The captures of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and his nephew Ammar al-Baluchi thoroughly disrupted the current and potential mechanics of al-Qaida external operations. Now the two represented an abundant wealth of intelligence for American authorities, if they could properly decipher and analyze the trove. Despite enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM proved difficult. For example, he often referred to his operative Adnan al-Shukrijumah, whom he named as Abu Jafar al-Tayyar, as involved in multifarious plots in disparate locations¹. A previously confiscated letter from KSM to Ramzi Binalshibh referenced Shukrijumah planning to be smuggled from Mexico to a country presumed to be the US². KSM alluded to Shukrijumah’s role in an American mission, but was judged to be misdirecting the CIA as to his actual position³. Uncertainty as to Shukrijumah’s location prevailed, with the CIA declaring that he fled the US after the arrest of KSM, and the FBI confirming his departure in May 2001⁴. Multiple interrogations of suspects revealed Shukrijumah was in Pakistan. In fact, the elusive operative was transplanted from Karachi to the new headquarters of al-Qaida external operations, in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

Meanwhile in South Waziristan

Directly due to the devastating raids against al-Qaida external operators earlier in the year, Abu Faraj al-Libi journeyed to Shakai, South Waziristan in September 2003 in order to establish the direction and procedures for al-Qaida external missions with the Egyptian Hamza Rabia⁵.  It was Hamza Rabia’s residency in South Waziristan that made him an alluring option to now helm these plots⁶. After the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, Abu Faraj assisted in transporting Ayman al-Zawahiri to a new safehouse in Shakai⁷. Thus, Abu Faraj conveyed the desires and parameters to Hamza Rabia direct from Zawahiri’s specific requests⁸. They utilized available assets, such as paramilitary operative Spin Ghul, who approached Abu Faraj with the intention of bombing the US Embassy and other targets in his native Niger⁹. He was dispatched in August 2003, remaining in communication with Hamza Rabia via courier for coordination of the plot¹⁰. Thus, Abu Faraj oversaw Hamza Rabia and the South Waziristan based al-Qaida survivors as they were commissioned to revitalize and restore a minimalistic al-Qaida training apparatus in the FATA for such external endeavors, mimicking their camps from Afghanistan¹¹.

Meanwhile, paramilitary oversight remained with Abdulhadi al-Iraqi. The Shakai base provided the perfect launching area for attacks against US forces just across the border in Afghanistan. This included the village of Angor Adda, wherein several al-Qaida seniors openly functioned, despite any infrequent Pakistani clearance operations. The Egyptian Khalid Habib established himself in Angor Adda, often reported as a “frontline¹²,” and indeed he was often joined by his compatriots. Multifarious groups interoperated with one another, as for example, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) paramilitary commander Abu Laith al-Libi labored side-by-side with East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) leader Hassan Mahsum in the region¹³. Centralizing the efforts, the Egyptian-Canadian Ahmed Said al-Khadr was tasked with coordinating with the local militias with whom al-Qaida was now entrenched¹⁴. All the while, the Americans were seemingly incapable of responding to the cross-border al-Qaida ventures.

In the autumn, around September or October, Abdulhadi and weapons procurement manager Hamza al-Jawfi met with an operative named Janat Ghul who was known to deliver additional Arabs to the camp from Iran¹⁵.  Also present at the meeting in Jawfi’s house were Hassan Ghul and Egyptian Sami Mohamed Fahmi Tufankashi¹⁶.  The Egyptian was known as Abu Abdulrahman al-Masri or more specifically Abu Abdulrahman BM.  He was given this name due to his proficiency with the BM-12 rocket launcher¹⁷.  Tufankashi had traveled to Afghanistan via Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviets¹⁸.  After departing during the Afghan civil war, he returned after the Taliban consolidated power and rejoined with his militant compatriots.  After the invasion he fled with family through the safehouses of Karachi, before departing for a third country where he was incarcerated briefly¹⁹.  Following his liberation he returned and joined the al-Qaida camp in Shakai, where he became a known and respected advisor and instructor²⁰.  As such he was at the meeting with Janat Ghul, in which the operative offered to procure Russian constructed anti-aircraft missiles.  With Hamza al-Jawfi’s role in weapons procurement and the status of a fighter like BM who was knowledgeable of the launchers, Abdulhadi was joined by experts.  However, Abdulhadi refused Janat Ghul his requested funds, and later was vindicated, as Janat Ghul assuredly concocted the claim just to manipulate the militant commander into providing money²¹. These types of circumstances represented the al-Qaida efforts to properly arm their contingent for their forays into occupied Afghanistan. Incursions which were met with minimal resistance from Pakistani authorities.

Plight of the Canadian

As Pakistani raids were concerned in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the locals were known to be stringent in their protection of their guests.  Thus, the Pakistani Army had no real desire to fight the tribesmen while trying to flush out the foreigners.  Usually, the foreign elements were warned well in advance of a raid, at which point they could arrange to hide or flee, preventing any such firefight between the Pakistanis and the tribal hosts²².  In October 2003, such a perfunctory raid was scheduled for the village of Angor Adda, South Waziristan, located precariously close to the Afghan border.  Perhaps because of consistent failures in apprehending al-Qaida in the FATA, the Pakistanis approached the task in a much more aggressive manner than usual.  A prompt warning was not delivered to the native tribesmen in this instance²³. Also it can be assumed that with the amount of attacks occurring across the border in Paktika province, ending with combatants retreating to South Waziristan, the militant nests needed to be addressed by Pakistani forces, as pressured by the incandescent and exasperated Americans²⁴. 

The safehouse in question was infested with al-Qaida just a day prior to the Pakistani maneuver; to include Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, Ahmed Said al-Khadr, Hamza al-Jawfi, Sheikh Issa al-Masri, and of course Khalid Habib²⁵.  In addition, Hassan Mahsum, commander of the ETIM coordinated here with the other militants²⁶.  It was a startling fact that so many of the functional members of the network were utilizing the same dwelling to convene, just mere miles away from the coalition forces they plotted against. Khadr, had just traveled to the location with his young son Karim, having previously been subjected to the loss of other children²⁷.

Ahmed Said al-Khadr, the previously discussed Canadian al-Qaida operative, had dwelled in the outskirts of Toronto, raising his family, having arrived in the nation in 1977²⁸. During the 1980s he procured funds for the mujahidin resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan under the guise of charities²⁹, and even founded the Health and Education Project International Canada, a veiled effort to supply financial support to militant training camps³⁰. In 1990, Khadr transplanted his family to Peshawar, Pakistan in order to be in the theatre of action³¹. He arranged a marriage for his 15 year old daughter Zaynab to a Sudanese-Egyptian Khalid Abdullah³². Yet this partner was suspected of purchasing a vehicle used in the 1995 Egyptian Islamic Jihad suicide bombing against the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, resulting in 17 killed³³. Khalid Abdullah disappeared before the marriage could commence, avoiding justice for the bombing³⁴. Due to this, Khadr was arrested for his connections to the attack, and held in Pakistan³⁵. Protesting his confinement, Khadr commenced a hunger strike to gain attention to his supposed innocence³⁶. Detention was brief, as Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien petitioned to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, requesting fairness for Khadr, who was in turn released from custody shortly thereafter³⁷. Liberated, Khadr arrived in Toronto vindicated³⁸, but soon reneged and returned to the Khorasan region³⁹.

From 1996 onward, the Khadr family was based in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, but moved frequently through the region, traveling, and spending significant time at bin Laden’s Nazim Jihad compound⁴⁰. Zaynab eventually married Khalid Abdullah, but the union was rapidly dissolved, and the latter finally extradited to Egypt⁴¹. For her second wedding in 1999, senior al-Qaida leadership including bin Laden were in attendance⁴². Khadr remained an emissary for bin Laden, even working to mediate between the al-Qaida commander, the Taliban, and Afghan warlord Hekmatyar Gulbuddin⁴³. As such, he was in the region, managing his orphanages and charities, when the invasion came in 2001. Further, he was added to the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Global Terrorists List on October 12, 2001⁴⁴, meaning he was an initial target in the nascent War on Terror.

Remaining in Kabul until the city fell in November, Khadr escaped to Logar province with his wife, sending his children ahead first to an orphanage that he established⁴⁵. Despite the fortuitous avoidance of the bombing, Khadr’s son, Abdulrahman, at age 20, was captured by the Northern Alliance during the fighting that November⁴⁶. This when he attempted to drive back from Logar to Kabul in an effort to receive funds from his parents⁴⁷. Khadr eventually connected with and established himself in the South Waziristan agency of the FATA with his fellow militants⁴⁸. With his 15 year old son Omar restless and tired of being left with the women, Khadr allowed him to train under and dwell with paramilitary commander Abu Laith al-Libi and his men⁴⁹. In the summer of 2002, when Abu Laith needed a Pashto proficient militant for an excursion to Khost, Omar joined, only to be captured after a violent July firefight in which Omar killed a US medic and was himself wounded and apprehended⁵⁰. Following the capture of Omar, Khadr moved his wife Elsamnah, daughter Zaynab, and sons Abdullah and Karim, to join him permanently in South Waziristan⁵¹. 

There they were oft in the presence of the temperamental Egyptian Hamza al-Jawfi, responsible for acquiring weapons for the network⁵².  Khadr’s status, wealth, and Western passport gave him no benefits in South Waziristan, as he hid with Jawfi, his now taxing friend from his time across the border in Khost⁵³.  Jawfi had been met with several personal disasters in the time since the 9/11 attacks.  These included the death of a newborn child, and the death of his wife in the follow-on pregnancy⁵⁴.  Most assuredly, some of this can be contributed to the harsh conditions of living in the tribal agencies in hiding.  Thus, Jawfi had become contentious and his relationships strained.  Some was self imposed, as Jawfi once destroyed a collection of Western movies (including Harry Potter films) on DVD that were secretly being viewed by Karim and Jawfi’s own four remaining children⁵⁵.  Despite this, Khadr preferred Jawfi over Abdulhadi⁵⁶.  He preferred both over Abu Laith al-Libi, whom he decidedly blamed for Omar’s capture⁵⁷. 

Khadr may have been promoted to the al-Qaida Majlis ash-Shura, and was primarily responsible for activities in the tribal agencies, which included attacks on forces allied with the Americans, and the coordination of al-Qaida with the locals and the Taliban⁵⁸.  An examination of al-Qaida documents demonstrates the coalescing of foreign elements under an umbrella known as the Majlis al-Shura al-Mujahidin, and it was this council to which Khadr was named⁵⁹.  It is unclear how synonymous, if at all, this council was with the al-Qaida Majlis al-Shura.  Nonetheless, Khadr as an Arab, specifically of Egyptian origin, being placed in charge of coordination with local militants maintaining paramilitary responsibilities, indicates that he was probably on the overall council as well.  While important, his status was inflated in his son Omar’s leaked Guantanamo assessment file, which asserted that Khadr may have been fourth in line of al-Qaida⁶⁰.

Khadr’s specific paramilitary assigned area of command was Shagai, in Khyber agency, where his forces could stage cross border raids into Afghanistan⁶¹.  Thus, coalition, Afghan, and even Pakistani forces were at risk of attack by this developing threat in the FATA.  The Canadian tasked his son Abdullah to assist in obtaining weaponry for these efforts, and during six months in 2003, Abdullah visited weapons purveyors and used $20,000 in fundings for rifles, ammunition, RPGs, and mortars⁶².  Abdullah transferred the equipment to an al-Qaida lieutenant in charge of weapons procurement and distribution (Hamza al-Jawfi)⁶³.  Abdullah was previously employed with Jawfi in acquiring weapons for the Taliban struggle against the Northern Alliance⁶⁴.  He also obtained an abundance hydrogen peroxide to be used in the manufacturing of mines and other explosive devices, sixty of which were made for use in Afghanistan against the Americans⁶⁵.  With weapons delivered, Ahmed Said al-Khadr was readied for outfitting his men for guerilla warfare.  Khadr promoted an approach to the fight that relied on subtle tactics, while Abdulhadi preferred more traditional warfare⁶⁶.  This was a point of contention in that Khadr believed there was no way the al-Qaida forces could survive without resorting to guerilla warfare⁶⁷. As an example, al-Qaida later eulogized one Mohamed Anwar, known as Abu al-Walid al-Pakistani of Lahore, a veteran of the Lashkar e Taibi outfit, who desired to fight in Kashmir⁶⁸. However, he later joined with Khadr and participated in several ambushes and rocket fire against coalition forces, the final incident resulting in his death⁶⁹. It then certainly makes sense that Khadr would be in the Angor Adda village with Khalid Habib and Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, especially given their responsibilities as militant combat commanders⁷⁰, and Khadr’s role in organizing with local elements⁷¹.  Perhaps his own displeasure with the Iraqi could be mediated through direct influence with the Egyptians and locals both.   

Gunfight in Angor Adda

On October 3, 2003, the Pakistani Army warned of an impending raid, but the unspoken arrangement collapsed.  Pakistani forces attacked via helicopter taking the Khadr family unawares.  While most of the al-Qaida officials had time to escape or hide, Khadr and his son Karim were returning to the safehouse from morning prayers⁷².  Karim was wounded through the spine, rendering him paralyzed from the waist down and lying in a roadside ditch for hours.  Khadr made it to the doorway of the safehouse before being killed⁷³.  Al-Qaida internal communications lamented that Khadr did not take the threat posed by the Pakistani military and government seriously⁷⁴.  Among the seven other fighters shot and killed in the safehouse was Hassan Mahsum, emir of the ETIM⁷⁵.  In addition, President Pervez Musharraf claimed an individual named Samarkand was killed as well⁷⁶.  Hamza Rabia in internal communications also references an Abu Samarkand being killed, indicating that he was an established fighter within the group ⁷⁷.  A further eulogy identified him as Abu Samarkand al-Urduni, confirming his nationality as Jordanian⁷⁸.  He was Habis Abdullah bin Falah, who once proselytized in America, and fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan⁷⁹.  After the war he participated in a jihadist movement in Peshawar, before reuniting with al-Qaida and associated militants after the American invasion⁸⁰.  To do so he traveled through China to return to Pakistan⁸¹.  Despite his and Khadr’s colorful histories, it was the slain ETIM leader Mahsum that garnered the most attention from the incident.   

The ETIM was composed of ethnic Uyghurs inhabiting China’s western Xinjiang province, but representing some of the eastern reaches of the Turkic peoples, most closely associated with Central Asians such as Uzbeks. The US designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization in August 2002 at the behest of the Chinese government in order to appease Beijing’s opposition to the potential US invasion of Iraq, and began to suspiciously report that the focus of the ETIM had diverged from China to attacking American interests⁸². Mahsum was adamant that his ETIM had no affiliation with al-Qaida or the Taliban whatsoever, and received no financial or logistical assistance from either entity⁸³.  This was an obviously fraudulent claim made just the year prior.  His reception of bin Laden’s pre-9/11 invitation to base his activities out of an al-Qaida camp (Tora Bora⁸⁴) proved the statement untrustworthy.  Captured Uyghur militants at Guantanamo directly contradicted the claim, relaying that Mahsum accepted significant al-Qaida support while based in Afghanistan⁸⁵. That he would be associated with Khadr in the enterprise of linking the disparate militants into a functional combatant force was no surprise, as just prior to 9/11, Mahsum began convening meetings of what he dubbed the League of Islamic Mujahidin, a conglomerate of various jihadist entities⁸⁶. In addition, he at one point in South Waziristan shared an office with Abu Laith al-Libi, where they conducted militant activity and recruiting⁸⁷.  Out of necessity, the ETIM, intent on freedom from China, was now enmeshed with al-Qaida and others in a war with the coalition forces, resulting in lethal consequences. In this early autumn gunfight, Mahsum perished alongside of the al-Qaida councilor.  The mud constructed buildings were not indicative of the influence within.  The eight militants fell with two Pakistani soldiers, resulting in a spectacle in South Waziristan⁸⁸.  One of Mahsum’s bodyguards, Idris al-Turkistani, perished with his commander as well⁸⁹.  The Pakistani military later readily confirmed Mahsum’s demise⁹⁰. 

The raid and resulting carnage was viewed as a mistake, a problem to be blamed on Khadr for his assumed carelessness, and not due to the concentration of al-Qaida central commanders and officials in South Waziristan.  Thus, the locale was still viewed as a safehaven and operational base, despite some difficulties in travel and communication.  Especially given the issues with the major cities, as had precipitated the fall of KSM and his cohorts.  An al-Qaida facilitator and official, Sharif al-Masri, came to Shakai some time between October and November, in order to convene with his peers⁹¹.  Living in vicinity of Quetta, Baluchistan province, he attempted to manage al-Qaida resistance in Kandahar from across the border⁹².  Complete with at least two aides on a staff, the Egyptian was of obvious importance, especially considering that Kandahar was such a significant location for the Taliban and al-Qaida.  His gathering with the other commanders displayed productivity achieved from Shakai. 

The Musharraf Conspiracy

Meanwhile, Hamza Rabia from the base in the Shakai valley spent the autumn of 2003 reinvigorating al-Qaida operational prowess, and conducted the planning and instructing of operatives in an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf⁹³.  This type of operation specifically had been discussed by KSM and Abdulhadi in spring 2002⁹⁴.  A Syrian known as Abu Bakr al-Suri provided electronics lessons and explosives training for the participants, consisting of approximately a dozen Pakistani militants⁹⁵.  The Syrian was now assistant to Rabia in his endeavors⁹⁶.

Described as the first real field operation for Abu Faraj, the December 2003 suicide attack and assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi, were conducted in coordination with local Pakistani militants⁹⁷.  Local operatives were coordinated for the event by Pakistani Amjad Hussain Faruqi⁹⁸, and trained by Hamza Rabia in Shakai⁹⁹. Musharraf understood that al-Qaida was willing and able to bring their vengeance against Pakistan¹⁰⁰.   

With KSM in CIA custody and Abu Faraj receiving direct orders from bin Laden, the Libyan invariably became enmeshed with terroristic operations¹⁰¹.  Abu Faraj issued the orders to assassinate President Musharraf, coordinating between the External Operations unit under Hamza Rabia, and his local network of a variety of Pakistani militants and contacts, under Faruqi¹⁰².  In this capacity, Hamza Rabia assumed External Operations, with the promise of producing attacks and results where KSM had failed after 9/11¹⁰³.  This also provided Abu Faraj a layer of protection, in that he was not privy to all of the details of the plots.  The groundwork was to be handled by Hamza Rabia, and in urban Pakistan by Faruqi. 

The Punjabi Faruqi commenced his association with Pakistani jihadists fighting in Kashmir as early as 1988, amounting to being a child soldier¹⁰⁴.  When the jihadists, foreign militants, and extremists in neighboring Afghanistan took Kabul and consolidated power in 1992, Faruqi was but a youth, at 18, yet was marching in alongside of the Paksitani jihadist faction Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan, or SSP¹⁰⁵.  Known for their anti-Shiite leanings, the SSP was associated with Harakat ul-Ansar (HuA) and Lashkar e Taiba, among the prominent Pakistani jihadist movements¹⁰⁶.  Although young, Faruqi made a name for himself operating in Afghanistan, and joined with Mullah Mohamed Omar on the latter’s mission to protect cotton shipments through Afghanistan into Pakistan¹⁰⁷.  As the Taliban grew from Kandahar outward, influencing and conquering, Faruqi remained with the organization¹⁰⁸.  He and his men directly participated in the taking of Herat for Mullah Mohamed Omar¹⁰⁹.  His legend continued to grow with these exploits.  He departed the SSP, joining his comrades in HuA, before taking time to fight in Kashmir on their behalf¹¹⁰.  By September 1996, as the Taliban took cities including Jalalabad and Kabul, Faruqi returned in order to participate in the conquest¹¹¹.  When the Taliban executed former Afghan President Najibullah, Faruqi was supposedly there¹¹². 

Faruqi became acquainted with al-Qaida leadership during this time, and assisted in the migration of the militant officials from Jalalabad to Kandahar¹¹³.  Herein, he probably became closely associated with Abu Faraj al-Libi, as President Musharraf clarified in his biography that the two met while in Afghanistan¹¹⁴.   

When the HuA split back into its original entities in October 1997, Faruqi joined the Harakat ul Jihad Islami (HuJI) as a lieutenant to Qari Saifullah Akhtar, and later after bin Laden’s fatwa declarations in February 1998, maintained presence as a representative of the HuJI with al-Qaida¹¹⁵.  So great was Faruqi’s legend that he was even reported to have been a hijacker on Indian Airlines Flight 814 in December 1999¹¹⁶.  In fact, he was also said to have been a bodyguard to Maulana Masud Azhar, a Harakat ul Mujahidin (HuM) leader freed alongside Ahmed Omar Said Sheikh, as a result of the hijacking¹¹⁷. 

Regardless of the veracity of these adventures attributed to Faruqi, he was still a primary force in HuJI after the 9/11 attacks and during the American invasion of Afghanistan.  So much so that he was among the leaders of the thousands of Paksitanis associated with HuJI that came to the defense of the Taliban¹¹⁸.  Faruqi was specifically said to have recruited approximately 200 of his fellow Punjabis for the cause¹¹⁹.  Those numbers were dwindled by the American air campaign against Taliban forces, but Faruqi managed to flee home to Pakistan, rebuilding relationships with al-Qaida along the way. 

Faruqi’s flight found him hiding in a madrassa in Karachi before reaching a communications link with Daniel Pearl’s primary abductor Ahmed Omar Said Sheikh, and more importantly KSM and Ramzi Binalshibh¹²⁰.  After the fall of those al-Qaida operatives, Faruqi became another asset under the purview of Abu Faraj, and with his Pakistani networks was able to ensure that operations inside his native borders persisted.  Abu Faraj provided funds for the Musharraf attack to Faruqi, who was willing to combat his own government, utilizing his renegade faction of Pakistani militants, now known as Lashkar e Jangvi¹²¹.  Thus, he provided the operatives, even recruiting several Pakistani air force technicians for the first December attack¹²².  Ayman al-Zawahiri had on September 10 and 28, called upon the Pakistani security apparatus to remove Musharraf from power¹²³.  Apparently, some were willing. 

December Assassination Attempts

In November, Abu Faraj visited both Hamza Rabia and Abu Bakr al-Suri at their domicile being utilized as a training center and headquarters for operational plotting in Shakai¹²⁴.  In this location, Hamza Rabia conducted research and instruction on explosives, detonators, and other security related issues¹²⁵.  During the visit, the Libyan and Egyptian reportedly discussed uranium supposedly buried near Kandahar¹²⁶.  However, this conference was undoubtedly primarily to prepare for the coming Musharraf assassination attempt.  Hamza Rabia’s bombs were potent and readied. 

December 14, 2003 saw President Musharraf returning from Karachi to Rawalpindi, intending to be transported from the Air Force base to his residence in the city, referred to as the Army House¹²⁷.  As the President’s vehicle crossed the Jhanda Chichi Bridge¹²⁸, in the vicinity of Army House, the al-Qaida attempt came to fruition.  Explosives planted on the bridge detonated and tore a gap in the road, decimating reinforced concrete, and exposing the abyss underneath¹²⁹.  The President’s movements were offered by the lowly military technicians approached by Faruqi, and these same men were involved in planting the bombs on his behalf¹³⁰.  Astonishingly, up to 250 kg of C4 explosives were planted on the bridge, leaving Pakistani forces incredulous, but forced to admit the participation of military personnel¹³¹.  Fortunately, Musharraf’s vehicle had just passed the point and was safe from falling, although it was launched forward in the air¹³².  This fortune was accounted for later when it was revealed that a radio signal jammer employed by the President’s security resulted in delaying the detonation signal to the bridge¹³³.  Escaping and reaching his home unharmed, Musharraf and his wife even journeyed to a wedding held in Islamabad that same evening¹³⁴.  There were surprisingly no casualties in this event¹³⁵.  While Musharraf believed himself safe after the attempt, and reveled in the unease and despair of the assassins in their failure, Abu Faraj and Faruqi had contingency plans. 

By December 25, 2003, Musharraf was still making public appearances, but with increased security, an armored Mercedes limousine, obstructed traffic to prevent approaching assassins, and additional vehicles in his motorcade¹³⁶.  After speaking at a conference that day in Islamabad, the motorcade began the transit back to the Army House, with Musharraf in the third car, behind staffers and security, along with a heavy police escort¹³⁷.  After crossing the bridge from the previous attempt, the motorcade was 200 yards from that blast site and was almost home¹³⁸.  Police had halted traffic from the other side of the road, but a van was able to attempt to penetrate through a gap in the median to reach Musharraf’s vehicle¹³⁹.  This occurred near a gas station along the route, from which the van approached¹⁴⁰.  A lone policeman stood vigilant against the van, but was killed¹⁴¹.  The van actually struck the median instead of making it through the gap, perhaps lessening the potential damage to Musharraf’s vehicle.  Nonetheless, when the suicide bomber detonated, there was carnage and destruction brought to the roadway, the blast taking the President’s car from the right rear and leveling damage to it¹⁴².  However, the armored vehicle and its occupants survived and sped away, before yet another suicide bomber detonated his car, resulting in significant damage¹⁴³.  This too was near a gas station along the road, which is believed to be the point of origin for the second bomber¹⁴⁴.  In this instance, a police van responded and rammed the second suicide bomber before that vehicle could directly impact the President’s limosine¹⁴⁵.  Musharraf’s vehicle now driving on rims, with damage to the windshield as the second blast had hit them from the front right quarter, still managed to return safely to Army House¹⁴⁶.  Three vehicles in the convoy were damaged, but no one from within them killed¹⁴⁷.  Outside that protection however, fourteen were killed, including police, plus the two suicide bombers¹⁴⁸.  A third van misfired, never departing its position near the bridge, and was quickly overwhelmed by police¹⁴⁹.

Junior Pakistani Army soldiers and six Pakistani Air Force technicians were arrested and charged in connection with the assassination attempts¹⁵⁰ – [A].  Initial reports from the time rapidly blamed al-Qaida for the attacks, in concert with Jaish e Mohamed and Lashkar e Jangvi¹⁵¹.  The suicide bombers were identified and associated with Jaish e Mohamed specifically, according to the media¹⁵².  Local reports asserted that Brigade 313, a confederation of the main Pakistani militant groups may have been responsible as well¹⁵³.  Concerning al-Qaida, Abu Faraj was yet to be mentioned at first; instead, the Pakistanis predicted that Abdulhadi al-Iraqi was involved, and may even have been in Rawalpindi to oversee the operation¹⁵⁴.  Some mixed version of these reports revealed itself in the reality. 

In the first attack, a crafty civilian and Jaish e Mohamed associate, Mushtaq Ahmed¹⁵⁵, was arrested for coordinating the Air Force technicians, and for physically sending the signal to detonate the bridge¹⁵⁶. Later, in November 2004, he escaped prison in Rawalpindi, after obtaining an Air Force uniform from a drowsy guard¹⁵⁷. Moving to Peshawar and then Lahore, he blended in with society, but continued to communicate with family and friends, efforts which were monitored by the ISI¹⁵⁸. Planning yet another attempt on Musharraf in Islamabad, Mushtaq was finally apprehended in April 2005¹⁵⁹.

Concerning the second attack, a Pakistani al-Qaida affiliate known as Salahuddin, in need of financial assistance, coordinated with Abdulhadi, and then Abu Faraj in search of employment, before being assigned to the assassination attempt under Faruqi¹⁶⁰. He and his men recruited corporals from the Special Services Group, a type of Pakistani special forces¹⁶¹. One was in the guard detail of the vice chief of staff of the Army, while another was previously assigned to Musharraf’s own detail¹⁶². One suicide bomber, a Kashmiri named Mohamed Jamil was but 23, yet had a vigorous jihadist career¹⁶³.  He was affiliated with Jaish e Mohamed, and traveled to Afghanistan to attend militant training camps in January 2001, staying in country through the eventual invasion¹⁶⁴.  Jamil was wounded, captured by the Northern Alliance in Kabul, and extradited home to Pakistan¹⁶⁵.  In April 2002, the Pakistanis holding him in Peshawar, saw no reason for continued detention and released him¹⁶⁶.  His home was raided in Kashmir after the bombing¹⁶⁷, and family members arrested¹⁶⁸.  His motives were seen as unchecked religious fanaticism¹⁶⁹. The second bomber, Hazir Sultan, an Afghan national and affiliated with HuJI, was 42, and attended training in South Waziristan¹⁷⁰.  He was viewed as easily swayed due to lack of positive familial influences¹⁷¹. Most likely both of these men were trained by Hamza Rabia in South Waziristan in preparation for the operations.  Especially given that Sultan was living in the agency.  It was reported that he was witness to the raid that killed Ahmed Said al-Khadr in October 2003¹⁷².  The failed third bomber was identified as Amir Sohail, captured during the fracas¹⁷³. Their cohorts in the plot were a mix of civilian militants and low-ranking Army soldiers [B].

Shifting Focus

By late December the jihadists in Shakai became aware that Hamza Rabia was culpable for the Musharraf operation¹⁷⁴.  Around the same time, the Tanzanian operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, previously laboring for KSM, was reassigned to Hamza Rabia along with two others by Abdulhadi al-Iraqi in order to assist with external operations¹⁷⁵.  Abdulhadi moved often between homes in the valley, and utilized the local madrassa and an impromptu guesthouse for foreign fighers without families, in order to conduct meetings¹⁷⁶.  Directly under his command within the village where Abdulhadi called home were an additional nearly 50 Arabs and others¹⁷⁷.  In fact, by the end of 2003 the camp included approximately 60 Arabs, upwards of 200 Uzbeks and Central Asians, and numerous Baluchi Pakistanis providing logistics¹⁷⁸.  Included among them were Abdulhadi’s assistant Osaid al-Yemeni and the logistician Muawiya al-Baluchi¹⁷⁹.  The latter resided in the guesthouse for unaccompanied fighters, alongside of several others including a Syrian who was most probably, Yasin al-Suri, eventually known for his role in transplanting additional foreign elements and funds into the region through Iran¹⁸⁰. The numbers were growing as for example, in December Janat Ghul delivered three further Arabs to the encampment via the Iran route, accompanied by one Qattal al-Uzbeki, who also resided in the unaccompanied house¹⁸¹. Even though many of these individuals were not originally associated with al-Qaida, they were now united in their plight as well as the insurgency. Among the most notable was the Palestinian Khalil al-Deek, the composer of an “Encyclopedia of Jihad” during the 1990s, who was previously detained in Jordan as a component of the failed “Millennium Plot,” aimed at Americans in Amman¹⁸². Yet there was a particular subset of the foreign elements that concentrated the most influence.

As Egyptians dominated the politics of the camp, pressuring and clashing with Abdulhadi’s personality and decisions, even more of the Africans were drawn to the concentration of militants in Shakai.  As mentioned, Shura member Sheikh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Othman Abu al-Yazid) arrived in November, fleeing the disarray in Karachi caused by the various raids against al-Qaida figures¹⁸³. Around the same time, Egyptian operative Sharif al-Masri visited, although he was based outside of Quetta, Baluchistan, responsible for operating assignments in Kandahar¹⁸⁴.  The successful transplant of al-Qaida to South Waziristan was yielding dividends, but the focus in 2003 increasingly centered on Iraq, for the American public, politicians, the media, but even for al-Qaida, and especially for Abdulhadi.  Abu Faraj al-Libi meanwhile, attempted to balance the objectives and personnel under his command. Situations in Iraq could provide a possible outlet and solution to his problem of the disputation between the Egyptian seniors and Abdulhadi al-Iraqi. First though, he faced a series of events in 2004 fraught with obstacles for the terror network.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

• [A] The six Air Force technicians implicated and involved in the first attack and were named as Niaz Mohamed, Adnan Rashid, Khalid Mahmud, Nawazish Ali, Karam Din, and Nasrullah. All were convicted via court martial on October 3, 2005, with Nasrullah sentenced to life and the other five to death¹⁸⁵. However, later reporting noted that the six Air Force were recruited by the civilian militant, Mushtaq Ahmed, and that Karam Din also actually received a life sentence¹⁸⁶. Karam Din died in prison on September 15, 2023. Niaz Mohamed was executed on December 31, 2014¹⁸⁷, Khalid Mahmud on January 10, 2015, and Nawazish Ali and Mushtaq Ahmed both on January 13, 2015. Adnan Rashid was freed from prison during a Taliban assault to liberate inmates in Bannu, Pakistan on April 15, 2012. Separately, an Army soldier, Islam Siddiqui, was alleged to have handled the actual device to detonate the bridge, and as such was rapidly convicted and hanged on August 20, 2005. This despite the assertion from President Musharraf himself that Mushtaq Ahmed was the man responsible for directly detonating the explosives. Thus, the Siddiqui case was suspicious and was subject to allegations of police misconduct and government interference, with his trial not conducted in parallel with the others, and his files not open to the defense attorneys of the others.
• [B] In the second attack, civilians Ghulam Sarwar Bhatti (the recruiter known as Salahuddin), Ikhlas Ahmed (known as Rusi due to his half-Russian heritage), and Rashid Qureshi (known as Tipu) were accused of recruiting and conspiring with lower ranking Army corporals Arshad Mahmud, Zafar Iqbal Dogar, and Mohamed Hanif. Planning was partially conducted in the home of another civilian conspirator, Zubair Ahmed (known as Tawsif), who also oversaw surveillance of President Musharraf’s normal route¹⁸⁸. Rana Mohamed Naveed was accused of hosting a weapons cache in his family’s home for the explosives¹⁸⁹ . Four of the civilians and Naik (corporal) Arshad Mahmud were sentenced to death on August 26, 2005. Arshad Mahmud was executed on December 20, 2014. Rusi, Salahuddin, Tipu, and Tawsif followed in hanging on December 22, 2014. Despite being sentenced to death by an appellate court, a further appeal resulted in commuting failed suicide bomber Amir Sohail’s (known as Sajad) and Rana Naveed’s sentences to terms of imprisonment. Naveed was released in November 2022. Lance Naif (corporal) Dogar (Musharraf’s former guard) never completed his portion of the attack, and was later utilized as a witness at trial. Less clear was a supposed militant from Khyber agency named Adnan Khan who was also convicted and given a 15 year sentence, with claims that he had attended a training camp. His family claimed he was mentally disabled after detention. Khan was eventually released in February 2017, but promptly went unaccounted for.

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