Pakistani Airstrikes Against Afghanistan: The Reemergence Of Hafiz Gul Bahadur

Written by Nolan R Beasley

The following article discusses the Pakistani military airstrikes of March 18 against Pakistani Taliban targets within eastern Afghanistan and the complex political causes that precipitated them. This includes a surge in assaults on the Pakistani military by militant perpetrators. Specifically, the discussion is geared towards the rejuvenation and rise of Hafiz Gul Bahadur as a threat against Pakistan, after being driven from his home in North Waziristan, and despite a lengthy history acting as their preferred version of Taliban.

Six militants wrought destruction against Pakistani military forces on Saturday March 16, 2024 in the early morning [1]. A Pakistani Army outpost in Mir Ali, of the restive North Waziristan district along the Afghan border was targeted [1]. It commenced with a vehicle borne explosive, within a truck, crashing into the compound, and continued with the remaining assailants storming in and engaging forces [1]. Several of the remainders themselves donned suicide vests and utilized these weapons [2]. The chaos resulted in the partial collapse of the targeted compound [2]. While the Pakistani military was able to neutralize the six militants, there were seven soldiers lost as well [1]. Five were killed in the initial bombing, and two additional during the following exchanges [3]. Two of the deceased were officers [1]. They were identified as LTCol Syed Kashif Ali Shaeed and CAPT Mohamed Ahmed Badar Shaheed [4]. The press was laden with the assertions that the TTP was responsible, although some proclaimed the caveat that it was a TTP aligned unit [1]. This deserves further investigation, in order to properly ascertain the identity of those culpable. Observers noted that the TTP and other Pakistani Taliban elements were responsible for a sizable increase in violence on Pakistani soil in the months and years since Afghanistan fell again to the Taliban [1]. Particularly after the collapse of a ceasefire between the TTP and Pakistan in November 2022 [4]. As the Pakistanis were desperate to maintain peace, especially given the ethnic Pashtun allegiances on either side of the border, they needed the Afghan Taliban government to stabilize the devolving situation. The Taliban however were full of denials and continued to support and allow their Pakistani Pashtun Taliban allies to operate. Thus, the connections between the governments of the two nations were strained at best [3].

The particular grouping deemed as responsible for the raid was the Jaish e Fursan e Mohamed, who themselves announced credit for the attack [2]. Locals observed the ferocity and power of the blasts and attacks, indicating the logistics and supplies available to the group [3]. It was a hitherto unknown unit, that under normal circumstances might be dismissed as a new insignificant threat, or an alias for the overall TTP. Apparently, it represented the vestiges of the infamous warlord and Pakistani Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who was once supreme in North Waziristan prior to the 2014 Pakistani military operation Zarb I Azb which forced his displacement across the border [4]. His forces now rejuvenated they joined the fray of cross border raids against the Pakistani military. His 0615 assault on Mir Ali was but the latest in a series of attacks perpetrated by Pakistani Taliban elements like his own, and the TTP [4].

Exasperated with the ongoing harassment and the lack of compassion or support from the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani government launched airstrikes into Afghanistan at 0300 on Monday morning, March 18 [5]. The two bombardments targeted Khost and Paktika provinces, supposedly against militant bases [5,6]. Specifically, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his men were the intended victims of the incursion [7]. The strikes killed at least eight individuals, which were claimed by the Taliban to consist of five women and three children [5,6]. The Taliban responded indignantly, with their spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid declaring that Afghanistan had been oppressed by powerful nations prior, did not tolerate invaders, and that their response would be detrimental to Pakistan [5]. Additionally, the Taliban announced that they had shelled Pakistani positions across the border in retaliation, although this remains a suspect claim [6]. For their part, the Pakistanis painted the scenario as a counter terrorism operation and accused the Afghan Taliban of harboring the TTP and utilizing them as a proxy in a conflict against the Pakistani government [5]. Over 650 attacks in 2023 targeted security and military units in Pakistan, particularly within Balochistan and the Pashtun dominated Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces [6]. The latter province contained the North Waziristan district, which was once one of seven agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Previous efforts to force the Afghan Taliban government to comply, such as the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Afghans from Pakistan, were to no avail [5,7]. In fact, this development was viewed with disdain, seeing as how Afghan refugees could be forced back to their oppressors within the Taliban [7]. The Pakistanis felt as if the Afghan Taliban were ignoring them and allowing for the escalating attacks and enabling their perpetrators to thrive [5]. A new Pakistani government was attempting to curb the violence and force the Taliban to restrain their foreign militant “guests.” [5]. President Asif Ali Zardari gave condolences to the families of the fallen soldiers at their funerals and promised to continue to defend Pakistan against the Taliban threat [4,5]. His presence along with several other senior officials acted as a warning to the TTP and Taliban of further escalation if the militants were allowed to operate freely [4,6]. This while Zabihullah Mujahid continued the Afghan denials, stating that Hafiz Gul Bahadur actually lived in and was based in Pakistan as opposed to the supposedly civilian domiciles targeted in Khost and Paktika [6].

Even while media organizations described the increased violence and enmity between Pakistan and the TTP, the presence of Hafiz Bul Bahadur conducting such a large operation against Pakistani forces was a separate and fascinating development [6]. The movements of the TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur were aligned in their displeasure with the Pakistani government, but were very much distinct, with their own histories, areas of influence, and motivations. The reemergence of Hafiz Gul Bahadur as an independent actor deserves a study of these factors. Hafiz Gul Bahadur had only turned against the Pakistani government in 2014 following his ouster from North Waziristan in Operation Zarb I Azb [8]. As recently as July 2023, Pakistani press focused on these differences, reporting that a TTP subcommander named Mukhlis Yar Mehsud had abandoned his superiors, joining the Hafiz Gul Bahadur network with 300 of his men [8]. Mukhlis was subsequently named as the HGB representative and leader for South Waziristan, where the Mehsuds had been the predominant militant force for years [8]. Mukhlis was a close affiliate of the late TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud and had some clout within the organization, meaning his betrayal was of particular concern to the TTP in terms of preventing rivals from infiltrating South Waziristan [8]. Seemingly, the lack of pressure from no coalition forces in Afghanistan, the freedom of movement granted by the Taliban, and the support of the Haqqani network was allowing Hafiz Gul Bahadur to expand his own organization. The move into South Waziristan was bold. The TTP attempted to cover by stating that there was confusion among names, and that the Mukhlis Mehsud joining HGB was a defecting member of ISIS-K [8]. However, this still may be the same person, as a Mukhlis Mehsud was known to have joined ISIS-K from the TTP, and later rejoined, swearing to Mufti Noor Wali, the emir of the TTP [8]. Again, this highlights the inaccuracy of stating that the Pakistanis were fighting an umbrella force of unified Pakistani Taliban. Although this ambition had been sought after prior by several militant parties.

Following the Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan in 2021, the disparate factions of the “Pakistani Taliban,” began to coalesce, and several again aligned with the TTP. This included the notorious Omar Khalid al-Khorasani and his Jamaat ul Ahrar group, plus the remnants of the dangerous Lashkar e Jhangvi, among several others [9]. Over on the Afghan side of the border they found both safety, bases, and homes in the eastern provinces from which to live, develop, and launch retaliation against the Pakistani government [8,9]. However, observers were explicit that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his men would not rejoin the TTP, and that the militant would maintain his autonomy.

It was this desire for autonomy that gave Hafiz Gul Bahadur his ability to succeed and persevere when so many of his peers fell. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was incensed when in 2001, the UN considered sending monitors to the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to sever a weapons artery to the Taliban [10]. As a Pashtun of the Wazir tribe, Hafiz Gul Bahadur felt a responsibility to support the Taliban, and fought for them in the past [10]. He fell in line with their beliefs, owing to a Deobandi Islam education in Punjab province of Pakistan, which he attended after his upbringing in Mada Khel, North Waziristan [11]. Particularly, he is assessed as having fought in the Afghan civil war after the Soviet collapse [11], and later assisted the Taliban in the fight against the Northern Alliance [12]. As a leader and activist in the Islamist political party Jamiaat Ulema Islam pre-9/11, he gained influence and evolved into a political and paramilitary official for North Waziristan post 9/11 [10,11]. He helped negotiate a peace settlement with the Pakistani government in September 2006, allowing for him to thrive and actually hold North Waziristan under a Taliban like rule of law [10]. The Pakistani demands in the peace deal were largely ignored, and the various factions in North Waziristan, including the Haqqanis and foreign elements began unrestricted cross border raids into Afghanistan [10]. Instead of resisting them, he welcomed the Haqqanis as they reestablished themselves after the American invasion and based out of North Waziristan [12]. He even allowed and supported the Haqqani Network as they established a camp for suicide bomber instruction in North Waziristan, earning the wrath of the Americans [12]. His ally in Miranshah, North Waziristan, Mullah Sadiq Noor ran a madrassa that acted as a central headquarters for the Haqqanis until it was eventual compromised in a drone strike [11]. Sadiq Noor was of the Dawar tribe and represented the HGB ability to appeal outside of the Wazir tribe [11,12]. Hafiz Gul Bahadur remained the type of Taliban preferred by the Pakistani government, one which was focused outwardly on the American presence in Afghanistan, and on retaking Afghanistan for the Taliban, but which refrained from outright attacks on Pakistani forces or institutions. His affiliation with the Haqqanis and their own intimate connections to the Paksitani ISI, along with his philosophy, ensured his protection at times [11]. However, increasing American drone attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (such as North and South Waziristan), and the Pakistani military encroachments on these territories, swayed him to action at times. This was most readily displayed in his acceptance of foreign fighters and al-Qaida in his territory as they worked alongside the Haqqanis [10,12]. While Hafiz Gul Bahadur held a distaste for the foreigners, the Haqqanis incorporated them into their schemes and plotting [10].

Hafiz Gul Bahadur appeared to be playing both sides, but he was deftly maneuvering with his forces through the maelstrom that was the Pakistani Taliban and political movements. He wavered from his peace with the Pakistanis beginning in July 2007 [10]. In December 2007 amid rising tensions, he joined the newly formed TTP as a lieutenant to South Waziristan’s Baitullah Mehsud, while almost simultaneously establishing new parameters for additional and extended peace with the Pakistani government [10]. It almost seemed as though he was sending a warning to the Pakistanis with his inclusion in the TTP, because his forces did not partake in violence attributed to the group. In fact, by July 2008, he had joined with another senior TTP deputy in forming what became known as the Muqami Taliban (essentially, local Taliban) within North and South Waziristan [10]. In the south, the representative was Mullah Nazir, infamous for his disdain for foreign fighters, particularly the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its breakaway dissident faction the Islamic Jihad Union. The moniker of “local,” seemed to enshrine this value of only native Pashtuns taking the helm of the battle at hand. For his part, Hafiz Gul Bahadur also opposed the influence of foreign fighters, but readily tolerated the presence and worked with the IMU, IJU, al-Qaida, and others [10]. They were more of an annoyance than a threat. After Mullah Nazir drove the Central Asian factions from South Waziristan, they established in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, nearby to the HGB headquarters of Miranshah, causing some consternation for Gul Bahadur [10,11]. The associate of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Mullah Sadiq Noor also disavowed the Uzbeks and some Arabs and at times the HGB network nearly came to violence with these parties [10]. It must be observed that as a part of his initial September 2006 peace agreement with the Pakistani government, Hafiz Gul Bahadur was to expel these foreigners from North Waziristan. Instead, he maintained the relationship [10]. This was assuredly to appease the Haqqani Network as they utilized the foreign elements. Neither Mullah Nazir nor Hafiz Gul Bahadur was listed as most wanted militants by Pakistan, while Baitullah Mehsud certainly was [10]. The Muqami Taliban may have been a product driven by the Haqqanis in order to temper the expectations of Baitullah Mehsud in reigning over all Pakistani Taliban factions [11]. Despite his nebulous and tenuous allegiances, Hafiz Gul Bahadur was not prone to infighting either, and continued to support and hold Baitullah Mehsud and the TTP in high regard (as they did him), even while maintaining his peaceful relationship with the Pakistanis [10]. He even harbored and assisted the TTP [12]. This after they were fleeing from Pakistani prosecution of their forces in South Waziristan [11].

In early 2009 at the behest of Afghan Taliban (and overall) emir Mullah Mohamed Omar, the Muqami Taliban leaders and the TTP began a much closer living and working relationship, colloquially referred to as the Council (or Shura) of United Mujahidin [10]. Intervention by both Mullah Mohamed Omar and the Haqqani network likely also led to Bahadur’s acceptance of foreign fighters in his territory [10]. This was also assuredly due to the deaths of several al-Qaida and Taliban officials during the early CIA drone campaign in North Waziristan. These were a series of events that the HGB network continued to blame the Pakistanis for [10]. Thus, it became pragmatic for the Haqqanis and Mullah Mohamed Omar to have the various factions somewhat aligned.

Later in 2009 he conducted attacks on Pakistani forces, although very reserved, such as ambushes, hostage takings and subsequent releases [10]. He did not dispatch a suicide bomber until July 2009, to express his displeasure [10]. This was viewed as a way for Bahadur to maintain his image as a forceful jihadist leader and offer a warning to the Pakistani government of what could occur if he completely turned against them [10]. The Pakistanis, while eager to engage Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan were at a precarious balance with Hafiz Gul Bahadur. He pulled back from the edge with the Pakistanis after the CIA drone assassination of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 [11]. His interests remained in protecting what he had established in North Waziristan, not endangering it to the risk of invasion or displacement [10]. In North Waziristan, he maintained a strict rule of Sharia law, even though he was not vocal about radical Islam [10]. His contemporary in the Muqami Taliban, Mullah Nazir was much more vehement in his espousal of jihadism and radical Islam, as opposed to the secular efforts by the current political establishment [10]. The associate of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Mullah Sadiq Noor was openly hostile to technology and enforced strict observance of Sharia law in North Waziristan [10]. Hafiz Gul Bahadur supported these beliefs, but also had a political background and his aforementioned ties to the government. To reiterate, he desired to control and rule North Waziristan, not to condemn it to destruction in battle [10]. This explained his reasoning for maintaining relationships with all of the major factions in the region. Only very rarely were there disputes or violence between the HGB network and others [10]. At the time, he was assessed to command approximately 1500 militants [11].

To the Pakistanis Hafiz Gul Bahadur was an uncertain but necessary ally. Of the Muqami Taliban, he alone expressed interest and desire to fight to defend Pakistan against India [10]. Yet he was even more adamant that the current Pakistani government was apostate in nature [10]. His religious leanings were hindering progress, but he was one of the best inroads to preventing Pashtun uprisings in the FATA. Thus, the Pakistani government remained focused on the TTP threat based out of South Waziristan. On a separate note, by late 2013 the leadership of the TTP and the South Waziristan Muqami Taliban had been ravaged by American drone strikes.

In the summer of 2014, the Pakistanis prepared a military offensive to cleanse the Shawal valley and other North Waziristan militant hubs [13]. Observers questioned whether this was meant to displace the Haqqani Network and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, or rather aimed solely at the foreign elements [13]. Hafiz Gul Bahadur himself felt no need for concern, given that he was adept at surviving this exact type of situation, and was certain that he would be the beneficiary of a reprieve from the Pakistani offensive [12]. By the year’s end, the question for the fate of the HGB network was answered. This considering that by December 2014, Pakistani airstrikes within their own territory in North Waziristan were said to have killed upwards of 30 of Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s militants, including seven primary commanders. In fact, press reports at the time alluded to the death of Gul Bahadur and his sometimes lieutenant Mullah Sadiq Noor [14]. Of course, the same Pakistani press later corrected and stated that Hafiz Gul Bahadur had instead escaped this fate and absconded to Afghanistan [4]. His home, meanwhile, and those of his chief lieutenants were razed, while family members and officers perished [12]. Commanders that remained behind faced this fate or capitulation. A minor former deputy of the HGB network, Aleem Khan, later resurfaced in March 2015 only to sue for peace and declare an end to hostilities with the Pakistanis [15].

Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his men dissipated into tribal Afghanistan, and more specifically, based on the locations of the recent airstrikes, inserted themselves into the Loya Paktia region of provinces, the traditional sphere of influence of the Haqqani family. Specifically, he relocated to Khost province and reinvigorated the relationship with the TTP [12]. However, instead of embedding strictly with the TTP, the HGB network was sheltered and supported by the Haqqanis [12]. It was acknowledged that due to both Haqqani and Gul Bahadur having had such power within North Waziristan, that they continued to coordinate and interoperated well with one another in Afghanistan [14,12]. The escape and establishment of bases from which to attack Pakistani government forces in North Waziristan makes sense considering this relationship. It made the HGB network a more reliable partner for the Haqqanis than the sometimes-volatile TTP. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was enraged by his treatment by the Pakistani government and the American drone strikes [12]. These sentiments enabled classic manipulation by the Haqqanis, allowing for a proxy force of aligned rebels to conduct operations now that patriarch of the family Siraj Haqqani had ascended to senior leadership in the Taliban government. Siraj was the Interior Minister and apparently held some belief that elements of the Pakistani government were supporting ISIS-K in their endeavors against the Taliban in Afghanistan, perhaps to keep them distracted or to ensure the utilization of the TTP against them instead of Pakistani forces [12]. As such, Haqqani was willing to utilize his old ally in response. Pakistani Operation Zarb i Azb had removed the HGB network from North Waziristan but allowed for its reestablishment and eventual rejuvenation [4]. They were now tools of Siraj Haqqani.

By late 2023, the HGB network and allies were preparing and perpetrating some of the worst attacks against Pakistani soldiers in years. A motorcycle borne suicide bomber in Jani Khel, Bannu district detonated adjacent to a military convoy, killing nine and wounding five on August 31, 2023 [16]. On November 28, another motorcycle targeted a convoy in Bannu, enroute from Miranshah, killing two civilians [17]. The suicide bomber was revealed to be an Afghan trained and dispatched by Hafiz Gul Bahadur [17]. In another incident, in Derra Ismail Khan district on December 12, an eerily similar incident to the one that precipitated the airstrikes had occurred [18]. The Pakistani military, having set up a camp at the local police station, faced a large vehicle borne explosive in a truck, followed by gunmen and suicide bombers; a total of six in all [18]. The assailants were all killed, but 23 Pakistani soldiers fell with them [18]. It must be noted that Hafiz Gul Bahadur was deemed responsible for expanding militancy in Derra Ismail Khan and Bannu [12]. Interestingly, in this episode too, another name was used to claim responsibility and maintain distinction from the TTP: The Tehrik e Jihad Pakistan [18]. This nascent group is recognized as a separate Pakistani Taliban contingent from the TTP and while not explicitly belonging to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the similarity in tactics and results, within an area of his influence, warrants further scrutiny as to his involvement. Either coordination or emulation is at play.

Now the recent Pakistani airstrikes, while risking further escalation are attempting to serve a threefold purpose. Firstly, to convince the Afghan Taliban that Pakistani air superiority could devastate them. The Taliban are unlikely to waver to this threat, due to years of surviving American and ISAF bombing campaigns. Secondly, the airstrikes serve to deter or remove Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a product of their own poor policies. Bahadur and his men may not be TTP for reasons explained, but they are enmeshed within the Pakistani Taliban community, and he is unlikely to be dissuaded by airstrikes after surviving the CIA drone war campaign. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is to veil the fact that the Pakistanis themselves have been responsible for many of the problems unfolding in Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted the Taliban in charge but are desperate to avoid having the TTP or groups like the HGB network have any influence or ability to stage domestic attacks. This is a showing to their people that the Pakistanis are able to defend themselves. Even if they know they cannot defeat this threat and may in the end just want them moved a further distance into Afghanistan, delaying the inevitable yet again.

That Hafiz Gul Bahadur obviously coordinates and operates with the TTP but remains distinct from them, is a political necessity for Siraj Haqqani. He is provided with a loyal proxy while the TTP receives the majority of the attention in response to the attacks. It will be interesting now that the Pakistanis have directly engaged Hafiz Gul Bahadur to see how this action progresses, and if he can manage to adroitly play the various sides to remain alive, relevant, and lethal.

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© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

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