Hamza Al-Ghamdi: US State Department Announces Reward For Veteran Yet Enigmatic Al-Qaida Majlis al-Shura Councilor

Written by Nolan R Beasley

The State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program has offered a $5 million bounty for leads and information resulting in the capture or death of Saleh Said al-Ghamdi, a member of the al-Qaida Majlis al-Shura, known within the jihadist community as Hamza al-Ghamdi.

The Veteran Jihadist And “The Northern Group”

Saleh Said al-Bitaih al-Ghamdi represented a contradiction in terms of al-Qaida leadership, in that he was unfamiliar to the Western public and press and was never listed as wanted by the US during the height of the war on terror. Yet was simultaneously renown in jihadist circles, while experts and scholars on jihadist militants had for years recognized his importance under the title of Hamza al-Ghamdi. Despite this, most journalistic mentions of the name “Hamza al-Ghamdi” post-9/11 actually referred to the UA Flight 175 muscle-hijacker and not Saleh Said al-Bitaih al-Ghamdi. For almost 19 years, the vital militant’s given name has languished on an all but obsolete 2005 Saudi most wanted list, before being recognized on June 11 this year by the US State Department.

Known as Hamza al-Ghamdi, he is a veteran of the Afghan Arab campaign against the Soviet invasion. According to former FBI agent Ali Soufan, Ghamdi was a participant in various battles in Afghanistan, to include bin Laden’s specific and notable victory at Jaji in 1987 [1]. It was this battle which solidified bin Laden’s fame among the Arab contingent fighting in Afghanistan [2]. Thus, Ghamdi also became a venerated and legendary figure among the militants. After the war, Ghamdi maintained his contacts with the various factions arising in Afghanistan [3]. As opposed to politics, he apparently hungered for continued jihad instead. Unsurprisingly, he reappeared in 1996 at a Tajik refugee camp in Taloqan, in vicinity of Kunduz, to command a new group of militants in a venture to battle within Tajikistan [3]. A Yemeni accomplice, Hussam bin Attash, known as Mohanad, recruited and brought the men to the camp [1,4]. Ghamdi was presented with a contingent of approximately 40 Arab fighters from mostly Yemen and Saudi Arabia, newly recruited and ready for instruction [1,3]. The arrivals were fascinated and impressed by Ghamdi and received his training eagerly [1]. Despite the diligent efforts of Ghamdi, the forty fighters, referred to by Soufan as the Northern Group, failed to ever enter Tajikistan [1,3]. Ghamdi utilized his contacts with the Northern Alliance faction in Afghanistani to relocate further south to Jalalabad with the Arab fighters [1]. Once the contingent arrived in Jalalabad, they met with bin Laden at one of his camps [3]. The vicissitudes of the jihadist life were displayed in that despite the futility of the Tajik venture, the men were then presented with the chance to and encouraged to swear allegiance to bin Laden [1]. This may have been Ghamdi, Mohanad, and bin Laden’s goal all along, in order to provide additional loyal Arabs to bin Laden, as he had recently arrived in Afghanistan again after being expelled from the Sudan. Seventeen of the 40 eventually swore fealty to bin Laden [1].

Hamza al-Ghamdi was rapidly incorporated into the structure of al-Qaida. A member roster created in the late 1990s and maintained by al-Qaida referenced him as number 131 [5]. These were members known to have sworn the bayat, or allegiance to bin Laden. His position on this list is misleading though, as Ghamdi was a loyal and dedicated al-Qaida member, with much responsibility. For example, when bin Laden announced his fatwa against the United States in February 1998, Ghamdi was one of his followers present [3]. In fact, in terms of security, current al-Qaida commander Saif al-Adel was responsible for bin Laden’s protection, and was assisted by Ghamdi [3]. Al-Qaida governance was comprised of various committees, each with a particular area of focus. As for the Security Committee, it was overseen by Saif Adel, with chairs at the table also belonging to Ghamdi and the Egyptian militant Khalid Habib [3]. Thus, Ghamdi was not only a factor in the administration of al-Qaida, but also held a post where he was constantly in the atmosphere and influence of bin Laden, building an unassailable rapport.

Saleh Said al-Ghamdi from the July 2005 Saudi Most Wanted List

Bin Laden rewarded his loyal elite protectors with positions of authority, operational responsibilities, assignments as revered martyrs, and often as stewards of the al-Qaida associated guesthouses in Afghanistan utilized by training camp attendees and militants fighting on behalf of the Taliban. As such, Ghamdi became the manager of the Azzam Guesthouse in Kabul [6]. The compound was the erstwhile residence of the Saudi Ambassador to Afghanistan and under Ghamdi and al-Qaida was utilized to house Arab combatants traveling to and from the front lines engaging against the Northern Alliance [7,8]. Ghamdi’s significance was also displayed in his utilization of the common network of al-Qaida safehouses within the Pakistani city of Karachi [9,10]. A member of the Northern Group that swore allegiance to bin Laden, Saqar al-Jadawi, noted upon returning to Afghanistan from Yemen in 2000, that bin Laden had acquired a large new contingent of bodyguards, though some originals remained [3]. Among those stalwart remainders was Ghamdi [3]. In fact, it was noted that Ghamdi was one of five permanent members of the contingent, which also included Jadawi as a chauffeur, two of bin Laden’s sons-in-law, and his personal secretary [11]. A mere week prior to 9/11, Ghamdi was observed driving a vehicle in bin Laden’s relocation convoy, as the senior al-Qaida leadership displaced from Kandahar to Kabul [3]. He remained steadfast by the side of his emir through the tribulations to follow in late 2001.

Security And Tora Bora

In the Tora Bora debacle and battle of December 2001, Ghamdi maintained a camp of fighters [12], while concurrently providing security for bin Laden [1]. The desperation of the moment appears to have required the expenditure of resources across his various capacities. In the aftermath of the invasion, the FBI and US intelligence garnered a clear picture of Hamza al-Ghamdi’s role in bin Laden’s security apparatus [3]. However, his name was not immediately broadcast as one of importance to the network.

In fact, multiple individuals were suspected or named as bin Laden’s security directors. From Saif al-Adel [3], Mohanad’s brother Walid bin Attash [4], the Moroccan Abdullah Tabarak [13], to the Afghan Amin al-Haq [14]. Saif al-Adel was of a distinguished status on the Majlis al-Shura by the time of Tora Bora [3]. Tabarak sacrificed his freedom in order to allow time for bin Laden to escape Tora Bora and briefly landed in Guantanamo detention [13]. Walid bin Attash became focused on operational duties [4]. Haq meanwhile, was reportedly responsible for ensuring bin Laden’s transfer into Pakistan across the border [15]. Thus, the direct and immediate protection and escort fell to Ghamdi during and immediately after Tora Bora [1].

Bin Laden was last observed by his men at Tora Bora.  He was said to remain at the complex through mid-December alongside his deputy Zawahiri, his spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, and at least one of his sons [10].  However, as opposed to his normal bodyguard contingent, Hamza al-Ghamdi was traveling in the company of Abu Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi and Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti while escorting bin Laden out of the mountains to safety [16].  Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti had trained hijackers and students on the usages of computers and sending emails, in his role in the media department under KSM.  He was also a known bin Laden courier [16].  Another man said to be with bin Laden at the end of Tora Bora was Abu Yusef al-Qannas, a Kuwaiti named Adel Yusef Ibrahim Bu Haymid, who was renowned for his abilities as a sniper [1,17].  He was a former Kuwaiti military officer and acted as a protector to senior al-Qaida [18] and held some minor command at Tora Bora [17]. According to Soufan, these men disappeared together with bin Laden [1]. We of course know now that Ahmed al-Kuwaiti remained with bin Laden for the next nine years, housing and protecting his emir and growing family unit. Ghamdi however, mysteriously faded away.

For the next two and a half years the nascent Taliban and al-Qaida insurgency developed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas across the border in Pakistan. Bin Laden maintained communications, command, and control with his men via his Libyan lieutenant Abu Faraj al-Libi [19]. Libi was assigned a host of responsibilities. Among them, was ensuring all internal operations of the organization, thus becoming their internal operations manager [19]. In 2004, with the al-Qaida Majlis al-Shura observing the ineffective and abrasive paramilitary command of Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, Libi oversaw a change in leadership for the al-Qaida insurgency. The Egyptian Khalid Habib, formerly of the Security Committee was appointed to the post [20]. Bin Laden learned of the appointment and made recommendations for Khalid Habib’s tenure, to include providing him with a competent deputy [21]. As it was, the Egyptian indeed had a named deputy.  Libi described to bin Laden in October 2004 that Hamza al-Ghamdi was given the role [20].  This confirms that despite apparently crossing the border into Pakistani alongside of bin Laden, the Saudi al-Qaida loyalist did not remain with his emir, and eventually made his way to the FATA. However, it can be assumed that from an intelligence viewpoint, the dearth of literature and propagandist mentions of Ghamdi, coupled with his escort of bin Laden from Tora Bora, led to the conclusion that he was probably in hiding with the wanted terrorist.

Another Egyptian might have been expected to also be appointed as deputy, especially given the amount of Egyptians disenchanted with Abdulhadi al-Iraqi’s direction [20]. The change to Hamza al-Ghamdi was undoubtedly to create balance.  Despite some initial reservations and debate [22], the primarily North African contingent leading al-Qaida on the ground had appointed Khalid Habib [20].  Bin Laden acquiesced [21], but it probably would have been difficult to maintain all factions together with nothing but Egyptians commanding the militant insurgency.  Therefore, Hamza al-Ghamdi represented the fighters of Gulf Arab origin. It also acted as a further appeasement to bin Laden to demonstrate that two of his most trusted and weathered comrades were helming paramilitary matters. This considering his proclivity in appointing bodyguards to positions of supposed honor and great responsibility.

The following year in July 2005, Saleh Said Bitaih al-Ghamdi was announced as wanted by the Saudi government in their third major wanted list issuance [23]. The second portion of the list was comprised of 21 militants believed to be fighting abroad from the Kingdom. Ghamdi, listed thirteenth in the announcement, was acknowledged as a veteran extremist but was not correlated to such an important figure as Hamza al-Ghamdi. He was noted as being a significant figure, and described as a midlevel al-Qaida official in his 40s at the time [24].  In this capacity he liaised between the upper echelon of the organization and its operatives in the field [24].  Furthermore, he was described as having spent time in Afghanistan in the late 1990s [24]. This vague outline was the only information available to potentially match the listed individual with Hamza al-Ghamdi.  As others on the list fell over the years to death or capture, Ghamdi remained, seemingly lost to irrelevance and grinding time. Meanwhile, the coming drone campaign in the FATA and renewed efforts in Afghanistan took a heavy toll on the al-Qaida paramilitary forces, creating opportunities for rising jihadists in the ranks.

Lost And Found

This is where the enigma of Hamza al-Ghamdi expands further. Despite his ascension to deputy commander of paramilitary forces in 2004, by late 2009 he is not mentioned by the next al-Qaida internal operations manager, Shaikh Said al-Masri (Mustafa Othman Abu Yazid) for assuming overall militant insurgency command [25].  Shaikh Said presents bin Laden with four options to replace the recently assassinated paramilitary commander Abdullah Said al-Libi, but never mentions Ghamdi [25]. Later in 2010, when bin Laden’s new internal manager and primary contact, the Libyan Atiyah Abdulrahman (Shaikh Mahmud al-Libi) is pressed to name a deputy, he recommends a list of 13 candidates (ten veterans and three emerging officers) for consideration [26]. There are some conspicuous absences on this list designed by Atiyah.  For our purposes, the most glaring is Hamza al-Ghamdi who was neither mentioned by Atiyah for the role of deputy, nor was he directly mentioned in other important operational correspondences between Atiyah and bin Laden [26]. The Saudi may have already been overseeing another department or committee, his presence tacitly understood by the communicating parties. He also may have quietly refused the offer.  He may too have departed the region temporarily. Perhaps his services were not even sought for these occupations. The al-Qaida facilitator Hassan Ghul, after his capture in 2004, described Ghamdi to his CIA interrogators as harsh and uncongenial [11]. It seems probable though that Ghamdi had already ascended further up the echelons into an advisory role. Specifically, a member of the oft referenced Majlis al-Shura of al-Qaida. Evidence this for this was not garnered until multiple years after Ghamdi’s disappearance.

Image of Hamza al-Ghamdi

In June 2014, the Majlis al-Shura remotely convened to agree upon a plan of succession for al-Qaida leadership as a contingency to the possibility of Ayman Zawahiri being incapacitated, incarcerated, or eliminated [27,28].  Handwritten notes were delivered by each Shura councilor available in order to delineate the plan.  Six of the handwritten vows were later revealed to the public [28]. Among them was the Zawahiri son-in-law Abu Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi, the producer of the propagandist media outlet as-Sahab [27,28].

Another of the affirmations was penned by Hamza al-Ghamdi, solving the mystery of exactly where this jihadist had been after Tora Bora [28].  Revealed now as a Shura councilor, his absence from the public makes much more sense and demonstrates how his stature had only increased.  Likely, he had been raised to the Majlis al-Shura long prior.  He signed his letter on June 2, 2014 as Hamza al-Ghamdi, with Saleh Said al-Ghamdi in parentheses, confirming his given name and matching it to the Saudi most wanted list of 2005 [28]. As a reflection of this now exposed position, he was described by the State Department to have maintained a close relationship with Zawahiri and fellow Shura councilor Abdulrahman al-Maghrebi [29]. Sami Sadat, the former Deputy Chief of General Staff for the Afghan National Army has claimed that Ghamdi was also a son-in-law to Zawahiri as well as one of his two primary deputies [30]. Furthermore, Sadat states that Ghamdi managed al-Qaida operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan while Zawahiri was in hiding and that he is now based in Kandahar [30].

The State Department announcement and reward offer confirms much of this story, recognizing his direction of bin Laden’s security detail prior to 9/11 despite US authorities having named others to this role during that time [29]. The State Department also specifically mentions his experience against the Soviets and within Tajikistan, his tenure over the Azzam Guesthouse in Kabul, and position at Tora Bora, before concluding with his ascension to the Majlis al-Shura [29]. The bounty placed upon Hamza al-Ghamdi on June 11, 2024 was $5 million [29].

The recent 33rd UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on ISIS and al-Qaida makes no mention of Hamza al-Ghamdi among the few names of al-Qaida leaders they reference [31]. However, given his previous 2014 pledge included following Saif al-Adel if he were an option to lead, then Ghamdi probably maintains loyalty to the current regime. The 33rd report did however mention an Abdulrahman al-Ghamdi acting as an intermediary between al-Qaida officials in Afghanistan and Saif al-Adel in Iran [31]. The Long War Journal, while reporting on Hamza al-Ghamdi has confirmed via US intelligence officials that Abdulrahman and Hamza al-Ghamdi are cousins [32]. This corroborates a supposed disdain for Iran that Ghamdi harbors, as per Sadat [30]. The Taliban regime undoubtedly provide Ghamdi with infrastructure, security, and freedom, especially if he is established in Kandahar.

Hamza al-Ghamdi is one of the few legacy figures from the early years of al-Qaida remaining. US authorities acknowledging his importance and the potential danger posed by his endeavors has been long overdue.

US Department of State Rewards for Justice Poster

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© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

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