by David Dorsey, THe News-Press, May 25, 2018, https://www.news-press.com/story/news/local/2018/05/24/memorial-day-2018-parents-fallen-cape-coral-soldier-await-justice-14-years-later/619479002/ ↩︎
216. Parents of fallen Cape Coral soldier Daniel Eggers await justice 14 years later, by David Dorsey, The News-Press, May 25, 2018, https://www.news-press.com/story/news/local/2018/05/24/memorial-day-2018-parents-fallen-cape-coral-soldier-await-justice-14-years-later/619479002/ ↩︎
217. After 13 years, CIA honors Fort Lewis Green Beret killed on secret Afghanistan mission, By Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The Washington Post,
     April 23, 2016, https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/military/article72560632.html#storylink=cpy ↩︎

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