SERIES: Fugitives Of The Peninsula – (Chapter 10 – Volcanic Ambitions)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Segment III – A War With The Angel Of Death (Chapter 10 – Volcanic Ambitions)

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/fugitives-of-the-peninsula/

This chapter examines the rise of Abdulaziz al-Muqrin to power in the terror organization, and his directed operational plots in early 2004. With the culmination of these ambitions against their own government, again the insurgents utilized an organizational alias to deflect culpability and negative public opinion. The Saudis meanwhile, strove to disrupt and prevent these militant endeavours. Their intention was to restrict the network from the top down, thus they were aiming for the commander of the franchise, Khalid al-Hajj.

The Significance of Khalid al-Hajj

With 23 militants remaining on List B, March 2004 saw Saudi security forces deliver a decapitation strike against the organization of AQSA.  The current leader of AQSA at this time was Khalid Ali al-Hajj (B-3), the lone Yemeni on the list.  Some view his role as leader as nominal, as he was linked to the al-Qaida network in the peninsula headed by Nashiri and not as initially connected to the Ayiri group whose members seemed to be really running the insurgency at that point in time [1].  Others view Hajj as the appointed leader of the franchise, one who led the organization from the rear while Muqrin led the attacks on the streets [2,3].  It is also important to note though that AQSA press releases at this time period are not attributed to him, which could further the thought that the Yemeni was leading from the shadows [1].  That is of course not to say that he was not a dangerous militant to both the Saudis and Americans but is to say that perhaps Muqrin and his followers held more sway with the most extreme radicals who craved violent action in the aftermath of the Riyadh Compound and Muhaya bombings.  Hajj may also have been holding Muqrin and the others in check during this time period as attacks were rather non-existent.  CIA Director George Tenet would reaffirm the importance of Hajj, whom he refered to as Abu Hizam al-Shair, by revealing intelligence stating that the Yemeni took orders directly from Osama bin Laden regarding attacks within the Kingdom [4].  Regarding all of these opinions, this author feels Hajj’s position as a confidant and henchman of Nashiri’s, and also of bin Laden’s, solidified him as the organization’s primary leader in early 2004.  He most likely instilled confidence in the others due to this fact.  For his origins, Abu Hizam al-Shair had been a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden after he joined the al-Qaida organization in Afghanistan back in the late 1990s [5].  As such, he made his connection with Nashiri and was used by this man as money handler for operations [6].  He had specifically worked with Ahmed al-Darbi on his Strait of Hormuz plot [6,7].  As has been shown, bin Laden had a history of specifically delegating missions to men he personally knew and trusted, most of whom had spent time with him as a bodyguard.  In this way, bin Laden had a representative leading the Arabian branch who had been directly influenced and trained by him.  This was exemplified in both Ayiri’s and Hajj’s leadership of the franchise.  Despite the differing opinions as to his role, Hajj was still the priority figure targeted for assassination by the Saudi forces.  Their wish came to fruition on March 15, 2004 [8].  Hajj and his driver Ibrahim Abdulaziz Mohamed al-Muzeini found themselves in an awkward position at a checkpoint in Riyadh [8,9].  Somehow the two had stumbled into the hands of the awaiting Saudi forces. 

Khalid al-Hajj

Hajj and Muzeini were sitting in a vehicle loaded with weapons, including a Kalishnakov for each of them, corresponding ammunition, three 9-mm pistols, six hand grenades and $137,000 in cash [8,9].  As a side note, this quantity of cash further shows the importance of Hajj in the AQSA hierarchy.  Hajj had actually been turned in by a currency exchanger he was meeting in order to have the cash exchanged for Saudi riyals [10].  When Hajj and his driver found themselves potentially trapped, Muzeini did the only thing he felt he could do and drove the ’98 green Nissan Patrol through the checkpoint, refusing to stop in an attempt to get his boss to safety [9].  Hajj and Muzeini were pursued by patrol cars through the Nasim district of Riyadh and fired erratically upon them [8,9].  Luckily no Saudi civilians or security forces were injured or killed [8].  At an intersection in the same district, Hajj and Muzeini were eventually gunned down by the security forces while still in their Nissan [9].  Hajj’s role as AQSA chief executive had come to a violent climax.  Original reports reflected the belief that Muzeini was actually the wanted Abdulrahman al-Yazji (B-25) but this was proven untrue as Muzeini was merely an AQSA foot soldier and Hajj’s driver [9]. The death of the Yemeni national was hailed as a great success against Al-Qaida by the US, the Saudis, and their allies [8].  Unbeknownst to all involved, Hajj’s removal from the helm of AQSA only cleared the way for a madman, who had severe and demented intentions for both the Saudis and the Western expatriates within his country.

The Development of Abdulaziz al-Muqrin

Following the decapitation strike in March 2004, AQSA again found its footing and named Abdulaziz al-Muqrin as the official executive of the organization [11,12].  The reign of terror that was to come would thrust the Al-Qaida name back into the spotlight that had since been dominated by the Iraqi invasion and Zarqawi’s insurgency in that country.  Muqrin would make AQSA a formidable contemporary of both Zarqawi’s organization, and the regrouping al-Qaida network in the tribal agencies of Pakistan.  Muqrin would be referred to as “Al-Qaida’s Angel of Death [13].”

Abdulaziz al-Muqrin was born in the al-Suwaidi district of Riyadh and subsequently raised there [11,13].  Muqrin dropped out of high school by the late 1980’s with the intention of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan [11,13].  As a young man he developed a radical religious perspective and soon dropped away from classmates and recreation alike [13].  In school he had been a goalkeeper for the football team, but by age 17 in 1991 he had managed to travel to Afghanistan [13].  He was determined to wage jihad.  This goal he was able to achieve and more so, as he met with Osama Bin Laden and fought alongside his mujahidin [11].  Muqrin attended and subsequently became a trainer at the Jihad Wal camp outside of Khost [13].  It can be seen that Muqrin was indoctrinated in violent religious extremism from a very early age, probably due to being raised in al-Suwaidi with its reputation of radicalism.  Muqrin did not just preach his beliefs of jihad but vehemently acted upon them.  He was a manifestation of what extremists view a dedicated jihadi to be.  The youth found himself in several conflict zones in the aftermath of his experiences in Afghanistan [11,13].  Strangely, he foreshadowed his future conflict with his own homeland by being acquainted with the group of jihadists who perpetrated the 1995 bombing in Riyadh which killed six Americans [13].  He fought alongside other religious extremists in Algeria and was even involved in smuggling weapons from Spain to Algeria via Morocco [11,13].  He had actually been captured by the Algerians and had escaped.  In January 1996 he and ten other Saudis entered Bosnia via Croatia [14].  He fought in Bosnia against the Serbians alongside other Saudi youth and acted as a trainer there [11,13].  Finally, Muqrin found himself in the once and future jihadist hotbed of Somalia where he fought against groups trying to provide government to the anarchy that pervaded that nation [11,13].  By 1999, Muqrin was captured by the Ethiopians and extradited back to Saudi Arabia [11,13].  The sentence for the charges against him was four years [13].  Memorization of the Quran and good prison behavior led to the sentence being commuted to merely two years [11,13].  The nonsensical promotion of memorizing the Quran in order to be released early from detention has been in existence in several predominantly Muslim countries for years.  Muqrin was but one of many beneficiaries of the law.  Upon release Muqrin did not settle into a normal Saudi life but again sought out militancy in Afghanistan [11,13].  He arrived after the 9/11 attacks and was there for the war which followed [11,13].  It was there that he once again joined the ranks of Osama bin Laden’s fighters in Al-Qaida [11,13].  He was reportedly trained by Saif al-Adel and became an effective fighter and trainer [15].  In fact, he had developed a reputation for being harsh on his trainees during his time at Jihad Wal in the early 1990s [13].  Muqrin did as many foreign jihadists did in Afghanistan in late 2001:  he fought along the front lines for Brigade 55, he passed through Tora Bora, fighting there, surviving airstrikes and battle, and eventually crossed into Iran in order to return home [16].  After these accomplishments Muqrin joined a wave of militants, trained by Al-Qaida and other groups in Afghanistan, who were hell-bent on returning home and taking the war to their nations of origin [13].  Muqrin’s association with KSM and Nashiri’s efforts to bring jihad to the Kingdom, after the collapse of the Afghan extremist haven, provided him with the necessary credentials to be a leading militant figure for the returnees.  Muqrin led training camps set up within Saudi Arabia by the Ayiri network during 2002 and the beginning of 2003 in preparation for Saif al-Adel and Yusef al-Ayiri’s war against the Kingdom [17].  In fact, Muqrin led courses on assassinations performed from motorcycles and vehicles, as well as by bombings [17].  The courses began as early as January of 2002 and were aimed at culminating in the assassinations of intelligence and security officials [17].  Muqrin would not be constrained by familial ties either, as he was reported to have abandoned his wife and daughter in order to lead his life of violent crime [11].  Muqrin proved himself to be so deadly because he was determined to attack Westerners in Saudi Arabia as often as possible, with randomness and efficiency.  He lacked the desire to make his attacks grandiose, but found soft target attacks to be sufficient if carried out with brutal resolve.  This made him a deadly and feared militant commander.  This made his group more lethal and feared as well.  Also, as can be seen above, Muqrin did not have as close a personal relationship with Osama bin Laden as did his two predecessors, which allowed him to form AQSA into its own unique entity within the global scope of the organization and jihad as a whole. 

Abdulaziz al-Muqrin

Muqrin was assisted in his campaign by his senior most deputy Faisal al-Dakheel, the cousin of the fiery ideologue, Ahmed [18,19].  Dakheel mysteriously was described by AQSA releases as having initially “lived in sin” prior to his radicalization, no doubt referring to petty crime or drug usage [16].  He was transfixed by TV images of the war in Chechnya and soon became determined to participate in jihad there [16,20].  Dakheel however, was unable to make it to the Chechen rebels after his al-Faruq training in Afghanistan and thus returned home [16,20].  Once the 9/11 attacks occurred, he returned to Afghanistan, joined al-Qaida’s Brigade 55, and fought on the front lines [16,20].  As such, he fought against the US invasion as well, and when the lines broke, fled into Iran in order to make it back to his native country [16,20].  Once back in his homeland he had assisted Muqrin in developing an incredibly dangerous portion of the Ayiri network [17].  Initially he had desired to conduct attacks independently with his own men, as he was unaware of the Ayiri assimilation of cells.  Yet Turki al-Dandani introduced him to Muqrin and folded him into AQSA [20,21].  As part of Muqrin’s cell, he was placed in charge of the unit which was tasked with conducting assassinations of Saudi security and intelligence officers [17].  For example, very early in 2002, Muqrin had given returning militants, including Dakheel, a two-week course in assassination methods [17].  The majority of Dakheel’s attempts were failures or postponements [17].  Some actual attempts occurred (the Dhali and Huwairini instances) under Dakheel’s direction and he even led the ambush of security forces at the home of Khalid al-Farraj [17].  Dakheel and his brother Bandar had taken part in the very first skirmish between militants and Saudi security forces; an event which took place in the Shifa neighborhood of Riyadh, when forces attempted to arrest those gathered to listen to Ahmed al-Dakheel’s (the man who had recruited Faisal) radical sermons [20,22].  With all of his combined experience, Dakheel rose through the ranks when his captain took control of the organization. 

Operation Volcano And The Fahya Battle

Muqrin was named head of AQSA shortly after Hajj’s demise and he began his war soon thereafter [11].  April of 2004 was undeniably the beginning of Muqrin’s assault on the Saudi populace and their foreign workforce.  It began with a series of car bombing attempts and shootouts in and around Riyadh.  By April 18, 2004 the Saudis had found and defused three car bombs within Riyadh [23,24].  The third car was a 4-wheel drive vehicle which had been sought after by the Saudis for some time [23].  It had been parked in an area where previous gun battles had occurred [23].  The two previous car bombs had been discovered on the same day, just a few days before the third [23].  Both were also defused [23,24].  By April 20, two more truck bombs were found in Riyadh, with the perpetrators fleeing the area in a Jeep [25].  Both of these bombs were also defused [25].  It was evident that AQSA wished to take a heavy toll in the capital.  With five attempted car bombings in a week, the group had unsettled the frangible peace of the capital, just as it had earlier in the month with a series of shootouts.

The best-known shootout from this time period occurred on April 12, 2004 in the al-Fahya district of Riyadh [26,27].  Rakan al-Saikhan (B-2), allegedly a suspect in the COLE bombing due to his links with the perpetrators, as well as his compatriot Nasir al-Rashid (B-19) were among a large group of militants pursued by security forces [28,29].  It should be noted that while Saikhan was reported in the media to be a COLE bombing conspirator, his links were actually more to Mohamed Hamdi al-Ahdal and therefore not necessarily to Nashiri and the central plotters of that attack during the time in question [30,31].  That being said, the jihadist is believed to have assisted Nashiri and his men during their escape from Pakistan to the Peninsula by providing them with false passports and entrance [32]. He was also known to have worked in procurement of weaponry for the network [32].  These facts alone placed him in venerated jihadist company.  Saikhan represented another dangerous militant belonging to the extensive group of extremists linked to the Yemeni radical community. 

As for the Fahya gun battle in Riyadh, the clash began as security forces followed and attempted to pull over a suspicious car in that eastern district of the capital [26,27].  The two men in the vehicle fired upon the forces and fled to a safe house where several more militants poured forth and joined the escalating shootout [26,27].  In the end, the militants left one of their own, an individual named Khalid Abdullah al-Subait dead in the streets, trapped in his blazing vehicle [33].  Also left in the streets was a deceased member of the security forces [26,27]. The Security Forces Private, Ghadir al-Qahtani had been killed when a militant named Mohamed al-Farraj exited from Subait’s vehicle before it was engulfed and fired upon his pursuers in order to facilitate his escape [34].  One of the other militants actually fired an RPG at Saudi forces during the battle, further proving the amount of sophistication, money, and advanced weaponry these jihadists were in possession of [26].  Four additional Saudi forces were wounded [26].  The militants, with Saikhan and Rashid in tow, escaped the security forces while their compatriots proceeded on a joyride out of the capital where some of them eventually fired upon unsuspecting security forces and checkpoints set up for them [34,35,36].  This left an additional four Saudi security men dead in the militants’ path after they shot up a checkpoint in Uniza, Qassim province [36].  The checkpoint killings occurred the day after the Fayha shootout, and the same day that the first two car bombs were discovered [35,36]. 

In fact, it appears the security force murders were conducted by Muqrin’s men who were tasked with bringing the aforementioned car bombs to Riyadh.  In the process, they had become frightened, abandoned their gear and fired upon their enemies.  Their escape had left a trail of blood, but had also inadvertently robbed Muqrin of vital assets [37].

Muqrin’s plans for the car bombs had been secondary to his actual goal for the month of April 2004.  In what was dubbed Operation Volcano, Muqrin envisioned hijacking three oil tankers and having them drive to the Diplomatic Quarter of Riyadh in order to detonate with excruciating loss of Western life [37].  In addition, a car bomb with an assault crew, under the care of his deputy Faisal al-Dakheel, was to be used against the new Vinnel Corporation home across the city [37]. 

For this mission, Muqrin had specifically trained four obsequious suicide bombers to drive the hijacked vehicles:  Mohamed al-Ghaith, Mishaal al-Farraj (the brother of Khalid al-Farraj), Fahd Farraj al-Juwair (of the same family) and Dakheel al-Obaid [37].  Ghaith was young and wealthy and thus had even provided an additional vehicle: a bulldozer to be used to clear a path during one of the attacks. However, Muqrin’s unease escalated after a shootout on April 5 left one of his men dead and another captured [37].  In the end, Muqrin called off the attack, instead relying on one of his most trusted lieutenants, Saud al-Qotaini al-Otaibi (B-7), to provide 6 car bombs for the attacks.  Otaibi’s men had expertly constructed a prodigious number of vehicle borne explosives at a facility in Qasim province, but a series of unfortunate events befell the militants as they attempted to transport the vehicles [37].  Only one made it to Muqrin, while the others were abandoned by his men out of fear or via their own negligence [37].  Amidst the planning phases, several of the men partaking in Operation Volcano were residing at Khalid al-Subait’s safehouse in Fahya.  This included additional trained suicide bombers named Abdulaziz al-Mudaihesh and Fahd al-Farraj, as well as senior militants such as Saikhan and Rashid [37].  Security forces set up to raid the neighborhood and followed Subait’s car until the first shots were fired. The chaotic battle that ensued, no doubt led to the rash reactions of Muqrin’s men in abandoning valuable car bombs and attacking checkpoints at random [37].

As for the dead militant from the Fahya shootout, Khalid al-Subait, was a well-known veteran jihadist [38].  Not only had Subait fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s, but he had also built up a comradery with Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailim, known as Ibn Khattab or Emir Khattab, the leader of the Arab Mujahidin in Chechnya [38].  As such, Subait had fought in Tajikistan and Chechnya as well.  Subait acted as a teacher and a fighter during the second Chechen war before facing severe injuries from a Russian airstrike [38].  Upon his return home to Saudi Arabia, Subait did not participate in active jihad, but rather played the role of fundraiser for the Chechen cause, along with List B member Issa al-Aushan (B-15) [38].  He was galvanized by both the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan into joining, facilitating, and training with Ayiri’s network by 2003 [38]. 

In the meantime, US State Department officials, after observing the Fayha shootout and the previous shootout on April 5 in Riyadh, which had also left a militant dead, were growing concerned with the state of affairs in the kingdom [24,39].  In the April 5 incident, the battle occurred as security forces in Riyadh attempted to apprehend two individuals in a white pickup truck with stolen license plates [39].  In the resulting gunfire, Abdulrahman Naif Rabeh al-Sahli was killed and Abdullah Ghallab al-Sahli wounded and captured [39].  While neither were members of List B, they were still wanted for their connections to the militant group [39].  The battle, while not as significant as the Fayha exchange, helped to herald the wave of attempted April attacks, and it greatly worried the Americans.  It also worried Muqrin as can be seen in the fact that Sahli’s arrest seemed to throw off his mental fortitude with regards to Operation Volcano [37].  Subsequent incoming intelligence led the State Department to order all non-essential American personal to leave the country [24].  The intelligence foreshadowed the operation and warned of a series of car bombings [24]. 

Unknown to the Saudis or Americans at the time, the Fayha shootout was not a victory for AQSA.  Both Saikhan and Rashid, who were presumably targets of the Saudis leading up to the fight, were seriously wounded [28,29].  Abdulrahman Obaidallah al-Khalaf al-Harbi, a militant of Muhaya fame was also purportedly involved in the battle, as well as a cohort of Saikhan’s named Awad Mohamed Ali al-Awad [29,40].  Both of these men escaped unharmed with an unknown quantity of additional jihadists [29,40].

The Traffic Directorate Bombing

Shortly after the Fayha shootout and failed bombings, AQSA scored its first blow of the spring campaign.  On April 21, 2004 a car bomb successfully detonated at the old security HQ building in Riyadh which was home to the Traffic Directorate [41,42,43].  The complex housed the HQ for both the traffic control and emergency services [41].  In regards to Saud al-Qotaini al-Otaibi’s bomb producing venture, a militant named Saud Abdullah al-Jaadi is believed directly responsible for assembling the vehicles utilized in the failed car bombings and this successful one [44]. The Blazer carrying the bomb was driven by one Abdulaziz Ali Abdulaziz al-Mudaihesh, accompanied by the young Fahd Abdullah al-Farraj, and the detonation killed bystanders and police [45,46]. Colonel Abdulrahman Saleh of the security forces was among those killed [41].  The overall low death toll was due to the fact that the Blazer was stopped at the gate by security forces and the bombers had to set off the explosion prematurely, several meters away from the entrance [41,42,43].  At least four were killed immediately including a civilian employee, two police, including Col. Saleh, and an 11-year old Syrian girl [41,43].  The seven-story building took significant damage and almost 150 were wounded [41,43,47].  The scene was chaotic with debris, frantic residents of the neighborhood in the streets, the frenzied response of emergency services, and the wariness of the potential for additional bombers [41,43].  The hospitals were flooded with the injured and Capt. Ibrahim Mubarak al-Dosari of the traffic police soon joined the rest of the dead when doctors failed to save him [41]. 

On April 9, just prior to the string of car bombing incidents, Muqrin had called on all Muslims to kill Americans and announced plans to attack Arab countries in alliance with America [48].  The video release displayed a masked and demanding Muqrin instigating the insurgency with his words and warning the security forces not to interfere with his jihad [48]. Soon Muqrin spoke again, on April 27, and attempted to deny responsibility for the Traffic Directorate attack, propagating the incorrect idea that the fictional al-Haramain Brigades (who had claimed responsibility on April 22) was to blame for attacks against the Saudi infrastructure and populace [49].  The April 27 Muqrin broadcast allowed for his spilling forth more vitriolic comments which made his goals abundantly clear to his audience:  “The Jews, the Americas and Crusaders in general will remain the targets of our coming attacks…and the apostate Saudi government will be incapable of protecting their interests of providing security for them…We warn Muslims to stay away from Americans and their civilian and military sites so that they will not not be harmed when the infidels are targeted…We reiterate our previous declared commitment of the jihad policy of al-Qaida to target the Crusaders, Jews and apostates [50].”  Despite Muqrin’s denial, an attempt to help move public opinion on his side, his harsh words for the Saudi government made his intentions and actions transparent.  He and AQSA were truly behind the attack.  By July 2004, a video was released to prove AQSA culpability complete with statements from the bomber Mudaihesh and operative Fahd al-Farraj as they prepared for the bombing and offered justification for their actions [45].  The video also demonstrated puerile behavior from both suicide bombers, perhaps revealing less of a stringent force of martyrs available to Muqrin, but rather a unit of young men susceptible to radical religious exposition.

Following the failure of the multifarious car bomb campaign, but the success of the Traffic Directorate detonation, aimed at Saudi infrastructure and not foreign “apostates,” the next chapter examines the explosion of violence throughout the nation. Muqrin and his men were finally under extraordinary pressure from the authorities, but were able to shift methodology to soft-target attacks in order to increase the lethality of the insurgency.

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