SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 14 – Indiscriminate And Indivisible)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment IV – Violence Infinitum (Chapter 14 – Indiscriminate And Indivisible)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

The following chapter observes AQSA resuming their attacks, yet without the defined organization from before. This allows the Saudis to effectively counter the violence, both physically and via psychological means. In a rare occurrence, one of the List B members is observed outside of the Kingdom. Also we examine another anomaly in the saga of the organization thus far, as there are apparently two distinct declared layers of command, both strategic and tactical. Yet as opposed to fracturing, the network is displayed as opportunistic in determining echelons of control. 

An Indiscriminate Spree

Soon after the loss of their primary ideologue, on August 13, 2004, claimed responsibility for the murder of an Irishman which had occurred earlier in the month [1].  On August 3, two gunmen found their way into the Riyadh offices of the Rocky Trade and Construction firm and shot Anthony Higgins four times in the chest and head [2,3].  The engineer was of a family that included a poet and a millionaire businessman [1,2].  Two AQSA linked men were eventually arrested for the murder [2].  There had been speculation that the murder was indeed not terror related, but the announcement by AQSA proved that the group had not regressed to the point where they could not carry out minor operations – such as the random killing of an unguarded Western individual [1].

On September 15, 2004, three AQSA gunmen shot and killed British national Edward Muirhead-Smith in the parking lot of a Riyadh shopping center [4,5].  He worked for communications firm Marconi in the city [4].  AQSA militants were not attacking in complex raids or assassinating defense contractors specifically.  It seemed while the group was on the run more than ever, they were flagrantly picking off easy targets in the form of oblivious and obvious foreigners.  AQSA claimed the killing, and along with the Higgins murder, announced that they were targeting these men in order to “liberate the Arabian Peninsula from infidels [6].”

The attacks were not just occurring in Riyadh.  Militants on September 11, 2004 drove a car bomb to the former Saudi-American Bank and left it to detonate [7].  In addition to this bombing, a smaller explosion occurred later at the Saudi British Bank [7].  Neither attempt led to any casualties except for the wounding of one of the bombers at the first locale [7]. By September 24, a shootout in Tabuk netted the two AQSA culprits, Ridha Abdulrahman Khalil al-Najjar and Saleh Said Abdulrahim al-Najjar [8,9]. The duo was arrested after injuring four security forces [8].  Concerning more Jeddah attacks, a French engineer was murdered in the city on September 26, 2004 [10].  Laurent Barbot, an employee of defense contractor Thales was shot twice in the chest while still in his car at a market late that night [10].  Two men were later arrested for the crime and AQSA yet again claimed responsibility [10,11].  The announcement of the arrest occurred on November 23, almost two months after the murder, and portrayed militant Hamad al-Saadi as both the triggerman of the crime and the leader of a cell in the al-Jamia district of Jeddah [11].  The other militant, identified only by the surname al-Samiri, was said to have plotted the shooting [11]. However, the Interior Ministry refuted these claims, and the supposed confessions, as not entirely accurate; therefore the roles of Saadi and Samiri in the killing remain unclear [11].  Their capture will be discussed later. 

AQSA, after the loss of its leader and potential loss of his successor, was beginning to regain its former stature of inspiring fear throughout the foreign communities in the Kingdom.  Even as such, the organization continued forward in the latter portions of 2004 without one of their important lieutenants.  Abdullah Abdulaziz Ahmed al-Muqrin, the cousin of Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, had led the Eastern Province cell of the network and thus overseen the Khobar attacks [12].  One can assume that the loss of his cousin coupled with the demise of so many others in the organization drove the lesser Muqrin to do what he did next.  On September 3, 2004, the Ministry of the Interior announced that the cell leader had surrendered peacefully [12].  A 2008 Amnesty International report showed him to still be imprisoned along with Nimr al-Baqmi, one of the perpetrators of the Khobar attacks [13].  

In addition, AQSA announced on September 10, 2004 that its members had engaged in battle with Saudi security forces in the town of Buraidah, which is north of Riyadh [13].  According to the statement, the two sides clashed as the Saudis rushed to raid a safehouse and the militants attempted to cover the escape of the wives and children of the jihadists living there [13].  As such, AQSA militants were able to escape, yet they claimed to have left behind three dead:  Abdullatif Hamad al-Khudairi and two security force members [13].  Khudairi was described in Sawt al-Jihad as an ideologue for the group, who engaged in much teaching, writing, fundraising, and propagandizing in support of his fellow extremists [14].  The dead militant had also been an important student of Ali Fahd al-Khudair (one of the three prominent radical clerics arrested by the Saudis in May of 2003) [14].  Despite the AQSA claim, it appears only one member of the Saudi security forces, an officer named Yusef Ayed al-Harbi, died in the September 3 exchange [15].  With Khudairi’s death, AQSA’s ideology and propaganda committee continued to take fatal wounds, adding onto the loss of both Aushan and Zahrani.  However, a young jihadist named Abdulaziz al-Tuwaili al-Anzi had taken over as editor of Sawt al-Jihad allowing the publication to weather the storm [16].  In fact, propaganda and jihadist media continued to flow from AQSA, as seen by the press release above [13].  For another example, a long awaited video of the burial of Rakan al-Saikhan was finally released on August 31, helping to show that the outfit still had the ability to release differing forms of media, even amidst their interminable battle with Saudi forces [17]. 

Further violence occurred in Buraidah just days later when on September 5, 2004 three Saudi security force members, Sgt. Mufleh Saad Ruwaishid al-Rashidi, Sgt. Sayer Farhan Ghanim al-Nomasi and Marif Shakir Eid al-Rashidi, were killed while pursuing militants [18].  Seven militants were eventually apprehended [18].  Although Muqrin’s surrender and the Buraidah raids which resulted in Khudairi’s death were setbacks, there were still 11 men left from List B and they were more than enough to pose serious danger to the Kingdom’s inhabitants and contractors. 

An October Surprise

In October 2004 there were a series of events that would have implications on the structure and methods of AQSA.  Initially, with the sense that the organization was gaining ground again, the Saudis sought to discredit it with a volley of negative propaganda.  At the beginning of the month, the Saudis televised the confessions of two captured AQSA members [19].  One was Khalid al-Farraj, a captain within the organization who had worked for Muqrin.  It was Farraj’s residence that was raided in January 2004, just a month after the release of List B [20].  The reader may remember that his father Hamud was killed in the ambush that ensued [20].  Farraj would state that, “I can tell you that 95 percent of the cell’s members are ignorant [19].”  He continued, “They are even more ignorant than the uneducated. They have reached a point where they call all scholars in the country infidels [19].”  Farraj would herein tell his tale of the slow death of Amir al-Shehri after his wounding in 2003 [19].  He also attempted to discredit the AQSA ideologues by explaining that Ahmed al-Dakheel had labeled all Saudi police as infidels and therefore legitimate targets for death [19]. The other AQSA operative was Abdulrahman al-Rashoud who was a relative of Abdullah al-Rashoud, the List B member and ideologue who had been falsely reported killed in July [19].  He had cased several targets for Muqrin during his preparations for Operation Volcano [21].  Rashoud spoke of the group’s blatant negligence of proper Islam, “Before someone enters the group, he thinks that it is pure. From my observations, I have seen that they are committing actions that should not come from a group claiming jihad [19].”  He also described AQSA’s ability to procure funds through false charities, and spoke about car-jacking [19].  The militant also confirmed that the al-Haramain Brigades was just another moniker of AQSA, thus proving their culpability in attacks against the Saudi infrastructure and public, despite their claims to the contrary [19].  The televised confessions helped to make AQSA seem cruel, ignorant, blasphemous, as well as villainous. 

Next, on October 13, 2004 Saudi forces were able to prevent an AQSA attack on luxury residential compounds in the al-Nahda district of Riyadh [22,23,24,25].  Forces were able to surround and attack a building suspected of housing militants who were casing out the nearby compounds [22,23].  The pre-dawn raid led to a ferocious battle with militants who were using automatic fire and grenades on the besieging forces [22,23,25].  The militants had strategically placed women and children on the first floor of the building to be used as human shields but security forces were able to clear them out prior to engaging the suspects on the upper floor [23].  In the ensuing gun battle, seven officers were wounded including the head of the Special Forces Units [23].  One cornered militant blew himself up with a hand grenade while two others were shot and killed [23].  The dead included Abdulmajid Mohamed Abdullah al-Muni (B-18) as well as two of his men:  Issam Muqbil al-Otaibi and Abulhamid Abdulaziz al-Yahya [22,23].  Otaibi was a known criminal and Yahya was suspected of providing safe houses to militants just like Muni [26].  List B member Abdulrahman Mohamed al-Yazji (B-25) successfully fought his way out of the home and escaped Saudi forces [27].  A subsequent AQSA release claimed that the home belonged to Issam al-Otaibi and had been under surveillance prior to the arrival of Muni, Yazji and their cohorts [28].  The statement went on to say that Otaibi perished while saving the women and children on the first floor from the Saudi security forces; a story in direct contrast to the official Saudi version of events concerning the innocents [28].  Otaibi’s criminal record was expanded upon when it was revealed he had actually been extradited from another country to Saudi Arabia for jihadist actions just weeks prior to the shootout [29].  It is entirely possible that Otaibi was one of the extradited individuals from the summer that the Saudis had boasted of during their amnesty period.  Despite having signed a pledge to never partake in militancy again, Otaibi quickly joined with AQSA, a fact revealed by his home being used by jihadists, his death, and the militant press release [29].  The release went on to brag about the wounding of the Special Forces leader, a Lieutenant Colonel according to AQSA, and acknowledged the deaths of Muni, Otaibi, and Yahya, while still claiming victory [28]. 

Abdulmajid al-Muni

As for Muni himself, much like Zahrani, the young man also graduated from the Imam Mohamed Saud Islamic Law University [22,23].  Muni also acted on the group’s Shariah committee, meaning that he was yet another who served as an ideologue that justified, via his distorted religious views, the extremist beliefs and actions of AQSA members [22,23,24].  Muni’s justifications were used as a means to recruit members, just as Aushan and Zahrani had [22,23].  In fact, Muni was stated to be the leader of the Shariah committee, presumably ascending to this role after the Zahrani arrest [24].  Therefore he was a prime target for assassination.  Muni was unique among the militant ideologues because he was directly involved in the killings as well [22,23].  Strangely for a recruiter, Muni reportedly did not get along well with people [23].  He joined the militants against the express wishes of his father, an interpreter of peoples’ dreams [30], who wanted him to use his law degree to become a judge [22,23].  Muni had in fact graduated with high marks from his University [22,23].  Instead, the man became yet another AQSA ideologue to fall in 2004, and yet another member of List B to perish.

In addition to the fall of the above militant theologian, the month of October finished with another blow to the AQSA movement.  This one however, did not occur within the boundaries of the Kingdom and was an announcement of an event from the summer that had previously been unknown.   

The Belgian Connection

The announcement came from Belgium on October 26, 2004 and stated that three months prior, in July a member of List B had been arrested within its borders [31].  Hussein Mohamed al-Hasaki was one of two Moroccans on the list, (one of only three non-Saudis in all), and had somehow found his way out of the Kingdom [31].  Hasaki was a close associate of the Morroccan al-Qaida operative Karim al-Majati [31].  Hasaki was feared to have been sent to Europe by Majati in order to plan future attacks and set up a European cell [32].  This is particularly disturbing due to reports which claimed that Majati may have had a hand in both the Madrid train bombings of 2004 and the Casablanca bombings of 2003 [31,33]. Majati was also added to an FBI “Seeking Information List” back in the late summer of 2003 [33]. 

Hussein al-Hasaki

Hasaki had fought in jihadist hot zones abroad for some time, including Chechnya and in Afghanistan both against the Soviets and against the American invasion [31].  Hasaki fled with Saudi fighters back to their home country where he became a part of the AQSA network [31].  In fact, Hasaki was deeply entrenched in AQSA, to the point where he became accused of being involved in the Khobar massacre a few months earlier [31,34].  As mentioned, European officials feared that Majati and Hasaki were planning to set up a cell within Europe so that AQSA or a related off branch of Al-Qaida could claim attacks on that continent as well [32]. Before this vision came to fruition, Hasaki was rounded up with a group of other Moroccans [35]. 

Hasaki was a known member of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and had attended a summit in November of 2003 in Belgium just a month prior to being named wanted by the Saudis [35].  He was also wanted by Moroccan authorities as the GICM was responsible for recruiting and releasing the twelve suicide bombers who conducted the Casablanca attacks of May 2003 [35,36].  Hasaki had set up in the small town of Maaseik, Belgium with several other GICM members [35].  He married into the GICM community therein and his wife, Samira, was among a group of women who caused a stir in the community by wearing their traditional burqas [35].  The conservative attire managed to elicit fear in the populace [35].  Hussein’s brother, Hassan al-Hasaki, who was directly involved with GICM operations and linked to both the Casablanca bombings and the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, also frequented the town [35,36,37].  Hassan al-Hasaki was attempting to rebuild the GICM into a fully functioning organization [35].  With the successful Casablanca and Madrid bombings coupled with Hussein’s involvement in AQSA operations, the two were making well on these wishes.  It is unknown how Hussein may have been involved in the Khobar attacks, but as mentioned, upon the announcement of his arrest authorities stated that he had participated in some manor [31,34].  Interestingly, the Saudis never appear to have pressed for his extradition.  In addition, four other men were known as the Khobar assailants [38].  However, it is entirely possible that Hussein provided support for the operation.  Regardless, after his time in Saudi Arabia, he eventually fled to both Syria and Turkey in 2004 before ending up back in Maaseik [35].  This time, in July of 2004, the Belgians arrested the man from Saudi List B instead of surveilling him as had been done before [35].  Hasan al-Hasaki would last until December of 2004 when he was finally arrested in the Canary Islands [39].  He was convicted in Spain for the Madrid bombings and eventually sent to Morocco where he was tried similarly for the Casablanca atrocity [37,40].  After his conviction in Morocco, Hasaki was transferred to Spain yet again in April 2009, to finish out his sentences, despite supposedly being in deteriorating health [40].  Eventually on February 16, 2006, Hussein al-Hasaki of List B was sentenced to prison in Belgium for his role in various terrorist attacks including his connections to both the Madrid and Casablanca terror instances [41].  Particularly, Hussein, who had gone on trial in November of 2005, was convicted to seven years in prison for raising funds for the group [41].  In 2012, the European Court for Human Rights overturned his convictions over allegations of torture and found his trial to be unfair [42].  This was despite the clear evidence of his connections to militant groups such as the GICM and AQSA.  Hasaki was released from prison by October 2012 [42].  Despite being imprisoned for an extended period of time, this List B member now resides in freedom. 

Duality in Command

By early November 2004, there were only nine of the List B members left standing.  AQSA soon performed a move that would leave many wondering if in reality there were only eight.  AQSA announced new leadership on November 4, 2004, naming Saud Hamud Obaid al-Qotaini al-Otaibi (B-7) as its new executive [43].  Otaibi was a veteran jihadist but his experience differed from that of both Awfi and Muqrin.  Otaibi had traveled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s and Yemen in the early 1990s but returned to the Kingdom as a normal citizen instead of retaining a militant lifestyle [44,45].  He had been reactivated into jihad by AQSA when he was recruited into the organization by 2003 [45].  Saud al-Otaibi was being named as leader supposedly because the much sought after Awfi had succumbed to his wounds sustained in the firefight at his compound back on July 20 [43].  It is unclear if Awfi was actually seriously wounded or not.  If he had not been wounded, then it is likely that the man was so severely hunted that he chose to fake his own demise in order to lead the organization in peace, if it could be called as such.  If such is the case, then Awfi was forced to use Otaibi as a metaphorical lightning rod, hoping to draw Saudi forces away from him. 

Having said that, Awfi’s ghost reign of the organization, with Otaibi as an acting boss, was successful at times.  The movement was able to strike a few more blows against the Saudi and US governments in order to prove that they and their insurgency were indeed still relevant.  In fact, with the significant gains made by Saudi and US forces against the group since Muqrin’s demise, it seemed that they would not be able to carry out a coordinated raid, suicide bombing, or major attack again.  Under Otaibi and Awfi’s leadership, the group disproved this assertion.  In the meantime, the Saudis were wary of the news of Awfi’s death and actively sought out corroborating evidence of this announcement [43].  The authorities did not give up the search for the most wanted man in the Kingdom [46]. 

The Saudis also continued to pinpoint the other AQSA jihadists and remove them from the board of play.  The Saudis targeted these men for assassination or arrest whether they were on List B or not.  As such, Awfi and Otaibi actually had quite an assembly of henchmen in addition to their fellow list mates.  There was Awfi’s personal right hand man, Majid Hamid al-Hasri [47].  There were also Sultan Saleh al-Hasri and Ismail al-Khuzaim who participated in the Johnson abduction and beheading [48,49].  Awfi and Otaibi could count on Khalid al-Sinan and Badr al-Subayi who were lieutenants to Muqrin and who had helped carry out the Muhaya and other attacks [50].  Subayi was considered a top tier captain of the organization and a prime candidate for leadership [50].  Fayez al-Jehani was preparing to fulfill what he felt was his destiny in the name of AQSA, awaiting orders from his superiors while in Jeddah [51].  Jehani had recently lost three cousins in Fallujah, Iraq and was preparing for revenge on American interests [52].  Also, in Jeddah was another Muqrin associate from the Muhaya attacks, Issam Sadiq al-Mubaraki, who was equally loyal to the cause with his expertise in forgery and logistics for the network [53].  Dakheel al-Obaid had participated in both the Johnson abduction and the amputation of Nasir al-Rashid’s leg [54].  Thamir al-Khamis and Mohamed al-Suwailmi were considered computer savvy and helped keep AQSA’s communication with the outside world open [50,55].  Saud al-Jaadi was involved in rigging vehicle borne explosives for the network, such as the Traffic Directorate bombing [50].  Ibrahim al-Rimi was a Yemeni deputy to Khalid al-Hajj who had subsequently joined with the idealogue Sultan Bajad al-Otaibi (B-9), and helped keep internal communications of the group operating smoothly [50].  Yunis al-Hayari, the Moroccan who was one of the militants who had fought his way out of Awfi’s compound on July 20, was considered the deputy to Karim al-Majati [56,57].  Abdulrahman al-Mateb was one of Khalid al-Farraj’s men, but his captain’s harsh words against AQSA from prison had not deterred him from following Awfi and Otaibi [56].  With brutal, battle hardened and effective List mates such as Abdulrahman al-Yazji, Bandar al-Dakheel and Abdullah al-Subayi to bolster their ranks, and ideologues and avid operatives like Sultan Bajad al-Otaibi and Karim al-Majati to plan strikes and recruit, Awfi and Otaibi were well equipped to bring hell down upon their enemies.   Myriad militants rallied to the flag of AQSA and followed these two men. 

Having shown that there was no dearth of AQSA soldiers during this time period, it is important to move onto into the next stage of the war, in which AQSA was able to respond to the loss of their men with what was an unexpected strike of heavy force and preparation.  Yet on November 27, 2004, the Saudis scored another hit against the body of AQSA militants.  In Jeddah, Issam Sadiq Qasim al-Mubaraki was known to security forces as a participant in the Muhaya attack [53].  He was also known to have helped amputate the leg of a comrade (Rashid) with a power saw [53].  As forces closed in on his vehicle in the al-Jamia district of the city, Mubaraki fought back via hand grenade [53].  Before he could commence a better stand, the militant was shot dead in his car [53].  The vehicle contained quite a bit of supplies, equipment and weapons [53].  Mubaraki was known for his forging, as well as his past sheltering of militants [53].  Along with Mubaraki’s death, the Saudis made an unidentified arrest of another Muhaya conspirator [53].  Even prior to this important event, the Saudis had intervened against jihadists in Jeddah.  Previously on November 8, 2004 a Chadian named Musa Shakila was captured in the city [58].  The Chadian had escaped the Khalidiyah shootout the year prior between Ahmed al-Dakheel’s men and the security forces, but now with his time on the run ended, he gave up a militant safehouse [58].  This resulted, on November 9, with the Saudis conducting a raid in the al-Jamia district of Jeddah that deteriorated into a fire fight at a besieged residence [59].  Although one militant had quickly been captured, three more put up quite a resistance; yet in the end, one was killed and the other two apprehended [59].  The gunfight ended the life of extremist Sami al-Suhaibi, and as the fight occurred in al-Jamia, the instance corresponds with the apprehension of previously described militants related to the murder of Laurent Barbot [8].  A large amount of weapons were confiscated and Hamad al-Saadi, the accused leader of the Jamia cell and suspect in the Laurent Barbot murder, was captured with his conspirator known only as al-Samiri [11,60].  The Saudi hesitancy to accept confessions and declare Saadi’s story as inaccurate, was well founded [11]. The saga cleared only later when it became apparent that two Chadian AQSA militants apprehended in the engagement, named Ishaq Issa Ahmed Shakila and Issa Saleh Hassan Barkaj, were the actual culprits in Barbot’s killing [61,62].  It seemed that the arrest of Musa Shakila actually led to Ishaq Shakila in the firefight [58,61,62].  It is unknown what role if any, Hamad al-Saadi had in the murder, as the Africans were deemed responsible.  Chadians were often deployed by AQSA for missions of this sort, since as foreigners their chances of deportation were higher and they were inclined for more risks [63].  Although these were significant steps towards clearing Jeddah, it would soon become obvious that the efforts were not enough.

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