SERIES: Predators Of The Khorasan – Abu Haitham Al-Yemeni; First Al-Qaida Militant Eliminated Via Drone Strike In Pakistan

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Having discussed the history and circumstances of America’s first drone strike within Pakistani territory, we move to the next phase, in which the CIA began to actively hunt major al-Qaida figures in the FATA. At this time however, the drone strikes were still not the preferred method for elimination of high value targets within the tribal agencies. We will observe how this evolved in 2005, and discuss the opening casualty suffered by the terrorist network in the impending Predator campaign.

Read more: SERIES: Predators Of The Khorasan – Abu Haitham Al-Yemeni; First Al-Qaida Militant Eliminated Via Drone Strike In Pakistan

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

A Prince of Jalalabad

If the drones were yet to be the primary asset for incursions into Pakistan, we must discuss the tactics available at the time. They were large scale operations involving soldiers on the ground in hostile territory, as opposed to unmanned drones assassinating dangerous individuals. As such, in early 2005, an American raid was planned.  Militant officials and al-Qaida deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri were expected to be in attendance at a compound in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas; specifically the agency of North Waziristan1. While the raid failed to materialize, the aftermath revealed the evolution of American strategy in the region, and the nascent shift of tactics towards usage of the Predator drones. Among those that departed the conference was mid-level militant Abu Haitham al-Yemeni2.  Thus commenced a months long operation in which the jihadist was tracked, in hopes of his movements leading the CIA to another opportunity to permanently remove Zawahiri from action.  The CIA was believed to have been following Abu Haitham via his usage of his satellite phone3.  Having returned to Afghanistan, the wait was on to see to where or to whom the Yemeni would lead them.     

A native of Taiz, Yemen, and member of the al-Amari tribe, Abu Haitham arrived in Afghanistan in 1999 in order to train at al-Qaida’s al-Faruq camp4.  He underwent advanced instruction afterwards and fought against the Northern Alliance on the front lines at Kabul5.  After the US invasion, he joined retreating combatants and fled from Kandahar to Bermal and eventually Shah I Kot in Paktika, wherein he was part of the developing fierce Arab resistance6. At Bermal, several Arabs vowed to remain in Afghanistan and not to abandon their positions further7. Abu Haitham was among them, and named as one of their commanders8. As such, he participated in the harsh winter battle of Shah I Kot in March 20029. The battle, known as Operation Anaconda, aimed to drive foreign forces from Paktika and was the largest engagement since Tora Bora the previous December. The clash was costly for the Americans, al-Qaida, and other militant forces. The foreign elements were broken and most pushed across the border in Pakistan’s FATA, where insurgent forces coalesced.

Al-Qaida paramilitary commander Abdulhadi al-Iraqi relied on a variety of survivors from the 2001 invasion and Shah I Kot veterans to conduct any semblance of this insurgency. Among them still was Abu Haitham. Guantanamo detainee Harun Shirzad al-Afghani is revealed in his Guantanamo assessment to have been the connection between the temperamental Abdulhadi in his lair in the Shakai Valley of South Waziristan and Abu Haitham, operating in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan10.  Harun al-Afghani himself commanded a squad of fighters in Nangarhar, in conjunction with Abu Haitham11.  In a notable sequence of events, Abu Haitham and his cohorts in Jalalabad targeted local Afghan civil authorities with explosives disguised as books12.  In one bombing they injured several policemen in a Nangarhar police headquarters, attempting to assassinate their chief13.  In addition, they led attacks against American and Afghan forces as well14. It is known that Abu Haitham conveyed his experience in explosives manufacturing to local militants, readily preparing them for the insurgency15.

While the Egyptian Abu al-Hassan al-Masri was stated to oversee operations in Jalalabad in 200316, it is possible that Abu Haitham was an original primary commander of paramilitary forces in Jalalabad. However by October 2004, al-Qaida internal operations manager Abu Faraj al-Libi directly reported to bin Laden that notorious militant Abu Laith al-Libi, upon swearing a partial oath, was now responsible for operations in that particular enclave17. In fact, Abu Haitham established control in Jalalabad alongside of Abu Laith al-Libi, maintaining a presence there for the Libyan’s benefit later18. Abu Laith was reticent to swear fully to al-Qaida due to his obligations to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and due to his hesitance in speaking for the entirety of that group19. Presumably, Abu Haitham had no qualms about swearing to al-Qaida, and is referred to as “one of the princes” of Jalalabad, acknowledging his rank20. However, Abu Laith was the desired overall commander of Jalalabad, thus the Yemeni appears to have remained as a respected, but mid-level commander. Abu Haitham also used Harun al-Afghani as a courier between himself and an al-Qaida financial officer known as Abdullah Hamas al-Filistini, displaying the interconnectedness of the various al-Qaida units operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan21. He was close with and associated with Abu Mansur al-Harbi for example, an experienced and efficient al-Qaida trainer and combatant22. In another incident that was actually described by Harbi, Abu Haitham was halted at a checkpoint by Afghan forces, compelling the Yemeni to exit his vehicle and with a handgun, and fight against the opposing unit23. Killing local security members, Abu Haitham hijacked an additional vehicle in order to aid in his escape24.

Only known photograph of Abu Haitham al-Yemeni

A Cancelled Raid

In early 2005, a dramatic scenario developed, as American officials garnered intelligence giving them some confidence in the location of Ayman Zawahiri25.  Intercepted communications placed Zawahiri in North Waziristan for the aforementioned meeting of militant commanders26.  Thus, US Special Forces were prepared, and boarded onto an AC-130 gunships in order to parachute into the agency wherein they were to destabilize al-Qaida, via capturing or killing Zawahiri27.  CIA director Porter Goss urged the Defense Department to move forward, but by the nature of the mission, the amount of personnel increased28.  A contingent of SEALs was to jump from the C-130s and paraglide to a staging point from which to launch their assault within North Waziristan29.  Following this, they were to exfiltrate with their potential captives to another waypoint where Army helicopters would ferry them across the border into Afghanistan30.  The initial change to the plan called for a sizeable amount of Army Rangers to provide security for the helicopters inside of Afghanistan31. With the Army Rangers, SEALs, and CIA operatives all involved, Rumsfeld felt that the mission amounted to an invasion of Pakistan, and that the fragile alliance between the two nations would be risked if the Americans moved forward32.  President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan would need to approve the plan and he assuredly would not be willing to do so33. This caused Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to be leery of the mission and he canceled at the last moment34. 

Among those who attended the meeting and whose communications were intercepted was Abu Haitham al-Yemeni35. After departing the conference, the CIA remained close to Abu Haitham, tracking his movements in hopes that he might lead them to vital al-Qaida targets36. The patience of his observers expired with the capture of al-Qaida’s internal operations manager.

We discuss Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, and the internal politics of al-Qaida during the post-invasion era within separate chapters of this series. Pertaining to the subject of Abu Haitham, we must briefly reiterate the capture of Abu Faraj and one particular repercussion as it relates to the drone campaign. It occurred that Abu Faraj traveled to the city of Mardan in the eponymous district of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province on May 2, unaware that Pakistani authorities were alerted to his impending arrival37.  Hidden Pakistani forces ambushed and eventually apprehended the Libyan as he was being ferried to his destination38. The reverberations of the event were felt not just amongst al-Qaida officials, but within the CIA units hunting for important targets and their first Predator drone victim.

The Zero Strikes

Before we progress to the second successful drone strike in Pakistan, it is important to note the recent history of the lethal new assassination device. Prior to the first recorded success, against Nek Mohamed Wazir in South Waziristan, the method was employed in Afghanistan during the early stages of the war in both a futile attempt to rescue a potential Pashtun political leader and in a wistful attempt against Osama bin Laden. Known as Abdul Haq, the Pashtun commander was supported by some in the US Senate and Defense community, but brazenly entered Afghanistan on October 21, 2001, ill-equipped, oblivious, and utterly unprepared to deal with the Taliban threat39. Previously working with the CIA against the Soviets, Abdul Haq was seen as a possible unifier among the disparate divisions of Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan; an unlikely hope of creating a lasting alliance against the Taliban40. Now disagreements with the CIA precipitated the obdurate leader choosing to venture alone into enemy territory from his Pakistani haven. Shortly after entering Afghanistan, the stubborn Abdul Haq and his guards were subjected to the wrath of their foes and called for assistance from the US military41. The only US aircraft available was an armed Predator drone, subsequently utilized in combat for the first time. Despite firing upon the encircling Taliban, the Predator failed to prevent the inevitable, and the maverick Abdul Haq was apprehended and summarily executed42.

The result of the next early strike was a rapidly forgotten incident in which the CIA utilized a drone haphazardly, resulting in the first harm to civilians from the aircraft. As it happened, some intelligence officials incorrectly asserted that bin Laden may have retreated inward to Afghanistan after Tora Bora, as opposed to the reality of his abscondence into Pakistan. As such, observers were trained on the Zhawar Kili cave complex in Khost province, an erstwhile redoubt comprised of at least 35 caves utilized by warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his men43. Yet in January 2002, the complex was the recipient of American wrath and severe bombardment. On February 4, three locale male villagers [A], one of a noticeable height, commenced a sojourn to the complex in order to retrieve scrap metals from the various destroyed vehicles and equipment44. Whilst there at 1500 and lingering on an apex of the heights amidst the caves, they were targeted by a Predator drone and its munition, the hellfire missile45. Two of the men were killed, while the third joined them soon after46. Their demise was the catalyst for intense speculation in the coming days.

At least 50 American military and forensics officials ascended to the site in order to gather biological remains, with the sincere hope of matching DNA from the “tall” individual to bin Laden’s family47. Even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld refused to dismiss the idea that bin Laden’s assassination was pending confirmation48. By February 12 as the gathering of forensic evidence was completed, even though no determinations were concluded, US officials and the press began to refer to the targeted men as top al-Qaida officials. Random accessories found at the site, including radios, ammunition, and English documents (from a former paramilitary complex destroyed in previous bombings, no less), were insinuated as evidence to the men and their nefarious intent49. It was also revealed that the CIA was tracking them for hours, and while the US military slowly sought to take some credit for the strike, it appeared that intelligence assets were simply too eager to achieve a monumental assassination50. The Washington Post was the first to report that the men were simple locals, excavating the decimated complex for metals, inappropriately and incorrectly targeted for death51. The US military gave half-hearted attempts to defend the strike and proclaim their confidence52, but rapidly the memory of the event faded, and the CIA and military were able to deflect from the responsibility of the failure, never accepting blame53. By comparison the strike against Nek Mohamed Wazir was much smoother and less controversial. Returning to 2005, the second such assassination attempt in Pakistani territory was to also prove straightforward.

The Second Strike

Unlike the captured Libyan Abu Faraj, Abu Haitham al-Yemeni was unknown to the mass media in 2005. However, this changed when he became just the second major militant figure to be killed via an American Predator drone strike in Pakistan; the first al-Qaida official to suffer this fate.  It was asserted that the CIA was actively tracking him in the week prior to his death54.  This was likely an attempt to obscure the fact that the CIA had infiltrated some form of al-Qaida communications (and Abu Haitham’s satellite phone) back in January prior to the cancelled raid. The decision to eliminate the Yemeni was made once it became clear to the CIA that he would perhaps go into hiding55.  This was precipitated by the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi56. A further choice was made to neutralize him while traveling, being driven by a lone Pashtun combatant, as opposed to targeting him amongst a potential group setting of militants57. Abu Haitham was assassinated with a local militant named Samiullah Khan when a Predator drone destroyed their vehicle around 0200 on May 8, 200558. The explosion was reported in Torikhel, outside of Mir Ali, North Waziristan59. The Pakistanis initially denied the strike via their Information Minister, with other officials alluding to a car-bombing being responsible for the deaths60. US officials subsequently confirmed the incident as a CIA Predator drone strike61. As per the CIA agreement with Pakistan, the authorities of that nation were informed prior to the strike62.  This was contrary to initial reporting at the time, claiming that the CIA was enabled to fire when ready against militant targets63. Initial reporting incorrectly claimed that Abu Haitham was among those expected to assume the duties left vacant by Abu Faraj al-Libi64. ABC News broke the story first, confirming the kill and drone strike five days after they occurred65. This contrasts with how rapidly drone strikes in Pakistan were to be reported in the future, once the campaign intensified. Much later, in 2008, Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), an al-Qaida militant involved with counterintelligence work, listed Abu Haitham among the dead in his 2008 document, Martyrs in a Time of Alienation66.  In this document Adam laments that Abu Haitham was traced and neutralized after using a satellite phone for extended periods of time, undoubtedly pinpointing his location for the CIA and confirming the method employed to uncover him67. 

The Yemeni’s movements though, were probably not directly related to Abu Faraj al-Libi’s capture. In fact, Abu Haitham was called by his superiors to return to Waziristan from his base in Jalalabad68.  After an illness delayed him, he was able to embark on his final journey69.  Since Abu Haitham operated in Afghanistan, the fact that the drone killed him in Torikhel, North Waziristan demonstrates that he was returning to or fleeing to the FATA in the belief that he would be safe from the American reach therein.  At the time of his demise it was inconceivable to the militants that the Americans would conduct cross border raids or airstrikes in the tribal agencies.  There they felt that their most significant threat was spawned by the Pakistani authorities70.   It was initially reported that once he was located, Haitham al-Yemeni was followed in hopes that he would lead operatives to Osama bin Laden himself71, which obviously inflates his importance as a militant leader.  Yet given his appearance at the conference in North Waziristan, it is reasonable that the CIA suspected that he could take them to someone higher. 

As the initial al-Qaida victim eliminated via drone in the FATA, Abu Haitham is a fairly mundane character overall. Despite this, some sources exaggerated his occupation within the network, incorrectly asserting that the Yemeni was the number 3 leader within al-Qaida72. His importance was indeed inflated, although he still represented the available generation of al-Qaida fighters and ground commanders, remnants of their days in Afghanistan, and graduates of al-Faruq now utilized for war. For the CIA, the Predators proved effective in their mission. With Abu Faraj al-Libi now captured, the Libyan was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques in order to ascertain information on and the locations of significant al-Qaida figures in the FATA, specifically external operations commander Hamza Rabia73. The drones were honing their search for central leadership personalities. The question remained, how fast and efficient could the drones be in neutralizing these individuals before they could conduct their own operations and militancy.

CITATIONS and SUBSTANTIVE NOTES:

  • [A] The locals were identified as Daraz Khan (the tall man), Mir Ahmed, and Jehanghir Khan, all of Khost, all aged between 28 and 31.
  1. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  2. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  3. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  4. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  5. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  6. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  7. al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fazul Harun, Vol. 1, by Harun Fazul, a biography of Harun Fazul and history of al-Qaida, February 26, 2009 ↩︎
  8. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  9. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  10. Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  11. Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  12. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  13. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  14. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  15. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  16. Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  17. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  18. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  19. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  20. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  21. Guantanamo Detainee Assessment, Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, ISN 1348, https://wikileaks.org/gitmo/prisoner/3148.html ↩︎
  22. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 / Terrorist Designation of Azzam Abdullah Zureik Al-Maulid Al-Subhi, US State Department Release, August 7, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196105.htm ↩︎
  23. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  24. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  25. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  26. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  27. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html / Into Thin Air, by Evan Thomas, Newsweek, September 2, 2007, https://www.newsweek.com/thin-air-100565 ↩︎
  28. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  29. Into Thin Air, by Evan Thomas, Newsweek, September 2, 2007, https://www.newsweek.com/thin-air-100565 ↩︎
  30. Into Thin Air, by Evan Thomas, Newsweek, September 2, 2007, https://www.newsweek.com/thin-air-100565 ↩︎
  31. Into Thin Air, by Evan Thomas, Newsweek, September 2, 2007, https://www.newsweek.com/thin-air-100565 ↩︎
  32. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  33. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  34. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  35. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  36. U.S. Aborted Raid on Qaeda in Pakistan in ’05, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, July 8, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/washington/08intel.html ↩︎
  37. Can This Man Help Capture bin Laden?, by Tim McGirk, Time Magazine, May 8, 2005, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1059058,00.html ↩︎
  38. Can This Man Help Capture bin Laden?, by Tim McGirk, Time Magazine, May 8, 2005, https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1059058,00.html ↩︎
  39. CIA Sent Aircraft To Rescue Slain Leader, by Vernon Loeb and Marc Kaufman, The Washington Post, October 29, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/10/29/cia-sent-aircraft-to-rescue-slain-leader/712500ee-d160-4df5-9c29-d2d8b37151d2/ ↩︎
  40. CIA Sent Aircraft To Rescue Slain Leader, by Vernon Loeb and Marc Kaufman, The Washington Post, October 29, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/10/29/cia-sent-aircraft-to-rescue-slain-leader/712500ee-d160-4df5-9c29-d2d8b37151d2/ ↩︎
  41. CIA Sent Aircraft To Rescue Slain Leader, by Vernon Loeb and Marc Kaufman, The Washington Post, October 29, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/10/29/cia-sent-aircraft-to-rescue-slain-leader/712500ee-d160-4df5-9c29-d2d8b37151d2/ ↩︎
  42. CIA Sent Aircraft To Rescue Slain Leader, by Vernon Loeb and Marc Kaufman, The Washington Post, October 29, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/10/29/cia-sent-aircraft-to-rescue-slain-leader/712500ee-d160-4df5-9c29-d2d8b37151d2/ ↩︎
  43. Remembering Daraz Khan, the first Afghan killed by a Hellfire missile fired by a CIA Predator drone, by Matthew Nasuti, Kabul Press.org, December 27, 2009, https://www.kabulpress.org/article4438.html ↩︎
  44. Remembering Daraz Khan, the first Afghan killed by a Hellfire missile fired by a CIA Predator drone, by Matthew Nasuti, Kabul Press.org, December 27, 2009, https://www.kabulpress.org/article4438.html ↩︎
  45. Remembering Daraz Khan, the first Afghan killed by a Hellfire missile fired by a CIA Predator drone, by Matthew Nasuti, Kabul Press.org, December 27, 2009, https://www.kabulpress.org/article4438.html ↩︎
  46. Remembering Daraz Khan, the first Afghan killed by a Hellfire missile fired by a CIA Predator drone, by Matthew Nasuti, Kabul Press.org, December 27, 2009, https://www.kabulpress.org/article4438.html ↩︎
  47. U.S. tries to identify target of airstrike, CNN, February 10, 2002, https://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/02/10/ret.afghanistan.search/index.html ↩︎
  48. U.S. tries to identify target of airstrike, CNN, February 10, 2002, https://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/02/10/ret.afghanistan.search/index.html ↩︎
  49. U.S. checking clues from Afghan airstrike site, CNN, February 12, 2002, https://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/02/11/ret.afghanistan.search/index.html ↩︎
  50. U.S. checking clues from Afghan airstrike site, CNN, February 12, 2002, https://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/02/11/ret.afghanistan.search/index.html ↩︎
  51. Men Hit In U.S. Missile Strike Were Scavengers, by Doug Struck, The Washington Post, February 11, 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/02/12/men-hit-in-us-missile-strike-were-scavengers/e3807a8e-01c3-47d6-af62-46896d477afa/ ↩︎
  52. Pentagon Defends Missile Strikes on Afghan Complex, ABC News, February 12, 2002, https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80148&page=1 ↩︎
  53. Remembering Daraz Khan, the first Afghan killed by a Hellfire missile fired by a CIA Predator drone, by Matthew Nasuti, Kabul Press.org, December 27, 2009, https://www.kabulpress.org/article4438.html ↩︎
  54. Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, by Dana Priest, The Washington Post, May 15, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051401121.html ↩︎
  55. Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, by Dana Priest, The Washington Post, May 15, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051401121.html ↩︎
  56. Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, by Dana Priest, The Washington Post, May 15, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051401121.html ↩︎
  57. CIA Drone Kills al-Qaida Operative, NBC News, May 13, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7847008 ↩︎
  58. CIA Drone Kills al-Qaida Operative, NBC News, May 13, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7847008 ↩︎
  59. Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, by Dana Priest, The Washington Post, May 15, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051401121.html ↩︎
  60. CIA Drone Kills al-Qaida Operative, NBC News, May 13, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7847008 ↩︎
  61. CIA Drone Kills al-Qaida Operative, NBC News, May 13, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7847008 ↩︎
  62. The Unblinking Stare, by Steve Coll, November 17, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare ↩︎
  63. CIA Drone Kills al-Qaida Operative, NBC News, May 13, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7847008 ↩︎
  64. Exclusive: CIA Aircraft Kills Terrorist, ABC News, May 13, 2005, https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=755961 ↩︎
  65. Exclusive: CIA Aircraft Kills Terrorist, ABC News, May 13, 2005, https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=755961 ↩︎
  66. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  67. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  68. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  69. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  70. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  71. Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official, by Dana Priest, The Washington Post, May 15, 2005, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/14/AR2005051401121.html ↩︎
  72. CIA Missile Kills Al-Qaeda Leader In Pakistan: Report, by Aamir Malik, Arab News, May 15, 2005, https://www.arabnews.com/node/266958 ↩︎
  73. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Commmittee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎

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