SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 16 – Last Stand At Al-Ras)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment IV – Violence Infinitum (Chapter 16 – Last Stand At Al-Ras)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

In this final chapter of Segment IV, we delve into the storied Battle of al-Ras, in which a large contingent of AQSA militants finally face justice. With it, List B is essentially dismantled, but this does not mean that the network itself was rendered ineffective. We begin with discussing the relevant AQSA personalities involved, and then describe the actual engagement and aftermath. We conclude with the fates of other disparate AQSA personnel.

Sojourn of the Moroccan

The Battle of al-Ras was sometimes referred to as the last stand of Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia [1,2].  While this is not necessarily the case, it was certainly the end for AQSA in its then form.  That particular phase being dominated by List B members within its leadership.  New men would have to step forward to take control of the group after the battle.  At the point prior to the engagement however, with the new March statements from Awfi, the “resurrected” leader of AQSA appeared to be in charge yet again [3].  Saud al-Otaibi was seen now as the number two man in the organization [1].  Karim al-Majati was seen as its chief operational planner and logistician [1].  Otaibi himself was considered a chief spokesman now, warring with words across the internet and various forums [1].  As such, his propaganda campaign was becoming widely known [1].  Otaibi had based his operations out of al-Ras in Qasim Province for its location outside of the major cities, and for the relative ease of hiding within its growing sector [2].  The militants had the ease of traveling to the major cities from al-Ras without actually being within these locations where the Saudi dragnet was much more prevalent [2].  As al-Ras is located in the al-Qasim province and is hundreds of kilometers to the north of Riyadh where most previous engagements had occurred [4,5].  Security forces, due to a tip, tracked a large group of militants to a compound in al-Ras, and in the early morning hours of Sunday April 3, 2005, began to besiege those within [2,4].  The scene of siege and gun battle was very familiar by now to the Saudi populace and security forces [2].  This time however, they had Otaibi, Majati, and most likely Awfi pinned inside [4]. 

Karim Idris al-Majati

The fire fight was as mentioned, the most intense the security forces had yet to see [1,4].  AQSA militants fought back with machine guns, grenades, and various kinds of heavy weaponry [2].  The AQSA militants were defending their leaders to the death, striving to forge an impervious barrier in which to encompass them.  Karim Idris al-Tohani al-Majati (Abu Ilyas al-Maghrebi) (B-4) had entered the country illegally with fake passports with his wife and their two children [6,7].  Majati had a Muslim Moroccan father and Christian French mother [7].  He was born in Rabat, Morocco and raised in the city of Casablanca, but within a family that was not at all devoutly religious [7].  Majati admitted to not being religious at all, yet still yearning to defend Muslims [7].  He claimed to be profoundly affected by the Persian Gulf War and even defended a Muslim woman who was being persecuted in Morocco for wearing a hijab or veil to her employment [7].  Majati quickly married this woman [6].  Because of his secular upbringing, and his longing to be an American, he had a wealth of knowledge on Western culture, which was a great asset that AQSA frequently utilized him for [7].  Despite reports that he also had an American wife, this appears to not be the case [6].  Majati, was however, highly intelligent.  In fact, Majati had been a medical student in France, sent there after a decent childhood spent in Casablanca [7].  He dropped his studies, which eventually led to his return to Morocco and the meeting of his future wife, an event which directly led to his radicalization as she initially and perhaps inadvertently induced him to religious fervor [6].  The educated young man did not fit the mold of the typical AQSA foot soldier but was something much more, a leader in the organization, a middle man between AQSA and those placed much higher in Al-Qaida.  Majati was implicated directly in the May 2003 Casablanca attacks as well as the Riyadh compound bombings of the same month [6,8].  Although he was intimately involved in the network, there are corroborating reports stating that he, along with Ayiri, was extremely hesitant about commencing the insurgency in May of 2003 [9,10].  There was a much less direct suspicion that he may have been involved with the group of Moroccans who carried out the March 2004 Madrid bombings [8].  As mentioned, after Majati dropped out of the French medical school, he returned home to Casablanca and found a new vigor for religion [6,8].  Neighbors saw him as strange, but did not fear him [8].  After a business trip to France, Majati announced to his wife that he would be going to Bosnia to wage jihad [6,7].  Majati entered Bosnia with other Muslim fighters, helped to set up training and schooling but was eventually captured [7].  The French Embassy in Croatia helped to have him released and he returned home [6,7].  Afterwards, he trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s, at the Khalden camp [7].  He trained alongside of Amer Azizi, the ringleader of the Madrid bombings [8].  In fact, he frequented Afghanistan throughout the decade [6,7].  Majati also spent some unexplained time in the US during the late 1990s [6].  In 2001, the Majati family prepared to leave Morocco for the last time [6].

Majati was in Afghanistan in 2001 in an attempt to meet with Al-Qaida and Taliban leadership including with bin Laden himself [6].  He succeeded in becoming acquainted with several top personalities in the organization [7].  Majati only became a part of al-Qaida after the 9/11 attacks, joining with the experienced jihadists in fighting the American onslaught [6].  After the US invasion, Majati, as mentioned above, was able to find his way into the Kingdom with his family [6].  Many suspect that Majati was sent there by bin Laden or other Al-Qaida leadership in order to set up cells to help undermine the monarchy [5].  During the US invasion of Afghanistan Majati fought under the command of the insurgent Abu Laith al-Libi around Kabul [7].  After his retreat into Pakistan he became associated with Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and thus it can be assessed that the al-Qaida leader sent him out to conduct operations for the organization [7].  Majati also was known as a close associate of bin Laden’s point man in the Kingdom, Yusef al-Ayiri, or Swift Sword [10].  The man also became a suspect in supposed plots aimed at European countries such as Belgium [8]. For instance, one of Majati’s men, as previously mentioned, Hussein al-Hasaki, was arrested near Antwerp and set off alarms concerning Majati all through the continent [8]. 

After Majati arrived in the Kingdom with his two sons and wife, they hid in Riyadh [6].  Interestingly, Khalid al-Jehani, who’s martyrdom statement had been found in the rubble in Kabul after Mohamed Atef’s assassination would hide and stay with Majati in the early months of 2003, due to an apparent increasing depression [6,11].  Majati’s association with Jehani (who had extensive and deep al-Qaida roots) provided further evidence of the Moroccan’s significance to AQSA [6].  Police eventually arrested Majati’s wife and young son Ilyas as they went to a doctor, in hopes that a sick Jehani would be in the vehicle with them [6].  He was not, and he and Majati were involved in the Riyadh bombings shortly thereafter [10].  Again, despite Jehani’s obvious enthusiasm for martyrdom (perhaps due to his mental health) it must be noted that Majati was of the same mind as Ayiri in believing that the May 2003 attacks were rushed and would leave the organization in an indefensible position [9].  Majati was then left with a remaining son in his care, who he had indoctrinated in extremism from an early age [6].  This son, Adam, followed in his father’s extremist footsteps [12].  Both Majatis were involved in the extensive operation which led to the capture and eventual beheading of Paul Johnson [4,12].  Majati and his son also fired upon highway patrols and participated heavily in Muqrin and AQSA’s war on foreign workers in the Kingdom [4,12].  Eventually, Majati’s wife and son Ilyas were deported from the Kingdom, but Karim and Adam remained on [6].  Majati was said to be an adept at disguises and clandestine movements, but his wife later denied that Majati had ever left the Kingdom in order to orchestrate terror attacks in Morocco or Spain [6].  The Moroccans however claimed that Majati helped to directly train the Casablanca bombers [8].  The wife also repudiated in an interview that Majati was a member of the GICM or any other terror group, stating instead that he was “al-Qaida only [6].”  

Firefight at al-Ras

Saud al-Otaibi

The firefight at al-Ras lasted from April 3 until April 5, a Tuesday [1,2,4,5,13].  For those few days the Jawazat neighborhood in Al-Ras was a bloody war zone [2,4].  When it was all said and done, both Saud al-Otaibi and Karim al-Majati were dead, along with 13 of their soldiers [1,2,4,5,13,14,15].  Fourteen militant bodies were initially found and the fifteenth was discovered later [4,16].  Six additional militants loyal to Awfi and Otaibi were arrested, five having been wounded and the last having surrendered [4].  When Saudi forces initially approached, they were hit hard by the besieged extremists [2].  Immediately three militants were killed and one captured on the first day of fighting [2].  The quickly captured militant turned out to be the AQSA ideologue Hamad al-Humaidi [2].  The militants barricaded themselves in their compound fighting the Saudis and holding them at bay [2,4].  As the Saudis discovered that they were in for a protracted engagement, they began to focus on clearing the residential area of civilians and innocents [2].  In fact, an entire girl’s school had to be evacuated as it sat right on the perimeter of the intense fighting [2].  Once this task was successfully completed the Saudis reengaged [2].  The second day of combat saw the AQSA militants successfully render military vehicles inoperable and leave a multitude of security officers wounded, including a General [2].  Despite the Saudis’ claims to the contrary, local reports state that 35 security force members were wounded by the end of day one and 58 by day two [2].  It was not a victory for AQSA however, as by the end of the second day, eight militants, including both Otaibi and Majati were dead [2,14].  Despite the automatic fire and RPG rounds from the jihadists, the Saudis raided and overtook the compounds on the third day, leaving the aforementioned fifteen dead [2,4].  The militants had engaged in intense street fighting, using at least thirteen residential compounds and schools as cover [2,12].  The captured militants later stated that they were unsure they were even in al-Ras due to the fact that they had been smuggled to the pro-Islamist town in female attire which covered their faces [4].  In the aftermath, reports emerged that Saleh al-Awfi was also among the dead [1,4].  Three bodies, believed to be Otaibi, Majati, and Awfi were immediately sent for DNA testing [4].  The results came back positive for both Otaibi and Majati [12,16].  Other dead militants from the battle identified via DNA included Adam Karim al-Majati, Hani Abdullah Ahmed al-Jaithan, Faisal Mohamed Hadi al-Baidhani, Majid Mohamed Said al-Masud, Fawaz Mufdi Atiyah al-Anzi, Abdulrahman Abdullah al-Jarbou, Nawaf Naif Khadimis al-Hafi, and Abdulsalam Sulaiman Mohamed al-Khudairi [12,16].  The five other dead were not immediately identified [12].  However, the leaked Guantanamo assessment of Issa al-Aushan’s brother Abdulaziz revealed that their cousin Naif Abdulaziz Mohamed al-Aushan, an AQSA militant who supplied the ice in which Paul Johnson’s head was stored, was killed in April of 2005 by Saudi forces [17].  Naif’s death, along with those mentioned above were confirmed by Sawt al-Jihad and the Saudi press [18,19].  The militant publication, as well as the Saudi government, also gave identities to three of the remaining dead:  Walid Mohamed Ibrahim al-Samani, Saad Mohamed Sulaiman al-Okail, and Mateb Hilal Minawar al-Maqati al-Otaibi [18,19].  The final militant killed was not to be identified until years later on October 7, 2008 [20].  He was Saud Mohamed Abdulaziz al-Saadan, a returnee from Afghanistan who had received explosives training at al-Qaida camps, and participated in readying the car bombs of April 2004 [20].  All of the militants were Saudis, minus the Majatis [12].  Jaithan was involved with the Muyaha incident [12].  Baidhani participated in preparing the car bombs utilized in the December 29, 2004 attacks on the Interior Ministry and Special Forces base [12].  Masud was yet another militant involved in preaching his thoughts online and recruiting other youths [12].  He held responsibilities for handling intelligence and information for the organization [12].  Anzi had been captured and then released by the security men some two years before [12].  Jarbou provided shelter and vehicles for members of the group [12].  Hafi, an Afghanistan veteran, used his knowledge to train the fighters, indoctrinate them online, and provide shelter [12].  Khudairi was involved in helping prime car bombs and assualt security personnel [12].  Samani meanwhile, was involved in attacking the security apparatus, sheltering militants, and propagandizing within Qasim province [136-19].  Okail had been wanted for auto theft and attacks on security forces [19].  Aushan had fought in Afghanistan, returned, and become involved in forgery and propagandizing [19].  Finally, al-Maqati al-Otaibi was a recruiter and logistician for the organization [19]. 

The arrested militants included Saad Salamah al-Anzi and Saleh Abdulaziz al-Juma [18].  The apprehended also included some AQSA veterans who had been sought after by security forces.  Adel Saad Jaza al-Dhubaiti (also known as Adel Saad al-Mutairi) had quite a resume, including being linked to the Muhaya attacks, being a direct participant in the Khobar attacks, as well as being implicated in the attempted car bombings of April 2004, and the Bandar al-Dakheel led murder of the German chef [12,18].  As the triggerman in the BBC shootings of Frank Gardner and Simon Cumbers he displayed a blatant disregard for mercy [21].  His arrest was a great relief for the Saudis as finally all four Khobar attackers were either dead or captured.  Another of the apprehended al-Ras combatants, the ideologue Hamad Abdullah Ibrahim al-Humaidi, had been arrested in February 2003 and subsequently released [22].  His previous arrest came on suspicion of his being involved with militants returning from Afghanistan and came at a time when the Interior Ministry was quietly attempting to make arrests to prevent a war within its borders [22].  Humaidi then became a part of the Shariah Committee within the group, as well as being involved with recruitment and propaganda [23].  Humaidi had been in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and was respected for his veteran status [23].  The militant however, remained dormant in terms of jihad until the commencing of the uprising in 2003 [23].  Saleh Abdulrahman Ibrahim al-Shamsan was the last identified of the 5 wounded and captured men from Al-Ras.  He participated in moving and sheltering militants, translating for them, and assisted with their propaganda efforts [12].  The unidentified sixth captured militant was only referred to by AQSA as al-Buhaiji, but subsequent research provided evidence that he was assuredly a militant named Najib Abdulaziz Abdullah al-Buhaiji [24,25] – [A].

It can be seen that Otaibi and Majati surrounded themselves with several of the most important AQSA operatives left available.  Their loss was devastating to the group, as was the loss of Otaibi.  Saud al-Otaibi, as mentioned, had made his way to Afghanistan in the late 1980s but stayed only briefly [26].  More importantly, Otaibi avoided prison terms in the Kingdom by fleeing to Yemen where he was placed under the tutelage of men like Qaed Sinan Salim al-Harithi [26].  Later when he could live openly in the Kingdom, Otaibi had associated with the Bayt Shubra, a gathering of precursor jihadists with whom both Ibrahim al-Rayes (B-6) and Abdulaziz al-Muqrin had fraternized with [90-26].  In fact, Rayes and Otaibi became very close friends [26].  Otaibi was considered a dormant jihadist until the insurgency of 2003, at which point he is said to have fled underground and joined AQSA [23].  Otaibi abandoned his wife and children in 2003 when, while transporting dates, he fled a police checkpoint and fully committed himself to extremism [27].  He and his men eventually rented their al-Ras hideout with fake military IDs and the local populace remembered seeing Otaibi and Adam Majati, the errand runner of the group, together for prayers at the mosque [2].  The young Majati brought supplies to the house to as to not raise suspicions while his father and Otaibi plotted [2].  Yet they could not stop the inevitable tide of Saudi intelligence and shifting public opinion.  With all of these deaths, Awfi was left with relatively few reliable soldiers.  In fact, the number was decreased even more almost immediately.

Peripheral Militants Pursued

Abdulrahman al-Yazji

Interestingly, at the same time as the battle of al-Ras, Abdulrahman Mohamed Mohamed al-Yazji (B-25) made an ill-conceived attempt at distracting forces away from Otaibi and Majati [2,4].  Yazji was also on the list of the many militants wanted in connection with the Muhaya bombing [13].  It is safe to assume that the Muhaya attack was partially the source of the 26 most wanted extremists.  Yazji had originally gone to Kashmir in order to receive militant training and wage jihad, yet was influenced by others to eventually travel to Afghanistan [28,29].  Once there, the militant trained and fought for Brigade 55 along the front lines [28,29].  Yazji was yet another militant who fled through Iran in order to return to his homeland after the US invasion [28,29].  His cousin Abdulkarim had been one of the suicide bombers who perpetrated the Riyadh compound bombings of May 2003 [30].  Yazji led security forces on a chase through Riyadh and made his final stand in the Sinaiyah district in the southern portion of the city [2,4].  He barricaded himself in a residential building in this, the industrial portion of the capital [2,4,5].  The cars, garages, alleys, and industrial debris of this slum area made it a difficult job for the security men to flush him out [4].  However, around 8 am on Wednesday April 6, 2005, the building was raided and Yazji was shot and killed [2,4,5,13].  An accomplice with him, a Yemeni taxi driver, was wounded and captured [2].  Yazji failed at drawing security forces away from Al-Ras and in the end it had cost him his life in vain.  Brigadier General Mansur al-Turki and Prince Naif himself both claimed a certain sense of victory following both of these raids, and the intense battles which followed [4].  It was this day incidentally that AQSA released a statement that confirmed the deaths of Otaibi and Majati [5].  They did not confirm the death of Awfi.  In fact, the leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had escaped death yet again. 

The battle of al-Ras marked the end of an era of sorts for Al-Qaida within in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  The summer of 2005 saw the Saudis taking stock of their situation and deciding on a new strategy to continue the fight against their adversaries.  The battles in December of 2004 in addition to Al-Ras had decimated the ranks of Al-Qaida.  The rank and file now remained, somewhat intact, but these militants would have to be dealt with as well, whether their names were nationally known or not. 

The Saudi security forces were quick to continue their campaign against those not on the List B.  Abdulaziz Rashid Hamdan al-Tuwaili al-Anzi was involved in preaching AQSA’s causes online, propagating their propaganda, and was one of the men who assisted Saikhan and Rashid after they had been mortally wounded [31].  He was involved in their burials as well [31].  Perhaps due to his closeness with Rashid, he would pen his prolific writings for Sawt al-Jihad under the name Abdullah Nasir al-Rashid, including a diatribe on the regulations of attacking petroleum targets and the economic effects of jihad [32,33].  As has been mentioned, Anzi had taken over as editor for Sawt al-Jihad after Issa al-Awshan was killed [32].  In early May 2005, Anzi was pulled over by security forces in the Rawabi neighborhood of east Riyadh [31].  The man was in possession of much cash and many weapons and thus he fired on the security forces [31].  In the return fire, he was wounded in the jaw and back [31].  After failing to hijack a vehicle, he entered a restaurant late in the evening and attempted to take hostages [31].  It was another failed attempt, and he was subsequently arrested [31].  Tuwaili was incarcerated at al-Hail prison, where he exhibited extreme signs of psychosis; the maimed former ideologue breaking under the pressure of captivity [34] – [A].  The Saudis continued to negate Al-Qaida plots and attempts and only had three members of List B remaining.

Abdullah al-Rashoud

Not long after this incident however, on June 23, 2005 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaida in Iraq announced the death of Abdullah Mohamed Rashid al-Rashoud (B-24) [35].  Zarqawi claimed that Rashoud was killed along the Syrian border in the Iraqi town of Qaim by precise US bombing raids against his forces there [35].  Rashoud, according to Zarqawi had only entered Iraq, by sneaking across the border from Saudi Arabia, in April [35].  “He entered Iraq a month and a half ago as an immigrant crossing the border to Al-Fayafi and Al-Qaffar to Al-Qaim to participate in the battles there. He responded to God’s call and was seeking his paradise and wanted glory for his religion,” Zarqawi claimed [35].  He would continue, “When the Crusaders could not enter the area, the only thing they could do was bombard the Mujahidin with warplanes, our sheikh (Al-Rashoud) got what he wished — martyrdom [35].”  He had graduated from the al-Namas branch of the University with a science degree and as such ended up as a scientific teacher at a branch of the same Islamic university that Muni and Zahrani had attended [36,37].  He was one of AQSA’s main ideologues and most admired, as he was one of their oldest at 37 [35,37].  In 1997, he had been arrested for issuing statements to his followers encouraging them to kill government officials [35,37].  He had also led an angry demonstration against the merger of male and female schools before going into hiding [35].  Rashoud was known as being very volatile and primitive in his religious convictions [35].  In November of 2002 he fulminated against the monarchy and led a demonstration demanding to speak to the Grand Mutfi of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh.  Although he was initially refused by the police, he was eventually given an audience, but none of his particular grievances were resolved [38,39].  Afterwards, he along with Ahmed al-Dakheel were driven into hiding, where they were given no choice but to join Ayiri’s network for protection and platform [38].  Prior to being smuggled in into Iraq, Rashoud was sheltered by a young militant who called himself Sanafi al-Nasr [40]. Much like Turki al-Mutairi before him, he became famous for penning eulogies of slain al-Qaida fighters in the future [40].  No doubt he was influenced by his time with the fiery rhetoritician.  Rashoud’s death in Iraq revealed a strategy of AQSA to send its fighters into that nation to fight US and allied forces there [37].  The US Marines who cleared out Qaim and the surrounding areas said that they had found passports from numerous countries in the fighters’ hideouts [41]. 

With Rashoud finally dead, this left only Awfi and Talib Saud al-Talib (B-16) alive on List B.  The Saudis could continue to attempt to pick off AQSA members without naming them as wanted, or they could push the worst remaining to the forefront of public awareness by publishing a new list.  They would actually publish more than one list [42].  In light of Rashoud’s death in Iraq it only seemed appropriate for the Kingdom to issue lists targeting AQSA members within the country and for militants fighting in foreign theatres. 

SEGMENT IV Appendix (For List B Status as of June 2005):

LIST B:

  1. ABDULAZIZ ISSA ABDULMUHSIN AL-MUQRIN (RE)
  2. RAKAN MUHSIN MOHAMED AL-SAIKHAN (RE)
  3. KHALID ALI AL-HAJJ “ABU HAZIM AL-SHAIR”  (RE) (YEMENI)
  4. KARIM IDRIS AL-TOHANI AL-MAJATI
  5. SALEH MOHAMED AWADALLAH AL-ALAWI AL-AWFI  (RE)
  6. IBRAHIM MOHAMED ABDULLAH AL-RAYES
  7. SAUD HAMUD OBAID AL-QOTAINI AL-OTAIBI
  8. AHMED ABDULRAHMAN SAQAR AL-FADHLI
  9. SULTAN BAJAD SAADUN AL-OTAIBI
  10. ABDULLAH SAUD ABUNAYAN AL-SUBAYI
  11. FAISAL ABDULRAHMAN ABDULLAH AL-DAKHEEL (RE)
  12. FARIS AHMED JAMAAN AL-SHOWEEL AL-ZAHRANI
  13. KHALID MUBARAK HABIBALLAH AL-QURASHI
  14. MANSUR MOHAMED AHMED FAQEEH
  15. ISSA SAAD MOHAMED AL-AUSHAN
  16. TALIB SAUD ABDULLAH AL-TALIB
  17. MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MOHAMED AL-MUBARAKI
  18. ABDULMAJID MOHAMED ABDULLAH AL-MUNI
  19. NASIR RASHID NASIR A-RASHID
  20. BANDAR ABDULRAHMAN ABDULLAH AL-DAKHEEL
  21. OTHMAN HADI MAQBUL AL-MARDI AL-AMRI (RE)
  22. TALAL ANBAR AHMED AL-ANBARI
  23. AMIR MUHSIN MORIF AL-ZAIDAN AL-SHEHRI
  24. ABDULLAH MOHAMED RASHID AL-RASHOUD
  25. ABDULRAHMAN MOHAMED MOHAMED AL-YAZJI
  26. HUSSEIN MOHAMED AL-HASAKI

LEGEND:

  • KILLED IN EXCHANGE OR RAID
  • PERISHED IN SUICIDE ATTACK
  • CAPTURED
  • FREE AT LARGE
  • (RE) = Repeated Name from List A

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] – All six of those apprehended during the Battle of al-Ras, (Hamad Abdullah Ibrahim al-Humaidi, Adel Saad Jaza al-Dhubaiti, Saad Salamah al-Anzi, Saleh al-Juma, Saleh Abdulrahman Ibrahim al-Shamsan, and Najib Abdulaziz Abdullah al-Buhaiji), plus captured idealogue Abdulaziz Rashid Hamdan al-Tuwaili al-Anzi, were executed on January 1, 2016 by the Saudi government for terrorism convictions [25]. These occurred as components of a Saudi mass execution that day of 47 combined Sunni terrorists and Shia dissidents.

© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

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