SERIES: Red Sea Fray (Chapter 2 – Prosperity Guardian)

Written by Nolan R Beasley

In the first portion of this series, a brief history of the pugnacious Houthis, within the Zaidi sect of Shia Islam, was provided. Afterwards, focus shifted to the current conflict involving the Yemeni rebels, beginning in late 2023. In addition to attempted strikes against Israel, the Houthis were now targeting international shipping; ostensibly only those with Israeli connections. The US Navy was poised in the region to defend and counter. 

COMMERCIAL SHIPPING AND ISRAEL ENDANGERED

It became apparent in the aftermath of the boarding of the MV Galaxy Leader that this incident was not an anomaly. Shipping lanes in the seas around Yemen were under consistent threat. The activity destabilized an already precarious temporary peace between Ansarallah and the Saudis, giving rise to fears of continually increasing warfare [1]. The Americans meanwhile, displayed willingness to commence striking into Houthi controlled Yemeni territory in response to the hijacking of the MV Galaxy Leader [1]. Though it must be observed, that the Houthis themselves did have some defenses, having already destroyed an American MQ-9 drone with their own Iranian supplied Khordad-3 air defense system [1]. The Houthis purported Coastal Defense commander, Mohamed al-Qadiri, discouraged international security forces from approaching Yemeni territorial waters, threatening responses [1]. 

Missile launches did not cease either. Amidst the drama of the cargo vessels, the IDF dispatced an F-35 fighter jet to destroy an incoming Houthi missile near Eilat on November 22 [2]. Despite the successful downing outside of Israeli territory as well as proficient warning sirens in the city, the Houthis took to social media to taunt civilians and government officials alike over the disruption of routine life [2]. In fact, during the zealous defense of Eilat, false alarms were common. For example on November 24, the IDF launched against aerial targets later investigated as probable false intrusions [3]. Reports of explosions in Eilat were noted, even without actual missile or drone impacts [3]. 

On November 25, the Maltese-flagged MV Symi was targeted via an Iranian Shahid-136 drone while transiting through the Indian Ocean [4]. The ship was leased to a French operated company by an Israeli billionaire’s own Singapore based shipping enterprise, demonstrating the desire to strike ships linked to Israel, yet resulting in international repercussions [4]. Damage to the ship was inconsequential, and it was not immediately certain that the Houthis were actually responsible, given that the Symi had already passed through the Red Sea and beyond before being struck [4]. The location and claim of responsibility from a Hezbollah affiliated media center indicated that another member of the “Axis of Resistance,” or likely direct Iranian action was the cause of the damage to the Symi [4]. The Houthis claimed a similar drone attack on the MV Calandra the same day, purportedly owned by the Israeli company ZIM [5]. Video of the attack displayed a massive blaze onboard the ship, with reports of the Sri Lankans and Indians rushing to provide firefighting and rescue assistance [5]. However, the claim proved to be false, as the video was of a chemical fire onboard a ship back in May 2021 [6]. While it was indeed assisted by the Sri Lankans at the time, this event had naught to do with the current war, and was conflated with the earlier, lesser drone strike incident on the Symi [6]. There was no attack on a MV Calandra. This is of interest, in that the Houthis felt the need to be mendacious concerning their attacks. Perhaps this was to take credit for something the Iranians were doing, or to match their benefactors in violence. Another simpler option is that the Houthis were spreading fear via social media, knowing that the majority of readers would not verify the claims. Regardless, the Houthis were still launching enough actual attacks to be of grave concern. 

These events spawned other actors to attempt their own, perhaps independent, endeavors. On November 27, the USS MASON DDG-87 received a distress call from the Israeli affiliated MV Central Park, boarded by five Somali pirates [7]. MASON responded, liberated the ship, and captured the pirates as they absconded towards Yemen [7]. Approximately one hour and 40 minutes into the operation, the Houthis launched a missile, landing 10 nautical miles away from MASON in the Red Sea [7]. Originally reported as two missiles fired at the destroyer, the Pentagon later clarified only one projectile was detected, and that there could be no certainty to whether or not MASON and/or MV Central Park were the actual targets [7]. This careful language was obviously intended to deescalate the tense circumstance yet ignored the inherent dangers of the Houthis launching missiles potentially haphazardly in the busy shipping lane. The event was strange, leaving journalists to wonder how exactly the Houthis knew of the location of MASON, and if the potential missile attack on the Israeli operated MV Central Park would just coincidentally happen in concert with an independent Somali piracy event [8]. Especially given that the location of the incident was not near a particularly active piracy zone along the Somali coast [8]. Thus, these journalists postulated that perhaps the Houthis were contracting Somalis, already familiar with the concept and methods for piracy, to engage in the war on their behalf [8]. The coincidences are unusual in this case, but the theory makes sense, given that the pirates fled towards Yemen as opposed to Somalia prior to their capture. The Pentagon declined to make the link between the two entities and instances though [7].

CONTINUED US NAVAL INTERVENTION

The US Navy continued to patrol and protect vessels in the area, with USS CARNEY downing an Iranian KAS-04 drone over the Red Sea, launched by the Houthis on the morning of November 29 [9]. This came the day after an Iranian drone flew uncomfortably close to the aircraft carrier USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER CV-69, approaching within 1500 yards of the high value vessel in an unsafe and unprofessional manner [10]. The EISENHOWER Strike Group was deployed to the region in response to the Hamas attacks and subsequent Gaza War but was recently filtered down to the Red Sea in further response to Houthi actions [10,11]. The CARNEY engagement represented the fourth time during the conflict that American forces tangibly interacted with Houthi weaponry in self-defense or defense of other entities [11]. 

A fifth incident occurred on December 3, as well as additional aggression towards international shipping [12]. During a prolonged event commencing in the morning, the Houthis reported launching a missile at a cargo vessel, followed by a drone at a different vessel transiting the Bab al-Mandeb strait [12]. The reality was that the Houthis fired a missile at the Bahamian flagged MV Unity Explorer, missed, then followed up with an impact on the second attempt [13]. Next, two Panamanian-flagged vessels, the Sophie II and the Number 9 were each hit by a Houthi missile apiece [13]. Although the projectiles were ineffective and caused but insignificant damage, the Houthis claimed the incident, in order to further disrupt traffic. Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree linked Unity Explorer and the Number 9 to two different Israeli businessmen, attempting to justify the two attacks he claimed [14]. CARNEY meanwhile, over the course of the event, was forced to down three separate Houthi drones, including the first one with a trajectory towards the destroyer [12]. After its initial defensive action, CARNEY sailed to assist the Unity Explorer in between missile attacks against the vessel and shot down the second drone during this time [13]. CARNEY downed the third drone while responding to the incident on the Sophie II [13]. It is possible that the Houthis omission of responsibility for the incidents with CARNEY and Sophie II were to avoid escalation and to maintain the focus on Israeli affiliated ships as opposed to supposed collateral damage [14]. This is just a theory and may not be viable given the Houthis’ blatant disregard for the safe passage of vessels in the Bab al-Mandeb. This included a potential attack against the Liberian-flagged tanker C Genuine also on December 3, given that the crew reported an explosion in the air over their stern, while at a distance of 10 nautical miles from Taiz, Yemen [15,16]. 

Brig Gen Yahya Saree,
Houthi spokesman

Houthi claims on December 6 stated that multiple projectiles were fired at Israeli military targets in Eilat, although the IDF reported downing only one missile via its Arrow air defense system, safely over the Red Sea [17]. Of note, there is a change of language for the Houthis in the claim. Instead of accepting that they had fired upon civilian targets, the new wording indicated that they were aiming for military infrastructure instead, in an apparent public relations improvement attempt. The Houthis clarified that their aggressions were aimed at the Israeli military, Israeli shipping, and conducted in solidarity with the Palestinian people [18]. One could imagine that these types of statements meant to delay any international response and narrow the scope of the conflict to between Israel and the Iranian proxies. 

The US Navy was undeterred and again removed a Houthi drone from the sky on December 6 [19]. USS MASON downed the UAV in the southern Red Sea, as part of the DWIGHT D EISENHOWER Strike Group’s efforts to protect shipping and prevent launches against southern Israel [19]. Thus far, three US destroyers had engaged Houthi aerial targets. Interestingly, CARNEY bragged in a spirit promotional aired during the US Army-US Navy football game, that the ship was 22-0 against Houthi missiles and drones [20]. Thus, the CARNEY initial tally from October 19, must have been closer to the CNN estimate of 15 drones destroyed as opposed to the 19 drones otherwise reported. If not, then when considering all reported CARNEY interventions thus far, the total would be larger than 22. 

USS CARNEY engages Houthi aerial targets with SM-2 missiles launched from the aft Vertical Launch System – photograph appeared in USS CARNEY spirit promotional and is credited to Aaron Lau, USN

SUCCESSFUL HOUTHI STRIKES, FOREIGN NAVAL DEFENSIVE MEASURES, AND SOMALI PIRACY

Even as the US Navy boasted of their success, media and security analysts noted that the Singaporean-flagged vehicle carrier MV Centaurus Leader observed a drone attack, which fortunately missed the vessel and resulted in what was often called a “proximate explosion [16,21].” EU Naval forces involved in the anti-piracy Operation Atalanta clarified that the Centaurus Leader was fired upon via attack drone twice, with both attempts failing to impact [22]. International forces joined the fray on December 10 as the French frigate FS LANGUEDOC FFG-653 defended itself against two Houthi drones [23]. The frigate employed Aster 15 surface to air missiles to destroy the targets and stated that the Houthis specifically meant to harm them [23]. This was an indication that US authorities had yet to give. FS LANGUEDOC was patrolling the Red Sea as per orders when the drones were discovered inbound [23]. Yahya Saree meanwhile, expanded his boisterous threats, claiming that the relatively successful campaign was to be expanded in an attempt to blockade all shipping efforts from reaching Israel [23]. The next day, the French found themselves again thrown into the conflict. The Norwegian-flagged MT Strinda, a tanker with a payload of biofuels, was attacked and struck by an anti-ship cruise missile fired by the Houthis, just north of the Bab al-Mandeb [24]. FS LANGUEDOC came to the protection of the vessel, shooting down an additional drone threatening the tanker [24]. USS MASON also provided assistance and escorted the vessel back out of the strait and into the Gulf of Aden [24]. The French again utilized the Aster 15, and with just a 20 nautical mile range, it indicated the close proximity of the threat to both the frigate and the tanker [24]. MT Strinda was scheduled to make a port visit in Israel on its way to Italy, revealing that the Houthis were monitoring publicly available tracking information on the shipping, cargo, and tanker vessels in the region [24]. The missile caused minimal damage, including a fire that was eventually extinguished, but fortunately caused no wounds among the crew [24]. 

December 13 saw the Marshall Islands-flagged MV Ardmore Encounter come under direct threat of piracy when Houthi personnel onboard several skiffs attempted to board and overtake the ship [25]. The incident approximately 50 nautical miles off the shore of Hudaidah, further demonstrated the dangers of that particular port being used as a base and launching arena for Houthi attacks [26]. USS MASON rushed to the defense of the vessel, and along the way was forced to down yet another Houthi drone, itself with a trajectory directed towards MASON [25]. Internal security onboard the Ardmore Encounter thwarted the hijacking attempt, exchanging gunfire with the pirates at ranges of several hundred meters [26]. The Houthis fled, at which point their counterparts on land fired two missiles towards the vessel, both of which failed to find their target [25]. Initial reporting claimed a shore-based battery somewhere brought down one of the missiles, although the veracity of this is undefined and it is unknown if the Saudis or another nation fired upon the projectile, if true [26]. Furthermore, Ambrey, a maritime security organization in the volatile waterways, reported that a Maltese-flagged vessel, MV Lady Tramp faced an approaching armed small boat the same day [26,16]. No incident was recorded from this, as the potential pirates failed to complete their approach. 

The following day, the Maersk shipping company again faced the perils of the Bab al-Mandeb strait as targeted by the Houthis. Just north of their strait transit, MV Maersk Gibraltar was fired upon by a Houthi ballistic missile [27]. While the missile missed its target, sparing the Maersk Gibraltar, it did directly threaten the international shipping lane yet again [27]. Some reports state that the missile impacted the ocean a mere 50 meters away from the hull of the vessel [28]. The Houthis after firing, hailed, taunted, and warned the Maersk Gibraltar against continuing onward, declaring more missile attacks were to transpire [27]. In fact, the Houthis ordered the vessel to change course and surrender in Yemen; a suggestion promptly ignored by the crew [28]. In follow on statements, the Houthis claimed to have struck the Maersk vessel successfully [29]. Maersk responded with furor, demanding political resolutions to the conflict and maintaining that the scenario was detrimental for free global trading conditions [28]. The company also denied that the carrier, traveling from Oman to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was struck by any projectile directly [29]. At the same time of this incident, vague reports emerged of yet another event in the strait, near the Yemeni island of Socotra, that was of grave concern [28]. 

Word spread that a Maltese-flagged carrier was successfully boarded [28,30]. Prior to being rendered dead in the water, the vessel was observed performing suspected evasive maneuvers, probably to thwart smaller vessels from approaching [28]. In addition, an Iranian-flagged fishing vessel may have been spotting for the pirates and killed its AIS broadcast (transponder) prior to the incident [28,30]. The hijacked carrier was revealed by the European Union Naval Force to be the MV Ruen, boarded on December 14 [31]. The Europeans dispatched a Spanish warship to aid, while the 18 crew members barricaded in the ship’s citadel from the pirates [31]. An Indian maritime patrol aircraft established contact with the crew on December 15, confirming their safety and condition in the citadel [31]. However, the boarders later breached the secure chamber and took the crew hostage as well as control of the entire vessel [31]. The Spanish warship was joined by Japanese and Indian counterparts in monitoring the developments on December 16 and attempting to establish and maintain communications with the hijacked vessel [31]. This resulted in the successful medevac of a stricken crew member for health reasons [31]. By the end of the December the Bulgarian operated vessel and its remaining crew were brought to within 3 nautical miles of the Somali coast and anchored, still under close observation by the EU Naval Force and other relevant authorities [32]. This was apparently another Somali hijacking operation, but the coincidental timing continued to beg the question of whether or not there was cooperation between the pirates and the Houthis in disrupting shipping lanes. 

Shortly after MV Ruen was hijacked, several more vessels faced Houthi violence on December 15. Transiting northward in the Red Sea, MSC Alanya received instruction and demands from the Houthis to turn 180 degrees and commence a southbound transit instead [33]. Advised and monitored by US Naval forces, the vessel plodded onward to the north after taking evasive actions to avoid Houthis in small craft, who were issuing the threats directly [33]. A Liberian-flagged vessel, Alanya fared better than two of its counterparts during that same day [34]. This as the two other Liberian-flagged vessels came under attack in the Bab al-Mandeb. MV Al-Jasrah was impacted by a drone, resulting in a fire, later controlled by the crew [33]. The force of the strike, on the port side of the vessel, resulted in a container plunging into the ocean [34]. MV Palatium faced two ballistic missile launches, with one of the projectiles impacting the vessel [33]. USS MASON was dispatched to assist the Palatium III, which was also on fire after the strike [33]. Successful crew efforts extinguished the blaze, and USS MASON was not further needed [34]. The Houthis confused the vessels, claiming attacks on Alanya and Palatium III while omitting the Al-Jasrah, which was actually targeted and hit [33]. The militants claimed the vessels were bound for port calls in Israel, while in reality they appeared instead destined for Saudi Arabia [33]. Al-Jasrah was to pull into port in Egypt [34]. This did not dissuade Yahya Saree from using this justification on social media to explain the attacks [34]. Fortunately, no crew members were harmed by the events on any of the three carriers [33]. German company Hapag-Lloyd, owners of Al-Jasrah began to contemplate the suspension of shipping through this convenient and efficient route until the situation could be brought under control [33]. Maersk was forced to make the announcement that all of its vessels scheduled to transit through the Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea were to pause and await further instruction, halting lucrative trade routes for the world’s largest shipping company [35]. Hapag-Loyd then followed, temporarily pausing its own fleet from using those routes [35]. The Houthis were now contributing to potential worldwide economic impacts, as an estimated $1 trillion of goods were transported annually through the strait, as well as 10% of the world’s oil supply [35]. 

PROSPERITY GUARDIAN AND HOUTHI SANCTIONS

Precautions were warranted as USS CARNEY faced a swarming of 14 drones on December 16, successfully engaging and shooting down all of the targets, with no damage to shipping in the area [36,37]. The attack commenced in the early morning, with the drones launching from Yemen, however USCENTCOM refused to declare that the drones, known to be single use attack, or suicide drones, were dispatched in an effort to impact CARNEY [37]. Nonetheless, the destroyer proved up to the task, and neutralized the attack wave, earning praise and awards from their superiors for their continued success against the Houthi threats [37]. The Houthis clarified, indicating that the drone wave was launched in an effort to overwhelm defenses in Eilat, Israel and strike random targets within [38]. During the night, the British HMS Diamond eliminated another Houthi drone, aimed at shipping carriers, with a Sea Viper missile [38]. Of note, this was reported to be the first Royal Navy downing of an aerial threat since the First Persian Gulf War [38].

Merely two months after the initial volley of missiles and drones deployed from Yemen, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a crucial announcement concerning the conflict. On December 18, Austin noted the reckless nature of the Houthi actions and their detrimental effects on international trade and commerce, while declaring the implementation of Operation Prosperity Guardian [39]. The initiative would expand upon the infrastructure already within the region and encompass a large international involvement as a Combined Maritime Force, under the pre-existing Combined Task Force 153 [39]. Austin revealed the creation of the operation while in Bahrain [40]. Noting that CTF-153 was previously established to maintain security in the Red Sea, Austin emphasized the inclusion of the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain into the operation to deter and dissuade the Houthis from attacks [39]. Austin preceded the declaration by embarking on a Middle Eastern journey to discuss security and regional stability with partners in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and of course Israel [40]. While also in Bahrain, Austin called upon leaders of 40 nations during a virtual conference, including members of NATO and other allies and partners, in an effort to discuss the deteriorating situation in the Red Sea, the threat to international commerce, and to garner support for Prosperity Guardian [40]. Successfully, 20 nations agreed to join and assist [40].  The Pentagon described Prosperity Guardian as a metaphorical highway patrol along the Red Sea, where the various countries could participate in protection of international shipping with military, staffing, or logistical contributions, in order to provide a sense of security to mariners, and to deny the vagabond Houthis the ability to harass and disrupt international commerce [40]. International media expressed hope that Prosperity Guardian would succeed, citing the analogous international operations to deter Somali pirates, which began some years prior [41]. It was also noted that in response, Maersk was considering rescheduling several cargo vessels to transit through Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea again, thus avoiding the only other option: a 3,000 nautical mile detour around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, in order to commercially link Asia and Europe, and the inevitable increase in global goods prices as a result [41]. 

While the Defense Department built bridges to military coalitions, the Treasury Department increased sanctions against the smuggling network that enabled the Houthis to receive their advanced weaponry. The Treasury had already sanctioned a primary individual helming the network, the Houthi Yemeni Said al-Jamal on June 10, 2021 [42]. Said Ahmed Mohamed Jamal [43], was stationed in Iran, working to ensure the illegal sale of Iranian goods, particularly petroleum, bypassing existing sanctions against the Shiite state, and then funneling the proceeds through a convoluted series of exchanges and intermediaries, in order to end in the Houthi coffers [42]. The tens of millions of dollars in funds were used by the Houthis and IRGC-Quds Force elements within Yemen to maintain their government, purchase weapons, and conduct operations [42]. Jamal was able to find a variety of African, Asian, and Middle Eastern customers willing to ignore sanctions in order to purchase the Iranian petroleum and goods [42]. Several portions of his network, both individuals and entities were sanctioned along with him [42]. The State Department followed suit in imposing sanctions and designating Jamal [43]. 

Now over two years later, the network continued to thrive and received additional sanctions from the Treasury Department. On December 7, 2023 the Treasury Department announced these additional sanctions, targeting those perfidious exchange houses and intermediaries utilized by Jamal [44]. These included Bilal Hudroj and his Lebanese Hudroj Exchange, as well as Ahmet Duri in Turkiye and his Jawhirah Exchange. Both of these entities handled millions of dollars and euros on behalf of Jamal and ensured that the funds funneled down through the complex financial network to senior Houthi militants [44]. Abu Sumbol General Trading in Dubai was given the same treatment for its contributions to the pecuniary crimes [44]. Of note, after his 2021 designation, Jamal and a relative named Khalid Yahya Rajeh al-Odhari established the Davos Exchange as a means to bypass the original sanctions and to continue to launder money in amounts of millions of dollars for the benefit of the Houthis and the IRGC Quds Force [44]. International businessman and nefarious shipping agent Fadi Deniz and his Deniz Capital Maritime, Inc were sanctioned for their roles in illegally shipping the illicit goods and oil for Jamal. Deniz maintained a variety of front companies in multiple nations in order to achieve this degree of advanced smuggling [44]. In total on December 7, the Treasury sanctioned the four mentioned individuals and nine business entities [44]. 

This was followed on December 28, by even further sanctions against the network. This included the receiving end of the conduit as the Nabco Money Exchange and Remittance Company in Sanaa, accused of receiving millions of dollars in deposits from the Jamal network, and serving as the waypoint for money in and out of Houthi controlled Yemen [45]. The leader of Nabco, Nabil Ali Ahmed al-Hadha received equal sanctions as the primary Sanaa based intermediary of the network and was well positioned as the president of the Currency Exchangers Association in Houthi territory [45]. Hadha also laundered and funneled immense amounts of funds from Turkiye [45]. Jamal used al-Rawda Exchange to exchange money into Yemeni rials and to cover the operations of Iranian originated funds arriving from abroad; the final stage of the Iranian financial support to the Houthis, as they money would then be transferred to Houthi government and military entities [45]. In total, December 28 saw the Treasury sanction Hadha and three financial institutions [45]. 

Meanwhile, as time advanced, some opinion veered to the observed problems associated with Prosperity Guardian [46]. This included the lack of tangible support from some partners who notably only sent minimal staffing officers to assist with the efforts [46]. Other important naval allies declined to directly participate, while others sent warships on their own accord to contribute independently [46]. Thus increasingly, it appeared that Prosperity Guardian was an operation to be shouldered by the US Navy [46]. The complex political implications of the conflict evolving from the IDF-HAMAS Gaza War undoubtedly prevented full and unhindered international support [46]. 

But Prosperity Guardian was necessary as demonstrated by an attack on December 18, the very day the initiative was born. As the destroyers USS CARNEY, USS STETHEM, and USS MASON patrolled the Bab al-Mandeb, the Houthis again launched projectiles [47]. This occurred at a time when more companies were entertaining the cautious prospect of avoiding the strait and Red Sea, such as British Petroleum, announcing that very day that ships would pause from entering the treacherous waters [48]. This would force tankers to travel to excessive lengths around Africa [49]. Either way, new insurance costs for the carriers, or the expanded travel times and costs, were translating to rising oil and goods prices [49]. Each attack proved consequential. The Norwegian oil tanker Swan Atlantic was engaged by a Houthi attack drone as well as an anti-ship ballistic missile in the Red Sea on December 18 [47]. The ship took minimal damage and none of the crew were wounded [47]. USS CARNEY responded to the distress of the vessel [47,48]. However, reports state that despite a damaged water tank, the crew was able to extinguish a resulting fire from the strike [49]. Thus, the Cayman Islands-flagged vessel continued onwards to its Indian Ocean destination [49,50]. At 0900, around the same time as the Swan Atlantic attack, the Panamanian-flagged MV Clara observed a nearby explosion in the sea but was not damaged and did not require assistance [47]. The Houthis reveled in the actions, explaining that drones were used to attack the ships due to their Israeli linkages [47]. Yahya Saree described and justified the situation as both vessels ignoring hails and warnings prior to the attacks [49]. The Norwegian entity that owned the Swan Atlantic denied the assertion that the biofuel carrier was engaged with the Israelis and noted Singaporean management with an Indian crew [47,48].

Houthi officials responded with determination, vowing to continue the hostilities despite Prosperity Guardian. Houthi politician Mohamed al-Bukhaiti declared that any significant international mobilization against them was to be met with increased attacks, and that the Houthis were prepared and willing to incur losses and sacrifices to maintain their position [51]. Militarily they were ready to face international navies, at least according to their officials [51]. Major General Yusef al-Madani confirmed Bukhaiti’s sentiments and reminded the world that the Houthis felt obligated to conduct operations given the situation in the Gaza war, promising that any nation would face Houthi wrath if they interfered in their support of Palestine [51].

Purported piracy boarding attempts remained of concern as well. Also on December 18 two vessels were approached by small attack craft with apparent intentions of hijacking. The Marshall Islands-flagged MV Magic Vela, a bulk carrier [21], was approached by a single attack craft but it and the pirates within were repelled by the embarked security team firing warning shots, according to EU naval forces [16,22]. In the other case, the Marshal Islands-flagged MV Green Trader was accosted by five small craft, which fled at the approach of a military helicopter offering protection to the threatened freighter [16,22]. Both incidents occurred in vicinity of the Bab al-Mandeb strait [22], further emphasizing the need for international cooperation in thwarting the threat, whether it be ideological Houthi attacks or the more financially motivated Somali piracy.

Despite the limitations of Prosperity Guardian, the shipping lanes had to be protected, and the coalition as it was, plus independent international forces, were coming to the aid of the struggling commercial route, in hopes of the normal resumption of trade and the defeat of the Houthi maritime threat. 

In the next chapter of the series, we discuss the escalation of the Houthi conflict and the American led military response known as Operation Poseidon Archer

CITATIONS:

© Copyright 2024 Nolan R Beasley

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