SERIES: Red Sea Fray (Chapter 5 – Dragging Anchor)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

In the wake of the fatal drone strike by Iranian proxies against American forces in Jordan, the Biden Administration unleashed extensive airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. The effectiveness of these strikes and their timing were questioned, with evidence pointing that they were restricted and conducted after advanced warnings in order to prevent further escalation. In Yemen, the Houthi rebels now faced another round of American and British airstrikes from Operation Poseidon Archer, as another portion of these responses to the Iranian proxies. This as the Houthis and international authorities were entrapped in a cycle of attacks and defensive maneuvers.

THIRD MAJOR OFFENSIVE STRIKES OF POSEIDON ARCHER

The previous reciprocal strikes were resulting in nothing more than a stalemate. American bombings, both reactionary and precautionary, were doing minimal degradation to the Houthi arsenal. Even as the US Navy fought through February 2 against aerial threats, the Houthis were able to target the Saudi-flagged MV Daffodil with an attack drone [1,2]. While the projectile missed its target in the Red Sea, it proved that the Americans were not going to be able to prevent every single attack. Furthermore, on February 2, the Israelis were forced to employ their Arrow aerial defense system yet again to down an incoming ballistic missile over the Red Sea before it could reach the southern city of Eilat [3]. The Houthis again reminded the Israelis that the attacks would continue until such a time as the invasion of Gaza was ceased [4].

By February 3, a decision was made to go on the offensive for the third major round of degradation strikes in Operation Poseidon Archer against Houthi armaments. It commenced with yet another preventative strike, at 1920 when American forces destroyed six anti-ship cruise missiles, readied to launch at targets in the Red Sea [5]. Following at 2330, American F/A-18s from USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER and British Typhoon aircraft swept in, while destroyers USS CARNEY and USS GRAVELY unleashed Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, in order to demolish 36 selected targets over 13 locations in Houthi controlled territory [6-9]. Militarily significant sites were destroyed across six Yemeni provinces: Hajjah, Hudaidah, Taiz, al-Bayda, Dhammar, and Sanaa [9]. Yet again these included radar and air defense facilities, missile launching systems, helicopters utilized for piracy, command and control centers, drone operations and storage locales, and underground weapons storage facilities [6-9]. The latter may have proved to be the most vital, as the intent of the strikes was to reduce stockpiles of Houthi weaponry, discouraging them from further usage of these resources. There still remained the question though of just how much of an arsenal the Houthis maintained and if the strikes were actually diminishing it enough to curb the attacks. The British Typhoons destroyed a facility west of Sanaa known to provide guidance and control for drones deployed against nautical targets [9].

At 0400 on February 4, another anti-ship cruise missile aimed at the Red Sea was destroyed by US forces in self-defense, illustrating the capability of the Houthis to move these assets into firing position even among intense bombing raids [10]. Yet some observers still declared the futility of such missions as the offensive nature of Poseidon Archer, acknowledging the importance of preventative strikes against impending missiles or drone launches, but questioning the effectiveness of strikes against military targets that were purposeless anyway after years of warfare [11].

HOUTHI GAINS AND LOSSES

The Houthis meanwhile were gaining advantages from the entire debacle. Particularly concerning their own territorial gains within Yemen. Advancing directly east, the Houthis had failed to complete the conquest of Marib province, leaving two vital districts in the control of Saudi and Emirati supported forces [11]. The line separating the two represented the cessation of conflict between the Arab Coalition and the Houthis in 2022 and was the most likely area to act as kindling for another flare up of brutal combat [11]. For the Houthis, they coveted Marib province’s remaining districts due to its abundance of resources, primarily fossil fuels, and desired complete control of the oilfields and resulting revenues [11]. Their stance of supporting the Palestinian cause, ceasing to fold to international pressure and bombing campaigns, and the persistence of their launches against commercial shipping, were reaping popularity, and support for the group was growing from within Yemen [11]. Therefore, recruiting was increasing in such numbers that the Houthis were replacing the forces lost during the previous long war against the Arab Coalition [11]. The rapid rejuvenation of their armed forces with new troops, led to the idea that the Houthis could be preparing to make a push to finally conquer Marib entirely, as well as provinces beyond [11]. This would place the Saudi and Emirati supported government in an untenable position, one in which they would be destined to fail at governance [11]. Millions of Yemenis were rallying in Sanaa to display excitement, approval, and zealous support of the Houthis and their campaign against international shipping [11]. Mohamed al-Bukhaiti, a Houthi politician, and Yahya Saree, their spokesman, both vowed to respond to the February 3 strikes with further escalation, and reassured their people that the commercial shipping interference would continue in solidarity with the Palestinian condition [12]. The relatively minor losses incurred in the conflict with the Americans, British, and Europeans would be dismissed as necessary, furthering their supposed moral high ground in acknowledging the Palestinian plight, and advancing their own domestic goals by allowing for the expansion of Houthi influence in their nation. According to the Houthis, even their personnel losses were minimal as well.

As a form of maintaining the facade of being the legitimate government and military of Yemen, the Houthis held a memorial parade for their fallen soldiers on February 10 [13]. Specifically, these “martyrs” were slain by the Americans and British during the previous airstrikes of Poseidon Archer. To date the Houthis admitted to only 17 military deaths. The Houthis celebrated their fallen as:

  • Colonel Abdullah Mujahid Dhiyab,
  • Colonel Abdullah Ali Ghanem,
  • Colonel Faisal Muhsin Musaed,
  • Colonel Sufyan Yahya Al-Aghrabi,
  • Colonel Taha Ali Jamjam,
  • Colonel Hamis Mohamed Al-Jaradi,
  • Colonel Ziad Mohamed Ajlan,
  • Colonel Ghamdan Zabinallah Jumaida,
  • Major Mohamed Ali Al-Mihdhar,
  • Major Ahmed Mansur Al-Asri,
  • Mohamed Abdullah Al-Houri,
  • Major Ali Mohamed Al-Dailami, 
  • Captain Hashim Ahmed Al-Sawari,
  • Captain Dhi Yazan Khalid Al-Kabsi,
  • Captain Yasin Mohamed Al-Shaari,
  • Captain Ahmed Mohamed Rajab, and
  • Captain Shaif Mohamed Jumaida

These reports aired on Saba News Agency, operated by the Houthis, and failed to delve into further details on the casualties. It is interesting that almost all of the dead were officers, indicating either that the equipment and locations targeted were manned by superiors or launch system experts, or that the Houthis posthumously awarded ranks to their deceased. Also telling, were rumblings that Iranian IRGC subject matter experts (concerning missile and drone launches), were also lost in the bombing campaign, but not publicly acknowledged [13]. 

Thus, Saree and publicly available Houthi officials were cautious about speaking on the Iranian presence, or any casualties these forces incurred, as well as their own leadership losses if there were to be any. The Houthi press machine had displayed an ability to be dislodged from reality previously, and so even something as innocuous as reporting their own casualties must be taken with some degree of skepticism. On January 29, for instance, Saree claimed the Houthis had successfully targeted the USS LEWIS B PULLER ESB-3 in the Gulf of Aden, a mobile expeditionary base for US Special Forces afloat in the region [14]. Supposedly a single anti-ship missile was deployed against the platform [14]. However, American defense officials rapidly and vehemently denied the claim [15]. These periodic falsities intermixed with the other relatively accurate Houthi targeting reports to display a willingness of lying to ensure that they maintained the appearance of relevance in the international realm of influence. The daily strikes against their weaponry were mundane but forced the Houthis to exercise caution and ingenuity in order to launch further successful strikes against shipping.

THE HOUTHIS UNDETERRED

Continuing through February 4, the US resumed what had become standard preventative strikes, by destroying a land attack cruise missile in an airstrike at 0530 [16]. Presumably, this was a projectile intended for southern Israel. Also slated for destruction were four anti-ship cruise missiles, aimed into the Red Sea shipping lanes, subjected to a separate airstrike at 1030 [16]. A rising threat in the region, unmanned surface vessels were seen again the next day, when an American airstrike removed two of the devices from service in Houthi controlled territory at 1530 to prevent their usage against merchant freighters [17].

Six anti-ship ballistic missiles were fired by the Houthis on February 6 in efforts to disrupt the routes of two specific vessels [18]. The MV Star Nasia, owned and operated by a Greek company, under the flag of the Marshall Islands, was targeted at 0320 in the morning, and while the projectile impacted in vicinity of the ship, only limited damage was incurred [18]. Occurring in the Gulf of Aden, the incident saw the MV Star Nasia just 53 miles from the coast of Aden [19]. The Greek shipping ministry acknowledged the attack and slight damage, noting that the cause of the explosion was unclear at the time [19]. The vessel was sailing from the US to India, giving Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree reason enough to proclaim the ship as American [19]. Later at 1400, another missile aimed at the ship, but was off target and splashed into the Gulf of Aden nearby [18]. The destroyer USS LABOON was dispatched to offer assistance and at 1630 downed the final projectile inbound to Star Nasia [18]. Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, the MV Morning Tide was sailing southbound after transiting the Suez Canal and was 57 nautical miles off the coast of Hudaidah when the crew noticed a nearby small craft and subsequently faced Houthi aggression [19]. Three missiles were said to have impacted the waters in vicinity of the ship, causing minimal damage according to CENTCOM [18]. Other initial reports stated that it was an attack drone that targeted the Morning Tide [19,1]. The projectiles were fired towards the port side of Morning Tide resulting in insignificant damage to the bridge windows [20]. Clarification to the discrepancy in responsibility comes from the hypothesis that there were in fact missiles fired at the Morning Tide, but that at least one originated from the small Houthi craft in vicinity of the vessel [21]. If this was true, then the Houthis were expanding the mobile platforms from which they could fire their projectiles, representing a concerning development. Morning Tide was British owned and operated, under the Barbados flag, giving the Houthis supposed justification for the attack [18]. Both vessels were able to continue onward with no injuries or significant issues [18]. Yahya Saree declared responsibility for both attacks, calling the targeted ships by name [20]. He also boasted of the accuracy of the missiles [21]. Furthermore, Abdulmalik al-Houthi promised increasing and escalating attacks due to the deteriorating situation in Gaza [20]. Observers noted that Houthi was dependent on Iran for this accurate targeting, given that their organic radar installations were themselves frequently targeted by the strikes of Poseidon Archer [20].

Later in the evening on February 7, American precautionary strikes at 2100 eliminated two further anti-ship cruise missiles poised to destabilize the Red Sea [22]. By 2330 that night, an additional land attack cruise missile was rendered useless in an airstrike, before it could be launched against Israel [22]. All three projectiles were labeled by CENTCOM as being intended to launch from mobile platforms, indicating that intelligence gathering and forces in the air were intently monitoring and searching for these difficult to find means of attack [22]. This ability gained momentum the following day when American airstrikes between 0500 and 0900 neutralized seven anti-ship cruise missiles on mobile platforms, plus four unmanned surface vehicles, aimed for usage in the Red Sea [23]. Through the entire day of February 9, from 0300-2140, this vigilance was rewarded, as additional American airstrikes prevented the employment of two more USVs, four more anti-ship cruise missiles, and one land attack cruise missile against targets in the Red Sea and beyond [24]. Just northward of the Houthi port Hudaidah on February 10, between 1600-1700, American missiles found and impacted two USVs and three anti-ship cruise missiles on mobile platforms [25]. Yet the question remained of whether the daily campaign was actually slowing the Houthi mechanisms of attack, or if it was simply a Sisyphean or futile exercise, in that the Houthis were well enough armed that eventually they would get several projectiles to targets in the shipping lanes.

Ironically, when the Houthis were able to next successfully strike a merchant vessel, it was the MV Star Iris; intending to enter port in Iran. Another Greek owned and operated vessel, sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, the Star Iris was destined to bring a cargo of corn to Bandar Imam Khomeini, in Iran [26]. In the dark of the morning on February 12, from 0330 to 0345, the Star Iris in the Bab al-Mandeb strait endured attack from two missiles, causing minimal damage and no wounds among the crew, but endangering the Brazilian corn meant for the Iranians [26]. It was but 40 nautical miles from the port of al-Mukha [27]. Yahya Saree attempted to divert attention by claiming that the ship was American [28]. Star Bulk Carriers, the parent company operated out of Greece, and had financial linkages to the US [27]. That being said, it was a tenuous reason to attack a ship inbound to Iran. It stands to reason that several days since their last launches against merchant vessels, the Houthis were eager to hit a target and either made a mistake or just accepted that any ship would suffice in lieu of repeated press coverage of American bombardments against their weaponry. The business link to America must have provided enough justification despite the destination. Those freighters enroute to Iran were traveling with a sense of safety, as observed by press reports, and thus did not alter course to avoid the Red Sea, making them vulnerable to Houthi efforts [28]. Saree was loathe to admit a mistake and decried the previous few days of American intervention and strikes on Houthi territory [27].

If the Houthis were desperate for launches, then they displayed this on February 13 when at 2120 they sent one anti-ship ballistic missiles careening aimless into the Gulf of Aden [29]. Despite being monitored by the US Navy no action was taken as the missile posed no threat to any vessels [29]. This following a 1435 airstrike earlier in the day in which a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile was destroyed before it could be employed against freighters in the Red Sea [29]. The subsequent day, February 14 from 1300-1930, saw four American airstrikes degrade Houthi chances for mobile launch success even further, with the destruction of seven anti-ship cruise missiles, three UAVs, and one USV, poised for harassment of Red Sea shipping [30].

F/A-18 launches from USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER

The search for these projectiles was exhausting but rewarding for US Navy pilots. Yet it also brought a sense of false security that perhaps the worst was over and done with when it came to the conflict. Perhaps the daily strikes were preventing attacks for that particular day, but not exactly ensuring that future incidents were guaranteed to be avoided. For instance, on February 15, from 1510 to 2000 US pilots were busied searching for targets and conducted two airstrikes eliminating three anti-ship cruise missiles and their mobile launch apparatus prior to threatening the Red Sea [31]. Yet even while this occurred, at 1630, an anti-ship ballistic missile launched against the British owned and operated, Barbadian-flagged MV Lycavitos in the Gulf of Aden, resulting in insignificant damage to the bulk carrier [31]. Both CENTCOM and the Houthi statement of responsibility maintained that the Lycavitos was British owned [31,32]. Other reporting disagreed with the assertion of British ownership, detailing that the parent company was Greek, with offices in London [32]. Additionally, the reporting was vague as to whether the projectile actually impacted the ship. Some journalists stated that the vessel was indeed struck, with shrapnel damage contained to limited portions of the ship [32]. Other monitoring groups maintained that the missile essentially missed its target, 85 nautical miles from Aden [2], but still represented another close encounter that could have ended tragically. Most likely the projectile exploded over or near the vessel, resulting in the shrapnel damage, but not representing a direct impact. Eventually the Houthi persistence would end with unfortunate consequences, thus the US Navy worked diligently in response. This vigilance involved the fighter pilots of the DWIGHT D EISENHOWER Strike Group (Carrier Strike Group Two) to be prepared to launch on very short notice to counter the threat of a missile or drone approaching commercial freighters or naval assets [33]. Coordination with the escorting destroyers was paramount, as the surface ships had limited time to identify and engage an aerial target [33]. Plus, the US Navy faced shifting Houthi tactics, including swarm waves, and the aforementioned USV and UUVs [33]. Commanders of the Strike Group and Carrier Air Wing noted the employment of the Samad-3 attack drone, a variant with an increased range [33]. Yet surprisingly, they also questioned Houthi targeting abilities, with the Iranian espionage vessel MV Behshad having transited to just off the coast of Djibouti, ostensibly not providing any data to the Houthi launchers [33]. Previous assessments determined increased Iranian involvement, so most likely, the movement of the Behshad was to visibly display Iranian forces pulling away from the conflict directly, while still providing support surreptitiously.

THE RUBYMAR

The next two vessels targeted suffered vastly different degrees of damage. From 1315 on February 16 to 0100 the following morning, the Danish owned and Panamanian-flagged MV Pollux was subjected to a series of Houthi missile launches. Four anti-ship ballistic missiles sought targets at various points through the time frame, three of which seemingly aimed at the Pollux while transiting the Red Sea [34]. However, no reports of damage or injuries surfaced from the incident [34]. That being said, monitoring agencies credited the Houthis with impacting the vessel with at least one of the projectiles, but with insignificant results [1,2]. The tanker carrying crude oil from Russia to India, was struck along the port side, at a distance of 72 nautical miles from al-Mukha in the Red Sea [35]. The Houthis proudly claimed the attack with Yahya Saree detailing an abundance of missiles utilized, undoubtedly, to signal that airstrikes had failed to properly reduce the militant stockpile [36]. Abdulmalik again rallied adherents with stories of success in the Red Sea conflict, in an apparent effort to increase support and recruiting [35]. During the dilemma of the Pollux, American forces conducted airstrikes between 1340 and 1845 in order to destroy one anti-ship cruise missile before it could launch from its mobile apparatus and yet another USV [34].

The second vessel impacted fared much worse. But this action was preceded by a concerning day on February 17 which five saw American airstrikes from 1500 to 2000 destroy three anti-ship cruise missiles and one USV [37]. The fifth strike was notable due to the employment of an unmanned underwater vehicle by the Houthis and its subsequent destruction [37]. US military officials admitted that the UUV deployment represented a new and concerning threat, with minimal intelligence garnered on the devices, and the potential for it to be lethal [38]. While this concern festered among the responding militaries in the region, the day of February 18 was unusually quiet, leading up to an explosive evening. According to CENTCOM, from 2130 to 2245 the British owned and Belizean-flagged MV Rubymar faced two incoming anti-ship ballistic missiles [39]. One impacted the vessel, resulting in a distress call from the crew [39]. The stricken vessel was 30 nautical miles off the coast of al-Mukhla in the Red Sea [40]. Having just completed a northward Bab al-Mandeb strait transit, the missile caused a massive explosion on Rubymar, debilitating the engine room [41]. Calling upon the assistance of coalition warships and nearby merchants, the crew was forced to abandon their vessel due to the significance of the damage [39]. After a three-hour nightmare, their sister vessel, another merchant freighter, under a Singaporean flag, rescued the entire crew despite the dangers [41]. Yahya Saree reveled in the success of the attack, describing the bulk carrier Rubymar as completely halted and at risk of sinking [40]. He further detailed the damage as “catastrophic,” a statement that turned out to be accurate [42]. The vessel, traveling between the UAE and Bulgaria had previously silenced its transmission of AIS information to ostensibly prevent Houthi tracking [42]. Despite the CENTCOM claim of being British owned, the bulk carrier was registered to the British and Lebanese owned [43]. Carrying 41,000 tons of fertilizers, the Rubymar was anchored before the crew abandoned ship, and left to slowly take on water and sink over the next several days [43]. The eleven Syrians, six Egyptians, three Indians, and four Filipinos were delivered safely to Djibouti [44]. During this time, the crippled vessel created an 18-mile-long oil slick and combined with the hazardous fertilizer cargo, represented the realization of an ecological disaster in the Red Sea [43]. The fertilizer was a of a class described as very dangerous and thus exposed the Red Sea and its environment to significant environmental repercussions [44]. US officials noted the Houthi disregard to their own environment and again emphasized the threat posed by the militants to international shipping, food and fishing industries, as well as their own Yemeni communities [43]. Debate ensued about what to do with the Rubymar, with towing to Djibouti appearing as the most appropriate option [44]. However, the idea of approaching and towing the Rubymar proved unfeasible as the time taken could expose other vessels to further attacks [43]. Thus, the Rubymar was left to slowly descend into the depths. It met this fate amidst increasingly foul weather in the Red Sea, some 12 days later on March 2, as the hull disappeared beneath the waves [45].

The vessel also caused an international fracas over undersea communication cables. Israeli press began reporting on February 26 that several cables were severed which provided internet connection between Europe and Asia, with the consequences most readily seen in the Middle East and India [46]. However, other undamaged undersea cables that crossed the Red Sea ensured that connectivity remained open even with the disruption in services caused by the others [46]. Companies affected said they estimated repairs to extend out to several weeks due to the nature of the work and the inherent risk posed by the Houthis [46]. For their part, the Houthis denied any such activity and even offered to assist in the repairs, given that the companies obtained appropriate “permits” from the government [47]. The accusations and denials did not provide clarification to what caused the communications interference and severed cables, or even if it was true. In early March, confirmations came that the Asia-Africa-Europe 1, the Europe India Gateway, and the Seacom/TGN-Gulf were the three cables severed, representing 3 out of the 14 in the Red Sea [48]. These communications linkages transmitted 25% of the internet traffic through the Red Sea according to the Associated Press [48]. While there was previous valid fear that the Houthis would resort to such a crime, there was still uncertainty as to the cause. The weak Yemeni government, internationally recognized and supported by the Arab Coalition, blamed the Houthis for the event, while the militants themselves continued to deny their culpability, even reporting on the severed cables for confirmation of the incident [48]. Eager to shift blame, the Houthis declared the Americans and British as responsible [48]. US officials at the White House later revealed that the sinking bulk carrier Rubymar dragged its anchor in its death throes, and that this anchor severed the three cables, thus solving the mystery [49].

OPERATION ASPIDES

The days following the strike on the Rubymar saw a flurry of activity in what was rapidly becoming a naval and aerial war between the Houthis and international contingents. These events drew grave concern from American senior officials considering that the Houthis had yet to cease their operations despite the airstrikes against them [50]. For the Europeans, February 19 brought about the official beginning of the EU Naval Force Operation Aspides, a purely defensive operation to protect shipping and commercial lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden [51]. Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium were among the EU nations readied to deploy warships to the arena, while Greece acted as the operational commander and provided the headquarters for the mission [51]. The EU was clear again to declare that minimal force was to be used, and only in self-defense, in efforts to ensure they were distinguished from the offensive operations of Poseidon Archer under the Americans and British [51]. The Europeans sought their own version of the previous American led international defensive mission, Prosperity Guardian, out of concern of being linked with the Americans in the widening conflict erupting since the October 7 attacks and subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza [51]. EU warships were already in the area for the anti-piracy Operation Atalanta, but nations such as Spain refuted the idea of tasking assets from that mission, thus furthering the need for a separate operation [51]. Others were in the region specifically for Prosperity Guardian, such as Denmark, having sent the frigate IVAR HUITFELDT F361, which arrived in the Red Sea on February 8 [52]. Denmark being willing to be more aggressive makes sense considering it is the home of shipping giant Maersk. The Danish also announced the availability of the IVAR HUITFELDT for Aspides [52]. With the competing interests, even among their member nations, it made sense that the EU Naval Force distinguished and specified a defensive operation for themselves. Italy shifted the destroyer CAIO DULIO D554 already in the region, from duties pertaining to Atalanta to the new Aspides, allowing a separate Italian vessel to maintain the former mission [53]. The German frigate HESSEN F221 arrived in the Red Sea on February 26 to be on the front line of defense for Aspides [54]. Greece provided the frigate HYDRA F452, arriving on March 2 to the Red Sea [55]. Also, at the time of the Apsides implementation, the French maintained two frigates in the region, both the ALSACE D656 and LANGUEDOC D653 [56]. The Operational Commander of Aspides was a Greek Admiral based in Larissa, Greece, while the Force Commander was an Italian Admiral based onboard the CAIO DULIO [55].

As the EU was establishing their mission, the Americans continued to act defensively and offensively, facing some of their most ferocious actions beginning on February 19 as well.

For our next chapter, we will discuss the Americans conducting their fourth major round of airstrikes against the Houthis and the lethal militant response on commercial shipping.

CITATIONS:

© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

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