SERIES: Predators Of The Khorasan – Nek Mohamed Wazir and The Battle of Wana

Written by Nolan R Beasley

Amid the story of the internal and external exploits of al-Qaida in the early aughts, we must detour to discuss their rugged tribal haven and their Pashtun hosts. We must also introduce the weapon of choice to be liberally utilized by American authorities in combatting the paramilitary threats in Pakistan. Thus, we begin our parallel series on the infamous drone strikes of Pakistan. Predators of the Khorasan will be a series devoted to detailing the individual militants killed via Predator and later Reaper drones from 2004 – 2016 in the Khorasan. We commence the project of exploring the American drone campaign in Pakistan by examining its first notable victim and the political intrigue that led to its implementation as legit counterterrorism strategy in the region. In June 2024 the US drone campaign in Pakistan reaches its 20th anniversary.

For the entirety of the Series, please see – https://chroniclesinzealotry.com/predators-of-the-khorasan/

The FATA

One must enter the study of the American military excursion into Afghanistan with a deep understanding of Pakistan as well. We will not delve into this herein. However, it must be noted that the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, is arbitrary, drawn by the boundaries of British stable influence on the region. Thus, ethnically the border does not provide a clear separation, but is merely a porous obstacle between various tribes of Pashtuns. Pakistani culture is comprised of multiple ethnicities, with the largest and most recognized being the Punjabis, Sindhis, and Balochis, each with a large province bearing their name. For the Pashtuns, they now inhabit Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, named for their Pashtun heritage and the Khyber Pass connecting Afghanistan and Pakistan across the Hindu Kush mountains. However, for years and during the beginnings of the war in 2001, this territory was merely called The North West Frontier Province, and in addition to regular provincially governed divisions, also contained semi-autonomous districts known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The FATA consisted of the primary agencies, from north to south, of Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. In addition, there were six frontier regions included in the FATA. Predominantly Pashtun, these agencies represented a blurring of the border during British rule, and was a frontier administered directly by the Pakistani federal government in the years after, creating a zone of separation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yet this also created a sphere of Afghan influence due to the similarities in culture given that both sides of the Durand Line contained Pashtuns. During the Soviet invasion, the FATA and North West Frontier Province became staging grounds for militants conducting their insurgency. This cultural bond became ever more apparent with the implementation of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, under the majority Pashtun ethnicity therein. Thus, during the 1990s, Pashtuns in the FATA were often recruited into the Taliban government and military, and were encouraged to do so by their own government, seeing as how a peaceful Taliban ruled Afghanistan provided a stable western border in contrast to the precarious situation in Kashmir and along the Indian border in the east.

It is with this background that we observe the beginning of the war in Afghanistan during the late stages of 2001. Multitudes of Pakistani Pashtuns from the FATA were forced to return home. However, with them came myriad other jihadists, from various ethnicities, including of course the Arabs, but also Central Asians such as Uzbeks and Chechens. To look further into the dynamic, we must also recognize that the Pashtuns were tribal, with these tribal variations playing an enormous role within their politics. In North and South Waziristan, the influential tribes included the Wazir, the Dawar, and the Mahsud.

Rise of Nek Mohamed Wazir

In the agency of South Waziristan, the eventual relocation of these Uzbeks, Arabs and others, was destined to be controversial and portentous.  For one young Pashtun militant, it offered an opportunity for jihadist stardom immortality.  Nek Mohamed Wazir, born in 1975 as a son of impoverished local Nawaz Khan, took advantage of an influx of funds to Wana (the largest and most important South Waziristan settlement) during the war against the Soviets, to attend a new founded religious and educational institution, the Jamia Darul Ulum Waziristan1.  As his father’s second son, he was not destined to inherit land or status in his small village of Kalosha2.  He was to make his own name in militancy.  Immediately known as an obdurate and determined student, who once stormed from a classroom in such a manner that it was perceived as a sincere threat to his instructor, Nek Mohamed claimed to have successfully finished school and been offered a spot in a Quetta university, but most likely never graduated from his initial education3. 

Radicalization likely did not occur in his limited experience in school.  Nek Mohamed attempted ventures, including opening a store in Wana, which ended in failure, and even once conducted a car theft, but was stopped by police shortly thereafter4.  Although he absconded from the police, he was confronted at home, and his family and tribe were forced to negotiate on his behalf5.  Seemingly headed for trouble, Nek was recruited to the Taliban by an Afghan associate named Mohamed Gul, who had previously lived in Wana as a refugee6.  Gul recruited heavily for the Taliban in the early 1990s, bringing Nek Mohamed and the others to Afghanistan, where he was a lieutenant to Taliban commander Saifur Rahman Mansur.  At 18 years of age, Nek Mohamed traversed across the border in the name of jihad in 19937. 

Nek then began a prodigious military career within the Taliban for such a young fighter8.  Once the Taliban established themselves and conquered Kabul, Saifur Rahman Mansur was placed in charge of a unit based west of the city in Kargha Lake9.  Having fought across southern Afghanistan for the Taliban and increasing the status of his name, Nek Mohamed became a lieutenant to Saifur Rahman Mansur after Mohamed Gul was killed in the ongoing fighting10.  This resulted in Nek commanding up to 3,000 Waziri and Afghan militants for the Taliban in theatres against the Northern Alliance, including Bamiyan, Mazar I Sharif, and others throughout the late 1990s11.  Nek was undoubtedly aware of the large presence of foreign elements in the region, but remained concerned with his position within the Taliban, and his Waziri tribesmen12.  In fact, al-Qaida communications later declared that he had no need of attending training camps due to weaponry and battle being ingrained in his heritage13. His obstinate nature was again noted by superiors in battle, who bestowed upon him the name Bodogay, implying that this nature may be detrimental14.  After the US invasion, Nek Mohamed and his men dissolved across the border and returned home15.  From Wana, beginning in December 2001, Nek Mohamed and his men commenced assaults from the FATA into Afghanistan16. 

Nek Mohamed Wazir, 2004

Concerning the foreigners, Nek Mohamed Wazir was welcoming to the Central Asians of the militant outfit the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fleeing the defeat and route at the Battle of Shah I Kot in March 200217.  Author Rahimullah Yusufzai of the BBC believes that Nek Mohamed and his men may have indeed participated in the battle, owing to Nek Mohamed’s close affiliation with Saifur Rahman Mansur, the commander of Taliban forces at the engagement18.  Regardless, he was a friend to Tahir Yuldashev, leader of the IMU, and his forces, as well as the al-Qaida associated Arabs, offering them shelter that they desperately needed, and allowing them to reestablish unmolested19. Al-Qaida operatives acknowledged that Nek Mohamed was intimately involved with and personally responsible for the efficient and safe migration of the Arab fighters from Afghanistan into the FATA20.

A Doomed Incursion at Wana

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf fully understood that al-Qaida militants were established in South Waziristan and in other agencies of the FATA.  The January 2004 capture of al-Qaida facilitator and courier Hassan Ghul in Kurdish Iraq proved the location accurate during his interrogation and elevated the pressure on the President from the Americans desiring action against the stronghold21.  For Musharraf though, it was the late 2003 al-Qaida attempts on his life that finally brought about his wrath against the nascent terrorist foundation and infestation in the agency22. 

To prevent the inconvenience of a boisterous invasion of his nation’s own territory, Musharraf addressed a grand jirga assembled at the Governor’s compound in Peshawar23.  From this perch, he implored the tribal leaders and militias to participate and allow the expulsion of all foreign element fighters in South Waziristan24.  By his own estimate upwards of 600 of the nuisances were established within, and he even offered them a type of amnesty, declaring that if they laid down their arms, they could remain in the FATA without facing deportation25.  Apparently, Musharraf’s call went unheeded26.  Of interest, the President’s speech on March 15, 2004 was a precursor to the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Islamabad just a couple of days in the future27.  Additional American pressure was imminent and there was a hunger for results against the militant presence.  Previous actions against the foreign elements were not satisfactory. This was the sentiment Musharraf informed to the 500 tribal leaders, and further expressed concern that the foreigners, of which he specifically and suspiciously referred to only as Uzbeks and Tajiks, would begin to infiltrate Afghanistan to harass American forces28.  Musharraf also assured those gathered, that American ground forces were not to be utilized, although he acknowledged that a team of Americans was in fact in the country for intelligence purposes29.  Musharraf’s concern is telling, as he also refers to the Libyan terrorist responsible for the assassination attempts30.  This being Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qaida’s internal manager at the time.  Thus, the Americans and Musharraf finally had a real common goal in removing the Libyan from the FATA. 

The next day Musharraf deployed his Frontier Corps in force into South Waziristan towards Wana.  Musharraf, in his autobiography, is quick to declare that the tribal forces were cooperative and that al-Qaida and foreign elements were acting on their own without much local support31.  The Frontier Corps were funneled into a valley where the foreign elements held the higher ground and began inflicting harm on the unit32.  Specifically, it was the Central Asians of the IMU drawing first blood via the ambush33.  The regular Pakistani military was forced to move in with an attempt to surround the fighters and rescue the Frontier Corps34. 

After surrounding the area, the foreigners continued to battle from another ridge outside of the attempted encirclement, resulting in 15 Frontier Corps and one Pakistani Army soldier killed35.  On March 16, international media began reporting on the heavy engagement reporting supposed successes for the Pakistani military in terms of militant casualties36.  Locals however, claimed that the Pakistani military were indiscriminate in their pursuit37.  Civilian vehicles and homes were targeted, as people fled the area, or were suspected of associating with the foreigners, to include those who had harbored them38.  Locals were faced with demolition of their homes and looting39. 

Breaking The Cordon

With reporting that a compound was surrounded in the fierce fighting of Wana40, Musharraf took to the airwaves of international media to make a startling claim.  Declaring that helicopters and fighter jets had joined the fray, Musharraf referenced the hardened resolve of the encircled foreign elements and postulated to CNN that a High Value Target had been entrapped41.  Rampant speculation ensued, and the candidate in the media for the pinned senior militant was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri42.  While Musharraf did not name Zawahiri, his generals were coy and continued to let the rumor swirl43.  They referenced that the area was composed of mud compounds and that the foreigners were entrenched, thus preparing the media for an intense series of firefights44.  Musharraf had engaged 7000 total combatants of his own, including 6000 regular Pakistani Army in the hopes of eliminating the threats45.  US assets in the region included supposedly unarmed Predator UAVs, to be utilized for reconnaissance46.  One has to wonder if the Americans had actually armed the drones in anticipation of a Zawahiri assassination.  The villages of Kalosha, Shin Warzak, and Zha Ghondai were also included in the military maneuver along with Wana47.  Senior officials insinuated that locals had brought the destruction down upon themselves48.  In Kuth Kali the militants were ignorant of the Pashto being spoken to them by their besiegers, indicating the positive appearance of Uzbek or Tajik fighters49.  These foreigners were not interested in surrender, negotiation, nor ultimatums.  Another surrounded compound in Shin Warzak gave even more fierce resistance, a potential broadcasting that the High Value Target was within50.

Yet at dawn on one of the first days of the encounter, the influential and suave, young and diligent Pakistani Taliban militant Nek Mohamed Wazir led his men from the safety of a dual cabin fortified pick-up truck, and took the security cordon around the compound unaware, breaking through the perimeter51.  When Nek Mohamed fled from the US invasion, he took six Taliban vehicles with him, and in the time since had increased his armor to at least 44 trucks, including the fortified versions used in this engagement52.  It is not surprising that Nek Mohamed Wazir acted with such vehemence and dedication to attending to a foreign element guest’s need.  At this point, the fates of the local Taliban and the foreign elements were intertwined.  While some of his men were neutralized in the rescue attempt, Nek Mohamed himself was successful.  He exfiltrated IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev from the compound and fled away back through the perimeter with bullets descending rapidly upon the truck53.  The vehicle was discovered abandoned, but the Pakistani and Yuldashev successfully escaped, although the latter was slightly wounded54.  In the end, Yuldashev was the encircled militant, while Zawahiri was nowhere in the area.  Pakistani forces on the ground continued to report the Zawahiri rumor, but with less confidence among their leadership55.  The uncanny resistance from the Uzbeks and Tajiks makes sense considering that it was their specific leader who was being protected.  Some in the media postulated that the Zawahiri rumor may have originated from wistful thinking and the hopes that a supreme al-Qaida official could be captured or killed as the first anniversary of the Iraq War rapidly approached56. 

Abu Faraj al-Libi detailed in an October 2004 report to bin Laden that Yuldashev was responsible for escalating the violence by ambushing the Pakistani Frontier Corps and soldiers, resulting in the increased engagements.  The Uzbek conducted his operations without express permission from the al-Qaida leadership in the region, nor the approval of local tribal militants57.  Thus, the Arabs of al-Qaida were unwittingly drawn into the battle and several displaced, as was required due to the Pakistani fire directed towards them58.  Al-Qaida external operations commander Hamza Rabia went further in internal communication, detailing that the Arab al-Qaida withdrew and withheld from battling directly, and also placed blame for initiation of the ambush with Yuldashev and the IMU59.  Some Arabs did in fact fall in battle, defending their positions from the Pakistani incursion.  These included Abu Osaid al-Taizi (Osaid al-Yemeni), an aide to al-Qaida senior military commander Abdulhadi al-Iraqi60.  Perhaps the most important combatants though were represented by the local contingent, and their willingness to protect and support the foreign elements.  Nek Mohamed Wazir had command of the Waziris fighting in the engagement.  As an Ahmadzai Wazir tribesman, it is important to note that he also led forces from the Mahsud tribe, including those under the command of formidable Mahsud combatants Abdullah and Baitullah Mahsud61. 

The fighting continued for days after, with officials referencing not just Uzbeks and Tajiks, but Arabs, Chechens, and Uighurs participating in the bloodshed as well62.  By March 20, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deflected a question about Zawahiri being surrounded but did not quash the rumor63.  Furthermore, the belief and hearsay that bin Laden himself was in North Waziristan was revealed64. 

By March 27, the Pakistanis acknowledged that the target was merely Tahir Yuldashev and that while wounded, he successfully escaped from the military maneuvers65.  While simultaneously announcing this, the Pakistanis admitted that the offensive was essentially over66.  The Battle of Wana lasted from 16 to 28 March, 200467.  Estimates of the dead varied, but Musharraf himself put them at 63 Pakistani forces, 36 foreign element fighters and 27 local fighters68.  Various sources declared that hostages had been taken on each side including 14 Pakistani military69.  The Pakistanis were quick to claim that their captives were being treated with respect, although apparently the same could not be said for the civilians and locals70.  It is unknown how many of the locals slain were actually civilians or if the number of foreigners killed was an exaggeration.  Musharraf praised the battle as eliminating logistics and operational command sites for the militants71.  He claimed that the militants fled to the Shakai Valley in South Waziristan72. Yet again, Musharraf would have undoubtedly been aware of intelligence from the captured Hassan Ghul which already proved the existence of an extensive al-Qaida presence therein prior73. 

Following his rescue from the clutches of the Pakistani military, Yuldashev put forth Nek Mohamed as the prime candidate to hold authority over all militants in South Waziristan, an appointment designed to deter unrest and violence between various factions of fighters74.  While Musharraf continued to taut the success of the South Waziristan operation75, senior anti-coalition militants including Jalaluddin Haqqani, sire of the notorious Haqqani family, and Mullah Dadullah, senior military official of the Afghan Taliban, traversed the supposedly cleared terrain in Wana to convene with Nek Mohamed in April 200476.  Thus, the rising idea of the Pakistani version of the Taliban was given undeniable legitimacy.    

A Deal Disregarded

Next, the Pakistanis chose to parlay with Nek Mohamed77.  April 24 saw the Pakistani military establishment walk into unfamiliar territory in order to negotiate with ostensibly, just a simple tribal militant78.  Owing to Nek Mohamed and his men’s ambuscade of the Pakistanis during the Battle of Wana, and the subsequent trepidation that these attacks could increase and be continuous, the Pakistani government recognized the threat and chose to pursue terms and negotiate79.  Strikingly, the Pakistanis were represented at the jirga, or tribal council, by General Safdar Hussain, the overall commander of the Pakistani military, with the event held at a madrassa in the Shakai valley of South Waziristan of all places80.  This was not a surreptitious meeting, as cameras and recorders abounded, capturing the bizarre scenes of Nek Mohamed and Gen Hussain hugging, enjoying tea, exchanging gifts (including rifles as per tradition), as well as Nek accepting a flowered necklace of peace from the Pakistani military commander81.  A peace agreement was signed, but it was clear that Nek Mohamed had the advantage from the beginning, forcing the government representative to come to his territory82.  Even more bizarre, despite overwhelming evidence, Gen Hussain declared that there were no foreign element fighters in Shakai or South Waziristan83.  This is contradictory as the terms included an amnesty of sorts for the actual foreign elements, so long as they ceased striking against Pakistani forces84.  Nek Mohamed also acquiesced to registering those foreigners with the Pakistani government85.  He emphasized that the Pakistani government was actually protecting the FATA, specifically from American incursions86.  Nek Mohamed, without acknowledging fault, insinuated that the past would not affect the future, and that war between the two sides had ceased87. 

The most important note here is that Nek Mohamed, while agreeing to cease attacks on Pakistani forces, decried the idea of abandoning the jihad in Afghanistan.  This was accepted by the Pakistanis, seemingly for self-preservation88.  The government paid for damages and deaths during the Battle of Wana and liberated prisoners89.  However, across the tribal agencies and other areas of Pakistan, this was viewed as the government attempting to pay the militants a bribe, or essentially as the militants ransoming the safety of soldiers and stability of the region90.  Astonishingly, some of the money was meant for the local militants to pay off debt to the foreign militants91.  With the peace treaty signed though, there was a tenuous hope for sustained success92.  Nek Mohamed immediately boasted to reporters of his vow to support the Taliban in Afghanistan, and extended the confusion regarding foreign elements, both denying their presence and promising to register those same individuals93.  While the Pakistanis claimed that the agreement constituted a new divide between the tribesmen and al-Qaida, other elements within the government accurately predicted that the debacle just gave power to those like Nek Mohamed and would result in further militant groups spreading influence and violence across Pakistan94.  Nek Mohamed was thus catapulted to fame within the militant and jihadist communities95. 

Unsurprisingly, Nek Mohamed never registered any of the foreign fighters, and even stated that the practice was not a part of the original deal96.  Clearly, he had defrauded the Pakistani government in order to protect the foreign guests.  Emboldened by his success in coercing the Pakistanis to his territory for negotiations, he reneged on his obligations, and furthermore began to assassinate rival tribal leaders, including those involved in the agreement, in order to consolidate his control in South Waziristan97.  He apparently claimed that the elders pressured him into the original truce, and that Pakistan had broken the peace98. With the failing of the agreement, the local militants in the agency recommenced randomized attacks on Pakistani forces99.  Soon the Pakistanis were forced to reengage in the Shakai Valley100, a maneuver that President Musharraf painted as a natural progression from the supposedly successful Battle of Wana, against militants who had fled to this location101.  On June 10, Musharraf authorized 10,000 soldiers and Frontier Corpsman to begin the offensive102.  With a cordon of the valley entrance set, the Pakistani Air Force was dispatched to bomb nine local compounds, followed by artillery and helicopter fire support103.  Next, at least 3,000 of the forces penetrated deeper into the valley to support special forces operators deployed in the area104.  Musharraf again claims success here noting that he lost four soldiers to the foreign elements losing approximately 50 fighters105.  Reports at the time describe 60 or so Central Asian fighters killed along with 20 Pakistani forces106.  All the while, Nek Mohamed Wazir held the resolve of the resistance together in South Waziristan. Hamza Rabia wrote in a missive sometime after May 2004, that despite previous fighting, the first real pressure on the Shakai had only just began weeks prior during the second round of Pakistani maneuvers107. He seemed to give the situation cursory attention and concern, indicating the al-Qaida belief that their safe havens would eventually hold108.

Predators Unleashed

For the Americans, specifically the CIA, this predictable turn of events presented a viable and fortuitous opportunity.  The CIA coveted the ability to operate within Pakistan and to conduct operations via remote controlled Predator drones, to be utilized for the purposes of assassinating select al-Qaida leadership.  The CIA probed the willingness of the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) during a meeting in Islamabad109.  Previously resistant to allowing the drones over Pakistan, the ISI was infuriated by Nek Mohamed’s betrayal, thus the CIA offered a trade:  Nek Mohamed would be eliminated via a drone, sort of a way to demonstrate its effective nature, and in return the Pakistanis would allow the CIA to operate the machines over their territory in order to target foreign elements110.  The Pakistanis took the deal, though it came with restrictions.  Specifically, the Americans could only operate the drones over certain airspaces of the FATA, and any and all drone strikes were to remain as covert happenings, meaning that the US could not claim the operations111.  The Pakistanis would simply take responsibility for any strikes or deny involvement of any sort112.  Thus, the stage was set for the upcoming drone war.  President Musharraf approved of the plan, which also included a clause that Pakistan must be notified and approve of impending drone strikes113. 

The CIA used simple means in locating Nek Mohamed.  The militant was tracked via a mobile phone conversation with a BBC journalist114.  He was found in Kari Kot, near Wana115.  On the evening of June 17, Nek Mohamed and several of his men gathered for dinner in the courtyard of his current compound, the militant commander having just spoken to the journalist on his satellite phone116.  He was joined by his brother Wali117.  Even as war came to South Waziristan, the men ate in peace, until such peace was shattered.  A hellfire missile fired from a CIA drone impacted in the courtyard where Nek Mohamed was dining, killing him and four of his companions118.  Dead with him were two boys, the relatives of the compound’s owner, only 10 and 16 years of age119.  With his left leg amputated in the trauma of the blast, Nek Mohamed was slain120.  His followers threatened response and the funeral, held in Kalosha was massive121.  Despite the anger, the Pakistanis went ahead with claiming the attack, postulating that their artillery and helicopters were capable of the precision engagement122.  The US held up their end of the deal, and now the Pakistanis would allow the drones to prowl.  The secret deal was exposed by the New York Times nine years later in 2013123. 

Nek Mohamed’s brother Wali survived the strike but was wounded124.  An early monument in the war, Nek Mohamed’s grave became a rallying point and sacred attraction within the FATA125.  Hopes that the South Waziristan tribesman would be deterred or fractured were dimmed as the brothers Haji Sharif, Noor Islam, and most predominantly Haji Omar Khan, all Ahmadzai Wazirs previously supporting Nek Mohamed, consolidated control over the local tribal militants126.  They continued the trend of defiance against the Pakistani government, while simultaneously supporting the Uzbek and other foreign elements in the agency127.  Nek Mohamed became a folk legend of sorts, with Haji Omar Khan leading commemorations on future anniversaries of the latter’s assassination128. The supposed Pakistani victory was even celebrated publicly by the Americans129. Meanwhile, al-Qaida officials in the FATA presumably had no indication that the drones were now actively hunting them.

CITATIONS:

  1. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  2. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  3. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  4. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  5. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  6. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  7. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann, Oxford University PRess, 2013 ↩︎
  8. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  9. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  10. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  11. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  12. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  13. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  14. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  15. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  16. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann, Oxford University PRess, 2013 ↩︎
  17. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  18. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  19. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann, Oxford University PRess, 2013 ↩︎
  20. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  21. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Commmittee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  22. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  23. Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  24. Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  25. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 / Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  26. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  27. Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  28. Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  29. Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  30. Musharraf Warns Against Failure of Wana Operation, Dawn, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http:/dawn.com/news/392654/musharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation ↩︎
  31. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  32. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  33. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 / Letter from Hamza Rabia to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
  34. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  35. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 / The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  36. Fierce Battle in al Qaeda Hunt, CNN, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20120308025811/http:/articles.cnn.com/2004-03-16/world/afghanistan.conflict_1_qaeda-and-taliban-pakistani-forces-shaukat-sultan?_s=PM:WORLD ↩︎
  37. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  38. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  39. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  40. Fierce Battle in al Qaeda Hunt, CNN, March 16, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20120308025811/http:/articles.cnn.com/2004-03-16/world/afghanistan.conflict_1_qaeda-and-taliban-pakistani-forces-shaukat-sultan?_s=PM:WORLD ↩︎
  41. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 / Pakistani Sources: Al-Zawahiri Surrounded, CNN, March 18, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/18/pakistan.alqaeda/index.html ↩︎
  42. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 / Pakistani Sources: Al-Zawahiri Surrounded, CNN, March 18, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/18/pakistan.alqaeda/index.html ↩︎
  43. Pakistani Sources: Al-Zawahiri Surrounded, CNN, March 18, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/18/pakistan.alqaeda/index.html ↩︎
  44. Pakistani Sources: Al-Zawahiri Surrounded, CNN, March 18, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/18/pakistan.alqaeda/index.html ↩︎
  45. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 / Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  46. Pakistani Sources: Al-Zawahiri Surrounded, CNN, March 18, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/18/pakistan.alqaeda/index.html ↩︎
  47. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  48. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  49. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  50. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  51. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml / Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  52. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  53. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml / Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  54. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml / Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  55. Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf, by Ismail Khan, Dawn, March 19, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm#selection-220.1-475.304 ↩︎
  56. Pakistani Army Corners 400 Rebel Fighters, by Hafiz Wazir, The Arab News via Reuters, March 20, 2004, https://www.arabnews.com/node/246198 ↩︎
  57. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  58. Letter from Abu Faraj al-Libi to Osama bin Laden, dated October 18, 2004 ↩︎
  59. Letter from Hamza Rabia to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
  60. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Commmittee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 / Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  61. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann, Oxford University PRess, 2013 ↩︎
  62. Hits on Qaeda Compounds Continue, CBS News via the Associated PRess, March 20, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hits-on-qaeda-compounds-continue/ ↩︎
  63. Hits on Qaeda Compounds Continue, CBS News via the Associated PRess, March 20, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hits-on-qaeda-compounds-continue/ ↩︎
  64. Hits on Qaeda Compounds Continue, CBS News via the Associated PRess, March 20, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hits-on-qaeda-compounds-continue/ ↩︎
  65. Top Al-Qaeda Leader Hurt, Hiding in Wana: ISPR, Dawn, March 27, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065613/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/28/top3.htm#selection-210.1-356.27 ↩︎
  66. Top Al-Qaeda Leader Hurt, Hiding in Wana: ISPR, Dawn, March 27, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065613/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/28/top3.htm#selection-210.1-356.27 ↩︎
  67. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  68. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  69. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 / Hits on Qaeda Compounds Continue, CBS News via the Associated PRess, March 20, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hits-on-qaeda-compounds-continue/ ↩︎
  70. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 / Top Al-Qaeda Leader Hurt, Hiding in Wana: ISPR, Dawn, March 27, 2004, https://archive.ph/20130702065613/http:/archives.dawn.com/2004/03/28/top3.htm#selection-210.1-356.27 ↩︎
  71. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  72. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  73. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Commmittee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Executive Summary, December 13, 2012 ↩︎
  74. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  75. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  76. Nek Muhammad Wazir, by Muhammad Ilyas Khan, The Monthly Herald, September 16, 2005, http://www.khyber.org/people/a/Nek_Muhammad_Wazir.shtml ↩︎
  77. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  78. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  79. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  80. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html / The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  81. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  82. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  83. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  84. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  85. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html / THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  86. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  87. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  88. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  89. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  90. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  91. Reviewing Pakistan’s Peace Deals with the Taliban, by Daud Khattak, CTC Sentinel, Vol 5, Issue 9, September 2012, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/reviewing-pakistans-peace-deals-with-the-taliban/ ↩︎
  92. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  93. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  94. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  95. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  96. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  97. Return of the Taliban: Nek Mohammed, interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai and Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html ↩︎
  98. Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, by Abu Ubaidah al-Maqdisi (Abdullah al-Adam), (book of 120 deceased militant biographies from the Khorasan theatre), 2008 ↩︎
  99. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  100. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  101. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  102. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  103. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  104. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  105. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by Pervez Musharraf, Free Press, 2006 ↩︎
  106. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  107. Letter from Hamza Rabia to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
  108. Letter from Hamza Rabia to Spin Ghul, dated June 29, 2004 ↩︎
  109. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  110. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  111. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  112. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  113. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, by Mark Mazzetti, Penguin Random House, 2013 ↩︎
  114. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  115. Case Study: Nek Mohammed Wazir, Naming the Dead Project, Airwars via The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://airwars.org/archives/bij-drone-war/namingthedead/people/nd1/?lang=en ↩︎
  116. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  117. Inside Pakistan’s Drone Country, by Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, BBC News, October 4, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-19714959 ↩︎
  118. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  119. Rise of the Predators: A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, April 6, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  120. Rise of the Predators: A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, April 6, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  121. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  122. THE REACH OF WAR: MILITANTS; Ex-Fighter For Taliban Dies in Strike In Pakistan, by David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, The New York Times, June 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-strike-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  123. Rise of the Predators: A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, April 6, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  124. Inside Pakistan’s Drone Country, by Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, BBC News, October 4, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-19714959 ↩︎
  125. Rise of the Predators: A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, by Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, April 6, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-drone-war-in-pakistan.html ↩︎
  126. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann, Oxford University PRess, 2013 ↩︎
  127. Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion, by Peter Bergen and Katherine Teidemann, Oxford University PRess, 2013 ↩︎
  128. Return of the Taliban: Interview with Haji Omar Khan, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/omar.html ↩︎
  129. US-led Coalition Welcomes Killing of Nek Mohammed, Agence-France Presse, June 20, 2004, https://www.brecorder.com/news/40307843/rs3792trn-development-outlay-approved ↩︎

© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

Leave a comment